Because of the proximity of U.S. sniper training, the number of American advisers assigned to their units, and the reasonable availability of weapon systems, a few South Vietnamese soldiers and marines surely developed and used some sniping skills. But only one reference to these experiences made its way into the official records and correspondence of the war—and it provides information that is not entirely accurate.
In his 1974 monograph Sharpening the Combat Edge, written for the Department of the Army Vietnam Studies Program, former 9th Infantry Division commander Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell mentions training provided the South Vietnamese by the USAMTU from Fort Benning in 1969. Ewell wrote, “One of the factors that gave the Vietnamese units quite a boost was the fact that we were able to help them with marksmanship training. After we had trained a sufficient number of our own snipers we established marksmanship classes attended not only by the 7th South Vietnamese Army Division but by the Vietnamese ranger and airborne troops from other areas of the country.”
Ewell refers to the South Vietnamese graduates of this training as “snipers” but that is euphemistic. Major Willis Powell, who supervised the training, states that the South Vietnamese were taught basic marksmanship techniques with some advanced instruction in long-range shooting. None of the South Vietnamese were trained with or were issued sniper rifles and scopes. Powell states that while there were some discussions about securing M14 sniper equipment for the South Vietnamese, nothing ever came of them.
No other official U.S. source mentions formal sniper training for the South Vietnamese armed forces, even though there is documented evidence that the Americans did train their allies in the use of Starlight scopes, the light-enhancing devices employed by snipers. But that equipment was not limited to snipers, as infantrymen also used it for observation during hours of darkness.
Members of the USAMTU, who established and conducted the 9th Infantry Division Sniper School, provided instruction on the Starlight scopes to the South Vietnamese when regular sniper classes were not in session. A note in the “Operational Report of the 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969” states, “Training conducted by the Sniper School has also included instruction given ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) personnel in the use of the Starlight scope. Several more classes of this type are scheduled for the month of May, 1969.”
Members of the USAMTU also trained Vietnamese to return to their units as instructors in the use of Starlight scopes. “Operational Report for 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 June 1969” reported, “The Sniper School also conducted training in the use of Starlight scopes for ARVN cadre from the 9th and 25th (ARVN) Infantry Divisions.”
Despite lack of proof, it seems unlikely that absolutely no South Vietnamese acted as a sniper during the long conflict. Whether self-trained or as unofficial students of army or Marine snipers, at least a few South Vietnamese undoubtedly employed scoped rifles to go gunning for the NVA. Whatever their degree of participation, however, they made no impact and did not merit anything more than the vaguest recollection in the official records.
Of the seven other countries of the Free World Military Assistance Forces supporting South Vietnam, three provided noncombat units: China and Spain sent only small military medical and support sections totaling less than 100 men each; the Republic of the Philippines sent a 1,500-man military engineering unit complete with its own security element, medical section, and civic action teams. Because of their missions, none of the three countries had any need to train or field snipers during their time in Vietnam.
The other four supporting countries varied in their use of snipers. Beginning in 1962 Australia provided individual advisers as a part of the Royal Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam (RAATTV), to the South Vietnamese army, and in 1965 the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (RAR), arrived in-country as a part of the ground combat force. In 1969, at the peak of their commitment, more than 7,600 Australian combat and support troops were in the war zone. During the course of the war, nine RAR infantry battalions totaling more than 35,000 men served in Vietnam, 504 of whom were killed in action and 2,193 wounded.
Unlike the Americans, who replaced individuals after one-year tours, the Australians rotated entire battalions. These Australian units arrived in Vietnam ready after nine months of combat preparation. Australian infantrymen trained at home with the semiautomatic 7.62-mm L1A1 SLR (self-loading rifle) common to all Commonwealth forces in the early 1960s. Upon arrival in Vietnam a few of the rifles were exchanged for the American M16s, but most Australian infantrymen remained armed with the L1A1.
The Australian infantrymen, who performed extremely well in Vietnam, gained renown for their fighting spirit and marksmanship, shooting and hunting being commonplace in Australia. All Australian infantrymen received some long-range shooting training at the Canungra Battle Efficiency Course, in Queensland, or at the Singleton Infantry Training Center, in New South Wales. In addition, each platoon in the Australian regiment arrived in Vietnam with a trained sniper in its ranks. These marksmen served as “special infantrymen” much as U.S. Army soldiers had during World War II.
Australian snipers carried L42A1 rifles, which were 7.62-mm modifications of the United Kingdom Rifle No. 4, Mk1, first fielded in 1942. Weighing 9.7 pounds and measuring 46.5 inches long, each bolt-action L42A1 came with a ten-round box magazine and a 3X Mk 32 scope. In trained hands the L42A1 was extremely accurate at ranges up to 850 meters.
Most of the Australian infantry operations in Vietnam, however, were in extremely thick jungle areas and rubber plantations that did not permit long-range shooting. Also, the RAR never emphasized or supported sniping to the extent that the U.S. Marine Corps and army did. Australia considered its snipers as part of the platoons, and special shooters received neither the attention nor the publicity of their American counterparts.
New Zealand sent its first support troops to Vietnam in 1964 and followed with two infantry companies in 1967. Those two units, integrated into the Australian Task Force, served until withdrawn in 1971. Like the Australians, the New Zealand infantrymen operated specially trained snipers assigned to most platoons and armed with L42A1s. Also like the Australians, a few of the other New Zealand infantrymen traded their L1A1 SLRs for M16s shortly after arriving in-country.
New Zealand never had more than 350 infantrymen in Vietnam at any one time. Their sniper numbers were never more than half a dozen, and like the Australians they made little or no impact on the conflict.
The Kingdom of Thailand supported South Vietnam by allowing U.S. air bases on its territory and by dispatching support and combat troops to the war zone. Its ground troops served in the Queen’s Cobras—the Royal Thai Army volunteer regiment—which arrived in 1967 and operated from Fire Base Bearcat, near Bien Hoa. They were replaced in 1968 by the Black Panther Division, composed of two infantry brigades, three artillery battalions, and an armored cavalry battalion. At its peak, Thailand had more than 11,500 combat troops in Vietnam.
Early plans called for the United States to issue 1,000 M16s per month from March through June 1967 to the Thai infantry in Vietnam. Theoretically, it would have been more effective to have issued the rifles to the Thai infantrymen for training before their deployment to Vietnam. However, U.S. logistic officers knew that any M16s delivered to Thailand tended to remain there to combat an insurgency in the country’s northern provinces rather than being deployed with units to Vietnam.
Compounding the problem of delivering the authorized M16s was the need for rifles to supply the increasing number of U.S. units committed to Vietnam. Ultimately, only 900 M16s were made available to the Thais. To make up the shortfall, the United States planned to supply the Thais with M14s until U.S. officials realized that the Koreans, who were receiving M1 rifles from the United States, would be insulted if the Thais were first issued the more modern M14s. Instead the United States issued the Thais M1 (semiautomatic) and M2 (full-automatic) .30 caliber carbines that lacked the fire
and stopping power of the other U.S. rifles. The Thai soldiers, however, were comfortable with the smaller, lighter carbines.
U.S. officials were correct in considering the feelings of the Koreans and making efforts to keep them happy. South Korea provided more than 300,000 men to the war effort and was second only to the United States in its commitment to assist the South Vietnamese. In addition to support units, Korea sent two infantry divisions and a marine brigade to the combat zone. More than 4,400 South Koreans died during their operations, which occurred mostly in the Central Highlands.
Although never available in any quantity, a small number of M1Cs, M1Ds, and M14s were accessible to both the Thais and the Koreans, and there is little doubt that at least a few soldiers from each country acquired scopes and mounts to assume the role of sniper. A few Korean officers visited the U.S. Marine Corps’s sniper schools as observers but neither they nor the Thais established a formal sniping school, nor did their soldiers officially attend† the U.S. training. Snipers simply did not play a role in the operational planning or execution of those two allies during their service in the Vietnam War.
With the exception of the sniper training and employment by U.S. soldiers and Marines, the use of the special marksmen in Vietnam by South Vietnam and its allies was nearly non-existent. The Australians and New Zealanders did have official, trained snipers, and the other Free World countries had a few unofficial snipers who acquired sniper rifle systems and training on their own. At best, however, usage of snipers by our allies in Vietnam was symbolic rather than significant.
*Although the SEALs performed well in Vietnam, their actual participation and impact have been exaggerated in the years since the war concluded. Their numbers never exceeded nine platoons, or 150 men, at any one time during the conflict—only a small fraction of 1 percent of the combat troop total.
†Several American veteran snipers recall that occasionally Korean, Thai, and other allies participated in at least portions of their training. There is no record, however, of any official agreement for training of the individuals.
CHAPTER 9
The Men Behind the Crosshairs
MOST books and articles about military snipers—whether discussing Vietnam or other wars—place more emphasis on the rifles, scopes, mounts, and ammunition than they do on the men behind the crosshairs, almost as if the authors, as well as their intended audiences, better understand windage, caliber, magnification power, grains of powder, and other technical information than they do the personalities and mind-sets of the snipers themselves.
Some writers concentrate so much on mechanics and hardware that it often appears the rifles themselves killed the enemy, as if there were no soldier sighting down the barrel or through the scope before squeezing the trigger to send a bullet downrange; an accurate picture of sniper activity in Vietnam can come only through examining the men behind the crosshairs and their abilities to adapt to their unit and terrain environments. Snipers conducted their missions in triple-layered canopy jungle, on steep mountains, in scrub-covered coastal lowlands, and across open rice paddies. Some areas of operation were in remote regions far from any population; others were in locations with heavy concentrations of farmers and families; still others were near large villages. At times the snipers sought the elusive, loosely organized and poorly equipped Vietcong, who were less than enthusiastic about standing and fighting. On other occasions, army and Marine snipers opposed North Vietnamese regulars who were aggressive and well organized, armed, and trained for battle.
Army and Marine snipers made whatever adjustments necessary to find, engage, and destroy whatever enemy they faced in whatever environments they found themselves. While their training, organization, utilization, and equipment varied, they shared the most important commonality—they were men who volunteered to be snipers, a unique group in a unique war. Nevertheless, in many ways they were not “super Marines” or “super soldiers”; rather, they closely resembled their brother infantrymen in the combat line units from which they came and to which many returned. Their ranks contained the good, the bad, and the indifferent, yet as a whole, Marine and army snipers in Vietnam set the standard by which military marksmen still operate.
One important aspect of the snipers was age. While much has been written about the youth of the men who fought in Vietnam—the average age of Americans in Southeast Asia was nineteen and a half, compared to twenty-six years of age in World War II*—the U.S. armed forces in the war zone also had senior sergeants and officers with ten, twenty, or more years of experience providing training and leadership. Even though expanding numbers of combat units in the war’s early years and the escalating casualty rates reduced their numbers as the war continued, at no point in the conflict were American units without some degree of senior leadership.
This mix of young, inexperienced soldiers and Marines with older, experienced senior NCOs and officers in Vietnam was equally evident in the sniper units of both services. Captain Robert Russell had twenty-two years’ experience as an enlisted and commissioned Marine, much of which he spent on competition shooting teams, when he established the sniper school for the 3rd Marine Division. All but one of his instructor staff were in their upper thirties or early forties with ten to twenty years’ experience as Marine marksmen. Sergeant Robert Goller, the youngest on the team at twenty-six, had eight years of competition shooting experience and had received a perfect 250 × 250 score in a 1961 rifle match.
When he formed the 1st Marine Division sniper school. Captain Jim Land brought to Vietnam his expertise in having established the Marine sniper school in Hawaii in 1960 as well as having spent years on competition shooting teams. His NCO instructor staff mirrored Russell’s team in rank, age, and experience.
The USAMTU team under the leadership of Major Willis Powell combined more than 170 years of active duty experience when it arrived in Vietnam to organize the 9th Infantry Division’s sniper school. Each member had fired on army shooting teams, and most were veterans of previous tours in Vietnam or the Korean War.
While veteran competition shooters with decades of experience in uniform formed the instructor teams in Vietnam, the vast majority of those whom they trained as snipers came from the lower enlisted ranks and were serving their first tour of duty in the armed forces. Both services recruited sniper volunteers at the in-country replacement centers where new arrivals were in-processed. Recruits for sniper training also came from combat units in the field, which received periodic allocations for infantrymen.†
Both the Marine Corps and the army used the same basic selection criteria for entry into their sniper-training programs. Indeed, the wording is so similar—at times identical—that it suggests the writers exchanged information when preparing Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1-3B, “Sniping,” and the army’s Training Circular (TC) 23-14, “Sniper Training and Employment,” both published in 1969.
Under sections labeled “Personnel Selection,” both manuals emphasize the importance of marksmanship, physical stamina, and mental condition of potential snipers. “The sniper trainee,” begins the selection requirements, “must be an expert marksman.” In addition to requiring the candidate to fire expert with military weapons, the criteria stress the importance of “an extensive hunting background” and experience in competition shooting if possible.
The manuals note that snipers often engage in extended operations with limited sleep, food, and water—conditions that require excellent physical conditioning to maintain reflexes, muscular control, and stamina. According to the manuals, athletics, especially team sports, were a good background for building cooperation and self-confidence. Wearing glasses was a liability to a potential sniper not only because of the importance of excellent vision but also because the lenses might reflect light and compromise a sniper’s concealment or render him useless if they were lost or damaged. Since the Marine snipers primarily used bolt-action rifles, their selection criteria added that volunteers should be right-handed because the additional movem
ent required by left-handed shooters to operate the bolt over the top of the scope increased the danger of detection.
Long before the antitobacco campaigns swept across the United States, the armed forces declared that snipers should be nonsmokers. Smoke or a smoker’s cough could give away a sniper’s position. Even if a sniper did not smoke during a mission, the addiction might cause nervousness and irritation that would lower his efficiency.
In reference to mental capacity, the services sought intelligence and emotional balance. A trainee had to be able to learn quickly and retain vast amounts of information on ballistics, ammunition, and optical devices in order to shoot accurately. He also had to be able to operate and maintain communications equipment, to call and direct artillery and air support, and to gather and report intelligence on the enemy and the terrain.
Along with the ability to learn, the requirements for snipers called for innate talent for fieldcraft. He had to possess stealth and a sense of direction to reach his firing position undetected and to feel comfortable in the outdoors.
Mental condition is clearly one of the most important characteristics of a good sniper even though the manuals gave it the same priority as physical conditioning and intelligence. The potential sniper had to exhibit characteristics of reliability, initiative, loyalty, discipline, and emotional stability. In short, a sniper had to be able to pull the trigger at the right time and in the right place.
The 1969 edition of FMFM 1-3B explained the difference between ordinary Marine infantrymen and sharpshooters: “An infantry Marine, in the heat of battle, kills the enemy emotionally and reflexively, lest he be killed himself. A sniper, however, must kill calmly and deliberately, shooting carefully selected targets. He must not be susceptible to emotions of anxiety or remorse. Candidates, for instance, whose motivation towards sniper training rests mainly in the desire for prestige which may accrue to them in performing a unique function, may not be capable of cold rationality which the sniper’s job requires. A proper mental condition cannot be taught or instilled by training.”
Inside the Crosshairs Page 12