Both services recognized that technology had improved durability and accuracy since World War II and looked for newer, better rifles with which to equip their special marksmen. In their search the two services took a variety of measures to determine which weapons systems to procure and ended up adopting different rifles.
With a maximum effective range of 600 meters and reasonable accuracy at 400 to 500 meters, World War II–vintage M1Ds were available in ample numbers for Captain Bob Russell and his sniper instructor team to secure them for their school and graduates. Or they could have adopted the more modern M14 as the sniper weapon of choice since at that time every Marine arrived in-country carrying one as his basic weapon.
Russell and his fellow instructors, however, concurred with the general consensus that the M1D lacked range and that the M14, having no scope to enhance its accuracy beyond the range of its “iron” or standard sights, was adequate only for the sniper team observer and not for the principal shooter.
Russell faced the same quandary the corps had encountered in 1942 and again in 1951, when the Marine Corps had conducted studies to determine the best sniper rifle. In both tests the investigators favored the Model 70 sporting rifle introduced by Winchester in 1937 for target shooting and hunting. This bolt-action rifle, having a five-round integral magazine and interchangeable twenty-four- and twenty-eight-inch barrels, delivered the long-range accuracy the Marines sought. However, officials had decided against its adoption because of the complications of injecting another rifle into the supply system—especially one that required 30.06-caliber (7.62 × 63-mm) ammunition rather than the standard military 7.62 × 51-mm cartridges. For that reason, the Marine Corps resisted adopting the Model 70 as its official sniper rifle for more than a quarter of a century.
However, when Russell and his staff sought a sniper weapon in 1965, they chose the Model 70 by default because it was the only rifle available that met the long-range accuracy requirement of the Vietnam battlefield.
The selection of the scopes for the Model 70s occurred in similar manner. Sufficient numbers of Unertl 8-power telescopes had remained in the Marine logistics system since their procurement as early as 1943 for use with the Model 70 and the M1903 sniper rifles in World War II.* While far from perfect, the distinctive twenty-four-inch-long Unertl 8-power scope would become one of the most recognizable pieces of equipment used by Marine snipers in Vietnam.
Russell and his team were satisfied with their selection, in part because for years they had practiced and competed with Winchester Model 70 sporting rifles equipped with Unertl 8 power telescopic sights rather than standard military-issue weapons. Because they were so confident in the long-range accuracy of the Winchester Model 70, they adapted it as the “unofficial-official” sniper rifle for their students.
The first dozen Model 70s to arrive in Vietnam were the very rifles that the 3rd Marine Division—including Russell and many of his staff—had used for years in national and international competition shooting matches. Now those same sharpshooters were using the same weapons to hunt the Vietcong and to train sniper volunteers. Despite their age, the rifles had been well cared for and were in excellent condition.
Russell’s request for additional Model 70s produced rifles from a variety of sources. The Marksmanship Training Unit at Quantico gathered several from its stocks and procured others from the Marine Corps Supply Center at Albany, Georgia, for transfer to the 3rd Division. Several of the Winchesters dated back to the Korean War and at least one had been used in the national rifle championship matches at Camp Perry, Ohio, in 1953. Many of the rifles were older than the Marines who would carry them into combat.
With the Marine Corps’s commandant’s approval of sniper units in late 1965, the headquarters staff calculated the need for 550 additional weapons for Vietnam and the U.S. training base. Searches to fill that requirement reached the entire corps, bringing Model 70s from Marine bases around the world. Some arrived with markings on their stocks showing that they previously had been assigned to Special Services facilities, which loaned them to Marines and their families for use in target shooting and hunting. The condition of the rifles varied, but most could be rebuilt or refurbished to meet sniper requirements.
While Russell and his staff began training their volunteers with the best rifle and scope available, the Marine Corps activated efforts to replace the equipment with a more sophisticated weapon system. In December 1965, the Marine Corps Headquarters instructed the Quantico Marine Schools Weapons Training Battalion to issue verbal orders to the Marksmanship Training Unit (MTU) to procure a rifle, telescopic sight, and mount suitable for use by snipers in Vietnam. The orders came with no deadline for a recommendation, but all parties involved were aware of the immediate need in the combat zone.
Major Willis L. Powell (top), founder of the army’s 9th Infantry Division Sniper School, briefs Assistant Division Commander Brigadier General James S. Timothy on the XM21 sniper rifle in October 1968. (U.S. Army)
Graduation photo of the 9th Infantry Division’s first sniper class in November 1968. (U.S. Army)
A 9th Infantry Division sniper prepares to aim (top) and fire (bottom) his XM21 during a daylight sweep in the Mekong Delta. (U.S. Army)
The U.S. Army’s most successful sniper in Vietnam: Sergeant First Class Adelbert F. Waldron of the 9th Infantry Division. (U.S. Army)
An army sniper in the 1st Infantry Division takes aim as his spotter provides security during operations south of Lai Khe in October 1969. (U.S. Army)
The M21 sniper rifle system as adopted by the U.S. Army in 1970. (U.S. Army)
The properly armed and equipped sniper as illustrated in U.S. Army Training Circular 23-14 published in October 1969. (U.S. Army)
A 9th Infantry Division sniper mounts an AN/PVS2 Starlight scope on his XM21 in preparation for a night mission. (U.S. Army)
The Hoa-Cam Training Center near Da Nang where the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions trained their snipers. (U.S. Marine Corps)
Captain Robert A. Russell, founder of the 3rd Marine Division Sniper School, on the range on November 3, 1965. (U.S. Marine Corps)
A 9th Marine Regiment sniper team in action during Operation Harvest Moon in December 1965. (U.S. Marine Corps)
A 9th Marine Regiment sniper engages a target with his Winchester 70 and 8X Unertl telescope from Hill 251 in December 1965. (U.S. Marine Corps)
The basic U.S. Marine Corps sniper rifles early in the Vietnam War (from the top): M1D with 2.2X M86 scope; Model 70 Winchester with 3X-9X variable scope; Model 70 Winchester with 8X Unertl scope. (U.S. Marine Corps)
The M700 Remington sniper rifle system. (U.S. Marine Corps)
A 26th Marine Regiment sniper at Hill 557 near Khe Sanh on January 10, 1968. (U.S. Marine Corps)
A 7th Marine Regiment sniper team uses a .50-caliber machine gun as a sniper rifle. (U.S. Marine Corps)
Joseph T. Ward of the 5th Marine Regiment prepares to depart An Hoa on a mission in 1969. (J. T. Ward)
A 1st Marine Division sniper team in action on January 21, 1970. (U.S. Marine Corps)
On February 9, 1966, the officer in charge of the Marksmanship Training Unit responded to the commandant of the Marine Corps in a brief, well-thought-out response endorsed by the chief evaluator, Colonel Walter R. Walsh, a marksman of some renown who had helped establish the Marines’ World War II sniper training. “The indicated urgency for an early recommendation,” the letter began, “dictated that evaluation be limited to presently available commercial items.”
Because the original instructions had provided no specific guidance, the letter explained that the evaluators had operated under some self-imposed assumptions. The assumptions of the MTU reflected their thorough knowledge of the characteristics of a dependable sniping system. Under a section titled “Self-imposed Assumptions,” the letter listed the requirements for the selected sniper system to use the standard 7.62-mm ammunition and “be simple, sturdy, and explainable with minimum amount of instruction.” The stud
y’s authors assumed that most targets would be at ranges of less than 600 yards but that snipers would require a well-sealed telescopic sight that could sustain operations in conditions of high humidity and be “capable of adjustment at ranges up to and including 1,000 yards.”
To meet the requirements, the MTU tested five rifles—including the Winchester Model 70, the Harrington and Richardson Ultra-Rifle, and three models of Remington—as well as seven different telescopes. The study discounted the Winchester Model 70 for its requirement of 30.06-caliber cartridges and eliminated the Harrington and Richardson because, as the evaluation reported, “These rifles are assembled from components of 3 manufacturers including a foreign made action.” They also rejected the Remington Models 600 and 700-ADL and BDL rifles as too light for military sniping operations. Only the Remington 700-40X merited positive comment: “This rifle is built on an action designed for the 7.62 mm cartridge. Trigger is internally adjustable. Relatively simple to bed.”
Of the various scopes tested, the MTU found problems of insufficient power, insufficient adjustment capability, and weak seals that allowed moisture in the sight. Only the Redfield Accu-Range 3X-9X received positive comment: “Well-sealed, adequate internal adjustment, built-in range finder to 600 yards.”
In analyzing the rifle and scope test data, the letter stated, “Based upon physical examination and use of the above equipment, coupled with personal experience of testing personnel with the above and similar equipment, it is believed that the Remington Rifle Model 700-40X, in combination with the Redfield Accu-Range 3X-9X variable power telescopic sight in Redfield mount, is the most suitable equipment now available for the purpose expressed.”
Walsh and his fellow marksmanship instructors knew that the Winchester Model 70 had supporters at many levels within the Marine Corps, so they added a paragraph before their recommendations to head off objections to their findings: “The presence in the Marine Corps Supply System of a number of Winchester Model 70 rifles was considered. However, these are all chambered for the .30-06 cartridge. Modification to the 7.62 mm cartridge could be accomplished, but would be expensive and not especially desirable. Additionally, rifles that are nominally Winchester Model 70s are now found, due to factory modifications made over the years, in 3 different types. Many of these parts are not interchangeable.”
The MTU letter also recommended “a hard carrying-shipping case with protective foam-padding containing desiccant and fungicide be provided for each rifle/scope unit.”
The corps’s leadership acted with remarkable speed. On April 7, 1966, the Marine Corps adopted the rifle, scope, and mount as recommended, designating the system as the M40, although for the remainder of the Vietnam War some would refer to it as the Remington 700, Model 700, or Remington M40.
Remington had marketed several types of 700s, including the two other models that the MTU found to be “too light,” as hunting rifles for several years, and had found wide acceptance of the Model 40X as a competition rifle before its selection by the MTU as a sniper weapon.
On May 17, 1966, the Marine Corps issued a supply contract to Remington detailing the specifications of the Model 40s and an order for delivery. By the end of the year Remington had completed 700 rifles and then produced nearly 300 additional weapons over the next five years. Remington modified the finish and added military swivels (for a sling) at its Custom Shop in Ilion, New York, and redesignated the rifle the Model 40 to comply with Marine specifications.
The M40 shared several characteristics with the Winchester Model 70 that it replaced. Both had a five-round magazine and a bolt action. Some critics at the time noted that bolt-action rifles required additional physical motions by the shooter to eject a spent shell and to reload a round into the chamber—movements that might compromise a sniper’s “hide” position—and they argued that semiautomatic rifles made better special marksman weapons.
Others countered that the additional moving parts in semiautomatic rifles made them less steady and therefore less accurate than bolt-action weapons. Marine marksmen admitted the slight weakness of “bolt-guns,” but believed both the Winchester Model 70 and the Remington M40 to be superior to any other bolt-action or semiautomatic rifle available.
The supply contract for the Remingtons also spelled out the specifications for the Redfield scopes and mounts to match the new rifles. The Redfield 3X-9X variable power telescope had entered the commercial market in 1962. At slightly less than thirteen inches long, the scope weighed only three quarters of a pound and proved to be rugged as well as resistant to humidity and moisture. More important, a simple power-selection ring allowed the marksman to enlarge or reduce the image between a magnification of 3.3X and 9.1X. Movement of the power-selector ring also adjusted internal stadia wires that provided the range-to-target measurement on an internal indicator scale.
Of all its characteristics and capabilities, the Redfield scope’s ability to accurately indicate range proved the most vital. Snipers, even those with extensive “trigger time,” had difficulty in determining the distance to the target. Adoption of the Redfield scope ended the sniper’s having to make his own range estimate.
The Marines sent 150 of the sniper systems to the Camp Pendleton scout-sniper school. A few of the rifles and scopes arrived in Vietnam during the final days of 1966, and by the end of the first quarter of 1967 adequate systems were in-country to arm the instructors and field snipers.
The final subparagraph of the MTU’s letter to the commandant of the Marine Corps recommended that “action be taken to insure availability of match-grade ammunition for use in the rifle.” Thus, along with the M40 sniper rifles came special ammunition manufactured for the marksmen’s use on the range and the battlefield.
Target shooters and snipers alike knew that, regardless of the sophistication of their rifles and scopes, much of their accuracy depended on the quality of their ammunition. The optimum ammunition contained no variance in the amount of propellent, the size or weight of the bullet, or the shape of the cartridge. Each round should have the same characteristics and strike at the same place when fired under the same conditions.
At the time of the Vietnam War, ammunition manufacture had become extremely standardized, producing highly accurate cartridges. The tolerances of mass production, however, allowed slight variation, and while that had little influence on the fire of conventional riflemen, it did affect the consistency and accuracy of target shooters and combat snipers.
In the later part of the nineteenth century, ammunition manufacturers began to produce limited numbers of cartridges made with special care to ensure that each possessed identical characteristics and capabilities. Specific demand for such special-made ammunition increased with the Olympic and other international shooting competitions that became popular after the turn of the century. Since those rounds were specifically made for and used in competition shooting, they became known as “match ammunition.”
Ammunition, including match, is manufactured in lots, that is, the rounds made in a single run on the cartridge plant assembly line. The manufacturer then assigns a lot number to each such batch and records the number on every ammunition container. Each round in a lot, especially those manufactured under match conditions, theoretically performs in the same manner. A sniper who zeroes his weapon with rounds of one lot can expect the remaining cartridges in the same lot to act identically.
Although the U.S. military had considered match ammunition for combat marksmen as early as World War II, it had not acted to acquire that type of round. Postwar marksmanship teams used match ammunition exclusively, but until Vietnam the most accurate rounds were limited to use on the target range. Logisticians resisted adding the more costly ammunition to already overburdened supply systems.
When Russell and Land established Marine sniper schools in Vietnam with the Winchester Model 70s, they never considered reverting to standard-issue cartridges. Instead they added match ammo to resupply requests. Because of the small number of snipers and the
small number of rounds they fired, ammunition sources in the States had no problem keeping up with demand.
The Lake City Army Ammunition Plant in Independence, Missouri, manufactured the match ammunition used in Vietnam. Built during World War II, the plant operated under management by the Remington Arms Company through a contract with the U.S. government, which actually owned the facility. Lake City first made .30-caliber ball ammunition for the Winchester 70s in 1957, and in 1962 became the sole supplier of the match-grade cartridges designated M72s. In 1964, the plant began manufacturing 7.62-mm NATO match ammunition as M118s.
Quality control requirements for both the M72 and M118 match rounds were the same. The Lake City plant tested each lot of match ammunition at its 3,400-acre facility, which hosted ranges that extended to 2,400 yards.† According to the military contract for match ammunition, “The acceptance test requirement is a mean radius of 3.5 inches for nine 10-shot groups from each of three test rifles at a range of 600 yards. The mean radius represents the average distance of each shot in the group from the group center.”
The U.S. Army approached its selection of a sniper rifle and scope in a manner similar to that of the Marine Corps, the primary difference being that it conducted the evaluation in combat in Vietnam rather than back in the States at a marksmanship training facility. When the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) began its study of sniper operations and equipment in 1967, it worked under specific instructions to test and evaluate rifles and scopes to determine which models the army should adopt as the official sniper system.
The ACTIV operated under the same restrictions as the Marine MTU. The immediate need for a sniper system meant it had to come from present inventory or via “off the shelf” civilian procurement. Time to develop a new rifle simply did not exist during the escalation of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia.
Inside the Crosshairs Page 15