The most obvious pre-attack actions occur at the Moment of Commitment (drawing a weapon, boarding a stage, rushing a protectee) -- but by the time such actions are revealed, the fast clock has already started. Accordingly, TOP observations that are substantially pre-attack are likely to be most valuable to the mission. Some examples:
Waiting for a long time along an assumed foot-route
Adjustment of something under the clothing
Indications that two seemingly independent people are communicating
Placing an object somewhere and leaving it
Trying to hide along the protectee's assumed foot-route
Leaving a position and then returning to the same position (indicative of retrieving a weapon from a car or hotel room, for example)
Doggedly returning to a position even after being told to move by protectors or event organizers
Being turned away at one checkpoint, then moving to another in an attempt to gain entry there
North vs. South
Another aspect of space is geography, which is often relevant to safety. For example, the Compendium cases reveal that in the Southern U.S., long gun attacks have occurred more frequently than in the Northern U.S. (See Compendium cases of Evers #2, Walker #3, JFK #4, Rockwell #7, King #8, Crescente #14, Flynt #16, Wood #20, Jordan #22, and Slepian #60, for example). Accordingly, when protectees are in the South, protectors are wise to give extra attention to the kinds of environments that could benefit a long-gun attacker.
Attackers who choose long guns over handguns are generally more interested in getting away -- and they are more likely to get away. The long gun makes escape more likely in two ways: First, the attack can be mounted from a greater distance. Second, unlike with handgun attacks in which the danger subsides once the shooter is under control, with rifle attacks, people in the target area cannot easily assess whether the danger has passed; accordingly, people remain in place longer -- and this fact benefits an attacker who intends to escape.
Any location or situation that increases the possibility of escape makes attacks attractive to a wider group of people. An attacker who can escape does not make as great a sacrifice as one who will surely be caught. Another geographic component worth noting is that most attackers in the Southern U.S. acted out of ideological motivation as opposed to the desire for fame. Ideological attackers are less likely to want to be caught, and are more likely to use long guns.
One case study that validates many of the concepts discussed in this chapter (notably ACE, TOP, and the North/South issue) thankfully does not include an attack, even though the situation and the space offered many advantages to an attacker. A series of public appearances took place daily over several weeks in a Southern U.S. city. Our protectee was at the center of a major national controversy that profoundly affected many people in the region.
Each day, media and onlookers gathered outside a public building the protectee had to enter. The regular public entrance placed our client in a canyon of highrise buildings and other ideal snipers' nests. All but one of those buildings afforded easy access to the rooftop through unlocked doors.
Further, the public entrance was in clear view of one of the worst types of structures for our work: a multi-level, open-sided parking facility. Anyone could drive a van or car onto any of the five levels, park wherever he found the best view of the protectee arriving and departing, base out of a vehicle, and benefit from a concrete half-wall that afforded concealment. A sniper could wait in his car or van for the ideal moment, fire a rifle (perhaps without even getting out of the vehicle), and then drive away through any of several exits on the far side of the structure, getting a significant head start in his escape. And because these appearances were in the South, the likelihood of rifle attack was elevated.
Photo by Gavin de Becker & Associates
The other entry possibility for our client was slightly less exposed, but had its own serious problem, almost a cliche for public figures appearing in the South: An abandoned motel frequented by vagabonds. Like the parking structure, the motel had five levels of open balcony walkways. A sniper could hide in any of the easy-to-access rooms, most of them with torn, but still-concealing curtains.
Photo by Gavin de Becker & Associates
Photo by Gavin de Becker & Associates
We started our evaluation with ACE. The environment and situation did afford an attacker with Access to our protectee (in this instance, visual access), Concealment for a sniper, and Escape opportunities. Standing where the protectee will stand, one can take measure of ACE both by assessing the obvious features of the surroundings, and also by getting an intuitive feel for the environment and situation. In this case, two of the authors stood there and knew by every measure that the vulnerability to attack was substantial.
Managing high-ground hazards that cannot be easily eliminated calls for two essential steps:
Minimize the protectee's duration of exposure to the hazards, and
Maximize the distance between possible snipers' nests and the protectee.
In other words, do not remain in the area of exposure any longer than absolutely necessary, and be as far as possible from high-ground positions that would favor an attacker.
The risks of high-ground exposure cannot be addressed effectively from the ground.
Adding more protectors around the protectee does not counter the tremendous advantage an attacker gains by a high-ground position, as the following photo makes clear. All around the protectee you see protectors and police officers, and many more protectors are along the route from the building to the car. The protectee is totally surrounded by protectors, and yet from the photographer's high-ground position, a sniper would have a clear shot.
Photo by Gavin de Becker & Associates
In a canyon of high-rise buildings, it isn't practical to place protectors at all staging points which a sniper might occupy, so effective Tactical Observation Posts (TOPs) become critical. When a protectee is exposed to one or more high-rise buildings with many windows, observers can be placed in vantage positions opposite the buildings to observe those windows and to communicate anything relevant to the members of the security team on the ground with the protectee.
In this case, given that there were so many rooftops and other vantage points for attackers, we deployed twenty-one people to the TOP responsibility. This included one person on each level of the open parking structure. Fifteen of them were overt (visible). While deploying so many people would be impractical in most situations, remember that such posts needn't be staffed for any longer than the period of exposure. In our case, that meant the brief walk between the car and the entry point, during two brief periods a day (arrival and departure). Also, these posts need not all be staffed with skilled protection professionals. For this assignment, we used administrative staff members, local police officers, and even two trainees.
In addition to the benefits of observation we gained, each TOP position we occupied denied that position to an attacker.
At the abandoned motel, city police conducted daily sweeps of the building in the hour prior to each of our client's appearances. However, nothing short of full access control could have reliably ensured that the building remained free of attackers -- and police did not have the resources to make any guarantees.
Given the various inherent challenges of having to enter the same building day after day, and given that the environment afforded so few advantages to us and so many to potential attackers, we took every practical step we could: We used a security-enhanced vehicle, unpredictably alternated between the two possible entrances to the building, deployed many protectors immediately around the protectee -- and above all, literally above all, placed many protectors in TOP positions.
In the following series of photos, even though walking along a closed and secured street, surrounded by protectors and police, it's blatantly obvious that the TOP location occupied by our protector (who took these photos) would otherwise have afforded a superb vantage
point for an attacker.
Photos by Gavin de Becker & Associates
Assigning Resources at Book Signing Events
In Chapter 2, we explored whether projective roles (protectors positioned at the attacker) are more important than protective roles (protectors positioned at the protectee). When moving through crowds without much control over the environment, any protector might be called to act protectively or projectively, depending upon where an attack commences. But many public appearances involve crowds or onlookers in controlled and predetermined places, with the protectee in a predetermined location. In such instances, protectors have the opportunity to decide how to distribute resources ahead of time.
One common type of public appearance, the book signing, gives us the chance to show the practical application of the concepts in this chapter. Booksignings offer attackers the two primary benefits of ACE, in that every attendee is afforded direct access to the protectee, and every attendee is also afforded some concealment as a member of the crowd. At the book signing, the protectee will be stationary and seated behind a table, while members of the public are ushered along the front of a table. Were an attack to occur at a book signing, protectors behind and adjacent to the protectee are most likely to act protectively (blocking, or moving the protectee down, to the side, away) -- while protectors interacting with and closest to the attendees are most likely to act projectively (disruption of aim, interference, disarming). So here we have a decision of resource allocation: Do we assign more people to protective or projective roles?
In this situation, people in projective positions are more likely to prevent or foil an attack than those in protective positions. In fact, that's the case for most public appearances, except for those few times that a protectee can be surrounded so much that he becomes barely visible, instances that are rare because, by definition, a public appearance is about being seen by the public.
In terms of advantages offered to attackers, book signings are the most high-risk appearances of any meet-and-greet event:
Every single person who attends a book signing has the realistic expectation of a close, face-to-face encounter with the protectee.
The encounter will be relatively long in duration, having to accommodate the presentation and signing of the book, some exchange of words, and often a handshake or even photo.
The protectee will usually be seated, and thus lower than an attacker and more difficult to move than a standing protectee. Note: with seated protectees, we utilize a chair with wheels, so protectors can roll the chair (and thus the protectee) back or to the side quickly and with ease.
Book signings are announced well in advance of the event date, and they occur at public sites which can be extensively surveilled ahead of time.
Finally, a would-be assailant can observe fairly accurate replications of the next public appearance by attending other book signings during the protectee's book tour.
He can observe the actual protectors, and become familiar with their demeanor and strategies.
Even with all these attacker advantages, capable protectors are likely to defeat an attacker in this setting if they exploit the degree of control available to them at such events. This means designing wise crowd management strategies, and above all, taking time away from an attacker by ensuring direct, arm's reach access to every attendee. It's also useful to have a visual block that prevents those waiting in line from seeing the protectee and protectors until each attendee is just about to enter the protected area. This removes the advantage an attacker could gain by observing the protectee for a long period, and also reduces the likelihood of an attack being launched while the attacker is somewhere in the line.
With most types of events, effective advance arrangements seek to design in and ensure distance between the protectee and members of the public, but at the book-signing event, each person (attacker included) can get very close to the protectee. That's the whole idea of the event. So we are left with this: If members of the public are already at the protectee, then members of the protective team must be at those members of the public already, in the truest sense of the word: all ready.
"A rock pile ceases to be a rock pile the moment a single man contemplates it, bearing within him the image of a cathedral."
Antoine De Saint-Exupery
Note: These postings are examples of what we'd suggest. Obviously, if you have greater resources and more Security Staff Agents available, deploy them.
A non-public arrival/departure area large enough for two vehicles to remain throughout the visit. (We want the option of keeping the vehicles there, even though sometimes we choose to move the vehicles after the arrival, so as to not telegraph the departure location). This area can be a loading dock, underground garage, back or side entry, etc. Throughout the detail, access to the cars will likely be needed often.
The route from and back to the vehicles can be through service hallways and elevators, loading areas, fire stairs, or other non-public areas.
The route to and from the public appearance or holding room can be through service corridors, fire stairs, etc. It might also traverse public areas on floors other than the one where the public appearance is taking place.
The holding room can be an office, dressing area, storage room, etc., where the party can gather prior to the public appearance. It is also a place to retreat to in the event of a safety concern that doesn't rise to the level of a complete or immediate evacuation from the location. It should be an entirely non-public area, and should have (at least) bottled water, a mirror, and where possible, a telephone.
The appearance site should accommodate members of the general public on the front, but not behind the table at any time during the event. The protectee's entry and exit should come from behind the table, and the route from the table back to the holding room and vehicles should be maintained as non-public throughout the event.
A solid barrier from wall to wall maintaining the space behind the table as non-public. A row of tables is a good solution.
Store employees preparing books (e.g., opening books to the signature page, etc.)
A wall or other obstruction, usually something temporary we add. This serves as a visual block to prevent those waiting in line from seeing the protectee and the setup until each attendee is just about to enter the protected area. Options we use for this purpose include large cardboard posters, a curtain hung on temporary posts, bookshelves temporarily relocated from other parts of the store, etc.
The protectee signing books. The table should have a full skirt down to the floor on the front. The protectee's chair should be on wheels. Available on or beneath the tabletop should be bottled water, pens, antiseptic hand-wash gel, and hand-wipes.
Hands-On Security Staff Agent: The role of this Security Staff Agent is to usher people from the line up to the table. He has a hands-on connection with each person as each is moved past him, and handed off to S2. He coordinates with S2 to determine when people are admitted to the secure area and how many are admitted at a time.
This Security Staff Agent has the key role at a book signing. As each person in interacting with the protectee, S2 can actually have hands on the person, and then usher the person along as the encounter ends. In the event of any inappropriate action by the attendee, S2 already has hands on the person, and can intervene. The justification for already having hands on the person is that S2 is politely ushering the person along, guiding the person toward the exit-but it's the real benefit we're after: Already being in physical contact with each person so as to minimize the time it would take to intervene effectively. S2 then passes each attendee to S3.
This Security Staff Agent becomes responsible for each attendee when each is handed off from S2. S3 then guides the person toward the exit and ensures that each person departs the area.
This Security Staff Agent is responsible to observe the entire encounter with each attendee and intervene when appropriate. S4 is responsible to evacuate the protectee if needed.
; This Security Staff Agent is responsible to remain with the cars, maintaining certainty of an uninterrupted exit route throughout the event. S5 is usually the driver of the protectee's car, and often posted right in the driver's seat, ready to depart at any time.
"I didn't want to attract too much attention standing near the barricade for so long waiting for Nixon... I wanted to shock the shit out of the SS men with my calmness."
Arthur Bremer, An Assassin's Diary
See Chapter 5
Essential Lesson of this Chapter:
In every environment, identify and assess the best suspects. They are always there.
During the early 90's, tennis star Monica Seles was deeply enmeshed in the continent's greatest conflict, the Serbs versus the Croats, and her public appearances often brought political demonstrations. Everybody knew that it made sense for her to have security at her public appearances in Europe, so when she played at the Citizen Tournament in Germany, two men were assigned to protect her.
Nevertheless, soon after arriving on the court, one of history's most brilliant athletes lay on her back, bleeding from a serious injury. She had fallen victim to a knife attack, the most preventable of all assassination methods. Why did the protectors fail and assailant Gunter Parche succeed?
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