The majority of attacks happen when the protected person is in or around the car, and these attacks succeed an astonishing 77% of the time. This statistic is, first and foremost, a clear call for having an armored car. It also teaches the value of not hanging around the car longer than is necessary. Avoid dallying and having conversations and goodbyes at the car -- do it all inside the building, and then depart. You are less vulnerable when moving, and you are most vulnerable when standing around saying goodbye, which people too commonly do at the car door.
All public figure attacks happen at the same time: Now. What we mean is that the present moment is the only time anything can occur. Accordingly, when you are in public, there is no such thing as a casual moment to your protectors. Staff members and assistants might view that time as a respite from work or as mere transit time, but your protectors are always engaged and busy whenever you are in public. Since they must be fully present -- not just physically, but mentally as well -- you'll notice when you're in public that your protectors sometimes don't look at you when you speak to them. They might even seem unresponsive at times. Understand that they are keeping their attention on the mission at hand -- and they are doing their primary work right now.
Anytime a member of the public can reliably know when and where to encounter you, that's when risk arises, and that's when enhanced protective coverage ought to be considered. This includes announced public appearances as well as public or private events at which your presence might be assumed or predicted.
Most people are not interested in the appearances or actions of your protectors. Protective coverage is almost never as apparent to others as it is to you (since you're the protectee, in the center and able to see everything). While most people are not even aware of your protectors, attackers are, and that's where you can benefit from deterrence.
Every public appearance is an opportunity to discourage future problems. When protective strategies send the message that you are not easily and readily accessible, it enhances your safety and reduces the likelihood of interference and unwanted encounters -- that day and well beyond.
Many successful attacks occurred when the protected person was leaving an event, so if you must arrive at a public event via the front entrance (for media or other reasons), always depart via a non-public route. Risk is enhanced as events end because organizers and local security personnel typically come to think their job is done. Any semblance of crowd control, attentiveness, and even pride in the event is often lost toward the end. At the same time, an attacker waiting along the exit route has been afforded time to prepare, to see the car being put in place, to judge distances, to observe security personnel, to assess protective strategies, and to select a position. He might be afforded hours to plan, to prepare himself, to gain confidence. You can take away every single advantage an attacker or unwanted pursuer might have -- simply by departing through an alternate exit. When you allow your protectors to apply this important precept -- Public Entry, Non-public Departure -- you'll also get other benefits: You'll be on your way home while others are still waiting for their cars or pressing through the crowd or experiencing all the unpleasant aspects of a public appearance.
Locations contain inherent advantages and disadvantages, and the hand you are dealt can be improved by advance work, set-up, and positioning. Accordingly, grant your protectors a fair say in the arrangements for your public appearances.
Listen to intuition, yours and your protectors'. An intuitive feeling of concern or fear is an excellent reason to ask questions, change a plan, or do things differently.
Avoid giving your protectors tangential tasks and responsibilities. The minute you give a protector an assignment that's outside his primary mission, you are taking his attention and energy away from your safety -- most particularly if you are in public. Through decades of observing protectors and protectees, the majority of so-called failures by protectors were failures to handle non-security tasks in the way expected or hoped for. Thus, protectors end up being measured not by choosing the best positions or maintaining the greatest readiness -- but by how they handled the luggage, the wake-up call, the phone message, the cat, the hair dryer. Most damagingly, a protector who has "failed" at some tangential mission might begin to adjust his actions toward priorities other than safety. When a protector is with you in a public environment, think of him as the professional equivalent of a pilot flying a jet. You want him undistracted, and you want to measure his performance by the only standards that really matter: safety and readiness.
Lessons in this book were learned by others at great expense. You can gain these same lessons with ease. Whether or not you read this brief book, at least consider incorporating these eleven simple precepts into your approach to safety.
We close with this encouragement: Analysis of both actual and simulated attacks -- thousands of them -- shows that when ready protectors are in a position to respond, they will prevail, almost always.
Gavin de Becker Tom Taylor Jeff Marquart
Ropelines and Barricades
You might at some point participate in meet-and-greet events, moving along a ropeline or barricade shaking hands, posing for photos, etc. These guidelines will make the event safer and easier.
Important Guideline #1: Stand back from the barricade
The first and most important step you can take is a step backwards. Stand back two or more feet from the ropeline/barricade so that people have to reach out far toward you in order to connect, and you have to reach out just a bit toward them -- if you choose to.
By standing back two feet from the barricade, you profoundly improve the experience for yourself while also helping your protectors be more effective, less intrusive, and less obvious.
The protectee in the following photos does this very well, standing back a full two feet from the barricade.
Photo by Ron Murray, ImageActive
Standing in this way, you can choose whom you touch and how you touch. The idea is that you are far enough back that they actually cannot reach you at all unless you extend an arm or hand to them.
Many candidates unwisely stand right up against the barricade -- terrible because protectors have no space into which they can respond. In those poorly done situations, the ropeline or barricade disappears entirely -- and that's when you see protectors having to shove and be intrusive.
In the better situation, the ropeline or barricade should be clearly visible to you at all times, and you decide how close to the barricade you will be, not allowing members of the public or campaign staff to decide how close to the barricade you will be. By standing back two or more feet, you always have available a step forward to avoid falling if someone tugs you and gains some leverage over you. By standing back, you reduce the leverage people have; they are leaning way forward and they have poor footing, not you.
Photo by Ron Murray, ImageActive
This positioning is good.
Important Guideline #2: Never reach into the crowd or over the barricade
In contrast with the protectee who is very good at standing back from ropelines and barricades, here's an example of the commonly seen mistake that's best to avoid: Reaching over the barricade.
Photo from AP Images
Photo by Jason Reed/Reuters TK
Instead of ever reaching over a ropeline/barricade, you want the whole hand-to-hand contact to happen on your side the barricade, where you can decide who and how you touch, to whom you extend your hands. As important, when everything happens on your side of the barricade, your protectors can see and respond.
Important Guideline #3: Avoid full handshakes
It's best to just take hold for a second of the tips of fingers, like the protectee does in these photos:
Photo by TK
Photo by TK
This way, you can release easily and you are not giving a grip they can use to tug you toward them and get you off-balance. You'll also be able to connect with more people in the time available.
Imp
ortant Guideline #4: Stay your course
Sometimes, you might hear people barking instructions at you, or telling your protectors to move. Often, your protectors will politely decline. They must choose their positioning, and you must choose yours -- positions cannot be dictated by a random event worker who gives no consideration to safety. If your protectors ever appear non-responsive, that's what's going on. Professionals will always be polite -- they won't, however, compromise just because someone asks them to.
You might see some other public figure toss himself into a crowd, or break the golden rule about never reaching over the barricade. But that's him and doesn't mean you have to do it.
Photo by The News Herald/Jennifer Frew
Multi-tasking Does Not Work in Public
You are at an airport boarding a private jet with your assistant. Your protector is asked to be sure all the suitcases get from the two cars into the jet.
That's the simple scenario, and just that fast, he is no longer a protector. He is no longer watching that man who drew his attention, the man standing back at the aviation building intently watching your every move, nor those people gathered near that gate, or anything else. You might have surmised, "It's fine to ask my protector to do something right now because there's no strangers around the jet right now anyway." Yet there might be no strangers around the jet specifically because people see your protector in position, alert, and actively deterring unwanted approaches. A moment earlier your protector was observing the environment, assuming the best position to intercept anyone who approached the aircraft. Since your request, however, he is a luggage handler placing his attention on trying to recall the description and location of bags and suitcases he might have peripherally seen being loaded into the cars at the hotel. Next, he is reaching around under the seat of the SUV to be sure some item hasn't slid under there. Instead of being ready to protect, he's in line to be blamed if a small paper bag containing something you purchased doesn't make its way into the passenger compartment. (It might well have been loaded into the luggage hold, but for the entire three-hour flight the protector will be the focus of resentment because the location of the paper bag can't be confirmed.)
Even the most capable and effective protectors might make poor luggage handlers. You or your assistant are much more qualified to know how many bags were packed, which bags you want where, which might be missing, which got loaded, which are in this or that car. In our firm, we'll assist clients in any way that enhances their convenience so long as it does not interfere with security and safety -- and any request in public that something be done right now profoundly interferes with security because it fully occupies the Now, placing the new task ahead of all others. When told to focus on something other than the mission, a protector becomes less effective -- and is usually a poor doer of whatever tangential task he's expected to handle. Everyone loses, both ways.
To be clear, protectors in our firm are frequently asked to handle tasks outside of security, and we provide a wide range of non-security services that help make clients' lives more convenient and enjoyable. However, these extra tasks are done when clients are home, or when protectors are advancing locations, or after clients depart -- in other words, when not currently engaged in the critical act of protecting.
Appendix 2
Pie Attacks on Public Figures and Executives, a brief report provided to clients of Gavin de Becker & Associates, circa 2006
Pie throwing, which started as a political tactic in the '60s is being popularized again through the Internet. Pie attack targets have included Ronald McDonald (5 times), Kenny Rogers (3 times), Karl Lagerfeld (twice), San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown (several times), Bill Gates, fashion executive Oscar de la Renta, Charles Hurwitz of Maxxam Corporation, the Prime Minister of Canada, the Former Chancellor of Germany, a famous geneticist, some authors, a philosopher, and others.
While this report focuses on the tactics of pie throwing groups, similar types of attacks have been used against executives and public figures using other foods, such as eggs. As discussed below, it is wise to have a response prepared for these types of attacks.
Tactics
In addition to reviewing the propaganda of several pie throwing groups, we've carefully analyzed pie attack incidents in order to provide insight to the tactics and strategies that are used.
They generally attack at public meetings, scheduled events, press conferences, or public appearances. They most often attack at a transit point (i.e. getting out of a car or coming out of a building), though a few incidents have occurred as a speaker left a stage after making a speech or participating in a press conference.
In planning their attacks, they seek intelligence about their target's schedule. They sometimes contact the target's organization under a ruse (media calling to check on an event), or they rely upon sympathizers within the organization to provide them information.
They operate in teams of at least four individuals, mixed male and female.
In order to deliver a pie, they have to get within 10 feet of the target.
When attacking people who employ security personnel, these groups have attempted to look "non-threatening."
They wear bulky clothes and backpacks in order to hide their pies and video cameras. One team member wearing a backpack faces the target, and stands in front of his associate. The associate then removes the pie out of view of the target and his security personnel.
Team member Number One distracts the target by asking a provocative question related to their cause d'jour. While the target is focused on the person who asked the question, team member number two will attempt to throw a pie directly into the target's face. Team member number three will be behind the target and, if the first attempt fails, he or she will deliver a pie upside down on the top of the target's head. Team member number four uses a camcorder to record the attack and the target's reaction.
To increase the chances of success, some attacks have involved additional pie throwers.
Pie throwers often run away or try to run away to avoid arrest.
They will release copies of their videotape of the pie attack to the media. They will also publish a "communique" on the Internet taking responsibility for the attack and stating their reasons for doing so.
If they are arrested, they have the support of activist lawyers and they attempt to gain additional publicity for their cause during the legal process.
Reaction
Having a protective detail certainly decreases the chances of a fully successful pie attack, and many have been prevented outright. Even aborted attacks can result in some pie landing on the Principal. Accordingly, we suggest that the Principal always have an additional shirt, tie, and jacket available, so that in the event this ever occurs, it's possible to get quickly back to the public appearance.
Because pies in the face are associated with comedy and clowns, the media reports on these assaults somewhat irreverently. We consider the attacks a serious assault, but the general public does not -- mostly because pie is used. In contrast, attacks using animal blood are similar in all regards to pie attacks, except that animal blood does not stimulate the same kind of stories. With either, a degree of humiliation can be part of these incidents. For these reasons and others, one's reaction to a pie attack is important. French philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy has reacted to his attacks with anger and challenging the attackers to fight. In part because of his reaction, he has been attacked five times.
Conversely, a French author who licked pie off his face and commented that it tasted good earned the media's respect for being a good sport. He has not been attacked again. In addition, Arnold Schwarzenegger also received favorable press reports when he joked about being hit by an egg by stating that the perpetrator owed him bacon.
We suggest having a quip in mind to be used in the event of a pie (or other food-type) attack. For example: "I ordered this pie a week ago," or "I ordered chocolate." Indeed, there is little humor to be found in such incidents, but the appe
arance of taking it lightly is important.
The pie throwers claim they are exercising free speech and are not committing an assault. Their goal is to humiliate powerful people and bring attention to their cause. None have attempted to harm anyone (beyond causing a momentary loss of dignity), though the attacks are alarming, disruptive, and can be feel fairly violent. For example, Mayor Brown and a pie thrower were both slightly injured a scuffle during and after a pie-throwing incident.
An attempted or successful pie throwing is not expected to receive a lot of publicity. Ironically, the more often the organizations throw pies, the less newsworthy such events become. However, if there are other elements to the story (a serious assault on a pie-thrower, an injury, lawsuits, etc.), publicity can continue for some time. The attacks on Mayor Brown continued to receive publicity because of jail terms imposed on several pie throwers. One claimed he was injured when tackled by one of the Mayor's aides.
Conclusion
Clearly, these incidents are worth avoiding, because in addition to the temporary embarrassment and disruption, we must also consider the larger consequences of a successful pie-attack, or other type of food attack. Permitting an attack to come off successfully would send a signal that you are vulnerable to attack. Future pursuers with more hostile intent might then be encouraged to pursue encounters with you.
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