by Mark Zuehlke
All Tuxford could do was to send some piecemeal sections of the Canadian Scottish forward. No. 3 Company under Major John Hall was assigned to the 14th Battalion while the 15th Battalion would be reinforced by Major Sydney Goodall’s No. 1 Company. Both units reached the front by 2100 hours. All his fighting troops now attached to other battalions, Lt.-Col. Leckie sent his unneeded headquarters staff to the rear and joined the brigade’s forward headquarters to monitor events.29
When No. 3 Company arrived, it was met by Lt.-Col. R. P. Clark who told Hall to send two platoons—Nos. 11 and 12—under his only remaining officer, Lt. Gordon Tupper, to reinforce the Royal Montreal Regiment’s No. 3 Company at Kenora Trench. As Tupper headed toward Kenora, Clark further ordered Hall to send No. 9 Platoon under CSM George Palmer to a strongpoint just back of Kenora, while Hall and No. 10 Platoon remained in reserve at battalion headquarters.30
Having lost two-thirds of its strength and all its officers other than Lt. W. J. Holliday, 14th Battalion’s No. 3 Company had by this time withdrawn with all its wounded from Kenora Trench and taken cover in Sudbury.31 Unaware of this development, Tupper and his men were still headed for Kenora Trench—following a 14th Battalion guide who led them astray and almost into the midst of a heavily manned German trench. Spotting the silhouettes of German coal-scuttle helmets, Tupper hurriedly turned his men about and beat a hasty retreat just as the enemy opened fire. Only a few men in the two platoons were hit, but No. 11 Platoon’s sergeant, George Slessor, ended up alone and lost in No Man’s Land. He eventually stumbled into an unoccupied section of Kenora Trench and took refuge there. He would be found the next morning, “sound asleep, with his head pillowed on a dead German.”32
Finally the guide came upon Holliday’s men in Sudbury Trench. Heartened by the reinforcements, Holliday mustered the seventeen men in his company still capable of fighting and charged back to Kenora Trench. The Germans had managed to get only a few men in place there and these were quickly driven off with about six being taken prisoner. Tupper then brought his men forward and the small force “consolidated as far as practicable.”33 Shortly thereafter, CSM Palmer, having failed to find the reported strongpoint that had been his objective, led No. 9 Platoon into Kenora to bolster the number of its defenders.
At dawn the Germans saturated Kenora Trench with shellfire, inflicting many casualties. But repeated counterattacks were thrown back. Slowly the number of defenders dwindled as the day wore on. In the late afternoon, Tupper and Holliday “decided that it would be wise to vacate this isolated position.” They fell back to Sudbury Trench and then reported their action to battalion headquarters.
Lt.-Col. Clark’s signal to Tuxford that Kenora Trench had been abandoned arrived at the same time that the division—pressured by corps—issued instructions intended to secure both Kenora and Regina Trenches. Once again 3rd Brigade’s 15th and 14th battalions were to seize Kenora, while 2nd Brigade’s 5th and 8th Battalions would go for Regina.34 Tuxford went forward to personally assess 14th Battalion’s condition. Including the Canadian Scottish from No. 3 Company under Major Hall, he counted just seventy-five men capable of going into action. How that number of men could succeed he had no idea but, as ordered, he sent the brigade forward at 0200 hours on September 28. They moved out into the muddy battlefield under heavy rain but the cover this offered was quickly lost as illumination flares pinned the Canadians in the open. In thirty minutes, the attack was shredded by German fire. The Royal Montreal Regiment calculated its losses since the beginning of the offensive at 10 officers and 360 other ranks.35 In this last action Hall’s casualties were not recorded, but they included ten men from one section led by Sgt. Ivor Burgess. The twenty-four-year-old sergeant from Winnipeg was among the men killed.36
Late on September 28, what was left of 1st Division was relieved by brigades of 2nd Division and the Battle of Thiepval Ridge closed. Field Marshal Haig admitted it had largely been a failure. The ridge’s now blood-soaked northwestern flank remained in German hands and Regina Trench seemed impregnable.
The Canadian Scottish—officially only being in support for the preceding nine days—lost one officer killed and three wounded with forty-one other ranks dead and another ninety wounded.37 Added to the 349 casualties suffered in early September, these losses left the battalion desperately needing time to rebuild—a story that was true of all the division’s battalions.
Withdrawn to a rest area at Warloy-Baillon, about five miles west of Albert, Major General Arthur Currie thought his 1st Division would be given sufficient time to incorporate reinforcements. Almost all raw recruits, they lacked even the most rudimentary skills of trench survival. There was a desperate shortage of officers. Few of those posted to the Canadian Scottish had any former combat experience.
Yet, even as the Battle of Thiepval Ridge was declared over, General Haig decided to renew the offensive on October 12. This time there would be an advance of two miles across the breadth of Fourth and Reserve Armies’ fronts. Reserve Army would make two thrusts, which would converge at Miraumont. One thrust, made by Canadian Corps, would drive northward from Thiepval Ridge through Grandcourt to Miraumont while the other followed the western bank of the Ancre River through Beaumont Hamel and then headed east to the point of convergence. Before this plan could rise beyond the theoretical, however, Regina Trench must be taken because it was to serve as the Canadian start line.
On October 1, 2nd Division went for the trench at 1515 hours to no avail and a cost of several hundred casualties. Byng decided he had no choice but try again with 1st Division supported to the right by 3rd Division. Heavy rains forced a postponement, but Byng knew time was short, for the Canadian Corps had to be in possession of Regina Trench by October 11 in order to carry out its role in Haig’s offensive. While waiting for the rain to let up, Byng drafted a plan of attack with sights set on a two-mile section of Regina Trench stretching from a point 500 yards west of Kenora Trench to where Canadian Corps lines met Fourth Army’s left flank. Each division was assigned half this frontage and would advance two brigades with two battalions forward so that eight battalions would simultaneously overwhelm Regina Trench. Currie assigned 1st Division’s share in the attack to his 1st and 3rd brigades. For his part, Brigadier Tuxford recognized that the Royal Montreal Regiment and 48th Highlanders were currently too beaten up for combat duty. So the Royal Highlanders and Canadian Scottish would have to lead.38
Regina Trench lay on Ancre Height’s reverse slope and could only be examined by aerial reconnaissance, which the rain made impossible. Hidden behind the heights, it presented a difficult artillery target requiring blind fire. Great banks of wire entanglements protected its front, and although the artillery daily ripped holes in it, each night the Germans repaired the damage by packing the gaps with coiled bales of concertina wire. The German defenders were mostly proud naval marines.
Finally the rain let up and, at dusk on October 7, 3rd Brigade moved to assembly positions inside some abandoned German training trenches northeast of Courcelette. Directly in support of the brigade were two trench mortars, which would each fire 120 rounds.39 The Canadian Scottish would advance on the brigade’s right with the Royal Highlanders to its left and 1st Brigade’s 3rd Battalion on its other flank. Artillery support had been promised, but it seemed strangely desultory and the officers distrusted the assurances that the wire fronting the trench had been broken. Having had no opportunity to send battalion scouts to reconnoitre the ground, they used flashlights to examine their maps and hoped these matched reality.
Initially the night “was fine and peaceful with moonlight so clear that a man’s shadow showed up dark and well defined. As the hours moved on, high, fleecy clouds overspread the sky, and the brightness became subdued; soon afterwards the moon sank down and, at zero it was quite dark.” The battalion was arranged so that Major Sydney Goodall’s No. 1 Company was on the right and No. 4 Company, under Major George Lynch, was on the left with No. 2 Company, still commanded by Lt. Duncan, behind Goo
dall and Major John Hall’s No. 3 backing Lynch.40 Each platoon leader had an extra water bottle filled with rum to provide his men with a little liquid courage just before the attack.41
At 0100 hours on October 8, the first wave slipped into No Man’s Land and dug in about 120 yards in front of the training trenches to shorten the distance it must cover while the second wave occupied the trench system. Regina Trench lay 700 yards distant, its position clearly indicated by the numerous flares the Germans fired into the sky. A few minutes before Zero Hour—0450 hours—the artillery on both sides ceased and an unnatural quiet settled over No Man’s Land. Then, precisely at Zero Hour, the Canadian Corps guns spoke again and unleashed the creeping barrage.
The guns firing signalled the Canadian Scottish to stand and advance. Each company’s platoons went forward in two waves spaced 50 yards apart, so the battalion advanced in four orderly lines. Major Lynch, Captain David Bell, SM Arden Mackie, and No. 4 Company’s piper James Richardson walked into the open and watched the shells fall for a couple of minutes. Then Lynch, Mackie, and the piper bade Bell adieu for he was to lead the company’s second line. Lynch blew his whistle and the three men walked ahead of the leading line with Richardson to Lynch’s left, Mackie his right.
Lynch had planned to leave Richardson behind, thinking a piper unnecessary for a night assault. But the twenty-year-old had demanded to be paraded before Lt.-Col. Leckie and begged to accompany the troops. Leckie had overruled Lynch.
The ground free of craters, the battalions were able to keep their lines properly dressed. Halfway to Regina Trench Mackie asked Richardson why he was not playing the pipes. Richardson replied he was to await Lynch’s order. On they went, taking little German fire and men began to hope their luck might hold. Then they passed over the crest of the hill and began descending toward the wire. With a sense of dread Mackie “was astonished to see it was not cut. I tried to locate a way through but could find no opening. When the company came up the enemy started throwing bombs and opened rifle fire. Seeing a big shell-hole on the left I ran over to Major Lynch to ask him to get in there until I could get the wire cutters to work on the wire, but as I got up to him he fell—shot in the breast. I knelt to bandage him but saw he was breathing his last. Piper Jimmy Richardson came over to me at this moment and asked if he could help, but I told him our company commander was gone.”42
The company was completely bunched in front of the wire. Some men threw bombs toward the German trench while others tried to beat down the wooden stakes supporting the wire with their rifle butts and then trample it into the mud. The German grenades generally fell short as they were throwing uphill, but their rifle fire was “deadly accurate.” Casualties mounted. Unless something were to be done quickly, Mackie realized that No. 4 Company would be wiped out.
Suddenly Richardson turned to the sergeant. “Wull I gie them wund?” he asked calmly. “Aye mon, gie ’em wind,” Mackie barked back.43 Coolly, the young smooth-faced soldier marched back and forth in front of the wire, playing the pipes while a storm of fire swirled past him on either side. “The effect was instantaneous,” reads his Victoria Cross commendation. “Inspired by his splendid example, the company rushed the wire with, such fury and determination that the obstacle was overcome and the positions captured.”44
On the battalion’s right flank, No. 1 Company’s situation proved less perilous, for the artillery had “smashed gaps in the wire” and the men charged through and gained the trench. Working rightward to join up with the left flank of 1st Brigade, the two companies here commanded by Major Goodall and Lt. Duncan met fierce resistance from the marines who neither asked for nor granted any quarter. Goodall was mortally wounded and Duncan killed on the spot.
On the left flank, Sgt. Mackie had taken the head of No. 4 Company after Captain Bell was killed shortly after Lynch. Commissioned from the ranks in 1915, Bell’s competence had been such that just before the attack he was offered a temporary staff appointment at brigade headquarters. In refusing it, Bell had said to leave before an attack was akin to desertion. While leading the second wave through the wire, a bullet pierced his helmet and he fell dead.
Major Hall had also been wounded at the wire. While waiting for the stretcher-bearers, he had jotted a note to Leckie: “My compliments to the Commanding Officer, and tell him I’m awfully sorry I am not able to carry on.” Hall died after being hit a second time while the stretcher-bearers were carrying him to the rear.45
Daybreak found the battalion locked in a fierce mêlée. Every commanding officer was dead. All its bombers were dead or wounded. Some men were throwing German bombs for everyone had exhausted their supplies. The right flank was in contact with 3rd Battalion from 1st Brigade but, on the left, there was no sign of 13th Battalion. Only a small Royal Montreal Regiment section led by a junior officer had managed to gain Regina Trench. They joined the Canadian Scottish. Sgt. George Slessor’s platoon held that flank and they hurriedly barricaded the trench with sandbags and hammered together bits of lumber ripped from the doors leading to German dugouts.
A quick count revealed ninety-eight Can Scots had reached Regina Trench. These included four officers and five non-commissioned officers. Looking back they could see the rest of the battalion hanging dead or wounded in the wire or scattered on the ground before it. Just two Lewis guns remained. Everyone was desperately low on ammunition, stripping it from the wounded. Lt. Edward Hart commanded. To advance beyond Regina would be suicidal, he decided, so they would dig in and hang on to the 360 yards of trench they had won.
Hart doubted that would prove possible, for the Germans busted through the barricade on the left and Slessor was wounded. A bloody bayonet charge regained the barricade, but the naval marines only went back a few feet and kept pressing forward at the slightest opportunity. No fool, Hart knew the Germans would inevitably break through. Lt. Charles Bevan was the only other Can Scot officer standing. He and Hall worked opposite ends of a line that kept shrinking as men fell. At 1500 hours they decided “to fall back.” Hart later wrote: “We had by this time no more than seventy-five all told in the trench. … It was apparently impossible for me to get messages back to Battalion Headquarters or for Headquarters to get messages to me. Therefore, I took the responsibility rightly or wrongly of ordering the Battalion to retire. Retirement was effected with light casualties, the men being passed back a few at a time to the jumping off trench.”46
Piper Richardson was among the few who did not reach safety. In the trench, Richardson had set his pipes aside and first joined the bombers before serving as a stretcher-bearer. About 200 yards from the trench, Richardson paused and announced he had forgotten his pipes. Refusing to be dissuaded, he headed back toward Regina Trench. He was never seen again. First declared missing, he was registered as presumed dead a year later. On October 22, 1918, Richardson was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.
The October 8 attack ended in disaster with neither division succeeding. This failure marked the end of 16th Battalion’s Somme operations. On the morning of October 11, its remnants—numbering the strength of a single company—marched to the rear. En route they passed the men of the 72nd Battalion (Seaforth Highlanders of Canada) from 4th Canadian Division advancing to their battle christening. The Seaforths among the Can Scots greeted their fellows affectionately, but one observer thought the contrast between them “pathetic. The new Battalion, smart and buoyant, flushed with the prospect of meeting the enemy in its first engagement; the old one, shattered, faced for the second time with the task of rebuilding battalion esprit and organization from the ground upward.”47
chapter eight
Vimy
- OCTOBER 12, 1916-MAY 4, 1917 -
Canadian Corps suffered 1,364 casualties in the October 8 attack with 344, or roughly twenty-five percent, of this total coming from 16th Battalion. Eight of the battalion’s 13 officer casualties died while 131 other ranks were killed. This was a staggeringly high percentage of men killed, slightly more than a third.1
Overall, Canadian Corps casualties in the Somme led to its full withdrawal from that sector on October 11 with 4th Canadian Infantry Division fed into the line on October 11 under command of Reserve Army’s II Corps. This Canadian division would be bloodied in successive attempts to seize Regina Trench, a goal that would not be won until November 11. Seventeen days later the last Canadian division on the Somme would depart for integration into Canadian Corps. By then the Battle of the Somme, after five devastatingly bloody months, was considered closed.
Canadian battle casualties totalled 24,029—a mere fraction of the 623,907 Allied dead and wounded. The Germans reported 465,525 casualties, but this figure did not take into account a quarter of their wounded who were treated just back of the front and returned to duty. British statisticians reworked the German numbers for a tally of about 670,000. Tellingly, Gen. Erich Ludendorff, commander of the German 8th Army engaged on the Somme, considered it “had been fought to a standstill and was now utterly worn out.”2 He was determined to “save the men from a second Somme battle.”3