The King's Cardinal: The Rise and Fall of Thomas Wolsey (Pimlico)
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It may be felt that, in teasing out an explanation for Wolsey’s policy during the period that the Great Enterprise was supposedly England’s aim, there has been too much supposition and guesswork and not enough attention to the evidence. This may be so, though it is one of the sine qua nons of this work that all the evidence needs a great deal of interpretation, not least because there are so many gaps in it. What, however, the surviving reports of Tunstall and Sampson permit is the construction of a viable alternative policy to the one, it has been argued, Wolsey adopted.249 Instead of trying to tell Charles what to do with his great victory, would it not have been much better for England to have adopted a more modest posture? Pavia could, and should, have been good news for her. If she had only been willing to please her victorious ally just a little, she would have been in a good position to gain from the resulting peace settlement – probably, in fact, rather more than she was going to from the Treaty of the More, though Tunstall and Sampson never said this. There is no evidence that Charles wanted to do England down. Indeed, it was, as Wolsey had pointed out, very much in his interests to continue his friendship with her, but only as long as he was not asked to do too much. Thus, for Tunstall and Sampson at least, the straightforward and honourable course was to fulfil England’s treaty obligations to the emperor in the reasonable expectation that he would reciprocate. Moreover, it was their belief that the policy that they now perceived Wolsey to have embarked upon was so dangerous, threatening an alliance between the emperor and Francis against England, that it had made them ‘more bold to write thus plainly in discharging of our duty to your highness’ – to which Wolsey had appended the comment: ‘Being in this fear and perplexity they know not the bottom of your affairs, nor the force of your puissance, thinking that all dependeth upon the emperor’s string’.250
Put like that, it is difficult not to feel a little sorry for the simple-minded English envoys! And at the same time it may serve as a warning to those of us who have tried to get to the bottom of what Wolsey was after – and it is worth pointing out en passant that Wolsey’s comment makes it clear that Henry certainly had. Whether the interpretation that has been presented here is correct only the dead will know for certain, but at least it does allow for the complexity of Wolsey’s approach. His secret diplomacy with the French had been specifically designed to free England from dependence upon the emperor, and for two reasons. Unlike Tunstall and Sampson, and probably others at the English court, Wolsey had come to believe nothing that the emperor said; and it has to be said that Charles’s record of broken promises was justification enough for this view. At the same time – and much more importantly – any policy that resulted in vital decisions affecting Henry’s honour and interests being made by someone other than Henry and himself was unacceptable. Wolsey had always been aware that in any alliance with the emperor Henry might be forced into a subsidary role, and it was to prevent this happening that the Great Enterprise had been invented. Henry had had to appear bullish and provide money and armies because only by drawing Charles into a conquest of France could he force him to treat him as an equal, while at the same time putting the maximum pressure on Francis so as to persuade him once again to come to Henry’s heel.
This, in general terms, was the policy Henry and Wolsey adopted in the years 1522-5, and, as was the case between 1515 and 1518, it was by no means an unmitigated success. Charles and the unexpected ally, Bourbon, proved to be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to manage. Francis, as usual, was very reluctant to be brought to heel. And by 1525 the situation had become, as far as England was concerned, something of a stalemate, with neither the French nor the Imperialists prepared to do what she wanted them to do. Pavia broke this up. Potentially it had been a moment of great danger, if dependence upon the emperor was what was feared. Wolsey’s immediate response, as in 1522-3, had been to be more bullish than ever, in a desperate effort to prevent Charles from making all the decisions. Meanwhile, he waited to see what had happened to France. If she had not collapsed completely there was a strong possibility that she would be willing to accept England’s predominance as never before. And this was how it turned out. Wolsey with his accustomed flair had been able to execute a diplomatic volte-face which could well have put England in a stronger position than ever before. What with an alliance with a suitably chastened France, the strong possibility of an anti-Imperial alliance, orchestrated by himself, emerging in Northern Italy, and an emperor who, though victorious, was increasingly desperate for money and, as always, dreadfully overcommitted, the scene looked set for Wolsey to execute another diplomatic triumph similar to that of 1518 – in other words, a settlement of the affairs of Europe directed from London. It was never to be. One reason was that Charles, whatever the weaknesses of his position, still had a great number of cards to play, including the person of the French king. Another would result from the fact that, all too soon, Henry would make the momentous decision to seek a divorce. For Wolsey this was a devastating stroke of ill-luck, for nothing could have been better calculated to undermine all his efforts to make his master the dominant sovereign of Europe.
1 Gunn, ‘French Wars’, pp.36-7; Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.21-4, 128; L.B. Smith, Henry VIII, pp.145 ff.
2 Thomas More, Correspondence, p.263 (LP, iii, 2555).
3 Ibid.
4 Goring, EHR, lxxxvi for all aspects of the general proscription.
5 See Hale for an excellent introduction.
6 Wolfe, Crown Lands, pp.66 ff; EHR, lxxix.
7 Bernard, War, Taxation and Rebellion, p.53 for all these figures.
8 Knecht, p.117.
9 Koenigsbergher, p.50.
10 Knecht, p.128.
11 Elliott, p.198.
12 Elliott, p.193.
13 Dietz, English Government Finance, p.173.
14 The approximate figures are 180,000 sq. miles for France and 194,000 for Castile and Aragon.
15 Knecht, p.119; Elliott, p.198.
16 For perceptive comments on the relationship between resources and foreign policy see Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, pp.115-25.
17 Wolfe, Crown Lands, p.86 for scepticism about Henry VII’s ‘mighty treasure’, while for the view that he took his scepticism too far see Starkey, ‘King’s privy chamber’, pp.393 ff., usefully summarized. in Elton, Reform and Reformation, p.30.
18 Rawdon Brown, ii, p.313 (LP, iii, 402).
19 Elton, Reform and Reformation, p.84.
20 Thomas More, Correspondence, pp.512-13 in a letter allegedly from Margaret Roper to her step-sister Lady Alington, in which she recounts More’s reaction to use of this same fable to persuade him not to continue his opposition to Henry’s ‘break with Rome’. It should not, therefore, be taken as a final statement of More’s view of Wolsey’s foreign policy.
21 Ibid, p.518.
22Inter alia C.S.L. Davies, Peace, Print and Protestantism, p.160; Elton, Studies, 1, pp.122-3.
23 Knecht, p.121.
24 This an underlying theme of Scarisbrick’s treatment; see Henry VIII, pp.125-47.
25 Knecht, pp.121-2.
26 Gunn, EHR, ci, pp.622-3.
27 Brandi, p.218.
28 The central argument of Bernard, War, Taxation and Rebellion. Much of what follows is a commentary on this work. The fact that I am one of its dedicatees is, I hope, an indication of my respect for the argument, despite my disagreement with it.
29 Most of what follows derives from Schofield, ‘Direct lay taxation’.
30 Hoskins, Age of Plunder, pp.214-15; Schofield, EcHR, 2 ser, xviii.
31 Schofield, ‘Direct lay taxation’, p.203.
32 Wolfe, Crown Lands, pp.66-75.
33 Central to Elton’s ‘Tudor Revolution’; see his Tudor Revolution, pp.160 ff.
34 For much of the above see Wolfe, Crown Lands, pp.76 ff.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid, pp.79-80 for the suggestion that the Acts of 1515 bore ‘the stamp of Chancellor Wolsey’s clear legal and administrative mind’; s
ee also Elton, Tudor Revolution, pp.45 ff. The statutes were 6 Hen. VIII cap.24; 7 Hen. VIII cap.7; 14 & 15 Hen. VIII cap.18.
37 Gunn, ‘Act of resumption’, p.106.
38 See pp.204 ff., 561 ff.
39 BL Titus B i, fo.188 (LP, iii, 576).
40 J.R. Lander, Crown and Nobility, p.188; Myers.
41 Elton, Tudor Revolution, pp.380-414.
42Inter alia Prestwich, pp.206 ff. for household reform in James I’s reign.
43 Ross, p.372.
44 Dietz, English Government Finance, p.89; Elton, Tudor Revolution, pp.399-400.
45 Dietz, English Public Finance, pp.412-20; Prestwich, p.207.
46 L.B. Smith, Henry VIII, pp.77 ff; also Newton.
47Royal Household, pp.137-61 is the most convenient, but not the best text for the Eltham ordinances. For a discussion of the various versions see Elton, Tudor Revolution, p.375, n.4.
48Inter alia Stone.
49 Newton is still probably the best account, but see also Elton, Tudor Revolution, pp.370 ff; D.R. Starkey, ‘King’s privy chamber’, pp.133 ff.
50 The so-called bouge, bouche or, as Skelton entitled one of his poems, ‘Bowge of Court’.
51Royal Household, cap.52, p.153, quoted in Newton, p.251.
52Royal Household, cap.40, p.149.
53 D.R. Starkey, ‘King’s privy chamber’, pp.133 ff.
54 Newton, pp.242-3 where he suggests the removal of a hundred gentlemen ushers, fifty-four grooms and an unspecified but greater number of guardsmen.
55Royal Household, p.137.
56 In this I am following Wolfe, Crown Lands, pp.1-28, but for criticism of this view see Harriss’s review in EHR, lxxxvii, p.172 and ibid, xciii, p.723, n.1.
57 Prestwich, pp.206 ff.
58LP, iv, 3231, 3243.
59 For 1530-1 the figure was £24,908, for 1539-40 £32,933, with some variation in between. What the figure was during the 1520s is not known, but in 1526 Wolsey seems to have hoped that the statutory allocation of £19,394 (1 Hen. VIII c.16) would be sufficient; for all of which see Elton, Tudor Revolution, pp.39, 399 ff.
60 For 1519 see BL Titus B i, fo.188 (LP, iii, 576).
61LP, iv, 1572, 1939 [4].
62LP, ii, 3313; see also Gunn, ‘Act of Resumption’ for other examples of Wolsey’s involvement in the detail of financial administration.
63LP, iv, app.36.
64 ‘No minister with such opportunities left so little trace upon the statute-book, and his single parliament of 1523 was one of the most barren in English history.’ (A.F. Pollard, p.337).
65 Elton, Studies, i, p.128.
66 For other critical assessments see C.S.L. Davies, Peace, Print and Protestantism, p.169; Graves, pp.43, 61-2; Lehmberg, p.1. Guy’s ‘Wolsey and the parliament of 1523’ appeared too late to be fully considered but it is by and large critical.
67LP, iii, 3024, 3249.
68 Bernard, War, Taxation and Rebellion, pp.119 ff. is excellent on all this.
69 Even Elton in Reform and Reformation, p.89 concedes this point.
70 Ibid.
71 14 & 15 Hen. VIII c.10; for all these acts see SR, iii, pp.206 ff.
72 6 Hen. VIII c.5, 7 Hen. VIII c.l.
73 But for a different view of the provisos see Scarisbrick, ‘Cardinal Wolsey’, pp.63-4.
74 BL Caligula D vi, fo.115 (LP, ii, 1223).
75 A.F. Pollard, pp.51-2, 343-4, but see also C.S.L. Davies, Peace, Print and Protestantism, p.169; Elton, Reform and Reformation, p.58; Roskell, p.320, none of whom make specific reference to the letter but can only have it in mind, or Pollard’s use of it.
76 Two subsidy Acts and one fifteenth and tenth had been granted.
77 Merriman, i, p.313 (LP, iii, 3249).
78 Elton, Studies, i, p.224.
79 Graves, pp.7, 41, 159-60 as a useful check for my arithmetic.
80 Ibid, pp.73-6; Lehmberg, pp.31-5.
81 Quoted in Graves, p.42. See also Speaker Audley’s request to Henry in March 1532 to dissolve parliament considering ‘what pain, charge and cost his humble subjects of the Nether house had sustained since the beginning of this parliament’.
82 There were two parliaments, 1512-4 and 1515, and five sessions, Feb.-March, Nov.-Dec. 1512, Jan.-March 1514, Feb.-April and Nov.-Dec. 1515.
83 See p.542 below.
84 The resistance to the Amicable Grant in 1525 would have discouraged any attempt to ask for money.
85 In April 1521 thought was given to calling a parliament in order to finance Surrey’s military activities in Ireland and resistance to a possible Scottish invasion. The idea was rejected because in this ‘hard and dear year’ people were not in a position to pay and anyway such money that might be granted could not have been raised in time or so at least Surrey was informed; see St. P, iii, p.67 (LP, iii, 1252).
86 A Commons’ Journal did not begin until 1547. For a good introduction to the sources see Graves, p.44.
87 Roper, p.19.
88St. P, i, 124 (LP, iii, 3267). For More’s thank you, see St. P, i, 125 (LP, iii, 3270).
89 See also Imperial ambassador’s report of 1 June: ‘Parliament has been postponed from the eve of pentecost to the 10th of this month because there are divers opinions and several difficulties have arisen… What is worse it seems likely the opposition will be greater this time than before. Wolsey is incredibly unpopular here and matters will not go so easily as he and Henry seem to believe.’ (Sp. Cal., F.S., p.235).
90 Roper, pp.16-19; Hall, p.655.
91 Hall, p.656.
92 But both Hall and Vergil do; see Hall, p.657; Vergil, p.307.
93 Hall, p.657.
94 Henry Ellis, I ser, i, pp.220-1 (LP, iii, 3024).
95Inter alia English Historical Documents, pp.360-8 for a good introduction. Anything by Harriss is illuminating, but see especially journal of Medieval History, ii.
96 Ross, pp.214-8.
97 Chrimes, pp.200-1.
98 Almost certainly the meagreness of the records make them appear more quiescent than they were. For instance, it is known that on a number of occasions the City of London mounted vigorous campaigns in the Commons of which the official records give no indication; see Elton, Studies, i, pp.84-6; Kennedy, pp.35 ff., 130 ff.
99Lords, pp.12-3, 21; Graves, p.61.
100Trevelyan Papers, p.8 for Warham’s initial request of £600,000. He eventually obtained £126,745; see also Bernard, War, Taxation and Rebellion, pp.120-1.
101 Lehmberg, pp.137-8, 254-5.
102 PRO SP 1/2/7/fos.187-8 (LP, iii, 2957), a draft in Tuke’s hand. Wolsey’s failure to deliver the opening speech to parliament, a task usually performed by the chancellor, led Elton to comment that he had ‘apparently extended his dislike of parliaments to the point of suppressing his normal delight in the sound of his own voice’; see Parliament of England, p.27. But, as Henry informed the Venetian ambassador, the explanation was that Wolsey was ill (Ven. Cal., iii, p.313).
103LP, iii, 2322, 23333; Sp. Cal., ii, pp.438-40; 449-51. When Charles addressed the Castilian cortes in July 1523 he appears to have failed to mention the Great Enterprise! For this and, more generally for Charles’s policy at this time see Brandi, pp.194 ff.
104 Henry Ellis, 1 ser, i, p.223 (LP, iii, 3023).
105 For Henry’s and Wolsey’s suspicions see LP, iii, 1810, 2551, 2567, 3302, 3326, 3346; for the English ambassadors’ suspicions see LP, iii, 3246-7, 3559.
106Sp. Cal., F.S., p.180.
107LP, iii, 2567. Cf. Charles’s comment in March 1523 that a good peace could only be obtained by a good war; see Sp. Cal, F.S., p.197.
108 Bernard, War, Taxation and Rebellion, pp.3-52.
109St. P, i, p.117 (LP, iii, 3231).
110LP, iii, 3207 for the treaty between Venice, Charles, Henry and Archduke Ferdinand.
111 3 Aug. 1523 a complicated story involving the ‘treasonable’ activities of the pro-French cardinal, Soderini; see Knecht, p.147; Pastor, ix, pp.185 ff.
112 Russell left England in
early August and the agreement with Bourbon was signed on 6 Sept. For Bourbon’s treason see Knecht, pp.146-9.
113Sp. Cal., F.S., p.253. For the effect of Bourbon’s treason see Bernard, War, Taxation and Rebellion, pp.11-12; Gunn, EHR, ci, pp.608-11.