by Joan Lock
Furthermore, there were not too many passengers onboard. Their weight was as nothing to the cargo she was capable of carrying. If all the (900) passengers were very plump, large gentlemen they would weigh 80 to 90 tons. ‘Ninety tons is no cargo at all for a ship that size.’ If they were ordinary size men they would weigh in at about 55 tons.
Russell had not finished rebutting criticism of the Princess Alice. Her proportions were perfectly all right: ‘I have built ships with less depth, less beam, and more length, which have not only navigated rivers but have crossed the Atlantic’.6
The only fault he found with the pleasure steamer was the distance between her forward bulkhead and the one behind the engine – 32 ft – which was too long for the section that carried the most weight. He was in favour of numerous, watertight bulkheads. The Princess Alice had five, which divided the body into six watertight compartments, which was considered adequate when she was built. More may well have prevented the ship from sinking so rapidly, although the fact that she was practically cut in two made the rapid sinking almost inevitable.
The assessors who went to the wreck to examine the site of Pether’s piece of deck took him with them to indicate the site but, it transpired, he had not actually removed it himself. In fact it had not been taken from the wreck but a ship-breakers yard to which some of the decking had been removed. He had asked them to cut him a piece of the thickest and been told it was all alike. However, lying about in the open, accessible to anyone was decking from three other boat decks that had just been delivered. The fragment could have come from one of those other decks. In any case, the assessors agreed that the sample Pether had brought to court did not come from the Princess Alice. There was talk of perjury charges being brought against this unfortunate ‘expert’.
A long dissertation in the Engineer was particularly cutting about Pim: ‘Unfortunately Captain Pim called witnesses to prove that she (the Princess Alice) was unfit for her duties who possessed little or no weight as experts’. When discussing the ship’s structure and the plank episode:
Again – perhaps from want of sufficient knowledge of the subject – Captain Pim entirely missed the true point at issue, namely the great transverse weakness of the Princess Alice, resulting from her extreme shallowness in proportion to her length, and the thinness of her plates; while he made a good deal of her narrowness, which had nothing to do with the matter.7
For some reason best known to himself, Captain Pim chose this arena to launch into an attack on both ships and the Board of Trade at whose door, he was sorry to say, the responsibility of this dire calamity rested. There had been no system of order on the Princess Alice, he claimed, and those handling the Bywell Castle were merely runners who had no interest at all in the vessel. As for the Board of Trade:
Sir, the condition of our merchant seamen is of the deepest moment to us. There are very few British seamen left, for at least four-fifths of the crews of our merchant ships are made up of foreign and home riff-raff – the scum of the earth – who, moreover, do not know one end of a ship from another … I have no hesitation in saying that during the last twenty-five years, since which time the mercantile marine has been under the control of the Board of Trade, our merchant service has steadily declined both as regards men and ships.
He also pointed out that there had been no instance of bravery on either vessel – with the exception of Brankston, who had abseiled down onto the stricken vessel. Considering how fast everything happened, one gets the impression that there was little time to do anything other than respond automatically to the situation and that there wasn’t much opportunity for bravery.
The man appeared to be pursuing a solo cause, but one wonders what assistance this was supposed to be to his clients, the relatives of Mr and Mrs Bridgeman, whom he claimed had been ‘done to death’ onboard the Princess Alice which, he still insisted, was of the flimsiest build.
Indeed Mr Mansel Jones, who was presenting the Board of Trade’s case seemed perplexed by Pim’s strange attack:
I am really at a loss to understand why Captain Pim should have chosen this court as the arena for the purpose of making such serious charges against a public department of this country, when he especially is privileged to make them in another place [the House of Commons] where they could be answered and refuted by the responsible officials at the head of that department … It may be that he thought it was safer to do so under the shield and protection of the advocate’s gown.8
In their final report the Board of Trade stated that it was evident that two distinct theories had been put forward. One alleging a sudden porting and great alteration in her course by the Bywell Castle, the other a sudden change to a hard a-starboard by the Princess Alice while the Bywell Castle ported only a little to go astern of her. ‘To one or other of these irreconcilable theories the witnesses usually adhered, and in equal proportions.’ Therefore, the court had been obliged to attach great weight to the evidence of witnesses not attached to either theory coupled with the position of the wreck. They had come to the following conclusion, as reported in The Times:
That the Princess Alice rounded Tripcock Point at a short distance off the Kent shore; that she straightened up the Reach at reduced speed under a starboard helm, heading towards Bull Point, till she brought the Bywell Castle end on to her when the latter vessel was coming down the Reach, steering to go round Tripcock Point; that the Princess Alice then went on at full speed, and continued under starboard helm more or less throughout; that at one time she was brought by the porting of the Bywell Castle somewhat on the port side of that vessel; that she did not shut her red light in from the Bywell Castle till immediately before the collision, when the orders were given to put her helm hard-a-starboard and to stop her engines, both of which orders were obeyed, but too late. It is possible that the Princess Alice may have been set off by the tide further than usual while she was straightening up after passing Tripcock Point. This would have prevented her turning short enough to bring her green light in view by the Bywell Castle, and so bring green to green, before the two vessels got to be end on to each other. That the Bywell Castle entered Gallions Reach somewhere about mid-stream; that she then steered a course to go round Tripcock Point, at the same time seeing the Princess Alice coming round and showing her red light. The Bywell Castle continued this course till both vessels became end on; she then, by porting, brought the Princess Alice a little on her port bow, and that soon after the red light of the Princess Alice became shut in; this was immediately before the collision; that orders were then given to put the helm hard-a-port and to stop the engines, both of which orders were obeyed, but too late.9
It was clear, the report went on, that the Princess Alice had committed a breach of Rule 29, Section (d) of the Board of Trade Regulations and the Regulations of the Thames Conservancy Board, 1872, by not porting her helm when she came end on to a vessel coming in the opposite direction, whereas by suddenly putting her helm a-starboard at the last moment she ran straight across and under the bows of the Bywell Castle. Therefore, the Princess Alice was to blame and the accident was unavoidable by the Bywell Castle. It was the opposite verdict to the one that would soon be arrived at by the inquest.
They also pointed out that the accusations of faulty construction and unfitness for service of the Princess Alice were utterly unfounded and ‘that the charges against the officials of the Board of Trade are likewise utterly unfounded’. They deplored the fact they had been made. They did not think the Princess Alice had been overloaded but recommended restriction of night travel.
As to the rules of the road, the Thames Conservancy Board should make more effort to educate people about them, particularly now that the Thames had become so crowded. Obstructions such as hulks and vessels like the Talbot powder barge and the Castalia should be removed. They added a manifesto about the future of navigation on the river:
The traffic on the River Thames has now become so crowded, and the dimensions of vessels passing up and down n
ow exceed so enormously those of the ships of the last generation, that the safe navigation of the river by large steamships from 250 to 500 ft in length is incompatible with the presence of small craft drifting up and down with the tide, and (not being under control) unable to follow any rules whatever. Many of the owners of barges and small sailing vessels now find it to their interest to employ steam above Gravesend, and the court is of the opinion that the time has arrived when it should be made compulsory on them to do so, and that no serious hardship would be entailed upon them by such compulsory enactment, which would conduce to the safety of river navigation more than any other change contemplated. The court is informed that the Mersey, the Clyde, and the Tyne are already in advance of the Thames, as on these rivers the bulk of the river traffic is now conducted under steam.10
A rather curious comment, given that both vessels involved in the accident had been steam driven, but maybe the thinking was that with fewer small craft to watch out for more attention might be given to larger, more lethal ones.
As for the culpability of those charged, Captain Harrison had not failed to keep a proper lookout and had given the order to stop and reverse as soon as he saw the danger of collision. Dimelow and Thom carried out the order to stop the engines promptly, but Dimelow should not have left the engine room to call on deck his second and third engineers. Long had failed to keep an efficient lookout and neglected to inform Captain Grinstead of the Bywell Castle’s light as soon as he saw them and to pass them on from the forward lookout. But this had not affected the outcome. All the officers’ certificates were returned.
Captain Pim, (who had a reputation as the British Seaman’s Friend) was not about to relinquish his campaign against the Board of Trade. His next move was to send a very long missive to its president, Viscount Sandon MP, complaining that their inquiry should not have been held while the inquest was still in progress, thus interfering with the common law process, and that the wreck commissioner, not Mr Balguy, should have presided. He demanded a further inquiry and included a number of recommendations for improving navigation on the Thames.
The reply he received from John G. Talbot MP, parliamentary secretary of the Board of Trade, pointed out that much of his complaint was based on the misapprehension that the court of inquiry and assessors were nominated by them when, in fact, they were merely the promoters. The inquiries were actually made by justices (thus, Mr Balguy) and a wreck commissioner appointed by the Lord Chancellor and the assessors were from a Home Secretary’s list.
Doubtless with the best of motives, on Friday 13 December 1878, the day Parliament reconvened, Pim tabled a question for the President of the Board of Trade asking ‘whether in consequence of the national importance of the Princess Alice calamity, the length of time necessarily occupied by the coroner and jury on the inquest (from 4 September to 27 November), and the trying character of the duties, he will recommend to the proper authorities some official recognition of their arduous services’.11
No action was taken on this so he also moved that an address be presented to the queen that she give directions that there be laid before the House a return of proceedings of the coroner’s inquest on the loss of the Princess Alice plus any correspondence addressed to the coroner. This was done. However, the producing of this return added another complicated and expensive task to those already weighing Carttar down, such as who was to pay fees to the shorthand writers, the police, and for the use of the town hall, and how much would they be?
Notes
1. A ‘painter’ is a rope for fastening a boat.
2. The Times, 24 October 1878.
3. Ibid.
4. The Times, 25 October 1878.
5. Possibly referring to the wooden stringer suggested by Captain Samuel Pether as extra protection.
6. Board of Trade Investigation into the Wreck of the Princess Alice: Coroners’ Records COR/PA/34; The Times, 29 October 1878 and Gavin Thurston, The Great Thames Disaster p.121.
7. The Engineer, 15 November 1878.
8. Board of Trade Investigation into the Wreck of the Princess Alice; Coroners’ Records COR/PA/34: The Times, 29 October 1878 and Gavin Thurston, The Great Thames Disaster, pp.156–7.
9. The Times, 11 November 1878.
10. Ibid.
11. The Times, 14 December 1878.
CHAPTER TWENTY
Life Goes On
The fate of the orphans had continued to exercise the Mansion House Orphan sub-committee. Adoption offers had continued to come in both to them and to the west Kent coroner, Mr Carttar. At the launch of the sub-committee the secretary had reported forty-one private offers to take girls and ten for boys.
Many people had been quite specific about their requirements: Mrs Pugh, of St Stephen’s Square, wanted a girl between the ages of six and ten, bookseller Mr Wardleworth a girl between three and eight, while cab driver Mr Sear and his wife would not take a girl under two. What Mrs Taylor wanted was a middle-class girl and Messrs Hopkin and Page of Shoreditch offered to take a boy of thirteen to fifteen years into their service as an apprentice.
Many mothers had died in the accident but, even if they were still alive, there was a strong feeling that their children might be better off in an orphanage than with a mother who was likely to become poor. The sub-committee also suspected that some relatives might take on a child in the hope of receiving financial reward from the fund.
Ultimately, about half the fund money was spent on buying the children places in orphanages and subsequent apprenticeships. At one meeting a motion was put forward by Dr Piggott, seconded by the Reverend Anson, Rector of Woolwich, that before placing any children there should be inquiries into their educational standards and class. It was carried.
The problem was solved in some cases if the father had been or was a freemason, as Captain Grinstead had. Two of his children were admitted into Masonic schools. Later, in 1882, one of his sons, William Robert, joined the Thames Police. William had been an apprentice waterman employed on the river. When he heard of the accident he had made his way to the scene and, as the Thames Police Museum web pages relate, ‘spent the next three days searching the vicinity, only coming ashore when he learned that his father’s body, easily recognizable by his uniform, had been recovered’.1 When the fore part of the vessel was raised the company’s flag still hung on the mast. William reclaimed it for his family and it was passed down from generation to generation before eventually being presented to the Thames Police Museum at Wapping where it remains.
Soon, John J. Powell of Temple, one of The Times’ ever-active letter writers, was worrying whether the auditing of these charities was satisfactory given the huge amounts involved: £35,000 for the Princess Alice disaster, upwards of £40,000 for the Abercarne miners’ families and about £1,000,000 for the Indian Famine Fund.2 Official auditors should be appointed who would publish the results. This was questioned by S.R. Townsend Mayer who wanted to know:
… by what test would an auditor by able to decide whether excessive grants had been made to sufferers by the Princess Alice disaster? It is alleged that many frivolous and dishonest claims have been sent in to the Mansion House Committee. Possibly all, or nearly all, these attempts at imposition have been frustrated; but supposing, for the sake of argument, that one has been allowed, how could an auditor detect the cheat? The fact is you cannot lay down a Procrustean rule that shall be applicable to all charities.3
The Mansion House Fund on behalf of the victims of the Princess Alice disaster was wound up on 11 October 1878, having reached a total of £35,000. More trickled in after that including (according to The Times) 100 guineas from a gentleman in thanks for not being onboard the Princess Alice and another 100 because he was not a shareholder in the Glasgow Bank (which had collapsed)!
By the end of 1878, despite failing health, Carttar had resumed his involvement with local affairs and political life and his work as a solicitor and as coroner for west Kent. This meant that rather than sitting regularly in the Woolwich
Town Hall boardroom he was now obliged to travel about the district to hold his inquests in public houses, as was then the custom. But Carttar’s health was failing fast and his coroner’s court duties were increasingly taken over by his deputy, Mr G. Collier. A glimpse of him is given in his letter of 14 June 1879, to S. H. Turner, Esq, Kentish Bank, Maidstone, regarding the ongoing saga of the Princess Alice inquest fees. He wrote that he wished and intended to be at the next finance committee meeting – if his doctor would allow it:
I was anxious to get the unsettled matter of Police and Gurney’s4 fees arranged with the Finance Committee as I promised the Secretary of State, but in fear of my ability to travel so far I have written the letters enclosed and if I do not appear by noon, be pleased to present them with my apologies and state the cause of my absence and oblige.
One of the enclosures, in a shaky, pencil-written hand, asked for the sanction to reward his officers: ‘I am constantly and anxiously applied to by my officers for your decision’.5 There had been a public subscription for the police involved in coping with the Princess Alice disaster. This had been distributed to 500 policemen but had left out Carttar’s officers. Eventually, Carttar received a County sanction to distribute £30 among them out of which Gilham received £11.10s and the others around 30 shillings each.
Extraordinarily, almost exactly a year after the Princess Alice disaster, Captain Pim was defending the pilot of a ship that had been involved in a serious collision in the Thames near Tripcock Point. The vessels involved were the City of London, a 977-ton screw steamer from Aberdeen, and the Vesta, a 1,050-ton screw steamer out of Hamburg. The City of London had been coming downriver from Limehouse at 8.20 p.m. on 13 August 1879, on its regular Wednesday run. Aboard were forty-two crew and ninety-four passengers, 200 tons of cargo and some horses. Coming upstream at full speed was the Vesta carrying twenty-five crew, fifteen passengers and 600 tons of cargo. The City of London had rounded Tripcock Point, being obliged go towards midstream to avoid some barges, when the crew saw the Vesta speeding straight towards them. Warning whistles failed to halt her but, just before the moment of impact, she stopped her engines and turned full speed astern, which did not prevent her from ramming the City of London on her port side, cutting into her engine room and causing her to rapidly fill with water and begin to sink.