This was clear enough – Roberts owed his advancement to Lytton, shared his views, and was not going to contradict his patron’s wishes. Moreover, his own friendship with Cavagnari and the advantages he had seen of strong action at the start of the Indian Mutiny impelled him to act as the Viceroy wished. As a young subaltern he had unflinchingly watched sepoys blown from the mouths of cannon.
Lytton also urged for the city of Kabul, as a ‘great national culprit’, the punishment of ‘total destruction ... by fire, in order that all Afghanistan & India may plainly perceive the full flame of the candle lighted by the Kabulese as they fired the British Embassy on the evening of the 3rd of September.’ The Viceroy then said that perhaps partial destruction was reasonable, considering the outcry there might be, and he would support Roberts in any efforts ‘to avenge the murder of my friend – and yours’, adding that ‘some things I cannot order. Vengeance for precious lives will be welcomed and applauded by the public if prompt. Our immediate action is not conciliation but retribution.’ In another letter which he ordered him to burn, he told him to press on, not bother about lines of communication and seize every possible strategic point ‘before the political weathercock at home has shifted.’13
Roberts, carrying a copy of Sir Henry Durand’s History of the [1st] Afghan War;* travelled with his wife from Simla to Umballa, where he left her and joined a train carrying his staff. He recorded in his diary: ‘God help her and bless her – I am travelling as fast as I can to Kurram.’ Major George White, proceeding to join the Gordons, met her ‘returning slowly & sadly to Simla. I promised her that the regiment & I would look after Fred & perhaps bring him back a peer.’ White, a reserved, athletic, service-hardened veteran, had been twenty-six years with the colours and had yet to have his moment of glory. He was an old friend of Roberts, and had noticed in March how he had already looked Very worn and old; all the responsibility of commanding an expedition like this, and the adverse criticism, must be very trying.’ His kindness to Lady Roberts was rewarded with a Balaclava she knitted and sent to him.14
Roberts’s force was small, 7,500 men and twenty-two guns, but they were in good spirits and included the excellent Highlanders and Gurkhas. He had also brought two of the new Gatling guns, which he thought worth giving a chance. The battery gunners had practised with the weapons, but despite much care and attention the ammunition drums could be turned only gingerly and were prone to jam.15 Much depended upon the force’s speed of movement – Roberts wished to advance before the mass of Afghan hillmen should rally to fight him on the approach to Kabul and at the city. The massacre of Cavagnari and his escort had shown that the infidels were vulnerable but would come for revenge. The Russian press observed that the destruction of the English mission demanded speedy and exemplary punishment of the murderers and their accomplices, although the march to Kabul must be undertaken by troops exhausted by recent exertions. Delay would be a sign of weakness.16
Everything had to be improvised. Roberts sent Baker with an advanced force to occupy Kushi, 14 miles beyond Shutagardan, protecting the entrance to the Logar valley, to collect their necessary transport and supplies for a swift move on Kabul, while trying to deceive the Afghans that no advance was to be made until spring by remaining in the vicinity of Aki Khel. He and Baker took much care over the column’s organization, although the march routine appears to have been careless. Transport remained a headache, with the mules nothing but ‘bare bones and sores’. MacGregor as Chief of Staff rented 500 brewery carts and issued orders to send on every beast, however sick and feeble, able to take the road. Although the 3rd Sikhs gave up ninety of their camels, the force was still short and some of the cavalry led their horses laden with grain sacks. Roberts could move only half his troops at a time which left his line of march twice as vulnerable, but it worked.17 He reckoned his 80-mile advance to Kabul with a small force, surrounded by a hostile population, and with serious transport deficiencies, as a greater achievement than his more famous and longer advance to Kandahar.18
With the assistance of the former British agent at Kabul, Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan, Roberts came to an agreement with the Ghilzai chief, Allud-ud-Din, for safe passage in return for a present of 3,000 rupees and a monthly payment of 2,000 rupees during the campaign. He issued a proclamation intended to be reassuring, saying that the purpose of the expedition was to avenge the destruction of the Embassy, but that no innocent person would be harmed. MacGregor grumbled in his journal: ‘I think all this blackmail paying is very wrong in principle, but our force is so small that it requires all such help.’19 It was Ramadan, and good Muslims were fasting during the day, a discouragement to campaigning. Passing overhead were cranes making their way towards the plains of India, one of the first signs of winter.
Food was requisitioned at gunpoint, if the villagers proved sullen and refractory. With the mood of revenge for the fate of Cavagnari and his comrades, the British and Indian troops gave little thought to whether the villagers had sufficient for the harsh winter. By 19 September, Baker was entrenched with his brigade on the Shutagardan Pass, the road was being improved, and transport and ammunition were being collected; on the 27th, Roberts marched with a small mixed forced of cavalry and infantry, intending to rendezvous with Baker. The Shutagardan defile was blocked and an ambush laid by some 2,000 tribesmen whom the flanking parties failed to detect. According to MacGregor’s diary, Roberts was nearly shot when Afghans opened fire. The medical officer was wounded and five Sikhs killed. Men of the 92nd Highlanders and 3rd Sikhs, respectively under Colour Sergeant Hector Macdonald and Jemadar Sher Mahomed, a native of Kabul, drove off the enemy, the latter receiving the Order of Merit.20
On 30 September, amidst preparations for the final advance, Roberts managed a glass of champagne to celebrate his forty-seventh birthday. On 2 October, a hundred rifles of the 3rd Sikhs sent forward by Colonel Money routed an enemy on a strong prominence of rock. The passage of the last 35 miles to Kabul began on 3 October, a further proclamation to the people of Kabul heralding the advance: the city would be occupied, those guilty of the attack on the mission punished and anyone found armed in Kabul or nearby would be treated as an enemy. With his small force facing unknown odds, Roberts was determined to take firm and if necessary ruthless action. When the inhabitants of the village of Koti Khel fired on his men, they surrounded it at dawn on 5 October, and in a fierce reprisal two villagers were killed and five captured, of whom three were immediately shot on Roberts’s orders for being in rebellion against their lawful ruler, the Amir. Roberts had already told Baker to shoot any of the Amir’s troops in the field with arms, ‘otherwise hanging, which does not waste ammunition’. This reflected the Viceroy’s orders, Roberts’s own wish to avenge Cavagnari and his belief that ruthless measures would cow opposition.21
The Amir was caught between the advance of the avenging British and the anger of his people. In two letters to Roberts, passed on by Captain Conolly at Alikhel, he claimed that he had done his best to prevent the tragic events at the Residency and was deeply upset. ‘By this misfortunate I have lost my friend, the envoy, and also my kingdom. I am terribly grieved and perplexed.’22 Roberts believed this pleading was a cover for the Amir’s guilt. Nawab Ghulam Hussain Khan told him that although Yakub had not actually planned the massacre, he had taken no steps to prevent it and that he was now playing the British false. The Amir sent two ministers as emissaries to the British camp, but their main task appeared to be to stop the advance, and Roberts wrote to Yakub: ‘After what has recently occurred, I feel that the great British nation would not rest satisfied unless a British army marched to Kabul and there assisted Your Highness to inflict such punishments as so terrible and dastardly an act deserves.’23 Roberts was warned by Lyall that although the Amir did not seem likely to have instigated the attack on the Embassy, he and his advisers had been stirring up the tribes against the British. He told the Amir that the British Army was advancing to exact retribution on the murderers and restore the Amir’s
government.
At the top of the Shutagardan Pass later that evening Yakub’s latest letter reached Roberts followed by the information that Yakub himself had already arrived at Baker’s advanced camp, accompanied by his eight-year-old son. On 12 October, he walked into Roberts’s camp accompanied by only two attendants and expressed his determination to resign. He was in very low spirits, said that he would rather be a grass-cutter in the camp of the English than ruler in Afghanistan and begged to stay until the Viceroy agreed to his being sent to India. His appearance did not impress either Roberts or the young Political Officer, Mortimer Durand: ‘a weak vacillating face, pleasant enough at times, but not trustworthy or in any way impressive ... He seemed very nervous and fidgety.’24
Lytton warned Roberts that they must wait for cabinet instructions before accepting the abdication. He also said that General Luther Vaughan, the correspondent of The Times, a paper which reflected cabinet views, would soon be arriving and Roberts was to be particularly civil to him. ‘General Vaughan is ready to write up any policy of which the cue is given to him by me, or by you on my behalf. His letters to The Times from Kabul may have a considerable effect upon public opinion at home.’25
Roberts regarded the Amir’s presence in the camp, with a constant stream of visitors coming and going, as a security risk, and stationed a Highlander in front and a Gurkha behind his tent as sentries. He was more prisoner than honoured guest, and his plea to halt the advance because there was only one regiment to guard the ladies of his court and family, and who could tell what might happen to them, was contemptuously rejected. Roberts was more worried about street fighting and a repetition of the disaster of the 1st Afghan War. To a reassuring proclamation to the Afghan people he added one to his troops not to be guilty of ‘indiscretion’ with native women, a source of trouble in 1839-42, according to his father.26
As Roberts continued the advance across open cultivated country, parties of armed tribesmen sat watching. Early in the afternoon the vanguard reached a group of villages known as Charasia. Ahead loomed the last major obstacle before Kabul, a crescent-shaped range of defensible sandy hills running 3 miles roughly east-west, between 700 and 1,500 feet above the plain. As Roberts did not have his entire force, and reconnaissance found no serious enemy, he decided to camp nearby and bring up the rest of his troops. As dusk began to close and large parties of tribesmen were seen on the hills, Roberts had uncharacteristically made a mistake not seizing the pass ahead. At dawn on 6 October, the rising sun showed masses of regular troops with artillery deploying on the heights. The Official History recorded:
Behind these heights lay the densely crowded city of Kabul, with the scarcely less crowded suburbs of Chardeh, Deh-I-Afghan, etc., and the numerous villages which lie thickly clustered all over the Kabul valley. Each and all of these had contributed their quota of men to dispute advance of the British; and it did not require much experience of Afghans to know that the numbers already assembled would be very considerably increased, if the enemy were allowed to remain in possession of their stronghold for a single night.
About this time it was also reported that the road in rear of the column was blocked, and that the march of General MacPherson’s brigade, with its long string of baggage, would be opposed; whilst on the hills on both sides of General Roberts’s camp bodies of men were seen assembling and, as was afterwards learnt, only waiting for nightfall to make a general attack upon the encampment.’27
Any hesitation would have brought an attack in overwhelming numbers not just upon Roberts’s force, but also on MacPherson encumbered with the convoys of stores and ammunition. The Afghans held a strong position with eighteen guns, several regular battalions and a host of irregulars. Their commander was Sirdar Nek Mohammed who had returned to Kabul after a long and secret interview with the Amir, ostensibly with instructions to quieten the troops, but had reappeared with a strong force to dispute Roberts’s advance. He expected an attack on his left at the Sang-I-Nawishta defile. In a difficult position and greatly outnumbered, Roberts did not hesitate. He sent a message to MacPherson to join him before dark, resolved to attack the enemy’s right, their weakest place, and then roll up their line from west to east. Baker was sent forward with 2,000 men and guns including the two Gatlings. The 72nd Highlanders, 5th Gurkhas and 5th Punjab infantry advanced without check and took the lower heights. Meantime a small column under Major White engaged the Afghan left with great success, drawing their attention away from Baker’s flanking movement. White had spotted with his binoculars that the steep slope enabled his men to advance in dead ground, so he took advantage of this to lure the superior enemy force from their breastwork and then rout them in close fighting. A watching officer of the 5th Punjab Cavalry wrote: ‘Major White led then in a most gallant & splendid way ... The hill was won. I never saw or heard of a more dashing brilliant thing.’28
As White then advanced to assist Baker in his attack, the Afghan right and centre broke and fled. Baker’s infantry seized the main ridge, and, pivoting on their right, then swept forward against the enemy’s left. With great coolness White detached two companies to assist Baker. Outflanked and enfiladed by Baker’s force, the Afghans abandoned their position and retired across the river, the 92nd Highlanders ascending the height on the left and taking the enemy guns. The cavalry pursuit however was feeble, a Russian commentator observing: ‘A portion of General Massy’s cavalry brigade got during the day to the rear of the Afghan infantry and yet it managed to do nothing. It could have pursued the retreating enemy, but apparently it had not the heart to do so.’29
British casualties were eighteen killed and seventy wounded, the Afghans’ upwards of 300 dead. All eighteen guns had been taken. The Gatlings had been a disappointment, one jamming after the first few rounds; the heliograph proved more effective, communicating between the wings of Roberts’s scattered forces. The battle was the most critical that Roberts had yet fought -failure would probably have meant the total destruction of his force, isolated and divided as it was. While everyone on the British side displayed courage and determination, it was on Roberts that the burden of critical decision fell. Colonel Hanna censured Roberts’s rashness, but acknowledged that officers and men alike had ‘felt the inspiring influence of their commander’s indomitable courage, and unshakeable confidence in himself and them’. On the following day at first light, Roberts rode over to White and said, T congratulate you, I was sure the 92nd would do well.’ He told the Highlanders that no one could have surpassed them, and attributed much of the success to White’s military instincts and personal gallantry, recommending him for the Victoria Cross. It was a turning point in White’s career after years of undistinguished service. Likewise, Colour Sergeant Hector Macdonald, the son of a poor crofter, had shown courage and leadership at Charasia and in the action on 19 September, and was recommended for a commission.30
The occupation of Kabul, which lay ahead, could have been the trickiest part of the advance. The population was mostly hostile and large numbers of Afghan troops were still about. Roberts’s force was too small to cope with fighting in the narrow streets and bazaars and his Mutiny experience determined him to avoid doing so, but he had to follow up his victory. On the morning after the battle, he advanced and occupied the village of Beni Hissar, 3 miles beyond the pass, intending to concentrate his force there before moving on to Kabul. At Charasia, MacPherson was threatened by large bodies of tribesmen who dispersed only after two infantry battalions were sent against them. Roberts could not concentrate his force as intended, because he was told that three regular Afghan battalions and survivors from the battle had entrenched on the Asmai hills to the north-west. He sent Massy to reconnoitre and then Baker to attack, but it was dark before the latter was ready and action was postponed. In the morning the Afghans had gone. Massy sent his squadrons down the Ghazni road, and 22 miles west of Kabul the 5th Punjab Cavalry dispersed a small enemy party, but no others could be found. Kabul merchants visited Roberts, and told him the Af
ghan army had dispersed, most to their homes, one group with Sirdar Mahomed Jan going off together. The enemy’s camp was left standing, and guns, elephants, camels, mules and ponies were taken.
White was furious that Baker and Massy had not been more energetic. He and Captain Hay of the Gordons, with their small force tucked down for the night on the 8th, agreed that the enemy camp ‘under our nose within 800 yards’ should have been seized, and their prediction that by morning the Afghans would have made off was proven by intelligence received about 3.00 a.m. White told his wife that Roberts or MacPherson would have done better. ‘The enemy broke up into small parties & made off. Great recrimination between Baker & Redan Massy who commands the Cavalry & who is as arrant an imposter as ever drew a sword. Self indulgent, timid, good for nothing fellow.’ The men who might have included Cavagnari’s murderers had escaped. Mortimer Durand, Political Secretary, echoed this assessment: ‘The escape of the mutinous regiments was sheer bad management, and due to Massy. His cavalry was ample, and had he enclosed the hill as he could easily have done in a continuous chain of vedettes, the disappointment w[oul]d have been impossible ... Massy is a nice plucky fellow, but very lazy and careless.’31 Although White censured Baker for inactivity, he had done better than the cavalry. As the moon rose soon after 11.00 p.m., he had pushed ahead with the infantry, attacked the withdrawing enemy, killed a number and taken others prisoner, occupied their camp, and at 5.30 a.m. on the 9th sent a message back to Massy, the cavalry Brigadier who should have led the pursuit. Instead of pursuing, Massy had withdrawn his eight squadrons into two walled enclosures and settled down comfortably for the night.32
The March to Kandahar- Roberts in Afghanistan Page 10