Even with the introduction of higher quality tanks, the slow attrition of German technical resources in the east could not be reversed. Both the Red Army and the German army relied largely on horses, but the Soviet stock of motor-vehicles steadily expanded while the German stock declined by almost 50 per cent from a peak reached in January 1943. The number of half-track transporters fell from 28,000 in 1943 to eleven thousand at the end of 1944. As German forces fell back the effort to maintain mobility and levels of mechanisation was abandoned. By 1944 still only one-tenth of the German army was mechanised. Instead the production effort was diverted to heavy infantry weapons necessary to fight the long retreat. Even the Tiger and Panther, and the lumbering ‘King Tiger’ and ‘Mouse’ that followed, became tools of defence, mobile anti-tank platforms to blunt enemy armoured attacks. Their gradual switch from offensive to defensive firepower helps to explain why German troops remained an effective fighting force, even when vastly outnumbered in tanks and aircraft. But for the bulk of the German army during 1943 and 1944 there was a progressive decline in the number of tanks and supporting aircraft, of lorries and half-tracks to move the infantry and supplies, and even of artillery pieces.28 The German soldier got used to fighting without a German aircraft in sight, with dwindling supplies of fuel and ammunition, and trucks and tanks short of tyres, spares and lubricants, and long marches on foot or by sled. The small core of high quality weaponry sustained pockets of a modernised army; the rest of the army fought a refined version of the infantry and artillery battles of 1918.
The German air force in the east suffered the same fate, though for rather different reasons. There were the same problems of supply and maintenance over long distances, the severe shortages of spares and replacement engines, the problems of flying in cold weather for which German aircraft had not been properly equipped. The use of rough grass airfields in forward areas increased the losses of aircraft and crew through accidents. But the real failure in 1942 and 1943 was in not matching either the quantity or the quality of Soviet aviation. Luftwaffe leaders, no less than the army, failed to anticipate the high levels of attrition that would be experienced even against a much weaker enemy. Before losses could be made good that enemy began to fight with large numbers of aircraft of much higher quality, making it difficult for German air units to avoid the attrition cycle. The German effort to introduce a new generation of advanced aircraft in 1942 to restore the technical lead enjoyed at the start of the war failed disastrously.
In 1941 responsibility both for the production and development of aircraft in Germany lay with Colonel-General Ernst Udet. It was a post for which he was utterly unsuited. He was appointed in 1935 at Hitler’s suggestion. A veteran fighter-pilot, Udet made his reputation in the 1920s as a stunt-man of the silent screen. He was a notorious bon viveur and womaniser, who narrowly survived a knife attack by one of his mistresses. He was a talented cartoonist; he ate only meat, a habit that left him in chronic ill health when he held office; he loved hunting. For the job of chief technical director of the German air force he had almost no credentials whatsoever.29 All he had wanted to be was a test-pilot, and even in his new office he still flew dangerously to get the feel of new aircraft. He was fully aware of his wide limitations. His only contribution to air force development was to insist that all bomber aircraft, even large four-engined craft, should have a dive-bombing capability, a requirement that set German bomber development years behind that of the Allies.
Under his wayward stewardship the Luftwaffe lost its direction. The real architect of German air power in the 1930s was Erhard Milch, an ex-director of Lufthansa, and Göring’s deputy. But in 1939, jealous of his successful subordinate, Göring excluded Milch from the realm of technical development and production altogether, and left the work to Udet. Between 1939 and 1942 aircraft production stagnated. Udet lacked the organisational skills and strength of character to impose what views he might have had on the scientists and entrepreneurs under his control. Unable to reach clear decisions about the development of new aircraft models he became the victim of rivalry between aircraft designers and the butt of every complaint from bureaucrats and airmen. Except for the Focke-Wulf 190, which proved to be a fighter aircraft of high quality when it was introduced in the autumn of 1941, every one of the new aircraft Udet selected was a failure. The He-177 long-range bomber, which Göring and Hitler wanted for attacks on Soviet industry and the Atlantic trade routes, was plagued with technical problems that stemmed from Udet’s dive-bombing order, and was never produced in any quantity.30 The new generation of medium-bombers and heavy fighters, the Junkers Ju-288 and the Me-210, were technical flops and were scrapped, but only after a heavy investment of money and production effort. The replacement for the ageing Stuka dive-bomber, the Hs-129, which was expected to match the Soviet Sturmovik, had to be withdrawn because its engines caught fire too easily, and were so susceptible to the dust of the southern Russian steppe that serviceability could not be maintained.31
The failure of almost the whole range of new air designs forced the Luftwaffe to stick with older, proven models. But the damage was done. Production of older models was run down to make room for the new; a great deal of modern factory space and skilled labour was allocated to production that never materialised. The prospect of developing German air strategy with long-range bombing and enhanced battlefield firepower evaporated. It proved impossible to expand numbers to meet all Germany’s many air fronts; air reserves, which for the Soviet Union comprised almost half of all combat aircraft, could not be built up. Udet did not survive long enough to see the chickens home to roost. On 17 November 1941, unable to stand the strain of office any longer, he drank two bottles of brandy and shot himself through the mouth. Milch was his successor. The unravelling of Udet’s legacy took almost two years, by which time German aircraft production was dwarfed by that of the Allies. Priority switched to defending the Reich during 1943, while air power on the eastern front declined. The last attempt to mass German aircraft offensively in the east came at the Battle of Kursk, when over a thousand planes supported the armoured thrusts. By this time the gap between the two air forces had all but disappeared; German losses at Kursk amounted to 1,030 aircraft. Air superiority passed to the Red air force. As more and more aircraft were sucked into the defence of the Reich, numbers in the east collapsed. German air forces mustered little more than three hundred fighters and three hundred bombers along the whole front during 1944, manned by crews whose levels of training and tactical skill were often a fraction of what had been the norm in 1941.32
* * *
It was Germany’s misfortune to be allied in the Second World War with two states whose ability to produce and deploy the new technologies of war was limited in the extreme. Neither Italy nor Japan developed large armoured forces; neither was effectively motorised; Japanese aircraft production, like Italian, was restricted by shortages of raw materials and industrial capacity. Though both states could produce designs of high quality, they lacked the technical means to turn them into large numbers of battlefront weapons that could compete on equal terms with the enemy.
The mechanisation of ground forces made scant progress by Allied standards. Italian military leaders well understood the principles behind modern armoured warfare. The Italian army actually organised the first armoured corps in 1938, and used an armoured division for the invasion of Albania in 1939. And there it stopped. Italy fought the war with the three mechanised divisions she possessed in 1939. They were equipped with tanks that were between ten and twenty years old, with small-calibre armament. A new tank, the M13, was introduced into battle in the invasion of Greece in 1941, but proved easy prey for Greek artillerymen. The M11 tank used in the North African desert was under-armed and poorly maintained. Two of the three armoured divisions were destroyed at the Battle of Alamein. None of them had adequate numbers of supporting vehicles. Most of Italy’s 75 divisions were horse-drawn; in August 1942 two Italian cavalry squadrons made their country’s last cavalry
charge with sabres drawn against a Soviet infantry division. The divisions nominally designated as ‘motorised’ divisions had only 350 vehicles each. Tank production was too small to supply more – only 667 tanks were manufactured in the whole of 1942 and 350 in 1943. Even for these small numbers the supply of fuel and ancillary services proved difficult.33
Japan made no attempt to embrace the new developments. The army remained an infantry army, reliant largely on horses. Army divisions had on average three thousand mounts, but fewer than three hundred vehicles. Tanks were produced in small quantities to serve as infantry support. They were poor by wartime standards. Armour was so thin it could be penetrated by small-arms fire, while the standard heavy tank boasted only a 37-millimetre gun. Production of tanks, most of them light vehicles, declined during the war from 1,100 in 1942 to 400 in 1944, and a mere 142 in 1945. For all its postwar success, the Japanese car industry was tiny in the 1930s. In 1938 Toyota produced 458 cars, Honda 1,242 and Datsun 2,908.34 Most of the army’s stock of trucks in 1941 were imported American models, for which the supply of spare parts dried up. The entire Japanese army had approximately seventy thousand trucks and cars, and limited numbers of personnel carriers and half-tracks. This represented one truck for every 49 soldiers overseas against an American figure of one for every thirteen. During 1942 the Japanese army explored the prospect of building up self-contained armoured forces but rejected the idea as beyond Japan’s capability. Tanks played only the smallest part in the conquest and defence of the southern empire.35
Possessing few tank forces of their own, the Japanese army failed to develop anti-tank weapons. Southern Asia and the Pacific were not ideal terrain for tanks, but both American and British forces deployed them in ever-increasing numbers. The Japanese army responded with primitive solutions. Coconuts were hollowed out and primed with explosives; soldiers stacked with explosives threw themselves under the tracks of oncoming tanks; others were positioned in foxholes in the ground holding bombs over their heads to detonate when tanks rumbled above them. Much other Japanese weaponry was obsolete. The main infantry rifle dated from 1905; it was difficult to fire rapidly, and was accurate over only relatively short distances. The heavy machine gun was a 1914 Hotchkiss model. The standard infantry artillery pieces dated from 1905 (a 75-millimetre gun) and 1922 (70-millimetre), but there was nothing to match the Allied artillery barrage. The key infantry weapon was the light machine gun, also a 1922 model. Japanese soldiers were encouraged whenever possible to use their bayonet, a 15½-inch blade kept on the rifle at all times. Officers used their swords, sharp enough to cut through a man’s body at the first stroke.36
Once the United States brought the weight of its new technology to bear in the Pacific war the contest became very one-sided. On the ground, in the air and at sea America enjoyed a wide lead in both quality and quantity. Japanese industry provided obsolescent material in substantial quantities until the blockade began to bite in 1944, but it suffered exceptional levels of attrition, leaving Japanese forces short of air cover, naval equipment and fuel. The demodernisation of Japanese forces threw them back on the one resource they had left: exceptional levels of endurance and moral commitment. Training and discipline in the Japanese forces was harsh by western standards. In 1934 a young American infantry lieutenant, Harold Doud, spent a year with a Japanese regiment. He observed at once a regime of strict obedience and elaborate protocol; the most minor transgression brought instant and violent punishment. Training pushed men to the very limit. Forced marches in the hottest parts of the day were supplemented by hours of bayonet practice. On an exercise he marched almost continuously for 29 hours without sleep. The men slept on long wooden platforms in barracks and lived mainly on a diet of rice and daikon, a pickled turnip. Each mealtime was accompanied by a long lecture on tactical or technical questions. Idle time was unknown; in the field soldiers were posted on sentry duty or patrols to keep them active. ‘Holidays’ to mark past Japanese victories were regarded as days on which training efforts were redoubled in honour of dead comrades and the Emperor.37
Military culture in Japan demanded the highest sacrifices from soldiers, even a willingness to kill themselves, flying aircraft packed with explosive into enemy ships, or making suicidal attacks on tanks and enemy positions. To retreat or be taken prisoner was an act of profound dishonour. Military codes were savagely enforced. The unwillingness to surrender, and the ability to survive for long periods of time in conditions of appalling deprivation, made the Japanese soldier a difficult enemy to defeat. That the long retreat through the islands of the South Pacific was so hard fought was not explained by the firepower or technology available to the Japanese garrisons. It owed more to the value-system of the military in Japan, and to high standards of tactical training. Nevertheless, fighting to the death was a self-defeating virtue. Japanese forces were drained of their best manpower early in the conflict. Levels of attrition were far too high to build up adequate reserves, and left Japan with a low ratio of military technology to manpower. Japan began the war with 232 serviceable naval craft; by the beginning of 1944 there were 180 and by the start of the following year only 95. The loss rate of Japanese naval aircraft in the first eighteen months of the war was 96 per cent.38 The weaknesses of the Japanese economy and the constant interruption of supply lines by enemy aircraft and submarines made it impossible to reverse the cycle of attrition, and condemned Japan to fight an old-fashioned war against an enemy whose technology and fighting power constantly expanded.
That such an imbalance should exist might be regarded as entirely predictable. Japanese fighting power reflected both the strengths and weaknesses of Japanese society. America’s abundant use of military technology was in turn a reflection of a culture fascinated by technical progress and invention, with a great depth of technical skill and experience. America was the world’s leader in the application of the internal combustion engine, on the ground and in the air. In a very general sense the advantages of technical familiarity were carried into America’s war effort. But they needed to be translated into effective use on the battlefield. In 1940 there were no American armoured divisions; the air force had given little thought to its role in offensive warfare. American military technology compared poorly with the best available in Europe. The defeat of the Panzer Lehr division four years later depended on America’s ability to forge a modern armed force out of the raw manpower and technology to hand.
In the 1930s the only mechanised force in the American army was the 7th Cavalry Brigade. It mustered 224 light tanks and a few self-propelled guns. The success of German forces in Poland and France forced American military leaders to rethink the whole shape of their army. In July 1940 the first two armoured divisions were created under the command of a separate Armored Force; in 1941 three more were activated. The Victory Programme planned for a final force of 61 armoured divisions. The first divisions were built in what was mistakenly thought to be imitation of Panzer forces, with an overwhelming preponderance of tanks rather than a mixed force. But field exercises held in 1941 showed the disturbing evidence that modern anti-tank weaponry could destroy massed tank attacks. Soviet armies learned the same lesson the hard way in 1941. In 1942 the structure of the armoured division was overhauled. The number of tanks was reduced to two regiments from three, and a regiment of motorised infantry with three battalions of self-propelled artillery was added. With the addition of engineers and service battalions, the new division was actually much more like its German counterpart, a self-supporting combined-arms unit with considerable tactical flexibility. However, the American division had the advantage that all its infantry was carried in armoured half-tracks, and all its artillery was motorised. In addition the unit had two Combat Commands, A and B, which allowed the division to develop smaller combined-arms combat forces capable of fighting on their own. This gave the whole structure even more flexibility. Each division had 375 tanks and 759 other tracked and armoured vehicles; the first Panzer divisions had had 328 and 97 respec
tively.39
The initial purpose was to use the armoured divisions as the decisive shock force, like the Panzer armies of 1940, but experience in the early fighting in Tunisia and Italy, where the terrain was largely unsuitable for the massed deployment of armour, brought a final reform of the way in which the US army organised its forces. Instead of fighting with two armies, one formed of the heavily armoured tank divisions, one based on infantry, the two were fused together to create, in effect, one vast Panzer army, with the resources more evenly spread. The number of armoured divisions planned was reduced from 61 to sixteen, and they were integrated with the general army command structure. They had a larger complement of tanks to allow them to be used in pursuit and exploitation, but were otherwise indistinguishable from the regular army divisions, all of which were allocated a battalion of tanks and self-propelled artillery and were fully motorised. The object was to fight in combination, tanks, artillery and infantry each supporting the other. As with the Soviet system a large reserve of tank battalions could be allocated to critical points in the battle. The breakout from St Lô was a good example of the system at work – an initial thrust by heavily armed and mobile infantry divisions to create a protected channel through which the armoured divisions could move, to exploit the fracturing of the enemy line.
The American decision to produce a completely mechanised and motorised army, rather than a heavily armed core, was made possible by the generous supply of vehicles from American industry and the very large pool of drivers and mechanics available at home. America was the most heavily motorised of the major combatants. In 1937 she produced over 4.8 million vehicles; Germany produced 331,000, Italy 71,000, Japan 26,000. For every thousand Americans there were well over two hundred motor-cars and trucks; for every thousand Germans only sixteen; for every thousand Japanese there was less than one.40 America’s motor-car culture helped to compensate for the lack of a conscript army. Both air force and tank force enjoyed high levels of serviceability. Standardisation of design – the original five tank engines were reduced to just one type for ease of maintenance – allowed interchangeability of parts and rapid repair and redeployment of damaged vehicles. American forces were backed up by a formidable supply organisation based on sturdy purpose-built army trucks. These were produced in such quantity that there was little need to resort to civilian requisitioning, whereas the German army was forced to denude the home economy of motor traffic. During 1944 America produced almost 600,000 army trucks. German industry turned out just 88,000, against losses between January and August of well over 100,000.41
Why the Allies Won Page 33