71 Imperial War Museum, Speer Collection, Box 368, Report 67, p. 14, interrogation and notes of Karl-Otto Saur. See too Report 68, p. 18, interrogation of Ernst Blaicher, who confirmed that Germany could have produced 30,000 tanks in 1944, rather than the 19,000 actually produced.
72 Air Ministry, Rise and Fall, p. 298.
73 PRO, AIR 10/3873, British Bombing Survey Unit, ‘German Experience in the Underground Transfer of War Industries’, pp. 6–12.
74 See the general treatment of this question in E. Beck, Under The Bombs: The German Home Front 1942–1945 (Lexington, Kentucky, 1986). For good case studies of German cities: D. Busch, Der Luftkrieg im Raum Mainz während des Zweiten Weltkrieges 1939–1945 (Mainz, 1988); M. Hiller (ed.), Stuttgart im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Gerlingen, 1989).
75 G. Kirwin, ‘Allied Bombing and Nazi Domestic Propaganda’, European History Quarterly 15 (1985), pp. 341–62.
76 J. Stern, The Hidden Damage (New York, 1947, reissued London, 1990), p. 230.
77 USSBS, ‘Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale’, pp. 20–1.
78 USSBS, European Theatre, Report 64B, ‘The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale’, vol. I (Washington, May 1947), pp. 13–14.
79 USSBS, Report 18, ‘Bayerische Motorenwerke AG (Munich)’ (Washington, 22 October 1945), p. 5; USSBS, ‘Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale’, p. 20.
80 Quoted in M. Hastings, Bomber Command (London, 1979), p. 241.
5 Along a Good Road
THE INVASION OF FRANCE
1 S. Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945 (3 vols, London, 1961), II, pp. 185–90; A. J. Marder, M. Jacobsen, J. Horsfield, Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy 1942–1945 (Oxford, 1990), pp. 155–9.
2 W.S. Churchill, The Second World War (6 vols, London, 1948–54), IV, p. 212.
3 J. A. Brown, Eagles Strike: South African Forces in World War II, Vol. IV (Cape Town, 1974), pp. 388–400; Marder et al, Old Friends, p. 158.
4 Churchill, Second World War, IV, pp. 197–8.
5 T. Parrish, Roosevelt and Marshall: Partners in politics and war (New York, 1989), p. 255; M. Matloff, E. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare (2 vols, Washington, 1953–9), I, pp. 161–77.
6 R.F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A history of United Stales military strategy and policy (London, 1973), pp. 317–21.
7 F. Morgan, Overture to Overlord (London, 1950), pp. 134–6.
8 R.M. Leighton, R.W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943–45 (Washington, 1968), pp. 835–6, appendices d-1, d-3.
9 Ibid., pp. 16–25, appendix B-1, pp. 826–8.
10 Ibid., pp. 10–25, 205–13, appendix B-2, p. 829.
11 Morgan, Overture, pp. 142–4; J. Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol. V: August 1943 to September 1944 (London, 1946), pp. 54–6. The size of the assault force in the original plan was conditioned by the narrow beach exits, which it was estimated could handle only 12,100 vehicles in the first 24 hours, enough for only three divisions.
12 The Secret History of World War II: The Ultra-secret wartime letters and cables of Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill (New York, 1986), Stalin to Roosevelt, 11 June 1943, pp. 106–7.
13 E. Morgan, FDR: A biography (London, 1985), p. 625.
14 M. Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943–44 (Washington, 1959), pp. 10–11. The remark was made by General Thomas T. Hardy. On British preferences, see M. Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War (London, 1968), chs 1–2. For a wartime analysis, B.L. Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare (London, 1942).
15 The contrast is discussed in Weigley, American Way of War, pp. 327–34. See too K. Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II: A reconsideration (Baltimore, 1963), esp. pp. 24–48.
16 Matloff, Strategic Planning, pp. 213–14.
17 M. A. Stoler, The Politics of the Second Front: American military planning in coalition warfare, 1941–1943 (Westport, Conn., 1977), pp. 11–15.
18 Ibid., pp. 130–1; A. Bryant, Triumph in the West: The war diaries of Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke (London, 1959), p. 58; D. Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938–1945 (London, 1971), p. 570, entry for 26 October 1943.
19 S. Beria, Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin (London, 2001), pp. 192–3.
20 Details on Teheran from R.E. Sherwood (ed.), The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins (2 vols, London, 1949), II, pp. 771–90; Morgan, FDR, pp. 693–4,697–704; Dilks (ed.) Diaries of Cadogan, pp. 578–82; Stoler, Politics of the Second Front, pp. 146–9; J. Ehrman, Grand Strategy Vol. V: August 1943 to September 1944 (London, 1956), pp. 174–81.
21 A. Birse, Memoirs of an Interpreter (London, 1967), pp. 160–1.
22 P. Brendon, Ike: His life and times (New York, 1986), p. 45 for quotation, chs 1–4 for Eisenhower’s career.
23 Bryant, Triumph in the West, p. 114, Alanbrooke’s diary entry for 24 January 1944: ‘Eisenhower has got absolutely no strategical outlook. He makes up, however, by the way he works for good co-operation between allies’. See the full comments in A. Danchev, D. Todman (eds), War Diaries 1939–1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke (London, 2001), p. 351: ‘I am afraid that Eisenhower as a general is quite hopeless.’
24 Details from B.L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery (London, 1958), chs 1–3.
25 Montgomery Memoirs, pp. 210–12; Churchill, Second World War, V, p. 393.
26 D.D. Eisenhower, Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe (London, 1946), pp. 11, 16–17; G. A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack (Washington, 1951), pp. 164–74.
27 Eisenhower, Report by the Supreme Commander, p. 7; S.E. Morison, The Invasion of France and Germany 1944–1945, History of US Naval Operations, vol. IX (London 1957), pp. 28–33.
28 Leighton, Coakley, Global Logistics, appendix d-5, p. 838, appendix D-3, p. 836; the figure of 350,000 from Eisenhower, Report by the Supreme Commander, p. 16.
29 Quotation from Morison, Invasion of France and Germany, p. 32; shipping details from L. Ellis, Victory in the West: Vol. I, The Battle of Normandy (London, 1962), pp. 34, 507; Royal Navy Historical Branch, Battle Summary No. 39, Operation ‘Neptune’ (London, 1994), p. 38 gives the following figures for the overall shipping allocated:
naval units 1,206
landing craft 4,127
ancillary craft 423
merchant ships 1,260
total 7,016
30 Roskill, War at Sea, III, pp. 25–8.
31 Eisenhower, Report by the Supreme Commander, pp. 13–14; W.F. Craven, J.L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II (6 vols, Washington, 1948–55, reissued 1983), III, pp. 73–4.
32 R.G. Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe (Washington, 1992), p. 366; A. Harris, Bomber Offensive (London, 1947), pp. 197–201.
33 S.E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New York, 1990), p. 126.
34 Davis, Carl A. Spaatz, pp. 336–8.
35 Craven, Cate, Army Air Forces, III, pp. 75–81; Davis, Carl A. Spaatz, pp. 347–9.
36 Craven, Cate, Army Air Forces, III, p. 160; Churchill, Second World War, V, pp. 465–7 for the Churchill-Eisenhower-Roosevelt correspondence; Davis, Carl A. Spaatz, pp. 400–1.
37 Craven, Cate, Army Air Forces, III, p. 158; Eisenhower, Report by the Supreme Commander, p. 20.
38 Craven, Cate, Army Air Forces, III, pp. 159–60.
39 For details see J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System 1939–1945 (London, 1972), esp. chs 10, 11; M. Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War (London, 1990), chs 5, 6; on air reconnaissance D. Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German military intelligence in World War II (London, 1978), pp. 499–500. An average of one successful photo-reconnaissance flight every other day was the most the German air force could supply, far too little to provide a clear picture of Allied forces or movements.
40 Howard, Strategic Deception, 115–17; Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, pp. 488–9; C. C
ruickshank, Deception in World War II (London, 1979), pp. 99–113, 177–86.
41 Cruickshank, Deception, pp. 177–81; W.B. Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy deception (Westport, Conn., 1993), pp. 110–17.
42 Cruickshank, Deception, pp. 176–7; Howard, Strategic Deception, pp. 106, 120.
43 Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler, pp. 110–12; Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, pp. 489–91.
44 Howard, Strategic Deception, p. 131; Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, pp. 492–6.
45 Eisenhower, Report by the Supreme Commander, pp. 20, 24; on German reactions see Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, pp. 488–9; Howard, Strategic Deception, pp. 130–1; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 257–60.
46 Cited in Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, p. 497.
47 H. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler’s War Directives 1939–1945 (London, 1964), pp. 218–20; F. Gilbert (ed.), Hitler Directs His War: The secret records of his daily military conferences (New York, 1950), pp. 76–7; B. Liddell Hart, The Rommel Papers (London, 1953), pp. 465–6.
48 A. Speer, Inside the Third Reich (London, 1971), pp. 352–4; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 142–7; M. Cooper, The German Army, 1933–1945 (London, 1978), pp. 485–91; F. Ruge, ‘The Invasion of Normandy’, in H.-A. Jacobsen, J. Rohwer, Decisive Battles of World War II: The German view (London, 1965), pp. 322–5.
49 Details in D. Fraser, Knight’s Cross: A life of Field-Marshal Rommel (London, 1993), pp. 452–60; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 241–64; Liddell Hart, Rommel Papers, pp. 454–60.
50 Morison, Invasion of France and Germany, pp. 43–6; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp 236–40.
51 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 154–5, 249–52; B. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill (London, 1948), pp. 387–9 for the views of Rundstedt and von Schweppenburg; E.F. Ziemke, ‘Rundstedt’, in C. Barnett (ed.) Hitler’s Generals (London, 1989), pp. 198–9; F. Ruge, Rommel und die Invasion: Erinnerungen von Friedrich Ruge (Stuttgart, 1959), pp. 174–5.
52 Fraser, Knight’s Cross, pp. 460–4.
53 Liddell Hart, Other Side, pp. 398–403; Cooper, German Army, pp. 500–1.
54 Fraser, Knight’s Cross, p. 461.
55 R. Miller, Nothing Less than Victory: The oral history of D-Day (London, 1993), pp. 79–88, 90–8 on the mood of German soldiers; Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, pp. 507–9 on the May scare.
56 Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, pp. 505–11.
57 Roskill, War at Sea, III, p. 18; Morison, Invasion of France and Germany, pp. 69–70; on the meeting, see C. D’Este, Decision in Normandy (New York, 1983), pp. 82–90.
58 D.D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (London, 1948), p. 269; on Churchill’s remarks to Harriman, see W. Averell Harriman with E. Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941–1946 (London, 1976), p. 311: ‘“He told me”, Harriman recalled, “that if Overlord failed, the United States would have lost a battle, but for the British it would mean the end of their military capability.”’
59 Morison, Invasion of France and Germany, p. 68; Roskill, War at Sea, III, p. 12.
60 Eisenhower, Report by the Supreme Commander, pp. 18–19; Royal Navy Historical Branch, Operation ‘Neptune’, pp. 70–1.
61 Bryant, Triumph in the West, p. 157, Alanbrooke’s diary entry for 27 May 1944; M. Blumenson (ed.), The Patton Papers 1940–1945 (Boston, 1974), p. 454.
62 Ambrose, Eisenhower, p. 135.
63 Morison, Invasion of France and Germany, pp. 79–80; Royal Navy Historical Branch, Operation ‘Neptune’, pp. 72–4. The Admiralty predicted a force eight gale in the Irish Sea, moving eastwards. See too Eisenhower, Crusade, pp. 273–4.
64 Ambrose, Eisenhower, pp. 138–40; Eisenhower, Crusade, pp. 274–5; Brendon, Ike, p. 145 has the final words as ‘“O.K. We’ll go.”’ Perhaps he spoke less distinctly than those present recalled.
65 Morison, Invasion of France and Germany, pp. 84–7; Fraser, Knight’s Cross, p. 485; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 275–6; Ruge, Rommel und die Invasion, p. 166.
66 Miller, Nothing Less than Victory, p. 221.
67 On the bombardments see Roskill, War at Sea, III, pp. 42–7; Morison, Invasion of France and Germany, pp. 11–12, 93–4; Craven, Cate, Army Air Forces, III, pp. 190–3.
68 Eisenhower, Report by the Supreme Commander, p. 32.
69 Ruge ‘Invasion of Normandy’, pp. 336, 342–3; Roskill, War at Sea, III, pp. 53–5; Royal Navy Historical Branch, Operation ‘Neptune’, p. 132 for losses throughout the campaign. Weather claimed 153 craft of all kinds (mostly small vessels); enemy action (submarines, torpedo boats, aircraft, shore fire) claimed 108, including 25 warships and 18 cargo vessels.
70 British Air Ministry, The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force 1919–1945 (London, 1947, reissued 1983), pp. 323–5, 327–32. By the end of June the Allies enjoyed an 11:1 superiority in fighter aircraft in France. On Rommel’s views on the decisive effect of air attack, see Ruge, Rommel und die Invasion, pp. 169–70; L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West: Vol. I, The Battle of Normandy (London, 1962), p. 567, has figures of 466 serviceable combat aircraft for the whole 3rd air fleet territory.
71 Speer, Inside the Third Reich, pp. 354–5; Goebbeis diaries, entries for 5th, 7th and 8 June, Daily Mail 11 July 1992, pp. 6–7; H. Eberle, M. Uhl (eds) The Hitler Book: The Secret Dossier Prepared for Stalin (London, 2005) pp. 148–9.
72 Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1939–1945 (London, 1948, reissued 1990), pp. 395–6, conference of 12 June 1944; pp. 403–4, conference at the Berghof, 12 July 1944; Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, pp. 514–19.
73 Bryant, Triumph in the West, p. 167, letter from Montgomery to Brooke, 13 June 1944; E. Bauer, Der Panzerkrieg: Band II, Der Zusammenbruch des Dritten Reiches (Bonn, 1966?), pp. 100–1. The balance of forces developed as follows:
74 Roskill, War at Sea, III, pp. 63–6; C. Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (London, 1952), pp. 321–2; Eisenhower, Report by the Supreme Commander, pp. 68–9.
75 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 422–49; Eisenhower, Report by the Supreme Commander, pp. 39–40; Morison, Invasion of France and Germany, pp. 176–9.
76 H.C. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower (London, 1946), p. 498, entry for 13 June 1944, and p. 520, entry for 1 July 1944.
77 Ambrose, Eisenhower, pp. 144–7; N. Hamilton, Monty: Vol. II, Master of the Battlefield (London, 1983), pp. 642–4, 657–61; Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, pp. 338–41.
78 Figures from D. Belchem, Victory in Normandy (London, 1981), p. 178; Bauer, Panzerkrieg, pp. 124–5. On the issue of Caen see D’Este, Decision in Normandy, pp. 249–50, who cites Montgomery’s view that ‘Ground did not matter so long as German divisions stayed on this flank’. See too O.N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story of the Allied Campaigns from Tunis to the Elbe (London, 1951), p. 317: ‘while Montgomery held the pivot at Caen, the whole Allied line was to wheel eastward …’ For a more critical assessment of the failure to take Caen, see A. Horne with D. Montgomery, The Lonely Leader: Monty 1944–1945 (London, 1994), pp. 123–6.
79 Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (4 vols, Frankfurt, 1961), IV, pp. 316–17; Ruge ‘Invasion of Normandy’, pp. 339–40.
80 Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, p. 398, conference of 29 June to 1 July, Berghof; Kriegstagebuch, IV, pp. 323–4.
81 Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, pp. 356–7; H. von Luck, Panzer Commander (New York, 1989), pp. 150–1.
82 Cited in Horne, Lonely Leader, p. 207, from a report by General Dawnay to Brooke, delivered on 14 July; see too Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, pp. 353–5, who cites Montgomery’s instructions to General O’Connor on 15 July that the object of Goodwood was ‘generally to destroy German equipment and personnel’. Also see Ellis, Victory in the West, I, pp. 329–30. Eisenhower endorsed this reading of the strategy in Report by the Supreme Commander, p. 39: ‘Our strategy … was to hit hard in the east in order to contain the enemy main strength there while consolidating our position in the west …’
83 Kriegstagebuch, IV, p. 326; Bauer, Panzerkrieg, pp. 104–5, 125–6; Wilmot, Str
uggle for Europe, p. 388; on Goodwood, Belchem, Victory in Normandy, pp. 153–6; J. A. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign (New York, 1991), pp. 227–31; Cooper, German Army, pp. 506–7.
84 Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, pp. 528–37; Ambrose, Eisenhower, pp. 147–9; Montgomery, Memoirs, pp. 261–3; M. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit (US Army in World War II, European Theatre, Washington, 1961), pp. 194–6.
85 Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, pp. 390–2; G. Picot, Accidental Warrior: In the front-line from Normandy till victory (London, 1993), p. 109; Belchem, Victory in Normandy, p. 178.
86 On air tactics, R.P. Hallion, Strike from the Sky: The history of battlefield air attack 1911–1945 (Washington, 1989), pp. 206–14; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, pp. 238–9.
87 Blumenson (ed.), Patton Papers, p. 456.
88 Cooper, German Army, pp. 507–8; Bauer, Panzerkrieg, pp. 132–4; Kriegstagebuch, IV, pp. 328–9.
89 W. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters (London, 1964), pp. 447–9; Liddell Hart, Other Side, pp. 418–22; Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, pp. 400–2.
90 Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, pp. 457–65; on Ultra, R. Bennett, Ultra in the West: The Normandy campaign of 1944–1945 (London, 1979), pp. 112–16; Craven, Cate, Army Air Forces, III, pp. 248–52.
91 Cooper, German Army, pp. 510–11; Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, pp. 420–1.
92 M. Shulman, Defeat in the West (London, 1947), p. 175; von Luck, Panzer Commander, pp. 162–5.
93 W. Thornton, The Liberation of Paris (London, 1963), pp. 205–9.
94 Speer, Inside the Third Reich, pp. 488–9.
95 Hitlers politisches Testament: Die Bormann Diktate vom Februar und April 1945 (Hamburg, 1981), pp. 121–5, 2 April 1945.
96 Eisenhower, Report by the Supreme Commander, pp. 143–5 on the surrender; on victory celebrations in Britain, R. Cross, VE Day: Victory in Europe, (London, 1985), pp. 92–3; on the Soviet Union, R. Parker, Moscow Correspondent (London, 1949), pp. 11–13; a rather different account in C. Porter, M. Jones, Moscow in World War II (London, 1987), p. 214.
Why the Allies Won Page 52