Why the Allies Won

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Why the Allies Won Page 54

by Richard Overy


  39 Ogorkiewicz, Armoured Forces, pp. 87–92; K. Greenfield, R.R. Palmer, B. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops (Washington, 1947), pp. 64–72.

  40 Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, The Motor Industry of Great Britain, 1938 (London, 1939); League of Nations, World Production and Prices 1925–1935 (Geneva, 1936), p. 90.

  41 USSBS, Report 77, ‘German Vehicle Industry Report’, pp. 8–10, 13.

  42 H.H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), p. 199.

  43 On intelligence on Germany, see Library of Congress, Arnold Papers, Box 246 for the G2 report, ‘Germany, Domestic Production, Capacity and Sources of Aviation Equipment’ (16 January 1941), and the ‘Memorandum for Chief of Intelligence, Estimates of German Air Strength’ (no date). It was calculated that German front-line air forces would total 36,000 by June 1941, when the true figure was 3,451.

  44 D. Syrett, ‘The Tunisian Campaign, 1942–1943’, in B.F. Cooling (ed.), Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support (Office of Air Force History, Washington, 1990), pp. 158–70; Hallion, Strike from the Sky, pp. 149–58; A. Tedder, Air Power in War (London, 1948), pp. 38–40.

  45 Hallion, Strike from the Sky, p. 161.

  46 Ibid., pp. 181–2.

  47 Di Nardo, Mechanized Juggernaut, pp. 91–5; Piekalkiewicz, Tank War, p. 310. At the same time on the eastern front there were only 318 serviceable tanks, and 616 serviceable self-propelled guns.

  48 D.D. Eisenhower, Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (London, 1946), p. 17.

  49 E. Bauer, Der Panzerkrieg: Band II, der Zusammenbruch des Dritten Reiches (Bonn, 1966), p. 247; Piekalkiewicz, Tank War, p. 310; Craven, Cate, Army Air Forces, VI, p. 423; R. Kilmarx, A History of Soviet Air Power (London, 1962), pp. 188–92; A. Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941–1945 (London, 1971), pp. 436, 527.

  50 C.F. Jones, ‘Industrial Capacity and Supplies of Raw Materials’, in S. van Valkenburg (ed.), America at War: A geographical analysis (New York, 1943), p. 162.

  51 M. A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The search for economic security 1919–1941 (Ithaca, New York, 1987), p. 146; M.A. Barnhart, ‘Japan’s Economic Security and the Origins of the Pacific War’, Journal of Strategic Studies 4 (1981), pp. 114–19; D. Yergin, The Prize: The epic quest for oil, money and power (New York, 1991), pp. 355–66; ‘Oil in the Far East’, Petroleum Press Service 9 (1942), pp. 1–7.

  52 USSBS, Pacific Theatre, Report 48, ‘Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding’ (Washington, January 1947), pp. 1, 18; J. Cohen, Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis, 1949), pp. 133–46.

  53 USSBS, Report 72, ‘Interrogation of Japanese Officials’, no. 53, pp. 214–16.

  54 USSBS, Pacific Theatre, Report 46, ‘Japanese Naval Shipbuilding’, (Washington, November 1946), p. 9 (there were 6,197 suicide boats, and 419 human torpedoes or kaiten); T.A. Bisson, Japan’s War Economy (New York, 1945), pp. 164–6.

  55 P. Hayes, Industry and Ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi era (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 36–42, 66–7, 133–5; W. Birkenfeld, Der synthetische Treibstoff 1933–1945 (Göttingen, 1963).

  56 USSBS, Report 109, ‘Oil Division Final Report’ (Washington, August 1945), pp. 14–18; M. Pearton, Oil and the Romanian State (Oxford, 1971), pp. 249, 259–61.

  57 O. Nissen, Germany: Land of substitutes (London, 1944), pp. 77–8, 82; details on the conversion of German vehicles in Petroleum Press Service 9 (1942), p. 55. By the summer of 1941 some 150,000 commercial vehicles had been converted to gas generators, 60,000 to liquid gas.

  58 Van Creveld, Supplying War, pp. 196–201.

  59 H. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler’s War Directives (London, 1964), p. 179, also pp. 151–2.

  60 ‘The Threat to Russia’s Oil Supplies’, Petroleum Press Service 9 (1942), pp. 105–7; ‘German Drive for Maikop Oil’, Petroleum Times 47 (1943), p. 56.

  61 Overy, Goering, pp. 216–17; A. Fredborg, Behind the Steel Wall: Berlin 1941–43 (London, 1944), p. 126; Yergin, The Prize, pp. 336–7.

  62 C.R. Richardson, ‘French Plans for Allied Attacks on the Caucasus Oilfields Jan-Apr 1940’, French Historical Studies 8 (1973).

  63 R. Cooke, R. Nesbit, Target: Hitler’s Oil: Allied attacks on German oil supplies 1939–1945 (London, 1985), pp. 102–7.

  64 C. Webster, N. Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany (4 vols, London, 1961), IV, pp. 508–16; USSBS, Report 109, ‘Oil Division Final Report’, pp. 18–26; Piekalkiewicz, Tank War, p. 291. The total needed per month was calculated to be 327,000 tons.

  65 G.D. Nash, United States Oil Policy 1890–1964 (Pittsburgh, 1968), pp. 157–65; Yergin, The Prize, pp. 371–2. On the cooperation of the big oil businesses, see H. Larson, E. Knowlton, C. Popple, History of Standard Oil Company: Vol. Ill, New horizons 1927–50 (New York, 1971), pp. 522–36.

  66 Petroleum Press Service 10 (1943), pp. 1, 31–2; Petroleum Press Service 11 (1944), pp. 45–6; A.M. Johnson, Petroleum Pipelines and Public Policy 1905–1959 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), pp. 320–5.

  67 Yergin, The Prize, pp. 383–4.

  68 Ibid., p. 382.

  69 Harries, Soldiers of the Sun, p. 304.

  70 R. Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), pp. 580–2, 612; Harries, Soldiers of the Sun, p. 303.

  71 G. Brooks, Hitler’s Nuclear Weapons (London, 1992), p. 46.

  72 M. Walker, German National Socialism and the Quest for Nuclear Power 1939–1949 (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 17–21; Brooks, Hitler’s Nuclear Weapons, pp. 20–3.

  73 Brooks, Hitler’s Nuclear Weapons, pp. 43–6; Rhodes, Making of the Atomic Bomb, pp. 455–7, 513-17.

  74 Brooks, Hitler’s Nuclear Weapons, pp. 102–5; Walker, German National Socialism and the Quest for Nuclear Power, pp. 81–7.

  75 P. Joubert de la Ferté, Rocket (London, 1957), pp. 17–18; M.J. Neufeld, ‘The Guided Missile and the Third Reich: Peenemünde and the forging of a technological revolution’, in M. Walker, M. Renneberg (eds), Science, Technology and National Socialism (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 52–8.

  76 De la Ferté, Rocket, pp. 21–2; A. Speer, The Slave State: Heinrich Himmler’s masterplan for SS supremacy (London, 1981), pp. 203–7.

  77 Speer, Slave State, pp. 210–11; on problems in development, Neufeld, ‘Guided Missile’, pp. 62–5.

  78 B. Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom (London, 1957), pp. 523, 527; T.H. O’Brien, Civil Defence (London, 1955), pp. 652–68, 682.

  79 Brooks, Hitler’s Nuclear Weapons, pp. 120–2; USSBS, Report 60, ‘V Weapons (Crossbow) Campaign’ (Washington, 24 September 1945), pp. 35–6; R. Karlsch Hitlers Bombe: Die geheime Geschichte der deutschen Kernwaffenversuche (Munich, 2005).

  80 R.W. Clark, The Birth of the Bomb (London, 1961), pp. 135–9, 155–6, 168–70; Rhodes, Hitler’s Atomic Bomb, pp. 368–9.

  81 F.M. Szasz, British Scientists and the Manhattan Project (London, 1992), appendix iv, p. 152; L.R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told (New York, 1962), pp. 40, 295–8.

  82 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 298.

  83 Brooks, Hitler’s Nuclear Weapons, p. 127.

  84 J. Erickson, ‘New Thinking about the Eastern front in World War II’, Journal of Military History 56 (1992), p. 284.

  8 Impossible Unity

  ALLIES AND LEADERS IN WAR

  1 C.E. Bohlen, Witness to History 1929–1969 (London, 1973), p. 131.

  2 A.H. Birse, Memoirs of an Interpreter (London, 1967), p. 154; Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 142.

  3 S. Butler (ed.), My Dear Mr. Stalin: The Complete Correspondence of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin (New Haven, 2005), pp. 129, 172.

  4 H.H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), p. 465; Birse, Memoirs of an Interpreter, pp. 154–5.

  5 Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 142.

  6 A. Perlmutter, FDR and Stalin: A not so Grand Alliance, 1943–1945 (Columbia, Missouri, 1993), p. 69 (the reference is to the diary of Joseph E. Davies, who acted as go-between for Roosevelt).

  7 Arnold, Global Miss
ion, p. 468; Perlmutter, FDR and Stalin, p. 159.

  8 F. Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (London, 1947), pp. 70–1; K. Eubank, Summit at Teheran (New York, 1985), pp. 350–1.

  9 W. Averell Harriman with E. Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941–1946 (London, 1976), pp. 273–4.

  10 K. Sainsbury, The Turning Point (London, 1986), p. 266; A. Bryant, Triumph in the West: The war diaries of Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke (London, 1959), p. 83.

  11 Eubank, Summit at Teheran, p. 351; Harriman, Special Envoy, p. 278; Birse, Memoirs of an Interpreter, pp. 160–1.

  12 Sainsbury, Turning Point, p. 322, appendix B, ‘The Teheran Communiqué’.

  13 J. Colville, The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street diaries 1939–1955 (London, 1985), pp. 331–2, entry for 11 January 1941; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. 3 (Washington, 1959), p. 38, memorandum by Dean Acheson, 3 October 1941.

  14 J.C. Schneider, Should America Go to War? The debate over foreign policy in Chicago 1939–1941 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1989), p. 61; on the general background, see W. Heinrichs, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American entry into World War II (Oxford, 1988); W.F. Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease 1939–1941 (Baltimore, 1969).

  15 W.S. Churchill, The Second World War (6 vols, London, 1948–54), III, p. 539.

  16 A.H. Vandenberg (ed.), Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (London, 1953), p. 28.

  17 R. A. Divine, Roosevelt and World War II (London, 1969), p. 31. The quotations are from a speech by Roosevelt on 10 June 1940 at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville.

  18 D. Dimbleby, D. Reynolds, An Ocean Apart: The relationship between Britain and America in the twentieth century (London, 1988), p. 139.

  19 Perkins, Roosevelt I Knew, p. 307.

  20 A. Danchev (ed.), Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance: The Second World War diaries of Brigadier Vivian Dykes (London, 1990), p. 80, entry for 28 December 1941; A. Danchev, Very Special Relationship: Field Marshal Sir John Dill and the Anglo-American Alliance 1941–1944 (London, 1986), pp. 13–24.

  21 H. G. Nicholas (ed.), Washington Dispatches 1941–1945: Weekly political reports from the British Embassy (Chicago, 1981), report of 9 October 1943, pp. 257–8.

  22 A.C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (New York, 1958), pp. 211–17.

  23 Memorandum on ‘Soviet-American Relations’ by Andrei Gromyko, 14 July 1944, reproduced in Perlmutter, FDR and Stalin, appendix 4, p. 259.

  24 I. Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador: The war 1939–1943 (London, 1967), pp. 159–60; Colville, Fringes of Power, pp. 404–5, diary entries for 21 and 22 June 1941; M. Kitchen, British Policy Towards the Soviet Union During the Second World War (London, 1986), pp. 57–8.

  25 Perlmutter, FDR and Stalin, p. 72; W. Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as wartime statesman (Princeton, 1991), pp. 21–4; R.H. Dawson, The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1959), pp. 116–22.

  26 Kitchen, British Policy, p. 64; on the State Department, see S.E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American foreign policy since 1938 (London, 1988), p. 34, who quotes George Kennan from the Russian desk: ‘We should do nothing at home to make it appear that we are following the course Churchill seems to have entered upon …’

  27 Kitchen, British Policy, p. 65.

  28 Colville, Fringes of Power, p. 344. Churchill’s comment was not meant to be taken seriously.

  29 E. Roosevelt (ed.), The Roosevelt Letters 1928–1945 (3 vols, London, 1952), III, p. 385, Roosevelt to Stimson, 30 August 1941.

  30 Harriman, Special Envoy, p. 75; Perlmutter, FDR and Stalin, p. 73; R. Sherwood (ed.), The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins (2 vols, London, 1948), I, pp. 326–45.

  31 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. I, pp. 815–16, Sumner Welles to Ambassador Umansky, 2 August 1941, and memorandum, Division of European Affairs, 19 August 1941.

  32 Dawson, Decision to Aid Russia, pp. 282–9.

  33 W.P. and Z. Coates, A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations (London, 1944), p. 696.

  34 R.B. Levering, American Opinion and the Russian Alliance 1939–1945 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1976), p. 61.

  35 S.M. Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin: The Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the origins of the Grand Alliance (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1988), p. 155.

  36 Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin, p. 158; D. Reynolds, W. Kimball, A. Chubarian (eds), Allies at War: The Soviet, American and British experience 1939–1945 (New York, 1994), p. 210.

  37 Kimball, Juggler, p. 195; Perlmutter, FDR and Stalin, p. 82; on the cynical motives behind Britain’s agreements with the Soviet Union, see G. Ross, ‘Foreign Office attitudes to the Soviet Union 1941–1945’, in W. Laqueur (ed.), The Second World War: Essays in military and political history (London, 1982), pp. 256–8.

  38 P. Winterton, Report on Russia (London, 1945), p. 2.

  39 J.R. Deane, The Strange Alliance: The story of American efforts at wartime co-operation with Russia (London, 1947), pp. 95–7

  40 Perlmutter, FDR and Stalin, pp. 231–2; Kitchen, British Policy, p. 80.

  41 Deane, Strange Alliance, pp. 93–4; A. Werth, Russia at War (London, 1964), p. 574.

  42 B. Sokolov, ‘Lend Lease in Soviet Military Efforts 1941–1945’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 7 (1994), p. 567–8; J.L. Schecter, V.V. Luchkov (eds), Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston, 1990), p. 84.

  43 Sherwood (ed.), White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, II, p. 777.

  44 M. Kitchen, ‘Winston Churchill and the Soviet Union during the Second World War’, Historical Journal 30 (1987), p. 421.

  45 Butler (ed.), My Dear Mr. Stalin, p. 63.

  46 S. Bialer (ed.), Stalin and His Generals: Soviet military memoirs of World War II (New York, 1969), pp. 347–8.

  47 M. Carver, ‘Churchill and the Defence Chiefs’, in R. Blake, W.R. Louis (eds), Churchill (Oxford, 1993), pp. 356–7.

  48 I. Deutscher, Stalin (Oxford, 1966), pp. 22–3.

  49 Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin, p. 140; A. Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel lives (London, 1991), pp. 804–5.

  50 For a recent Russian account V.P. Yampolsky (ed.), Organy Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine (Moscow, 2000) vol ii, pp. 98–104; see too E. Mawdsley, Thunder in the East; the Nazi–Soviet War (London, 2006), pp. 63–4.

  51 Admiral Kuznetsov, ‘Command in Transition’, in Bialer, Stalin and His Generals, p. 348; Schecter, Luchov (eds), Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 63–4.

  52 In Bialer, Stalin and His Generals: N.N. Voronov, ‘The Vexations of Centralization’, p. 368, S.M. Shtemenko, ‘Stalin, the Taskmaster’, pp. 352–4, and A.M. Vasilevski, ‘Chief of the General Staff’, pp. 350–1.

  53 Bryant, Triumph in the West, p. 77.

  54 Arnold, Global Mission, p. 468.

  55 R.T. Goldberg, The Making of Franklin D. Roosevelt: Triumph over disability (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), p. 169.

  56 Perkins, Roosevelt I Knew, p. 29.

  57 Lord Halifax, Fulness of Days (London, 1957), p. 241.

  58 A.H. Vandenberg (ed.), The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (London, 1953), p. 10, diary entry 8 March 1941.

  59 Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 136; Danchev, Very Special Relationship, p. 57. This was the view of Field Marshal Dill, who also wrote, less charitably, that the more he got to know Roosevelt, ‘the more superficial and selfish I think him’.

  60 E. Morgan, FDR: A biography (London, 1985), p. 632.

  61 R.H. Ferrel (ed.), The Eisenhower Diaries (New York, 1981), p. 40, entry for 4 January 1942.

  62 R. Weigley, History of the US Army (London, 1968), pp. 453–5; R.A. Divine, Roosevelt and World War II (London, 1969), pp. 3–5; Butler (ed.), My Dear Mr. Stalin, pp. 6–7 on Leahy, Hopkins, and the Map Room.

  63 Morgan, FDR, p. 550.

  64 Bryant, Triumph in the West, p. 77; Lord Ismay, The Memoirs of Lord Ismay (London, 1960), p. 338.

  65 Harriman, Spe
cial Envoy, pp. 440–1; Halifax, Fulness of Days, p. 241.

  66 Details in Blake, Louis (eds), Churchill, and J. Charmley, Churchill: The end of glory (London, 1993).

  67 G.T. Eggleston, Roosevelt, Churchill and the World War II Opposition (Old Greenwich, Conn., 1979), p. 130.

  68 Halifax, Fulness of Days, pp. 218–20, recalled the situation more accurately than Churchill, in his Second World War, I, pp. 572–4. See too Charmley, Churchill, pp. 393–5; Blake, Louis (eds), Churchill, pp. 265–70; D. Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War (London, 2004), pp. 127–8.

  69 Churchill, Second World War, I, pp. 524–5.

  70 I. Berlin, Mr. Churchill in 1940 (London, 1950), p. 12.

  71 Halifax, Fulness of Days, pp. 221–2; Harriman, Special Envoy, p. 205.

  72 Lord Moran, Winston Churchill: The struggle for survival 1940–1965 (London, 1966), p. 269.

  73 Ibid., p. 102.

  74 Halifax, Fulness of Days, p. 222.

  75 J. Wheeler-Bennett (ed.), Action This Day: Working with Churchill (London, 1988), pp. 17–28, 245.

  76 Bryant, Triumph in the West, p. 77; Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, p. 79.

  77 Wheeler-Bennett, Action This Day, pp. 27, 245; K. Robbins, Churchill (London, 1992), pp. 127–31.

  78 M. Howard, ‘Churchill and the First World War’, in Blake, Louis, Churchill, p. 142.

  79 Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, London, AIR 8/463, letter from Chief of Air Staff to Churchill, 20 March 1941; PRO, AIR 9/102, Air Ministry, ‘Appreciation of the attack on German war industry’, 18 February 1941.

  80 Moran, Winston Churchill, p. 134.

  81 Ibid., p. 102.

  82 Churchill, Second World War, I, p. 526; R. Lewin, Churchill as Warlord (London, 1973), p. 264.

  83 A. Bryant, The Turn of the Tide 1939–1943 (London, 1957), p. 35.

  84 D. Fraser, Alanbrooke (London, 1987), p. 202.

  85 Churchill, Second World War, II, p. 234; Ismay, Memoirs, p. 318.

  86 J. Erickson, The Road to Berlin (London, 1983), pp. 53–5.

  87 S. Shtemenko, ‘Profile of a Staff Officer’, in Bialer, Stalin and His Generals, pp. 355–9.

  88 H. Salisbury (ed.), Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles (London, 1969), p. 214.

 

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