The ship had been so lifted as to be unfit for action; two feet of her hull below the shield was exposed. She could not be sunk again by letting in water without putting out the furnace fires and flooding the magazines. Never was a commander forced by circumstances over which he had no control into a more painful position than was Commodore Tattnall. But coolly and calmly he decided, and gave orders to destroy the ship; determining if he could not save his vessel, at all events not to sacrifice three hundred brave and faithful men; and that he acted wisely, the fight at Drewry’s Bluff, which was the salvation of Richmond, soon after proved. She was run ashore near Craney Island, and the crew landed with their small-arms and two days’ provisions. Having only two boats, it took three hours to disembark. Lieutenant Catesby Jones and myself were the last to leave. Setting her on fire fore and aft, she was soon in a blaze, and by the light of our burning ship we pulled for the shore, landing at daybreak. We marched 22 miles to Suffolk and took the cars for Richmond.
The news of the destruction of the Virginia caused a most profound feeling of disappointment and indignation throughout the South, particularly as so much was expected of the ship after our first success. On Commodore Tattnall the most unsparing and cruel aspersions were cast. He promptly demanded a court of inquiry, and, not satisfied with this, a court-martial, whose unanimous finding, after considering the facts and circumstances, was: “Being thus situated, the only alternative, in the opinion of the court, was to abandon and burn the ship then and there; which, in the judgment of the court, was deliberately and wisely done by order of the accused. Wherefore, the court do award the said Captain Josiah Tattnall an honorable acquittal.”
It only remains now to speak of our last meeting with the Monitor. Arriving at Richmond, we heard that the enemy’s fleet was ascending James River, and the result was great alarm; for, relying upon the Virginia, not a gun had been mounted to protect the city from a water attack. We were hurried to Drewry’s Bluff, the first high ground below the city, seven miles distant. Here, for two days, exposed to constant rain, in bottomless mud and without shelter, on scant provisions, we worked unceasingly, mounting guns and obstructing the river. In this we were aided by the crews of small vessels which had escaped up the river before Norfolk was abandoned. The Jamestown and some small sailing-vessels were sunk in the channel, but, owing to the high water occasioned by a freshet, the obstructions were only partial. We had only succeeded in getting into position three thirty-twos and two sixty-fours (shell guns) and were without sufficient supply of ammunition, when on the 15th of May the iron-clad Galena, Commander John Rodgers, followed by the Monitor and three others, hove in sight. We opened fire as soon as they came within range, directing most of it on the Galena. This vessel was handled very skillfully. Coming up within six hundred yards of the battery, she anchored, and, with a spring from her quarter, presented her broadside; this under a heavy fire, and in a narrow river with a strong current. The Monitor, and others anchored just below, answered our fire deliberately; but, owing to the great elevation of the battery, their fire was in a great measure ineffectual, though two guns were dismounted and several men were killed and wounded. While this was going on, our sharp-shooters were at work on both banks. Lieutenant Catesby Jones, in his report, speaks of this service: “Lieutenant Wood, with a portion of the men, did good service as sharp-shooters. The enemy were excessively annoyed by their fire. His position was well chosen and gallantly maintained in spite of the shell, shrapnel, grape, and canister fired at them.” Finding they could make no impression on our works, the Galena, after an action of four hours, returned down the river with her consorts. Her loss was about forty killed and wounded.6
This was one of the boldest and best-conducted operations of the war, and one of which very little notice has been taken. Had Commander Rodgers been supported by a few brigades, landed at City Point or above on the south side, Richmond would have been evacuated. The Virginia’s crew alone barred his way to Richmond; otherwise the obstructions would not have prevented his steaming up to the city, which would have been as much at his mercy as was New Orleans before the fleet of Farragut.
* * *
1 The officers of the Merrimac were: Flag-Officer, Franklin Buchanan; Lieutenants, Catesby ap R. Jones (executive and ordnance officer), Charles C. Simms, R. D. Minor (flag), Hunter Davidson, John Taylor Wood, J. R. Eggleston, Walter Butt; Midshipmen, Foute, Marmaduke, Littlepage, Craig, Long, and Rootes; Paymaster, James Semple; Surgeon, Dinwiddie B. Phillips; Assistant-Surgeon, Algernon S. Garnett; Captain of Marines, Reuben Thom; Engineers, H. A. Ramsey, acting chief; Assistants, Tynan, Campbell, Herring, Jack, and White; Boatswain, Hasker; Gunner, Oliver; Carpenter, Lindsey; Clerk, Arthur Sinclair, Jr.; Volunteer Aides, Lieutenant Douglas Forrest, C.S.A., Captain Thomas Kevill, detachment of Norfolk United Artillery; Signal Corps, Sergeant Tabb.
2 According to the pilot of the Cumberland, A. B. Smith: “Near the middle of the fight, when the berth-deck of the Cumberland had sunk below water, one of the crew of the Merrimac came out of a port to the outside of her iron-plate roof, and a ball from one of our guns instantly cut him in two.… Finally, after about three-fourths of an hour of the most severe fighting, our vessel sank, the Stars and Stripes still waving. That flag was finally submerged, but after the hull grounded on the sands, fifty-four feet below,…our pennant was still flying from the top-mast above the waves.”
3 Lieutenant Jones reported: “It was not easy to keep a flag flying. The flag-staffs were repeatedly shot away. The colors were hoisted to the smoke-stack and several times cut down from it.”—EDITORS.
4 In his official report, Captain Van Brunt says of the fight, as viewed from the Minnesota:
“At 6 A.M. the enemy again appeared,…and I beat to quarters; but they ran past my ship and were heading for Fortress Monroe, and the retreat was beaten to enable my men to get something to eat. The Merrimac ran down near the Rip-Raps and then turned into the channel through which I had come. Again all hands were called to quarters, and opened upon her with my stern-guns, and made signal to the Monitor to attack the enemy. She immediately ran down in my wake, right within the range of the Merrimac, completely covering my ship, as far as was possible with her diminutive dimensions, and, much to my astonishment, laid herself right alongside of the Merrimac, and the contrast was that of a pigmy to a giant. Gun after gun was fired by the Monitor, which was returned with whole broadsides from the Rebels, with no more effect, apparently, than so many pebble-stones thrown by a child.… The Merrimac, finding that she could make nothing of the Monitor, turned her attention once more to me. In the morning she had put one eleven-inch shot under my counter, near the water-line, and now, on her second approach, I opened upon her with all my broadside-guns and ten-inch pivot—a broadside which would have blown out of water any timber-built ship in the world. She returned my fire with her rifled bow-gun, with a shell which passed through the chief engineer’s state-room, through the engineers’ mess-room amidships, and burst in the boatswain’s room, tearing four rooms all into one, in its passage exploding two charges of powder, which set the ship on fire, but it was promptly extinguished by a party headed by my first lieutenant.”
5 The “news” was of the first day’s battle before the Monitor had arrived.—EDITORS.
6 According to the official report, the loss on the Galena was 13 killed and 11 wounded; on the Port Royal, 1 wounded, and on the Naugatuck, 2 wounded. Total, 13 killed and 14 wounded.—EDITORS.
CHAPTER 10
FARRAGUT’S CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS.
William T. Meredith, Late U.S.N.,
AND SECRETARY TO ADMIRAL FARRAGUT.
It has astonished a great many people to learn from Admiral Porter’s article in “The Century” magazine [reprinted in the present work] that he was the first man to propose the opening of the Mississippi. Montgomery Blair, in the “United Service Magazine” for January, 1884, and ex-Secretary Welles, in “The Galaxy” for November, 1871, both fix the time when the discu
ssion of the question was begun by the naval authorities, which was before the appearance of Porter on the scene at Washington. And, indeed, the importance of the great river to the South was so evident to any one who studied our coast and the South-west, that it is safe to say that the eyes of the whole nation were bent on New Orleans as a point of attack just about the time that Porter imagines he suggested it.
Why was Farragut chosen flag-officer of the squadron to attack New Orleans? The answer is that he was known as an experienced and capable officer, who was on record as having plans to capture forts with ships. He was one of the few officers of sufficient rank to command a squadron who also had the strength and vigor necessary to bear the strain of arduous duty. These were the main reasons that Mr. Welles, the Secretary, and Mr. Fox, the Assistant Secretary, had for selecting him. Besides this, his appointment met the approval of Porter, who, when consulted by the Secretary, gave his voice for Farragut. It is easy now to understand how with the lapse of time Admiral Porter has learned to think that he chose the commander of the expedition. That he could have defeated Farragut’s appointment is probably true, but that he chose him is a mistake; he simply assented to the previous choice of Mr. Welles and Mr. Fox. (See articles by Welles and Blair, above referred to.)
Ex-Secretary Welles relates that the armament of the fleet had been determined, before Farragut’s appointment to the command, after consultation with the War Department and with General McClellan, who detailed General Butler to command the land forces of the expedition. Porter, whose advice was listened to, insisted on the importance of a fleet of schooners carrying 13-inch mortars, and asserted that a bombardment of forty-eight hours would reduce Forts Jackson and St. Philip to a heap of ruins. Mr. Welles says that Mr. Fox, who was a trained naval officer, at first objected to the mortars, and advocated running by the forts with the fleet, but finally was won over by the forcible arguments of Porter, whose plan the Department fully adopted. There is evidence, given by Commander Porter himself, that he advocated bombarding the forts till they surrendered or could be captured by assault, and that he was opposed to running the fire with the fleet leaving an enemy in the rear. (See his letter on this page.)
The forces to attack New Orleans were fixed, measures were taken to cast thirty thousand mortar-shells, collect the fleet and transport the soldiers, before Farragut was summoned to Washington from New York. Mr. Blair says positively that he was not to be given the command until he had been subjected to a critical overhauling by the authorities. We hear of Farragut at breakfast with Mr. Blair and Mr. Fox, probably on the morning of his arrival at the capital. Mr. Fox then showed him the point of attack, the plans, and the force to be employed. Farragut said he would engage to capture New Orleans with two-thirds the naval force. Mr. Blair tells us that he was so enthusiastic and confident of success that when he went away Mr. Fox thought him over-sanguine, and was a little inclined to distrust his ability. Mr. Welles relates that after this interview Farragut was brought to him, and they entered at once into all the plans of the expedition. When they came to the mortar-flotilla, Farragut said that he placed little reliance on mortars, and that they would not have been part of his plan and advisement, but that he would take the mortar-fleet with him, as it had been adopted as part of the equipment of the fleet and might prove of more advantage than he anticipated.
At 10 o’clock on the 20th of April, while the bombardment by the mortars was at its height, the flag-ship made signal that Farragut wanted to hold a conference of commanding officers. In an hour they had all arrived excepting three, who commanded vessels detailed that day for guard duty above the fleet, and Commander Porter, who was probably too much occupied with the mortars to leave his command.
Thirteen boats trailed at the stern of the Hartford, while the captains waited anxiously in the cabin to hear what the flag-officer would say. A private journal kept by Commodore Bell, who led the 2d division of gun-boats in the attack, describes as follows what took place at the conference:
“The flag-officer [Farragut] unfolded his plan of operations. Some discussion ensued, and Commander Alden read a written communication to Farragut from Porter, expressing his views as to the operations against the forts. Having read them, Alden folded up the paper and returned it to his pocket, whereupon I [Commodore Bell] suggested the propriety of the document’s being left with Farragut, and the paper was accordingly placed in his hands. It was therein stated that the boom, being a protection to the mortars against attack from above, should not be destroyed, upon which Farragut remarked that Porter had that morning assented to the boom’s being broken, and again (it was stated in the communication) that the fleet should not go above the forts, as the mortar-vessels would be left unprotected. Farragut said he thought the mortars would be as well protected (with the fleet) above as below the forts, and that the coöperation of the army, which entered into the plans of both parties, could not be effectual unless some of the troops were introduced above the forts at the same time that they were below. He intended to cover their landing at the Quarantine, five miles above, they coming to the river through the bayou. Once above, the forts cut off, and his propellers intact for ascending the river to the city, if he found his ships able to cope with the enemy he would fight it out. Some of the officers considered it a hazardous thing to go above out of the reach of supplies. Farragut remarked that our ammunition was being rapidly exhausted, without a supply at hand, and that something must be done immediately. He believed in celerity.”
Farragut “believed in celerity.” He saw that while the ammunition was being exhausted but little impression had been made on the forts, and he felt sure that the time had come to carry out his plan of dashing boldly up the river through the fire of the forts.
The communication from Commander Porter containing his plans of attack, to which I have already alluded, and which was referred to by Commodore Bell, is as follows:
“When the ships are over the bar, guns mounted, coal-bunkers filled, sick on shore, hospital arrangements made for the wounded, the fleet should move up, mortar-fleet all in tow; the chain across the river to remain untouched for the present, or until after the mortars get their position and open their fire. It is a good defense on our side against fire-ships and rams which may be sent down the river, and our ships can so command the opening that nothing can pass down. As the mortar-vessels are somewhat helpless, they should be protected at all points by vessels of war, which should be ready at a moment’s notice to repel an attack on them by rams, floating torpedoes, or fire-ships; the two latter to be towed out of the way, the rams to be run down by the heavy ships, while such vessels as the Westfield and Clifton attack them end on with cannon, while gun-boats try to force them to the shore. When everything is ready for the assault, a demand for surrender should be made in language least calculated to exasperate, and of such a nature as to encourage those who might be disposed to return to their allegiance. There is evidence of a strong Union feeling in New Orleans, and everything should be done without losing by delay to prevent a counter-feeling.
“When it is evident that no surrender of the forts will be made, the mortars should open deliberate fire, keeping two shells in the air all the time, or each mortar-vessel should fire once in every ten minutes. Fort Jackson, being casemated, should receive the largest share of the bombardment, three or four vessels being employed against Fort St. Philip, firing as often as they can coolly and conveniently load and point. In the meantime preparations should be made to destroy at a moment’s notice the vessels holding up the chain, or the chain itself, which can be done by applying a petard to the bobstays of the vessels or to the chain, all of which petards are prepared, and a man accustomed to the business with a galvanic battery will accompany the expedition.
“In my opinion there are two methods of attack,—one is for the vessel to run the gauntlet of the batteries by night or in a fog; the other is to attack the forts by laying the big ships close alongside of them, avoiding the casemates, firing shel
ls, grape, and canister into the barbette, clearing the ramparts with boat-guns from the tops, while smaller and more agile vessels throw in shrapnel at shrapnel distance, clearing the parapets, and dismounting the guns in barbette.
“The larger ships should anchor with forty-five fathoms of chain with slip-ropes; the smaller vessels to keep under way and be constantly moving about, some to get above and open a cross-fire; the mortars to keep up a rapid and continuous fire, and to move up to a short range.
“The objections to running by the forts are these: It is not likely that any intelligent enemy would fail to place a chain across above the forts, and to raise such batteries as would protect them against our ships.
“Did we run the forts we should leave an enemy in our rear, and the mortar-vessels would have to be left behind. We could not return to bring them up without going through a heavy and destructive line. If the forts are run part of the mortars should be towed along which would render the progress of the vessels slow against the strong current at that point. If the forts are first captured, the moral effect would be to close the batteries on the river and open the way to New Orleans, whereas, if we don’t succeed in taking them, we will have to fight our way up the river. Once having possession of the forts, New Orleans would be hermetically sealed, and we could repair damages and go up on our own terms and our own time.
Hearts Touched by Fire Page 42