General F. P. Blair joined me at Milliken’s Bend, a full-fledged general, without having served in a lower grade. He commanded a division in the campaign. I had known Blair in Missouri, where I had voted against him in 1858 when he ran for Congress. I knew him as a frank, positive, and generous man, true to his friends even to a fault, but always a leader. I dreaded his coming. I knew from experience that it was more difficult to command two generals desiring to be leaders, than it was to command one army, officered intelligently, and with subordination. It affords me the greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment in respect to his character. There was no man braver than he, nor was there any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with more unquestioning alacrity. He was one man as a soldier, another as a politician.
The navy, under Porter, was all it could be, during the entire campaign. Without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged. It could not have been made at all, in the way it was, with any number of men, without such assistance. The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of the service. There never was a request made, that I am aware of, either of the flag-officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptly complied with.
FROM A LETTER TO GEN. MARCUS J. WRIGHT, C.S.A., DATED NEW YORK, NOV. 30, 1884.
The campaign of Vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances. The elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war: voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased, and the draft had been resorted to; this was resisted, and a defeat, or backward movement, would have made its execution impossible. A forward movement to a decisive victory was necessary. Accordingly I resolved to get below Vicksburg, unite with Banks against Port Hudson, and make New Orleans a base; and, with that base and Grand Gulf as a starting-point, move our combined forces against Vicksburg. Upon reaching Grand Gulf, after running its batteries and fighting a battle, I received a letter from Banks informing me that he could not be at Port Hudson under ten days, and then with only fifteen thousand men. The time was worth more than the reënforcements; I therefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy’s country.
With a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapid movements were essential to success. Jackson was captured the day after a new commander had arrived, and only a few days before large reënforcements were expected. A rapid movement west was made; the garrison of Vicksburg was met in two engagements and badly defeated, and driven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged.
* * *
1 “It was at Port Gibson I first heard through a Southern paper of the complete success of Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson, who was making a raid through central Mississippi [from La Grange, Tennessee, to Baton Rouge, Louisiana]. He had started from La Grange, April 17th, with three regiments of about 1700 men. On the 21st he had detached Colonel Hatch with one regiment to destroy the railroad between Columbus and Macon and then return to La Grange. Hatch had a sharp fight with the enemy at Columbus and retreated along the railroad, destroying it at Okolona and Tupelo, and arriving in La Grange April 26th. Grierson continued his movement with about 1000 men, breaking the Vicksburg and Meridian railroad and the New Orleans and Jackson railroad, arriving at Baton Rouge May 2d. This raid was of great importance, for Grierson had attracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement against Vicksburg.”—From “Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant.”
2 Banks reached Alexandria on the 7th of May, and was acting in concert with Farragut’s and Porter’s fleet to control the waters of Red River.—EDITORS.
3 “After McPherson crossed the Big Black at Hankinson’s Ferry, Vicksburg could have been approached and besieged by the south side. It is not probable, however, that Pemberton would have permitted a close besiegement. The broken nature of the ground would have enabled him to hold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to the Big Black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point. It was my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of Vicksburg, and approach from that direction. Accordingly McPherson’s troops that had crossed the Big Black were withdrawn, and the movement east, to Jackson, commenced.
“As has been stated before, the country is very much broken, and the roads generally confined to the tops of the hills. The troops were moved one (sometimes two) corps at a time, to reach designated points out parallel to the railroad, and only from six to ten miles from it. McClernand’s corps was kept with its left flank on the Big Black guarding all the crossings. Fourteen Mile Creek, a stream substantially parallel with the railroad, was reached, and crossings effected by McClernand and Sherman with slight loss. McPherson was to the right of Sherman, extending to Raymond. The cavalry was used in this advance in reconnoitering to find the roads; to cover our advances, and to find the most practicable routes from one command to another, so they could support each other in case of an attack. In making this move I estimated Pemberton’s movable force at Vicksburg at about eighteen thousand men, with smaller forces at Haynes’s Bluff and Jackson. It would not be possible for Pemberton to attack me with all his troops at one place, and I determined to throw my army between his and fight him in detail. This was done with success, but I found afterward that I had entirely under-estimated Pemberton’s strength.”—From “Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant.,” C. L. Webster & Co.
4 “Pemberton was now on my left, with, as I supposed, about 18,000 men; in fact, as I learned afterward, with nearly 50,000. A force was also collected on my right at Jackson, the point where all the railroads communicating with Vicksburg connect. All the enemy’s supplies of men and stores would come by that point. As I hoped in the end to besiege Vicksburg I must first destroy all possibility of aid. I therefore determined to move swiftly toward Jackson, destroy or drive any force in that direction, and then turn upon Pemberton. But by moving against Jackson I uncovered my own communication. So I finally decided to have none—to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force eastward. I then had no fears for my communications, and if I moved quickly enough could turn upon Pemberton before he could attack me in the rear.”—From “Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant.,” C. L. Webster & Co.
5 Dr. William M. Beach of London, Ohio, sends to the editors this anecdote of General Grant:
“At the time of the Vicksburg campaign I was the Assistant Surgeon of the 78th Ohio Regiment: but I had been detailed by J. H. Boncher, Medical Director of the 17th Army Corps, as the Division Hospital Director of Logan’s division. I had a regular service of men and wagons; and at the battle of Champion’s Hill—when my division had been assigned to its position— I chose an abandoned farm-house and its surroundings as a proper place to establish our hospital, and immediately proceeded in its preparation. My position was in the rear of our left wing, and not far in the rear of Hovey’s right wing. About the time I was fairly ready to receive the wounded the line had advanced across an open field, and had swung to the right and front nearly a quarter of a mile. The steady roar of battle had rolled from Hovey’s front by this time to that of Logan’s, who was steadily advancing, and where the sound of the conflict was now simply terrific. Grant and his staff, coming from the left, dismounted at the front gate, within twenty feet of where I was standing. He had scarcely dismounted, when,—more clearly and distinctly hearing the fury of the contest on our right,—leisurely taking his cigar from his mouth, he turned slowly to one of his staff and said, ‘Go down to Logan and tell him he is making history to-day.’ ”
—EDITORS.
6 “It is true, in front of McClernand there was a small force of the enemy, and posted in a good position behind a ravine, obstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the road my staff-officers had followed, the enemy must either have fallen back or been cut off.”
—From “Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant,” C. L. Webster & Co.
7 Brigadier-General William Dwight, afterward of Banks’s staff. According to Banks, Dwight reported t
hat Grant said “he would give me 5000 men, but that I should not wait for them.”—EDITORS.
8 The revised statements (unpublished “Official Records,” Vol. XXIV., part I., p.167) show that the aggregate Union losses, including the above, from May 1st to July 4th, were: killed, 1514; wounded, 7395; captured or missing, 453,—total, 9362.—EDITORS.
9 On May 25th General Grant wrote to General Banks that it seemed to him advisable to collect as large a force at Vicksburg as possible, and says, “I would be pleased, General, to have you come, with such force as you are able to spare.” In the same letter General Grant makes this statement:
“When I commenced writing this it was my intention to propose sending you, if you will furnish transportation, 8000 or 10,000 men to coöperate with you on Port Hudson; but, whilst writing, a courier came in from my cavalry, stating that a force of the enemy are now about thirty miles north-east of here.… At present, therefore, I do not deem it prudent to send off any men I have, or even safe.…”
On May 23d, 1863, General Halleck wrote to General Banks:
“I assure you that the Government is exceedingly disappointed that you and General Grant are not acting in conjunction. It thought to secure that object by authorizing you to assume the entire command as soon as you and General Grant could unite.”
In Halleck’s instructions, dated November 9th, 1862, General Banks was authorized “to assume control of any military forces from the Upper Mississippi which may come within your command.… You will exercise superior authority as far as you may ascend the river.…”—EDITORS.
10 General Kimball was wounded at Fredericksburg, and on recovering was assigned to the command of a division in the West.—EDITORS.
11 Colored troops had been under fire on the 27th of May at Port Hudson.—EDITORS.
12 These troops came from the Department of the Ohio (Burnside), June 14th to 17th, having been transferred from the Army of the Potomac in the previous March. After Vicksburg they returned to Burnside’s command and took part in the East Tennessee campaign.—EDITORS.
13 See article on Port Hudson, to follow.—EDITORS.
14 Meant Edwards’s Station.—U.S.G.
CHAPTER 9
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.
Professor James Russell Soley, U.S.N.
By the 1st of July, 1862, the Mississippi had been traversed by the fleet of Davis from Cairo down, and by that of Farragut from the Passes up, and the only point where the Confederates retained a strong foothold was at Vicksburg. The objects of the river operations were to establish communication from the Ohio to the Gulf, and to cut off the important supplies drawn by the Confederacy from Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. The commanders of the Mississippi squadron during this period were, first, Charles Henry Davis, and later, David D. Porter, the transfer of the command taking place October 15th, 1862. The operations of the navy at this time were unique in maritime warfare in the energy and originality with which complex conditions were met.
After the defeat of Montgomery’s flotilla at Memphis, on the 6th of June, by the combined forces of Flag-Officer Davis and Colonel Ellet, the Mississippi squadron remained at Memphis for three weeks. Immediately after the battle Davis had formed the project of sending a force up the Arkansas and White rivers to cut off the Confederate gun-boats which were supposed to have taken refuge there, among them the Van Dorn, the only vessel remaining of Montgomery’s flotilla. Davis did not know that the Van Dorn had made her way into the Yazoo. There were, however, two Confederate gun-boats in White River, the Maurepas and Pontchartrain, which had previously been in the flotilla of Hollins at Island Number Ten—the former under Lieutenant Joseph Fry and the latter under Lieutenant John W. Dunnington.
On the 10th Davis received a telegram from General Halleck urging him to open communication by way of Jacksonport with General Curtis, then moving through Arkansas toward the Mississippi. Davis accordingly altered his plan, and directed that the expedition should confine its operations to the White River. The force detached for the purpose was composed of the iron-clads Mound City and St. Louis, and the wooden gun-boats Conestoga and Tyler, under Commander A. H. Kilty, of the Mound City, and the 46th Indiana, Colonel Graham N. Fitch. Ascending the White River, the expedition arrived on the evening of the 16th in the neighborhood of St. Charles, ninety miles from the mouth.
Anticipating this movement, Hindman had taken steps to obstruct the channel at this point, where the first bluffs touch the river. One hundred men, under Captain A. M. Williams, C.S. Engineers, were the only force which could be spared for the defense of the place, and their only arms were thirty-five Enfield rifles which Hindman had impounded at Memphis. Lieutenant Dunnington had placed two rifled 32-pounders in battery on the bluffs, and had manned them with part of the crew of the Pontchartrain. Finally, Fry had stationed the Maurepas in the river below.
The approach of Kilty’s gun-boats was first discovered on the afternoon of June 16th. Expecting an immediate attack, Fry placed the Maurepas across the stream and prepared to defend her. Finding that the gun-boats remained below, Fry now landed his guns and settled his ship, sinking her across the channel. Two transports also were sunk, and the imperfect obstruction thus created was completed about daylight. During the night a small rifled Parrott gun was placed in position four hundred yards below Dunnington’s battery, under Midshipman F. M. Roby. Two rifled Parrott 8-pounders were also moved up soon after daylight, and placed near Roby’s gun, and the three guns were manned by the crew of the Maurepas, and fought personally by Fry, the senior officer present. Below this second battery Captain Williams was stationed with his thirty-five men, those without arms having been sent to the rear. He was presently reënforced by the 12-pounder howitzer from the Maurepas, manned by some of her crew. The total force under Fry’s command comprised the men with Williams, and 79 seamen from the two gun-boats,—in all, 114 persons, to resist the attack of Fitch’s Indiana regiment, and four gun-boats, two of them iron-clads. Rarely has it happened to such a feeble force to accomplish so much by a determined resistance.
Early on the morning of June 17th the troops landed about two miles below the bluffs. At half-past 8 the gun-boats advanced to the attack, the Mound City ahead, followed closely by the St. Louis, the Lexington and the Conestoga bringing up the rear. They moved slowly, endeavoring to discover the enemy’s position, but in total ignorance of the whereabouts of his guns, which were covered by the trees and bushes on the bluffs. About 9 o’clock Williams’s men were engaged by Fitch’s skirmishers. The firing disclosed the enemy’s advanced position, and the gun-boats opened a heavy fire of grape and shell upon it, compelling Williams to fall back. Fry’s battery of four light guns, manned by the crew of the Maurepas, now became engaged with the gun-boats. At 10 Dunnington opened with his rifled 32-pounders. Kilty had now to some extent made out the location of the Confederate guns, and, moving up, replied with a rapid fire, aimed carefully in what was supposed to be the direction of the batteries, the vessel taking a position at point-blank range from both of them. At the same time Fitch sent word to him that the troops were ready to storm the batteries, unless he desired to silence them with the gun-boats. Kilty, unfortunately for himself and his crew, gallantly decided on the latter course.
The Mound City had been in position less than half an hour, about 600 yards from the batteries, when one of the 32-pounder rifle shot, directed by the skillful and experienced eye of Lieutenant Dunnington, penetrated the port casemate of the Mound City just forward of the armor, or, as Colonel Fitch rather comically described it in his report, “the larboard forequarter of the gun-boat,” and, after killing 8 men at the gun, struck the steam-drum, and went through it directly fore and aft. At the time, the Mound City was turning her wheel over slowly, and, being in slack water, the wheel kept on turning until the steam was exhausted, and the boat slowly forged ahead, running her nose directly under the battery. Lieutenant Blodgett immediately ran up in the Conestoga, with great gallantry, and making
fast to the Mound City, towed her away from the bank and out of action. Fitch, seeing the catastrophe, and apprehensive lest another fortunate shot from the enemy should deprive him of his support afloat, gave the signal to cease firing, and assaulted the works simultaneously in front and in flank. They were quickly carried; Dunnington and Williams made good their retreat, but Fry, who was badly wounded, was taken prisoner with about thirty of his men. General Hindman reported the Confederate loss as 6 killed, 1 wounded, and 8 missing.
The scene on board the Mound City, upon the explosion of the steam-drum, was beyond description. The gun-deck was at once filled with scalding steam, and many of the crew were instantly killed,—literally cooked alive. Others, in an agony of pain, jumped into the water, where they were shot at by sharp-shooters from the bluff, under orders from Dunnington and Williams. The boats from the other vessels put off at once to the rescue, and were riddled with shot while picking up their comrades. Out of 175 officers and men on board the Mound City, only 23 answered to their names at the roll-call that evening, and these were men and boys that were in the shell-room and magazine when the explosion took place. The only officers unhurt were Dominy, the first master, and McElroy, the gunner. Eighty-two men perished in the casemate, 43 were killed in the water or drowned, and 25 were severely wounded. The latter, among whom was the gallant Kilty, were sent at once to Memphis in the Conestoga. The Mound City remained at St. Charles, under First Master John H. Duble, of the Conestoga, with a crew of one hundred of Fitch’s men, her injuries being temporarily repaired.
Hearts Touched by Fire Page 86