During the active operations of a campaign the post of the commander-in-chief should be in the center of his marching columns, that he may be able to give prompt and efficient aid to whichever wing may be threatened. But whenever a great battle is to be fought, the commander must be on the field to see that his orders are executed and to take advantage of the ever-changing phases of the conflict. Jackson leading a cavalry fight by night near Front Royal in the pursuit of Banks, Jackson at the head of the column following McClellan in the retreat from Richmond to Malvern Hill, presents a contrast to Bragg sending, from a distance of ten miles, four consecutive orders for an attack at daylight, which he was never to witness.
Surely in the annals of warfare there is no parallel to the coolness and nonchalance with which General Crittenden marched and counter-marched for a week with a delightful unconsciousness that he was in the presence of a force of superior strength. On the 11th we find him with two divisions (Van Cleve’s and Palmer’s) at Ringgold, twenty miles from Chattanooga, and with his third (Thomas J. Wood’s), ten miles from Ringgold, at Lee and Gordon’s Mills, where it remained alone and unsupported, until late in the day of the 12th. Crittenden was at the mills with his whole corps on the 13th and morning of the 14th, moving back to Missionary Ridge during the 14th all his divisions except Wood’s, which remained all that day. Crittenden seemed to think that so long as the bridge there was held, there was no danger of the rebels passing to his rear on the road toward Chattanooga, though there were other bridges and several good fords over the Chickamauga at other points. It was to the isolation of Wood that Bragg refers in his order dated Lafayette, 6 P.M., on the 12th. Captain Polk (in the Southern Historical Society papers) says:
“General Bragg, in his official report of the battle of Chickamauga, charges General Polk with the failure to crush Crittenden’s forces in their isolated position at Ringgold. It will be noted, however, that General Polk was ordered to take position at a particular spot,—Rock Spring,—thence, if not attacked, to advance by daylight of the 13th of September, and assume the offensive against the opposing forces, which were expected from the way of Ringgold. But Crittenden was at Gordon’s Mills behind the Chickamauga on the evening of the 12th. The order was simply impracticable.”
The concentration at Rock Spring, seven miles south-west from Ringgold and four and a half miles south-east from Lee and Gordon’s Mills, was apparently to interpose between Crittenden’s columns, and to strike in detail whichever should present itself. But General Crittenden, unaware, apparently, of his danger, crossed the Chickamauga at the mills, and united with Wood about nightfall on the 12th. General Polk discovered that there was a large force in front of him on the night of the 12th, and not a single division, and hence he thought only of a defensive attitude. It is probable that, from his long experience of Bragg’s ignorance of the situation, he was skeptical in regard to the accuracy of the general’s information on the present occasion. Bragg certainly did not know of the union of Crittenden’s forces in the afternoon and night of the 12th. But, even with that knowledge, he would have acted wisely in falling upon the combined forces on the 13th and 14th.
The truth is, General Bragg was bewildered by “the popping out of the rats from so many holes.” The wide dispersion of the Federal forces, and their confrontal of him at so many points, perplexed him, instead of being a source of congratulation that such grand opportunities were offered for crushing them one by one. He seems to have had no well-organized system of independent scouts, such as Lee had, and such as proved of inestimable service to the Germans in the Franco-Prussian war. For information in regard to the enemy, apparently he trusted alone to his very efficient cavalry. But the Federal cavalry moved with infantry supports, which could not be brushed aside by our cavalry. So General Bragg only learned that he was encircled by foes, without knowing who they were, what was their strength, and what were their plans. His enemy had a great advantage over him in this respect. The negroes knew the country well, and by dividing the numbers given by them by three, trustworthy information could be obtained. The waning fortunes of the Confederacy were developing a vast amount of “latent unionism” in the breasts of the original secessionists—those fiery zealots who in ’61 proclaimed that “one Southerner could whip three Yankees.” The negroes and the fire-eaters with “changed hearts” were now most excellent spies.
The 13th of September was a day of great anxiety to me at Lafayette, in charge of the Reserve Artillery and the wagons trains, with only two weak divisions, less than nine thousand strong, to protect them. During the 11th and 12th my signal corps on Pigeon Mountain had been constantly reporting the march of a heavy column to our left and rear. These reports were communicated by me to the commanding general, and were discredited by him. At 8 A.M. on the 13th Lieutenant Baylor came to my camp with a note from General Wharton, of the cavalry, vouching for the lieutenant’s entire trustworthiness. Lieutenant Baylor told me that McCook had encamped the night before at Alpine, twenty miles from Lafayette, toward which his march was directed. Our cavalry pickets had been driven in on the Alpine road the afternoon before, and had been replaced by infantry. Soon after the report by Lieutenant Baylor, a brisk fire opened upon the Alpine road, two miles from Lafayette. I said to my staff, as we galloped toward the firing, “It is to be South Mountain over again.” This referred to the defense, on the 14th of September, 1862, of the passes of that mountain by my gallant division, reduced by fighting and marching to five thousand men. We learned, on reaching the Alpine road, that General Daniel Adams’s skirmishers had been attacked by two regiments of cavalry, which were repulsed. General Adams said to me, “The boldness of the cavalry advance convinces me that an infantry column is not far off.” Lucius Polk’s brigade was brought down from Pigeon Mountain, and every disposition was made to celebrate appropriately the next day—the anniversary of South Mountain. But that was not to be. General McCook (Federal) had been ordered to Summerville, eleven miles south of Lafayette on the main road to Rome, Ga. But he had become cautious after hearing that Bragg was not making the hot and hasty retreat that Rosecrans had supposed. He therefore ordered his wagon-train back to the top of Lookout Mountain, and remained all day of the 13th at Alpine. His cavalry had taken some prisoners from General Adams, and he thus learned certainly that Bragg had been reënforced. At midnight on the 13th McCook received the order to hurry back to join Thomas [in McLemore’s Cove]. Then began the race of life and death, the crossing back over Lookout Mountain, the rapid exhausting march north through Lookout Valley, and the junction at last at Stevens’s Gap on the 17th. The contemporary accounts represent McCook’s march as one of fatigue and suffering.
General Bragg returned to Lafayette on the afternoon of the 13th, and I communicated to him verbally that night the report of Lieutenant Baylor. He replied excitedly, “Lieutenant Baylor lies. There is not an infantry soldier of the enemy south of us.” The next morning he called his four corps commanders, Polk, Buckner, W.H.T. Walker, and myself, together, and told us that McCook was at Alpine, Crittenden at Lee and Gordon’s Mills, and Thomas in McLemore’s Cove. McCook was at that very time making that famous march, estimated by Rosecrans at fifty-seven miles, to join Thomas at Stevens’s Gap. But the Confederate commander did not know of this withdrawal, and possibly the fear of an attack in his rear by McCook kept him from falling upon Thomas and Crittenden in his front. The nightmare upon Bragg for the next three days was due, doubtless, to his uncertainty about the movements of his enemy, and to the certainty that there was not that mutual confidence between him and some of his subordinates that there ought to be between a chief and his officers to insure victory. Bragg’s want of definite and precise information had led him more than once to issue “impossible” orders, and therefore those intrusted with their execution got in the way of disregarding them. Another more serious trouble with him was the disposition to find a scapegoat for every failure and disaster. This made his officers cautious about striking a blow when an opportuni
ty presented itself, unless they were protected by a positive order.11
In reference to the long intervals between battles in the West, I once said to General Patton Anderson, “When two armies confront each other in the East, they get to work very soon; but here you look at one another for days and weeks at a time.” He replied with a laugh, “Oh, we out here have to crow and peck straws awhile before we use our spurs.” The crowing and pecking straws were now about over. On the 13th Rosecrans awoke from his delusion that Bragg was making a disorderly retreat, and issued his orders for the concentration of his army in McLemore’s Cove. Granger’s corps came up from Bridgeport, occupied Rossville on the 14th, and remained there until the battle of the 20th. Rossville is at the gap in Missionary Ridge through which runs the road from Chattanooga to Lafayette and Rome, Ga. General Rosecrans had felt it to be of vital importance to hold this gap at all hazards, in case of a disaster to his arms. On the 16th Rosecrans had his forces well in hand, extending from Lee and Gordon’s Mills to Stevens’s Gap, in a line running from east to south-west some eleven miles long. On the same day Bragg, with headquarters still at Lafayette, held the gaps in Pigeon Mountain, and the fords to Lee and Gordon’s Mills. Each commander was in position, on the 17th, to turn the left flank of his adversary,—Bragg by crossing the Chickamauga at points north of Lee and Gordon’s Mills; but by this he risked fighting with his back to the river,—a hazardous situation in case of defeat. He risked too, to some extent, his trains, which had yet to be moved toward Ringgold and Dalton. His gain, in case of a decided victory, would be the cutting off of Rosecrans from Chattanooga, and possibly the recapture of that place. Rosecrans could have flanked Bragg by crossing at the Mills and at the fords between that place and Catlett’s. This would have cut off Bragg from Rome certainly, and from Dalton in case of his advance upon Chattanooga, or else would have compelled him to come out and fight upon ground selected by his antagonist. The risk to Rosecrans was an insecure line of retreat in case of defeat, and possibly the loss of Chattanooga. But he had Granger’s corps to hold the fortifications of Chattanooga, and he held also the gaps in Lookout Mountain. Bragg showed superior boldness by taking the initiative. Rosecrans determined to act upon the defensive. He says that he knew on the 17th that Bragg would try to seize the Dry Valley and Rossville roads—the first on the west and the second on the east of Missionary Ridge. He thus divined the plan of his enemy twelve hours before Bragg’s order was issued. Therefore Rosecrans, on the afternoon of the 17th, ordered McCook to take the place of Thomas at Pond Spring, Thomas to relieve the two divisions of Crittenden at Crawfish Springs, and Crittenden to take these divisions and extend them to the left of Wood at Lee and Gordon’s, so as to protect the road to Chattanooga. McCook’s corps reached its position at dark, Crittenden’s near midnight. Thomas marched all night uninterruptedly, and the head of his columns reached the Widow Glenn’s (Rosecrans’s headquarters) at daylight on the 19th.
On the 18th Bragg issued, from Leet’s tan-yard, his order for battle:
“1. [Bushrod] Johnson’s column (Hood’s), on crossing at or near Reed’s Bridge, will turn to the left by the most practicable route, and sweep up the Chickamauga toward Lee and Gordon’s Mills.
“2. Walker, crossing at Alexander’s Bridge, will unite in this move and push vigorously on the enemy’s flank and rear in the same direction.
“3. Buckner, crossing at Tedford’s Ford, will join in the movement to the left, and press the enemy up the stream from Polk’s front at Lee and Gordon’s.
“4. Polk will press his forces to the front of Lee and Gordon’s Mills, and if met by too much resistance to cross will bear to the right and cross at Dalton’s Ford or at Tedford’s, as may be necessary, and join the attack wherever the enemy may be.
“5. Hill will cover our left flank from an advance of the enemy from the cove, and, by pressing the cavalry in his front, ascertain if the enemy is reënforcing at Lee and Gordon’s Mills, in which event he will attack them in flank.
“6. Wheeler’s cavalry will hold the gaps in Pigeon Mountain, and cover our rear and left, and bring up stragglers.
“7. All teams, etc., not with troops should go toward Ringgold and Dalton beyond Taylor’s Ridge. All cooking should be done at the trains; rations when cooked will be forwarded to the troops.
“8. The above movement will be executed with the utmost promptness, vigor, and persistence.”
Had this order been issued on any of the four preceding days, it would have found Rosecrans wholly unprepared for it, with but a single infantry division (Wood’s) guarding the crossings of the Chickamauga, and that at one point only, Lee and Gordon’s—the fords north of it being watched by cavalry. Even if the order had been given twenty-four hours earlier, it must have been fatal to Rosecrans in the then huddled and confused grouping of his forces.
All that was effected on the 18th was the sending over of Walker’s small corps of a little more than 5000 men near Alexander’s Bridge, and Bushrod Johnson’s division of 3600 men at Reed’s Bridge, farther north. These troops drove off Wilder’s mounted infantry from the crossings immediately south of them, so as to leave undisputed passage for Bragg’s infantry, except in the neighborhood of Lee and Gordon’s. On the night of the 18th Bragg’s troops were substantially as follows: Hill’s corps on the extreme left, with center at Glass’s Mill; Polk’s at Lee and Gordon’s; Buckner’s at Byram’s Ford; Hood’s at Tedford’s Ford.12 During the night Cheatham’s division of Polk’s corps was detached, moved down the Chickamauga, and crossed at Hunt’s Ford about 7 A.M. on the 19th. On that morning the Federal line of battle ran, in the main, parallel to the Chattanooga road from Lee and Gordon’s to beyond Kelly’s farm, and consisted of the divisions of Wood, Van Cleve, and Palmer of Crittenden’s corps, and Baird’s and Brannan’s of Thomas’s corps, in the order named from right to left. Negley and Reynolds, commanders under Thomas, had not come up at the opening of the battle of the 19th. The leading division (R. W. Johnson’s) of McCook’s corps reached Crawfish Springs at an early hour that day, and the divisions of Davis and Sheridan soon followed. It is about five miles from Crawfish Springs to Kelly’s farm.
THIS MAP IS BASED UPON THE OFFICIAL REPORTS, THE OFFICIAL TOPOGRAPHICAL MAP COMPILED BY EDWARD RUGER UNDER THE DIRECTION OF COLONEL W. E. MERRILL, CHIEF ENGINEER DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, AND THE MAPS OF CAPTAIN WALTER J. MORRIS OF GENERAL LEONIDAS POLK’S STAFF.—EDITORS.
Soon after getting into position at Kelly’s after his night march, General Thomas was told by Colonel Daniel McCook, commanding a brigade of the Reserve Corps, that there were no rebel troops west of the Chickamauga, except one brigade that had crossed at Reed’s Bridge the afternoon before, and which could easily be captured, as he (McCook) had burned the bridge behind the rebels. Thomas ordered Brannan to take two brigades and make a reconnoissance on the road to Reed’s Bridge, and place a third brigade on the road to Alexander’s Bridge. This order took the initiative away from Bragg, and put it in the hands of Thomas with his two divisions in line to crush the small Confederate force west of the river, and then with his supports, as they came, beat, in detail, the Confederate supports, delayed, as they must be, by the crossings and the distances to march. Croxton’s brigade, of Brannan’s division, met Forrest’s cavalry on the Reed’s Bridge road, and drove it back on the infantry—two small brigades under Ector and Wilson. These advanced with the “rebel yell,” pushed Croxton back, and ran over his battery, but were in turn beaten back by Brannan’s and Baird’s forces. Baird now began the readjustment of his lines, and during the confusion of the movement Liddell’s (Confederate) division, two thousand strong, struck the brigades of Scribner and King, and drove them in disorder, capturing Loomis’s battery, commanded by Lieutenant Van Pelt. Bush’s Indiana battery was captured at the same time. The defeat had become a panic, and Baird’s and Brannan’s men were going pell-mell to the rear, when the victorious Liddell found himself in the presence of a long line of Federal troops overlapping
both flanks of his little force. These were the troops of Brannan’s reorganized division on his right, and of the freshly arrived division of R. W. Johnson from McCook. Liddell extricated himself skillfully, losing heavily, however, and being compelled to abandon his captured guns. It was by Rosecrans’s own order, at 10:15 A.M., that R. W. Johnson had been hurried forward five miles from Crawfish Springs, just in time to save the Federal left from a grave disaster. At 11 A.M. Bragg ordered Cheatham to the relief of Liddell, but he reached the ground after Johnson—too late to drive Brannan as well as Baird off the field. Cheatham’s veteran division of seven thousand men advanced gallantly, driving the enemy before it, when it was in its turn hurled back by an attacking column which Thomas had organized after the defeat of Liddell and the arrival of two fresh divisions, viz., Palmer’s of Crittenden’s corps and Reynolds, of his own corps.
Unfortunately for the Confederates, there was no general advance, as there might have been along the whole line—an advance that must have given a more decisive victory on the 19th than was gained on the 20th. It was desultory fighting from right to left, without concert, and at inopportune times. It was the sparring of the amateur boxer, and not the crushing blows of the trained pugilist. From daylight on the 19th until after midday, there was a gap of two miles between Crittenden and Thomas, into which the Confederates could have poured, turning to right or left, and attacking in flank whichever commander was least prepared for the assault. As Cheatham was falling back, A. P. Stewart’s division of Buckner’s corps, 3400 strong, attacked Palmer’s division of Crittenden’s corps, which was flanking Cheatham, drove it back, and marching forward met Van Cleve’s division of the same corps hastening to the assistance of Thomas, and hurled it back also. Hood, with his own division and Bushrod Johnson’s, moved at 2:30 P.M., and gained for a time a most brilliant success, crushing the right center of the Federal army, capturing artillery, and seizing the Chattanooga road. The three Confederate divisions, after their first triumphs, had to encounter the four fresh divisions of Wood, Davis, Sheridan, and Negley, and were in turn driven back to the east of the road.
Hearts Touched by Fire Page 92