10 A bridge was thrown across the South Chickamauga Creek, at its mouth, and a brigade of cavalry was sent across it. That brigade caused the bridge across the Holston River to be burned by the enemy and thus cut off General Longstreet’s forces from coming back to General Bragg.—EDITORS.
11 This was not, however, the original plan to which Sherman assented, which was to march at once for the north end of the ridge.—EDITORS.
12 Hooker’s position in Lookout Valley was absolutely essential to us so long as Chattanooga was besieged. It was the key to our line for supplying the army. But it was not essential after the enemy was dispersed from our front, or even after the battle for this purpose was begun. Hooker’s orders, therefore, were designed to get his force past Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga Valley, and up to Missionary Ridge. By crossing the north face of Lookout the troops would come into Chattanooga Valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the valley, and would necessarily force its evacuation. Orders were accordingly given to Hooker to march by this route. But days before the battle began the advantages as well as disadvantages of this plan of action were all considered. The passage over the mountain was a difficult one to make in the face of an enemy. It might consume so much time as to lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where they were more wanted. After reaching Chattanooga Valley, the creek of the same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to be crossed.
I was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep Lookout Mountain until we got through with the troops on Missionary Ridge. By marching Hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position at any named time; when in this new position he would have Chattanooga Creek behind him; and the attack on Missionary Ridge would unquestionably have caused the evacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on Lookout Mountain. Hooker’s order was changed accordingly. As explained elsewhere, the original order had to be reverted to because of a flood in the river rendering the bridge at Brown’s Ferry unsafe for the passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all the troops together against Missionary Ridge.
—U.S.G.
13 Concerning this movement General Baird writes as follows: “I was ordered to report to General Sherman to reënforce his command. I marched the distance, about two miles to the rear of his position, and sent an officer to report to him, but I immediately received orders to return and form on the left of the line which was to assault Missionary Ridge. I reached there, and got my troops in position, just as the gun was fired directing the assault.”—EDITORS.
14 In this order authority was given for the troops to re-form after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying the ridge.—U.S.G.
15 Captain Benjamin F. Hegler, of Attica, Indiana, who was second in command of the 15th Indiana in the assault on Missionary Ridge, writes to the editors:
“General Grant says of the assault on Missionary Ridge that ‘the fire along the rebel line was terrific. Cannon and musket balls filled the air; but the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition used.’ The inference might be that the assault, though brilliant, was after all a rather harmless diversion. The 15th Indiana, of Sheridan’s division, started up the ridge just to the left of Bragg’s headquarters with 337 officers and men, and lost 202 killed and wounded, in just forty-five minutes, the time taken to advance from the line of works at the foot of the ridge and to carry the crest. This report I made officially to General Sheridan near Chickamauga Creek the morning after the battle.”
16 General Bragg was succeeded by General Hardee December 2d, 1863, and the latter by General Polk December 23d. General Johnston assumed command December 27th. On February 24th, 1864, General Bragg, “under the direction of the President, was charged with the conduct of military operations in the armies of the Confederacy.” In November, 1864, he was placed in command of the Department of North Carolina. In February, 1865, he came under General J. E. Johnston’s command again, and so remained till the surrender. General Bragg died Sept. 27th, 1876.—EDITORS.
1864
INTRODUCTION
Joan Waugh
In early 1864, President Abraham Lincoln turned to General Ulysses S. Grant to win the war. By March, Grant formulated a national military strategy with the defeat of Generals Robert E. Lee’s and Joseph E. Johnston’s armies as the centerpiece. Grant would direct the Army of the Potomac with Major General George G. Meade. His plan was simple and straightforward: force the Army of Northern Virginia out into the open and defeat them in battle, and then, “On to Richmond.” General William T. Sherman was ordered to advance south with three Western armies from Chattanooga to Atlanta. Once Atlanta was taken, Grant expected Sherman to strike out into the Southern heartland. General Philip H. Sheridan was tapped to head the Cavalry Corps in the Army of the Potomac, revitalizing that arm of the military.
Other Union armies were directed to coordinate attacks at the same time. In the West, Grant ordered General Nathaniel P. Banks to take Mobile, Alabama, while the Army of the James, led by General Benjamin F. Butler, threatened Richmond from the South. General Franz Sigel received orders to move up the Shenandoah Valley, cutting Lee’s communications lines and attacking Richmond from the east. Grant explained, “Before this time these various armies had acted separately and independently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity, often, of depleting one command not pressed, to reinforce another more actively engaged. I determined to stop this.” Grant brought all possible Northern manpower and resource superiority to bear on defeating the Confederates with his plan for armies acting in concert.
The Overland Campaign commenced when the approximately 120,000-strong Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan River in Virginia to engage Lee’s estimated 64,000 Confederates in the first week of May 1864. The early movements of the Overland Campaign saw the unraveling of the Union strategy. Grant’s attempt to move swiftly through a thick patch of brush and trees known locally as the Wilderness was foiled on May 5 as Lee blocked his way and commenced a fight. Grant responded with an attack exploiting a weakness in Lee’s position. Fighting resumed the following day but ended in stalemate. In his recollection for Battles and Leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Charles S. Venable recalled a dangerous moment during the battle when a courageous Lee rallied retreating soldiers to stand and fight. “Lee’s presence at the front aroused his men to great enthusiasm,” Venable stated, adding: “He was a superb figure as he sat on his spirited gray with the light of battle on his face. His presence was an inspiration.” The two-day Battle of the Wilderness resulted in 18,000 Federal and 12,000 Confederate casualties. A shock for Lee came when Grant declined retreat, as so many Union commanders had done before, instead slipping around Lee’s right flank.
Grant moved south from the Wilderness and toward Spotsylvania Court House, where Lee’s men erected a line of strong earthworks. The Battle of Spotsylvania raged back and forth for several days. The Confederates fought off repeated Union assaults behind a defensive position known as the “Mule Shoe.” On May 12, the Federals broke through a part of Lee’s formation, but the Southerners stood their ground for twenty-two hours in what came to be called the “Bloody Angle.” In a riveting account of the bloodletting, Union soldier G. Norton Galloway wrote: “So continuous and heavy was our fire that the head logs of the breastworks were cut and torn until they resembled hickory brooms.” On May 20, after days of constant fighting, Grant turned southeast again, but Lee thwarted the Union army’s leftward thrusts toward Richmond at North Anna River (May 23–27), Totopotomoy Creek (May 26–30), and Bethesda Church (May 31–June 1).
The spring of 1864 was one of Lee’s finest moments, when he switched from his favored aggressive style to one of defensive warfare, forcing Grant into a war of attrition. Confederate general E. M. Law expressed awe for the feats of his commander at this time. “General Lee held so completely the admiration and confidence of his men,” Law ex
plained, “that his conduct of a campaign was rarely criticized.” Weakened by illness, handicapped by the deaths or injuries of his principal lieutenants, and faced with a much larger opponent, Lee adapted brilliantly. He knew that the Confederacy’s best hopes rested on Northern political demoralization once the high cost of these battles was widely known. In turn, Lincoln’s reelection chances might be dashed, and a Democratic administration open to Southern independence would bring the participants to a conference table.
By month’s end, the Federals reached a crossroads northeast of Richmond called Cold Harbor, where 59,000 well-entrenched Rebels faced 108,000 Federals across a seven-mile front. On June 3, Grant’s massive early morning frontal assault on Confederate lines failed miserably. The campaign’s previous battles were inconclusive, but Cold Harbor was a victory for Lee. That day saw some 7,000 Federal casualties (to less than 1,500 for the Rebels), shattered three Union corps, and ended a month of incessant campaigning for both armies. The Union had suffered 50,000 losses and the Confederacy 32,000—41 percent of Grant’s forces and 50 percent of Lee’s. Those losses were terrible for a South unable to replenish its armies, but also a blow for the Northern morale needed to finish the war.
Grant flanked Lee one last time, crossing the James River and heading toward Petersburg. If Union troops could seize that vital communications and rail center, nearby Richmond would fall. On June 12, the army marched to the river and crossed a 2,100-foot-long pontoon bridge in a movement that caught Lee off guard. On June 16, the entire Union army was on the south bank. Moving swiftly, the Federals were closing in on Petersburg, defended by a ten-mile line of strongly built fortifications around the city. From June 15 to 18, the Federal forces, numbering around 63,000, threatened to overwhelm the much less numerous Confederate defenders, but several Union assaults failed to capture the Petersburg works. The Confederates quickly brought in reinforcements, making their defensive position even more formidable. General Lee arrived on June 18 to oversee operations. Grant, realizing that continued frontal attacks would be useless, ordered his men to “use the spade.” The Overland Campaign had ended, and the siege of Petersburg had begun.
The stalled military situation held huge consequences for the fate of the Lincoln administration. At this point, only victories in the field could sustain the Republicans in the fall elections. Butler’s, Banks’s, and Sigel’s campaigns had all failed. Reports from Georgia brought little relief. Sherman’s campaign began on May 7, featuring an almost continuous movement south in the face of weak resistance by Johnston. The biggest clash occurred at Kennesaw Mountain, Georgia, on June 27, where Sherman ordered a massed infantry assault against a strongly fortified position. One of Sherman’s corps commanders, General O. O. Howard, assessed the Kennesaw battle for the Century series: “Our losses in this assault were heavy indeed, and our gain was nothing. We realized now, as never before, the futility of direct assaults upon intrenched lines already well prepared and well manned.” After Kennesaw, Sherman pushed ever closer to Atlanta. In early July, the Federals arrived at the city gates, and like Grant in front of Petersburg, Sherman laid siege. Stalemate of the two biggest Federal armies excited Northern dissatisfaction with the war’s costs.
Back in Virginia, Grant sought to cut Lee’s lines of supply at Petersburg, ordering his soldiers to build a trench system around the Rebel line of defensive fortifications. By late June, the Confederates had approximately 50,000 (the number would rise to 66,000) men to 112,000 for the Union. From his headquarters at City Point on the James River, Grant presided over a vast logistical operation that kept the supplies flowing in to the troops in the field. In July and August, Grant extended his lines around the city, sending units out to cut the major railroad connections. Lee dispatched mobile forces to stop the Union’s forays, and many battles took place away from the siege area.
Federal forces badly mishandled a chance to end the Petersburg stalemate in the ill-starred attack that came to be known as the Battle of the Crater on July 30, 1864. Soldiers from the 48th Pennsylvania had tunneled five hundred feet under the Confederate works, packing the tunnel with four tons of black powder. When the powder was detonated, the blast created a huge gap in the Confederate lines. Union major William H. Powell recalled looking with astonishment at “an enormous hole in the ground about 30 feet deep, 60 feet wide, and 170 feet long.” Yet gross Federal incompetence failed to secure a success. Black troops in Union general Ambrose E. Burnside’s Ninth Corps played an important role in the battle. Specially trained to lead the assault, they were pulled at the last minute due to political considerations, but still supported the attack. Brigadier General Henry Goddard Thomas witnessed the sorry affair, concluding: “Thus ended in disaster what had first promised to be a grand success.” The debacle claimed 504 killed, 1,881 wounded, and 1,413 missing. An investigation followed, with one officer cashiered and one forced to retire.
Lee hoped to draw the Federals away from Petersburg and Richmond. His strategy worked, courtesy of Confederate general Jubal A. Early, who carried out a monthlong campaign culminating in an advance toward Washington, D.C. Two Early victories, at Lynchburg on June 18–19 and at Monocacy on July 9, resulted in Grant’s detaching the Sixth Corps from Petersburg and rushing it north. Early and his small army of 14,000 arrived at the outskirts of the Northern capital on July 11, alarming the citizenry. Early described what happened next: “I determined to make an assault on the enemy’s works at daylight the next morning. But during the night a dispatch was received … that two corps had arrived from General Grant’s army.… As soon as it was light enough to see, I rode to the front, and found the parapet lined with troops. I had, therefore, reluctantly to give up all hopes of capturing Washington.”
Early demonstrated the shockingly porous nature of Union defenses, prompting Grant to give Philip Sheridan the command of a newly created Army of the Shenandoah with orders to defeat Early and lay waste to the countryside. Sheridan carried out Grant’s orders with a vengeance, destroying huge parts of the valley’s capacity to feed the Southern army. This destruction was called “the burning” by the area’s inhabitants. The Union cavalry played a vital role in the campaign. Cavalry commander Wesley Merritt defended those actions, recording that “the cavalry was deployed across the valley, burning, destroying or taking away everything of value … to the enemy. It was a severe measure, and appears severer now in the lapse of time; but it was necessary as a measure of war.” Within a short period, Sheridan notched victories against Jubal Early at Third Winchester on September 19, Fisher’s Hill on September 22, and Cedar Creek on October 19. With the last of his three victories, Sheridan had fulfilled Grant’s instructions to end the Confederate presence in the valley. Now Sheridan could unite his forces with Grant’s along the Petersburg-Richmond front. Northern morale rose while Confederate spirits fell dramatically.
Two Federal naval victories in 1864 mitigated the disappointment of the seemingly endless ground campaigns. On June 19 the war sloop USS Kearsarge defeated the famed Rebel raider CSS Alabama off the coast of France in the Battle of Cherbourg. Writing for Battles and Leaders, the Union ship’s surgeon, John M. Browne, recounted the war of wits between the Confederate captain, Raphael Semmes, and the newly appointed Union captain, John Winslow. Brown pinpointed the exact moment it became clear to the men that the Federal sloop’s superior gunnery had had its intended outcome: “The effect upon the enemy was readily perceived,” observed Brown, “and nothing could restrain the enthusiasm of our men. Cheer succeeded cheer; caps were thrown in the air or overboard … sanguine of victory, the men were shouting, as each projectile took effort: ‘That is a good one!’ ”
The second Union naval success carried an even greater lift for Northerners at a critical time. On August 5, Admiral David G. Farragut seized control of Mobile Bay in Alabama, bringing an end to Confederate shipbuilding in that city and disabling the port’s ability to offer a friendly harbor for Southern ships avoiding the Union blockade. Lieutenant John Codd
ington Kinney described the war’s greatest naval hero as he prepared for attack: “He was sixty-three years old, of medium height … with an expression combining overflowing kindliness with iron will and invincible determination, and with eyes [that] in emergency, could flash fire and fury.” Farragut’s triumph closed the last remaining major Confederate port on the Gulf of Mexico and boosted Lincoln’s prospects for a fall victory. It was followed shortly by more good news for the Union from the two major theaters of war.
The Democrats’ midsummer expectations for certain electoral victory were permanently dashed as Grant’s strategy finally paid handsome dividends. Dissatisfied with Johnston’s proclivity for giving up Georgia’s territory, Davis replaced him with General John Bell Hood. Hurling his forces against the Federals at the Battle of Peachtree Creek on July 20, at the Battle of Atlanta on July 22, and at the Battle of Ezra Church on July 28, Hood sustained huge casualties with nothing gained. Sherman tightened his hold on Atlanta, forcing Hood to abandon it on September 1–2. On September 2, the city surrendered to Sherman, prompting wild celebrations throughout the North and, along with positive tidings from the Shenandoah Valley, assuring Lincoln of a second term and the continuance of Grant’s relentless campaigns. Confederate citizens knew that they were now facing a dire scenario.
Jefferson Davis vowed to fight on, spurring Sherman’s famous “March to the Sea.” Detaching General George H. Thomas to protect Tennessee from the depredations of Hood’s army, Sherman left Atlanta on November 16 and began his storied campaign through Georgia to the port city of Savannah. General Howard captured the esprit de corps of Sherman’s army at the beginning of their journey: “Behold now,” Howard declared, “this veteran army thus reorganized and equipped, with moderate baggage and a few days’ supply of small rations, but with plenty of ammunition, ready to march anywhere Sherman might lead.” Sherman and his force of 62,000 marched three hundred miles across the state—almost uncontested—living off the land and in some cases inflicting unauthorized damage to personal property. Captain Daniel Oakey of the 2nd Massachusetts remembered his unit’s role, describing a rough and ready group of soldiers “who were expected to make fifteen miles a day; to corduroy the road when necessary; to destroy such property as was designed by our corps commander, and to consume everything eatable by man or beast.” Crushing civilian and material support for the Confederacy, Sherman’s troops arrived at Savannah’s outskirts by December 17, and Confederate defenders led by General William J. Hardee abandoned the city on December 21. On the next day, Sherman sent a telegram to President Lincoln, offering him the city as a Christmas present.
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