Hearts Touched by Fire

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by Harold Holzer


  But the leading brigade struck the enemy’s force, which I had previously reported as massed in front of the crater, and in a sharp little action the colored troops captured some two hundred prisoners and a stand of colors, and recaptured a stand of colors belonging to a white regiment of the Ninth Corps. In this almost hand-to-hand conflict the colored troops became somewhat disorganized, and some twenty minutes were consumed in re-forming; then they made the attempt to move forward again. But, unsupported, subjected to a galling fire from batteries on the flanks, and from infantry fire in front and partly on the flank, they broke up in disorder and fell back to the crater, the majority passing on to the Union line of defenses, carrying with them a number of the white troops who were in the crater and in the enemy’s intrenchments.4

  Had any one in authority been present when the colored troops made their charge, and had they been supported, even at that late hour in the day, there would have been a possibility of success; but when they fell back and broke up in disorder, it was the closing scene of the tragedy. The rout of the colored troops was followed up by a feeble attack from the enemy, more in the way of a reconnoissance than a charge; but the attack was repulsed by the troops in the crater and in the intrenchments connected therewith, and the Confederates retired.

  It was now evident that the enemy did not fear a demonstration from any other quarter, as they began to collect their troops for a decisive assault. On observing this I left the crater and reported to General Ledlie, whom I found seated in a bomb-proof with General Ferrero, that some means ought to be devised for withdrawing the mass of men from the crater without exposing them to the terrific fire which was kept up by the enemy; that if some shovels and picks could be found, the men in an hour could open a covered way by which they could be withdrawn; that the enemy was making every preparation for a determined assault on the crater, and, disorganized as the troops were, they could make no permanent resistance. Not an implement of any kind could be found; indeed, the proposition was received with disfavor. Matters remained in statu quo until about 2 P.M., when the enemy’s anticipated assault was made.

  About 9:30 A.M. General Meade had given positive orders to have the troops withdrawn from the crater. To have done so under the severe fire of the enemy would have produced a stampede, which would have endangered the Union lines, and might possibly have communicated itself to the troops that were massed in rear of the Ninth Corps. General Burnside thought, for these and other reasons, that it would be possible to leave his command there until nightfall, and then withdraw it. There was no means of getting food or water to them, for which they were suffering. The midsummer sun caused waves of moisture produced by the exhalation from this mass to rise above the crater. Wounded men died there begging piteously for water, and soldiers extended their tongues to dampen their parched lips until their tongues seemed to hang from their mouths. Finally, the enemy, having taken advantage of our inactivity to mass his troops, was seen to emerge from the swale [see cut, this page] between the hill on which the crater was situated and that of the cemetery. On account of this depression they could not be seen by our artillery, and hence no guns were brought to bear upon them. The only place where they could be observed was from the crater. But there was no serviceable artillery there, and no infantry force sufficiently organized to offer resistance when the enemy’s column pressed forward. All in the crater who could possibly hang on by their elbows and toes lay flat against its conical wall and delivered their fire; but not more than a hundred men at a time could get into position, and these were only armed with muzzle-loading guns, and in order to re-load they were compelled to face about and place their backs against the wall.

  The enemy’s guns suddenly ceased their long-continued and uninterrupted fire on the crater, and the advancing column charged in the face of feeble resistance offered by the Union troops. At this stage they were perceived by our artillery, which opened a murderous fire, but too late. Over the crest and into the crater they poured, and a hand-to-hand conflict ensued. It was of short duration, however; crowded as our troops were, and without organization, resistance was vain. Many men were bayoneted at that time—some probably that would not have been, except for the excitement of battle. About 87 officers5 and 1652 men of the Ninth Corps were captured, the remainder retiring to our own lines, to which the enemy did not attempt to advance.

  In the engagements of the 17th and 18th of June, in order to obtain the position held by the Ninth Corps at the time of the explosion, the three white divisions lost 29 officers and 348 men killed; 106 officers and 1851 men wounded; and 15 officers and 554 men missing,—total, 2903. From the 20th of June to the day before the crater fight of July 30th these same divisions lost in the trenches 12 officers and 231 men killed; 44 officers and 851 men wounded; and 12 men missing,—total, 1150. These casualties were caused by picket and shell firing, and extended pretty evenly over the three divisions. The whole of General Willcox’s division was on the line for thirty days or more without relief. General Potter’s and General Ledlie’s divisions had slight reliefs, enabling those officers to draw some of their men off at intervals for two or three days at a time.

  In the engagement of July 30th the four divisions of the Ninth Corps had 52 officers and 376 men killed; 105 officers and 1556 men wounded; and 87 officers and 1652 men captured,—total, 3828.

  It was provided in General Meade’s order for the movement that the cavalry corps should make an assault on the left. Two divisions of the cavalry were over at Deep Bottom. They could not cross the river until after the Second Corps had crossed, so that it was late in the day before they came up. Indeed, the head of the column did not appear before the offensive operations had been suspended. As General James H. Wilson had been ordered to be in readiness, and in view of the unavoidable delay of General Sheridan, orders were sent to Wilson not to wait for General Sheridan, but to push on himself to the Weldon railroad. But the length of the march prevented success; so no attack was made by the cavalry, except at Lee’s Mills, where General Gregg, encountering cavalry, drove them away in order to water his horses. The Fifth Corps and the Eighteenth Corps remained inert during the day, excepting Turner’s division of the Tenth Corps (temporarily attached to the Eighteenth), which made an attempt on the right of the crater, but it happened to be just at the time that the colored troops broke up; so his command was thrown into confusion, and fell back to the trenches.

  SIDES AND EDGE OF TWO BULLETS THAT MET POINT TO POINT AT THE CRATER— THE SIDES FROM PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE ORIGINAL IN MAJOR GRIFFITH’S MUSEUM AT THE CRATER.

  THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG—1. SHARP-SHOOTERS ON THE LINE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CORPS. 2. BIVOUAC OF THE FIFTH CORPS IN THE RIFLE-PITS. FROM SKETCHES MADE AT THE TIME.

  In this affair the several efforts made to push troops forward to Cemetery Hill were as futile in their results as the dropping of handfuls of sand into a running stream to make a dam. With the notable exception of General Robert B. Potter, there was not a division commander in the crater or connecting lines, nor was there a corps commander on the immediate scene of action; the result being that the subordinate commanders attempted to carry out the orders issued prior to the commencement of the action, when the first attack developed the fact that a change of these plans was absolutely necessary.6

  * * *

  1 The writer of this article was serving as judge-advocate of Ledlie’s division, and also performed the duties of aide-de-camp to General Ledlie at the time of the explosion. When the orders were published for the movement he and Lieutenant George M. Randall, also of the regular army, and aide-de-camp to General Ledlie, were informed that they must accompany the advance troops in the attack, but that the volunteer staff would remain with General Ledlie, all of whom did so during the entire engagement, in or near a bomb-proof within the Union lines.—W.H.P.

  2 Sergeant Henry Rees entered the mine and found that the fuse had died out at the first splicing. He cut the fuse above the charred portion; on his way out for materials
he met Lieutenant Jacob Douty, who assisted in making a fresh splice, which was a success.—EDITORS.

  3 Immediately following the explosion the heavy guns along the line opened a severe fire.—W.H.P.

  4 A field-officer of one of the colored regiments [Lieutenant-Colonel John A. Bross] seized a stand of United States colors as he saw his men faltering when they first met the withering fire of the enemy, and mounting the very highest portion of the crest of the crater waved the colors zealously amid the storm of shot and canister. The gallant fellow was soon struck to the earth.

  While this was taking place an amusing occurrence happened in the crater. As the colored column was moving by the left flank around the edge of the crater to the right, the file-closers, on account of the narrowness of the way, were compelled to pass through the mass of white men inside the crater. One of these file-closers was a massively built, powerful, and well-formed sergeant, stripped to the waist—his coal-black skin shining like polished ebony in the strong sunlight. As he was passing up the slope to emerge on the enemy’s side of the crest he came across one of his own black fellows, who was lagging behind his company, evidently with the intention of remaining inside the crater, out of the way of the bullets. He was accosted by the sergeant with “None ob yo’ d—n skulkin’, now,” with which remark he seized the culprit with one hand, and, lifting him up in his powerful grasp by the waist-band of his trousers, carried him to the crest of the crater, threw him over on the enemy’s side, and quickly followed.—W.H.P.

  5 Among the captured was General William F. Bartlett. Earlier in the war he had lost a leg, which he replaced with one of cork. While he was standing in the crater, a shot was heard to strike with the peculiar thud known to those who have been in action, and the general was seen to totter and fall. A number of officers and men immediately lifted him, when he cried out, “Put me any place where I can sit down.” “But you are wounded, General, aren’t you?” was the inquiry. “My leg is shattered all to pieces,” said he. “Then you can’t sit up,” they urged; “you’ll have to lie down.” “Oh, no!” exclaimed the general, “it’s only my cork leg that’s shattered!”—W.H.P.

  6 A revised table that has been prepared for publication in the “Official Records” shows the loss of the Ninth Corps to have been 50 officers and 423 men killed, 124 officers and 1522 men wounded, and 79 officers and 1277 men captured or missing—3475. The total loss at the mine (including Turner’s division of the Tenth Corps) was 504 killed, 1881 wounded, and 1413 captured or missing—3798. General Mahone states that the number of prisoners taken was 1101. The loss in Lee’s army is not fully reported. Elliott’s brigade lost 677, and that was probably more than half of the casualties on the Confederate side.—EDITORS.

  CHAPTER 6

  THE DUEL BETWEEN THE “ALABAMA” AND THE “KEARSARGE.”

  John M. Browne, Surgeon of the “Kearsarge.”

  On Sunday, the 12th of June, 1864, the Kearsarge, Captain John A. Winslow, was lying at anchor in the Scheldt, off Flushing, Holland. The cornet suddenly appeared at the fore, and a gun was fired. These were unexpected signals that compelled absent officers and men to return to the ship. Steam was raised, and as soon as we were off, and all hands called, Captain Winslow gave the welcome news of a telegram from Mr. Dayton, our minister to France, announcing that the Alabama had arrived the day previous at Cherbourg; hence the urgency of departure, the probability of an encounter, and the expectation of her capture or destruction. The crew responded with cheers. The succeeding day witnessed the arrival of the Kearsarge at Dover for dispatches, and the day after (Tuesday) her appearance off Cherbourg, where we saw the Confederate flag flying within the breakwater. As we approached, officers and men gathered in groups on deck, and looked intently at the “daring rover” that had been able for two years to escape numerous foes and to inflict immense damage on our commerce. She was a beautiful specimen of naval architecture. The surgeon went on shore and obtained pratique (permission to visit the port) for boats. Owing to the neutrality limitation, which would not allow us to remain in the harbor longer than twenty-four hours, it was inexpedient to enter the port. We placed a vigilant watch by turns at each of the harbor entrances, and continued it to the moment of the engagement.

  On Wednesday Captain Winslow paid an official visit to the French admiral commanding the maritime district, and to the United States commercial agent, bringing on his return the unanticipated news that Captain Semmes had declared his intention to fight. At first the assertion was barely credited, the policy of the Alabama being regarded as opposed to a conflict, and to escape rather than to be exposed to injury, perhaps destruction; but the doubters were half convinced when the so-called challenge was known to read as follows:

  “C.S.S. ‘ALABAMA,’ CHERBOURG, June 14th, 1864.

  “TO A. BONFILS, Esq., CHERBOURG.

  “Sir:

  “I hear that you were informed by the U.S. Consul that the Kearsarge was to come to this port solely for the prisoners landed by me, and that she was to depart in twenty-four hours. I desire you to say to the U.S. Consul that my intention is to fight the Kearsarge as soon as I can make the necessary arrangements. I hope these will not detain me more than until to-morrow evening, or after the morrow morning at furthest. I beg she will not depart before I am ready to go out.

  “I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

  “Your obedient servant,

  “R. SEMMES, Captain.”

  This communication was sent by Mr. Bonfils, the Confederate States Commercial Agent, to Mr. Liais, the United States Commercial Agent, with a request that the latter would furnish a copy to Captain Winslow for his guidance. There was no other challenge to combat. The letter that passed between the commercial agents was the challenge about which so much has been said. Captain Semmes informed Captain Winslow through Mr. Bonfils of his intention to fight; Captain Winslow informed Captain Semmes through Mr. Liais that he came to Cherbourg to fight, and had no intention of leaving. He made no other reply.

  Captain Winslow assembled the officers and discussed the expected battle. It was probable the two ships would engage on parallel lines, and the Alabama would seek neutral waters in event of defeat; hence the necessity of beginning the action several miles from the breakwater. It was determined not to surrender, but to fight until the last, and, if need be, to go down with colors flying. Why Captain Semmes should imperil his ship was not understood, since he would risk all and expose the cause of which he was a selected champion to a needless disaster, while the Kearsarge, if taken or destroyed, could be replaced. It was therefore concluded that he would fight because he thought he would be the victor.

  Preparations were made for battle, with no relaxation of the watch. Thursday passed; Friday came; the Kearsarge waited with ports down, guns pivoted to starboard, the whole battery loaded, and shell, grape, and canister ready to use in any mode of attack or defense; yet no Alabama appeared. French pilots came on board and told of unusual arrangements made by the enemy, such as the hurried taking of coals, the transmission of valuable articles to the shore, such as captured chronometers, specie, and the bills of ransomed vessels; and the sharpening of swords, cutlasses, and boarding-pikes. It was reported that Captain Semmes had been advised not to give battle; that he replied he would prove to the world that his ship was not a privateer, intended only for attack upon merchant vessels, but a true man-of-war; further, that he had consulted French officers, who all asserted that in his situation they would fight. Certain newspapers declared that he ought to improve the opportunity afforded by the presence of the enemy to show that his ship was not a “corsair,” to prey upon defenseless merchantmen, but a real ship-of-war, able and willing to fight the “Federal” waiting outside the harbor. It was said the Alabama was swift, with a superior crew, and it was known that the ship, guns, and ammunition were of English make.

  A surprise by night was suggested, and precautionary means were taken; everything was well planned and ready for action, but still
no Alabama came. Meanwhile the Kearsarge was cruising to and fro off the breakwater. A message was brought from Mr. Dayton, our minister to Paris, by his son, who with difficulty had obtained permission from the French admiral to visit the Kearsarge. Communication with either ship was prohibited, but the permission was given upon the promise of Mr. Dayton to return on shore directly after the delivery of the message. Mr. Dayton expressed the opinion that Captain Semmes would not fight, though acknowledging the prevalence of a contrary belief in Cherbourg. He was told that, in the event of battle, if we were successful the colors would be displayed at the mizzen as the flag of victory. He went on shore with the intention of leaving for Paris without delay. In taking leave of the French admiral the latter advised Mr. Dayton to remain over night, and mentioned the fixed purpose of Captain Semmes to fight on the following day, Sunday; and he gave the intelligence that there could be no further communication with the Kearsarge. Mr. Dayton passed a part of Saturday night trying to procure a boat to send off the acquired information, but the vigilance along the coast made his efforts useless. He remained, witnessed the battle, telegraphed the result to Paris, and was one of the first to go on board and offer congratulations.

  At a supper in Cherbourg on Saturday night, several officers of the Alabama met sympathizing friends, the coming battle being the chief topic of conversation. Confident of victory, they proclaimed the intent to sink the “Federal” or gain a “corsair.” They rose with promises to meet the following night to repeat the festivity as victors, were escorted to the boat, and departed with cheers and best wishes for a successful return.1

  THE CREW OF THE “KEARSARGE” AT QUARTERS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

 

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