Hearts Touched by Fire

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by Harold Holzer


  The further operations of the Army of the James can best be treated of in connection with those of the Army of the Potomac, the two being so intimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body in which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged. I will briefly mention Sheridan’s first raid upon Lee’s communications which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and not specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign.

  On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the Wilderness, and when we were moving on Spotsylvania, I directed Sheridan, verbally, to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac, pass around the left of Lee’s army and attack his cavalry; to cut the two roads—one running west through Gordonsville, Charlottesville, and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond; and, when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to the James River and draw these from Butler’s supplies. This move took him past the entire rear of Lee’s army. These orders were also given in writing through Meade.

  The object of this move was threefold: 1. If successfully executed—and it was—he would annoy the enemy by cutting his lines of supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his own use supplies in store in the rear and coming up; 2. He would draw the enemy’s cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear, and trains than by remaining with the army; 3. His absence would save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from Fredericksburg, which had now become our base. He started at daylight the next morning, and accomplished more than was expected. It was sixteen days before he got back to the Army of the Potomac.15

  Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around Lee’s army; encountered his cavalry in four engagements and defeated them in all; recaptured four hundred Union prisoners and killed and captured many of the enemy; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war; destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance by the cavalry for more than two weeks.

  I fixed the day for Sherman to start when the season should be far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a condition for the troops to march. General Sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the task which was assigned him to accomplish in the spring campaign.

  The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, the enemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there. It is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting, some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very important battles; neither were positions gained in a single day. On the contrary, weeks were spent at some; and about Atlanta more than a month was consumed.

  Soon after midnight, May 3d–4th, the Army of the Potomac moved out from its position north of the Rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign destined to result in the capture of the Confederate capital and the army defending it.

  * * *

  1 The Red River campaign.—EDITORS.

  2 From December 17th, 1862, when he was superseded in command of the Gulf Department by General Banks, General Butler was not in active service until November 11th, 1863, when he assumed command of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina (the Army of the James).—EDITORS.

  3 These troops, the Tenth Corps, left the Department of the South during the month of April for rendezvous at Gloucester Point, Virginia.—EDITORS.

  4 General Burnside had been relieved of the command of the Department of the Ohio on the 12th of December, by General J. G. Foster, and on the 7th of January, 1864, had been assigned to the command of the Ninth Corps. This corps left Knoxville, Tennessee, March 17th–23d, and was reorganized at Annapolis for the spring campaign, and received an addition to its strength of five cavalry and twelve infantry regiments and five batteries of artillery.—EDITORS.

  5 General Johnston was relieved of the command of the Department of Tennessee by General Bragg, July 23d, 1863, and continued in command of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana. On December 27th, 1863, he assumed command of the Army of Tennessee, superseding Bragg.—EDITORS.

  6 General Crook was transferred from the command of a cavalry division in the Army of the Cumberland and assumed command of an infantry division in the Department of West Virginia, February 15th, 1864.—EDITORS.

  7 General Sigel succeeded General Benjamin F. Kelley in command of the Department of West Virginia on the 10th of March, 1864. After the second battle of Bull Run Sigel had been in command of the Eleventh Corps, the Reserve Grand Division of the Army of the Potomac, and the Lehigh District in Pennsylvania.—EDITORS.

  8 After the appearance of General Grant’s paper in “The Century” magazine for February, 1886, General William F. Smith made the following reply, which was printed in that magazine for May, 1886:

  “General Grant makes this general charge without assigning a reason for it or attempting to justify it by citing any instance in which I had failed in any duty I had been called upon to perform. This gives me the right to call General Grant himself as a witness in my own behalf, and to assert that the reasons which moved him to say that ‘the objections to my confirmation were well founded’ were of a personal, and not of a public nature.

  “The battle of Chattanooga ended on the 25th of November, 1863—my name was not sent to the Senate till the 15th of March, 1864. On the 18th it was returned to the President, with the request that the date of rank should conform to the date of nomination.

  “On the 23d of the same month it was again sent to the Senate, and my nomination was confirmed on the same day. It was therefore nearly four months after the battle when my name was sent to the Senate for promotion, and in three days thereafter the Senate asked the President to make the date of rank conform to the date of nomination; and on the same day that my name was returned to the Senate my nomination was confirmed. The question of my confirmation therefore was settled on the 18th of March, when the request was made to have the date of rank conform to the date of nomination, and during this time and up to the time of my confirmation General Grant was not in the city of Washington.

  “He left Washington on the night of the 11th of March for Nashville and did not return till some time during the 23d—the day on which the President returned my name to the Senate and upon which final action was taken. Shortly thereafter I was informed by a senator that my name had passed the Senate without having been referred to the Military Committee, which he stated to be a ‘high compliment and one seldom paid by the Senate.’ As to the fact whether this confirmation was made without a reference to the Military Committee, the records of the Senate will show.

  “But much more important to me is the fact that this sweeping denunciation was not founded upon any failure on my part to perform the duty I owed to the country, then in its struggle for existence, and that no one knew this better than the general who was in command of its armies. On the 12th of November, 1863, General Grant had addressed the Secretary of War as follows:

  “ ‘I would respectfully recommend that Brigadier-General William F. Smith be placed first on the list for promotion to the rank of major-general. He is possessed of one of the clearest military heads in the army—is very practical and industrious—no man in the service is better qualified than he for our largest commands.’

  “On July 1st, 1864, General Grant, from City Point, Virginia, addressed a letter to General Halleck, chief-of-staff, from which the following extracts are taken:

  “ ‘Mr. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, has just returned. He informs me that he called attention to the necessity of sending General Butler to another field of duty.… I have feared that it might become necessary to separate him and General Smith. The latter is really one of the most efficient officers in the service, readiest in expedients, and most skillful in the management of troops in action. I would dislike removing him from his present command unless it was to increase it, but, as I say, I may have to do it if General Butler remains.… I would feel st
rengthened with Smith, Franklin, or J. J. Reynolds commanding the right wing of this army.…’

  “So that on the 1st of July, 1864, General Grant thought he would be strengthened with General Smith commanding the right wing of that army. On the strength of that letter I was placed in command of the troops in the field belonging to the Army of the James, and General Butler was ordered back to administrative duty at Fort Monroe.

  “Being much out of health at this time, I had asked for a short leave of absence, to which this answer was returned:

  “ ‘HEADQUARTERS, CITY POINT, JULY 2D, 1864.

  “ ‘TO MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM F. SMITH:

  “Your application for leave of absence has just come to me. Unless it is absolutely necessary that you should leave at this time, I would much prefer not having you go. It will not be necessary for you to expose yourself in the hot sun, and if it should become necessary I can temporarily attach General Humphreys to your command.

  “ ‘U. S. GRANT.’

  “As my health did not improve I repeated my request for leave, and on the 9th of July I received the following from General Grant at City Point:

  “ ‘General Ord can be assigned to the command of your corps during your absence if you think it advisable.’

  “I left my command on that day, and City Point on the following day, and it is manifest General Grant up to that moment had not changed the opinion he had expressed in recommending my promotion. I returned to the army on the 19th of July, to find myself relieved from my command. During this absence of ten days, nothing connected with my military duties could have occurred to impair the confidence in me expressed in General Grant’s communication of the 9th.

  “I sought an explanation from him on the day of my return, and he was as reticent in assigning any cause for his action then as he was twenty-one years after, when, in preparing a contribution to the history of the war, he again passed sentence upon me without assigning a reason of any kind for his condemnation. I am to-day as ignorant of the causes for his action as I was then. That they were purely personal, and had not the remotest connection with my conduct as a soldier, I submit is proved by his own testimony, and it is upon this question alone that I care to defend myself.”

  In “The Century” magazine for September, 1886, Captain Joel B. Erhardt contributed the following extract from a letter that had never been made public:

  “COLLEGE POINT, L. I., JULY 30TH, 1864.

  “Hon. S. Foot.

  “DEAR SENATOR:

  “I am extremely anxious that my friends in my native State [Vermont] should not think that the reason of General Grant relieving me from duty was brought about by any misconduct of mine, and therefore I write to put you in possession of such facts in the case as I am aware of, and think will throw light upon the subject.…

  “On my return from a short leave of absence, on the 19th of July, General Grant sent for me to report to him, and then told me that he ‘could not relieve General Butler,’ and that as I had so severely criticised General Meade, he had determined to relieve me from the command of the Eighteenth Corps, and order me to New York City to await orders. The next morning the general gave some other reasons, such as an article in the ‘Tribune’ reflecting on General Hancock, which I had nothing in the world to do with, and two letters which I had written, before the campaign began, to two of General Grant’s most devoted friends, urging upon them to try and prevent him from making the campaign he had just made.…

  “VERY TRULY YOURS. “WILLIAM F. SMITH, MAJOR-GENERAL.”

  —EDITORS.

  9 The engagement at Plymouth extended from the 17th to the 20th of April, 1864. The garrison consisted of four regiments of infantry, with detachments of artillery and cavalry, under command of General H. W. Wessells. The principal reliance was the navy, which, however, was neutralized by the Confederate ram Albemarle. [See papers on the Albemarle, to follow.] After repulsing five charges General Wessells surrendered, with about 1500 men, to General R. F. Hoke.—EDITORS.

  10 General Halleck’s instructions for this movement were promulgated during January and February, 1864.—EDITORS.

  11 The 10,000 troops under General A. J. Smith that had been thus detached belonged to the 16th and 17th corps (Sherman’s army), at the time (March, 1864,) in the Mississippi Valley. Portions of these corps subsequently joined Sherman and Thomas.—EDITORS.

  12 On the 20th of April, 1864, General Beauregard was relieved of the command at Charleston, and on the 23d he assumed command of the Department of North Carolina, which on May 14th was extended to cover all of Virginia south of the James, including Drewry’s Bluff.—EDITORS.

  13 Smith’s 18th Corps and two divisions of the 10th.

  14 The words used in General Grant’s report, dated July 22d, 1865, are these:

  “His [Butler’s] army, therefore, though in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly before Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked.… The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealed itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most if not all of the reënforcements brought from the South by Beauregard against the Army of the Potomac.”

  —EDITORS.

  15 From “Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant” (New York: C. L. Webster & Co.) we take this account of the raid:

  “The course Sheridan took was directly to Richmond. Before night Stuart, commanding the Confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of his command. But the advance kept on, crossed the North Anna, and at Beaver Dam, a station on the Virginia Central Railroad, recaptured four hundred Union prisoners on their way to Richmond, destroyed the road, and used and destroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores.

  “Stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing toward Richmond, abandoned the pursuit on the morning of the 10th, and by a detour and an exhausting march, interposed between Sheridan and Richmond at Yellow Tavern, only about six miles north of the city. Sheridan destroyed the railroad and more supplies at Ashland, and on the 11th arrived in Stuart’s front. A severe engagement ensued, in which the losses were heavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortally wounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured.

  “Sheridan passed through the outer defenses of Richmond, and could, no doubt, have passed through the inner ones; but, having no supports near, he could not have remained. After caring for his wounded, he struck for the James River below the city, to communicate with Butler, and to rest his men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them.

  “He moved first between the Chickahominy and the James, but in the morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville. He then turned to cross to the north side of the Chickahominy by Meadow Bridge. He found this barred, and the defeated Confederate cavalry, reorganized, occupying the opposite side. The panic created by his first entrance within the outer works of Richmond having subsided, troops were sent out to attack his rear.

  “He was now in a perilous position; one from which but few generals could have extricated themselves. The defenses of Richmond, manned, were to the right, the Chickahominy was to the left, with no bridge remaining, and the opposite bank guarded; to the rear was a force from Richmond. This force was attacked and beaten by Wilson’s and Gregg’s divisions, while Sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily built a bridge over the Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced a crossing and soon dispersed the Confederates he found there. The enemy was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in bridge-building.

  “On the 13th Sheridan was at Bottom’s Bridge, over the Chickahominy. On the 14th he crossed this stream, and on that day went into camp on the James River at Haxall’s Landing. He at once put himself into communication with General Butler, who directed all the supplies he wanted to be furnished.

  “Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at Spotsylvania, but did not know where either this or Lee’s
army was now. Great caution therefore had to be exercised in getting back. On the 17th, after resting his command for three days, he started on his return. He moved by the way of White House. The bridge over the Pamunkey had been burned by the enemy, but a new one was speedily improvised, and the cavalry crossed over it. On the 22d he was at Aylett’s on the Mattapony, where he learned the position of the two armies. On the 24th he joined us on the march from North Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity of Chesterfield.”

  CHAPTER 9

  THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA.

  Oliver O. Howard, Major-General, U.S.A.

  The forces under General Grant after his appointment as general-in-chief were, the Army of the Potomac, under Meade; that of the Ohio, near Knoxville, under Schofield;1 that of the Cumberland, under Thomas,2 near Chattanooga; that of the Tennessee, under McPherson, scattered from Huntsville, Alabama, to the Mississippi; that of the Gulf, under Banks, in Louisiana; besides subordinate detachments, under Steele and others, in Arkansas and farther west.

  Grant took the whole field into his thought. He made three parts to the long, irregular line of armies, which extended from Virginia to Texas. He gave to Banks the main work in the south-west; to Sherman the middle part, covering the hosts of McPherson, Thomas, Schofield, and Steele; and reserved to himself the remainder. The numbers were known, at least on paper; the plan, promptly adopted, was simple and comprehensive: To break and keep broken the connecting links of the enemy’s opposing armies, beat them one by one, and unite for a final consummation. Sherman’s part was plain. Grant’s plan, flexible enough to embrace his own, afforded Sherman “infinite satisfaction.” It looked like “enlightened war.” He rejoiced at “this verging to a common center.” “Like yourself,” he writes to Grant, “you take the biggest load, and from me you shall have thorough and hearty coöperation.”

 

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