The remainder of the story is soon told. As the Tennessee left the Hartford she became the target of the entire fleet, and at last the concentration of solid shot from so many guns began to tell. The flag-staff was shot away, the smoke-stack was riddled with holes, and finally disappeared. The monitor Chickasaw, Lieutenant-Commander Perkins, succeeded in coming up astern and began pounding away with 11-inch solid shot, and one shot from a 15-inch gun of the Manhattan crushed into the side sufficiently to prove that a few more such shots would have made the casemate untenable. Finally, one of the Chickasaw’s shots cut the rudder-chain of the ram and she would no longer mind her helm.11 At this time, as Admiral Farragut says in his report, “she was sore beset. The Chickasaw was pounding away at her stern, the Ossipee was approaching her at full speed, and the Monongahela, Lackawanna, and this ship were bearing down upon her, determined upon her destruction.” From the time the Hartford struck her she did not fire a gun. Finally the Confederate admiral, Buchanan, was severely wounded by an iron splinter or a piece of a shell, and just as the Ossipee was about to strike her the Tennessee displayed a white flag, hoisted on an improvised staff through the grating over her deck. The Ossipee (Captain Le Roy) reversed her engine, but was so near that a harmless collision was inevitable. Suddenly the terrific cannonading ceased, and from every ship rang out cheer after cheer, as the weary men realized that at last the ram was conquered and the day won.12 The Chickasaw took the Tennessee in tow and brought her to anchor near the Hartford. The impression prevailed at first that the Tennessee had been seriously injured by the ramming she had received and was sinking, and orders were signaled to send boats to assist her crew, but it was soon discovered that this was unnecessary. Admiral Buchanan surrendered his sword to Lieutenant Giraud, of the Ossipee, who was sent to take charge of the captured Tennessee. Captain Heywood, of the Marine Corps, was sent on board the ram with a guard of marines. On meeting Admiral Buchanan he could not resist the temptation to inform him that they had met before under different circumstances, the captain having been on the frigate Cumberland when she was sunk in Hampton Roads by Buchanan in the Merrimac.13
FIGHT BETWEEN THE “CHICKASAW” AND FORT POWELL, AUGUST 5, 1864. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
The picture appears to represent the blowing up of Fort Powell, which did not occur until after 10 o’clock that night, when the fort was evacuated.—EDITORS.
Late in the afternoon the Metacomet was sent to Pensacola with the wounded of both sides, including Admiral Buchanan. In his report he accuses Captain Harrison of the Morgan of deserting the Selma. Captain Harrison in his report, on the other hand, charges Captain Murphy of the Selma with running away and with bad seamanship. Those who witnessed the fight at close quarters will not accept Captain Harrison’s view, and the record of killed and wounded tells the story. On the Morgan one man was slightly wounded, on the Selma eight were killed and seven wounded; and there is no doubt that the Selma was better managed and did more harm to the Union fleet than the two other rebel gun-boats combined. Captain Murphy of the Selma, in his official report, written like those of Buchanan and Johnston from the Pensacola hospital, tells very briefly the story of his part in the fight and makes no insinuations or complaints against brother officers. The total casualties in the rebel fleet were 12 killed and 20 wounded, as follows:
Killed. Wounded.
Ram Tennessee 2 9
Gun-boat Selma 8 7
" Gaines 2 3
" Morgan 0 1
Total 12 20
[To the above should be added those captured on board the surrendered vessels, including, according to Farragut’s report, 190 in the Tennessee and 90 in the Selma.—EDITORS.]
The Gaines, according to the official report of her captain, was disabled by a shot or shell from the Hartford, “which broke in the outer planking under the port quarter about the water-line, and which from the marks seemed to have glanced below in the direction of the stern-post.” This caused a leak in the after-magazine that could not be stopped, and made it necessary to beach the vessel as already described. The captain succeeded in removing the ammunition, supplies, and small-arms to the shore, for the use of Fort Morgan, and during the next night made his escape with his crew to Mobile, pulling up the bay in six cutters, which in the darkness easily evaded the Union gun-boats that were on guard. The Morgan also succeeded in making her way through without difficulty, covering all her lights and running very slowly until she had passed the Union vessels. The writer of this sketch has never been able to understand why the Morgan and the boats belonging to the Gaines were not destroyed during the afternoon following the fight, as might have been done with ease and safety by any one of the monitors. This was supposed to have been the object of a little excursion of the Winnebago in the afternoon, which, however, aside from firing a few harmless and unnecessary shots at Fort Morgan, accomplished nothing. The Chickasaw (Lieutenant-Commander Perkins) at the same time shelled Fort Powell, which was evacuated about 10 P.M. that night, the officers and men escaping to the mainland. The Chickasaw also tackled Fort Gaines on the 6th, and speedily convinced the commanding officer that it would be folly to attempt to withstand a siege. The result was a surrender to the army and navy the next morning.
Fort Morgan was at once invested, and surrendered on the 23d of August.
* * *
1 Based upon the author’s paper in “The Century” for May, 1881, entitled “An August Morning with Farragut,” revised and extended for the present work.—EDITORS.
2 According to Admiral Farragut’s report the Brooklyn was appointed to lead, because she had four chase-guns and apparatus for picking up torpedoes.—EDITORS.
3 Mrs. Farragut’s maiden name was Loyall.—EDITORS.
4 In Farragut’s Supplementary General Order (No. 11) of July 29th, occurs the following:
“There are certain black buoys placed by the enemy from the piles on the west side of the channel across it towards Fort Morgan. It being understood that there are torpedoes and other obstructions between the buoys, the vessels will take care to pass eastward of the easternmost buoy, which is clear of all obstructions.”
The easternmost buoy was the famous red buoy which figures in all accounts of the battle. As the fleet approached, the Tennessee was lying in the rear of the torpedo obstructions, and therefore to the westward of the red buoy. When Craven, in the Tecumseh, drew near to the buoy, influenced by the narrowness of the channel to the eastward, as his remark to the pilot would indicate (Mahan, “Gulf and Inland Waters,” p.231), or by a desire to get at the Tennessee more quickly, as Parker suggests (“Battle of Mobile Bay,” p.26), he disregarded the instructions, and, shaping his course to the westward of the buoy, struck the torpedoes. His course crowded the main column to the westward, and left no choice to Alden and the fleet following in his wake, but to pass over the obstructions also. Of 114 officers and men on board the Tecumseh, 21 were saved. Of these two officers and five men escaped in one of the Tecumseh’s boats, four swam to Fort Morgan where they were made prisoners, and ten, including Ensign Zettick and John Collins, the pilot, were rescued by Acting-Ensign Nields. It is to the statement of Collins that the world is indebted for the account of that heroic act which will forever be associated with Craven’s name. Commodore Parker thus tells the story:
“Craven and Mr. John Collins, the pilot of the Tecumseh, met, as their vessel was sinking beneath them, at the foot of the ladder leading to the top of the turret.… It may be, then, that Craven, in the nobility of his soul,—for all know he was one of nature’s noble men,—it may be, I say, that, in the nobility of his soul, the thought flashed across him that it was through no fault of his pilot that the Tecumseh was in this peril; he drew back. ‘After you, pilot,’ said he, grandly. ‘There was nothing after me,’ relates Mr. Collins; ‘when I reached the upmost round of the ladder, the vessel seemed to drop from under me.’ ”
—EDITORS.
5 The gallantry of Nields’s conduct was all the more striking in view
of the fact that in pulling to the Tecumseh’s wreck it was necessary to pass around the stern and under the broadside of the Hartford and across the Brooklyn’s bow, thus placing the boat directly in the line of fire of the fleet as well as of the fort. In fact, as the boat at first carried no flag, Acting Ensign Whiting, in charge of the forecastle guns on board the Hartford, was about to fire at her, when some one standing by informed him of her character and errand. A moment later, Nields himself observed the omission, and took the flag from its case and shipped it. The rescued men were placed on board the Winnebago, and Nields and his boat’s crew, unable to regain their ship, joined the Oneida, where they served during the remainder of the battle.—EDITORS.
6 The period of delay between the halting of the Brooklyn and the decision of the admiral to take the lead could hardly have been less than ten minutes, and may have been longer. The first signal message from the Brooklyn was taken from the forecastle of the Hartford. Then the smoke from the Hartford’s bow guns interfered, and I started up the foremast, intending to make a signal-station of the foretop. Finding a howitzer crew at work there I kept on to the foretop-gallant crosstrees, where I received and replied to two messages before the Hartford passed the Brooklyn. As I was not a sailor and had never before been so far up in the rigging of a ship, it could hardly have taken me less then five minutes to shift from the forecastle to the crosstrees. It was while going up the mast that I witnessed the sinking of the Tecumseh. —J.C.K.
7 Farragut, when he had altered his course, had every reason to suppose that there were torpedoes directly in his path. It was known that they had been placed west of the red buoy, the Brooklyn had seen them, and the fate of the Tecumseh was conclusive evidence. In fact the officers both of the Hartford and the Richmond heard the snapping of torpedo-primers under the bottom of the ships as they passed, but the torpedoes failed to explode, having probably been corroded by lying a long time in the water. —EDITORS.
8 In turning to clear the Brooklyn’s stern, the Hartford went ahead, while the Metacomet backed. —EDITORS.
9 The TENNESSEE, after colliding with the MONONGAHELA, grazed the bow of the KENNEBEC, injured slightly the latter’s planking, and dropped one of her boats on the deck of the gun-boat.—EDITORS.
10 The Oneida, the last ship in the line, suffered more severely than any other of the fleet in the passage. One shell exploded in the boiler, another cut the wheel-ropes, and a third disabled the forward pivot-gun. The list of casualties was very large, Commander Mullany being among the wounded. The crippled vessel was carried on by her consort, the Galena.—EDITORS.
11 The admiral says in his report:
“I cannot give too much praise to Lieutenant-Commander Perkins, who, though he had orders from the Department to return north, volunteered to take command of the Chickasaw, and did his duty nobly.”
According to the pilot of the Tennessee, “the Chickasaw hung close under our stern. Move as we would, she was always there, firing the two 11-inch guns in her forward turret like pocket-pistols, so that she soon had the plates flying in the air.”—EDITORS.
12 The first gun of the day was fired at 6:47 A.M. The surrender of the ram occurred at 10 o’clock.
—EDITORS.
13 The casualties of the Union fleet, as reported by Admiral Farragut, were 52 killed and 170 wounded, as follows:
Killed. Wounded.
Hartford 25 28
Brooklyn 11 43
Lackawanna 4 35
Oneida 8 30
Monongahela 14 0 6
Metacomet 1 2
Ossipee 1 7
Richmond 0 2
Galena 0 1
Octorara 1 10
Kennebec 1 6
To the above should be added the casualties on board the Tecumseh, viz., 93 drowned and 4 captured, making the total losses 145 killed, 170 wounded and 4 captured.—EDITORS.
14 First-Lieutenant Roderick Prentiss died a day later, as already mentioned.
CHAPTER 11
THE INVASION OF TENNESSEE.1
J. B. Hood, General, C.S.A.
Unless the army could be heavily reënforced, there was but one plan to be adopted: by manœuvres, to draw Sherman back into the mountains, then beat him in battle, and at least regain our lost territory. Therefore, after anxious reflection and consultation with the corps commanders, I determined to communicate with the President, and ascertain whether or not reënforcements could be obtained from any quarter.
The reply from His Excellency conveyed no hope of assistance:
“RICHMOND, September 5th, 1864.
“… The necessity for reënforcements was realized, and every effort made to bring forward reserves, militia, and detailed men for the purpose.… No other resource remains. It is now requisite that absentees be brought back, the addition required from the surrounding country be promptly made available, and that the means in hand be used with energy proportionate to the country’s need.
“ ‘JEFFERSON DAVIS.”
I thereupon decided to operate at the earliest moment possible in the rear of Sherman, as I became more and more convinced of our inability successfully to resist an advance of the Federal army.
I recalled General Wheeler from Tennessee to join immediately the left of the army, whilst Colonel Presstman, of the engineer corps, made ready to move with the pontoon-train and a sufficient number of boats to meet any emergency.
Upon the morning of the 18th the army began to move in the direction of the West Point Railroad, which the advance reached on the 19th. Upon the 20th, line of battle was formed, with the right east of the railroad, and the left resting near the river, with army headquarters at Palmetto.
On the 28th I issued instructions to commence the movement across the Chattahoochee at Pumpkin Town and Phillips’s Ferry, and on the following morning I directed that our supplies from Newnan cross the river at Moore’s Ferry. At noon I rode over the pontoon-bridge in advance of the infantry, and that night established my headquarters at Pray’s Church, along with General W. H. Jackson, commanding the cavalry.
The morning of the 1st of October Brigadier-General Jackson advanced with the cavalry, sending a detachment at the same time to operate against the railroad between the Chattahoochee and Marietta. That night the army went into bivouac eight miles north of Pray’s Church, after having effected an undisturbed and safe passage of the Chattahoochee. Information was here received that Kilpatrick’s cavalry was north of the river, and that Garrard’s cavalry had moved in the direction of Rome.
The night of the 2d the army rested near Flint Hill Church. On the morning of the 3d Lieutenant-General Stewart was instructed to move with his corps and take possession of Big Shanty; to send, if practicable, a detachment for the same purpose to Ackworth, and to destroy as great a portion of the railroad in the vicinity as possible; also to send a division to Allatoona to capture that place, if, in the judgment of the commanding officer, the achievement was feasible. The main body of the army in the meantime moved forward and bivouacked near Carley’s house, within four miles of Lost Mountain.
On the 4th General Stewart captured, after a slight resistance, about 170 prisoners at Big Shanty, and at 9:30 A.M. the garrison at Ackworth, numbering 250 men, surrendered to General Loring. The forces under these officers joined the main body near Lost Mountain on the morning of the 5th, having, in addition, destroyed about ten or fifteen miles of the railroad.
I had received information that the enemy had in store at Allatoona large supplies which were guarded by two or three regiments. As one of the objects of the campaign was to deprive the enemy of provisions, Major-General French was ordered to move with his division, capture the garrison, if practicable, and gain possession of the supplies. Accordingly, on the 5th, at 10 A.M., after a refusal to surrender, he attacked the Federal forces at Allatoona, and succeeded in capturing a portion of the works; at that juncture he received intelligence that large reënforcements were advancing in support of the enemy, and fearing he would be cut of
f from the main body of the army, he retired and abandoned the attempt. Our soldiers fought with great courage; during the engagement Brigadier-General Young, a brave and efficient officer, was wounded and captured by the enemy. General Corse won my admiration by his gallant resistance, and not without reason the Federal commander complimented this officer, through a general order, for his handsome conduct in the defense of Allatoona.
Our presence upon his communications compelled Sherman to leave Atlanta in haste and cross the Chattahoochee on the 3d and 4th of October with, according to our estimate at that time, about 65,000 infantry and artillery and two divisions of cavalry. He left one corps to guard the city and the railway bridge across the river, and telegraphed to Grant he would attack me if I struck his road south of the Etowah.
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