Hearts Touched by Fire

by Harold Holzer

  After his twenty-minutes talk with Grant, Sheridan mounted his horse, and, waving us a good-bye with his hand, rode off to Dinwiddie. The next morning, the 31st, he reported that the enemy had been hard at work intrenching at Five Forks and to a point about a mile west of there. Lee had been as prompt as Grant to recognize that Five Forks was a strategic point of great importance, and, to protect his right, had sent Pickett there with a large force of infantry and nearly all the cavalry. The rain continued during the night of the 30th, and on the morning of the 31st the weather was cloudy and dismal.

  General Grant had expected that Warren would be attacked that morning, and had warned him to be on the alert. Warren advanced his corps to ascertain with what force the enemy held the White Oak road and to try to drive him from it; but before he had gone far he met with a vigorous assault. When news came of the attack General Grant directed me to go to the spot and look to the situation of affairs there. I found Ayres’s division had been driven in, and both he and Crawford were falling back upon Griffin. Miles, of Humphreys’s corps, was sent to reënforce Warren, and by noon the enemy was checked. As soon as General Grant was advised of the situation, he directed General Meade to take the offensive vigorously. Miles made a movement to the left and attacked in flank the troops in front of Warren, and the enemy soon fell back. General Grant had now ridden out to the front, and hearing that he was at Mrs. Butler’s house near the Boydton plank-road, I joined him there. It was then a little after 1 o’clock. He had in the meantime ordered the headquarters camp to be moved to Dabney’s Mill, on a cross-road running from the Boydton plank to the Vaughan road, and about two miles from Meade’s headquarters, which were near the crossing of the Vaughan road and Hatcher’s Run. The general was becoming apprehensive lest the infantry force that had moved against Warren might turn upon Sheridan, who had only cavalry with which to resist, as the weather had rendered it impracticable thus far to send him a corps of infantry as intended, and the general-in-chief was urgent that a strong forward movement should be made by the Fifth Corps for the purpose of deterring the enemy from detaching infantry from that portion of his line. This advance was made later in the afternoon, and with decided success. When this movement had been decided upon, General Grant directed me to go to Sheridan and explain what was taking place in Warren’s and in Humphreys’s front, and have a full understanding with him as to further operations in his vicinity. I rode rapidly down the Boydton plank-road, and soon came to Gravelly Run. Hearing heavy firing in the direction of the Five Forks road, I hurried on in that direction. Crossing by the Brooks road from the Boydton plank to the Five Forks road, which runs north from Dinwiddie, I saw a portion of our cavalry moving eastward, pressed by a heavy force of the enemy, and it was found that Devin and Davies, after holding on tooth and nail for hours, had been driven in by the force of superior numbers and were falling back toward the Boydton plank-road. The brigades of Gibbs and J. I. Gregg had rushed in on the right and rear of the enemy, and got in some very good work, but were soon after compelled to fall back toward Dinwiddie. I turned the corner of the Brooks cross-road and the Five Forks road just as the rear of our cavalry was passing it, and encountered one of Sheridan’s bands,2 under a heavy fire, playing “Nellie Bly” as cheerily as if it were furnishing music for a country picnic.

  I found Sheridan a little north of Dinwiddie Court House, and gave him an account of matters on the left of the Army of the Potomac. He said he had had one of the liveliest days in his experience, fighting infantry and cavalry with cavalry only, but that he was concentrating his command on the high ground just north of Dinwiddie, and would hold that position at all hazards. He did not stop here, but becoming more and more animated in describing the situation and stating his views and intentions, he declared his belief that with the corps of infantry he expected to be put under his command he could take the initiative the next morning and cut off the whole of the force that Lee had detached. He said: “This force is in more danger than I am—if I am cut off from the Army of the Potomac, it is cut off from Lee’s army, and not a man in it should ever be allowed to get back to Lee. We at last have drawn the enemy’s infantry out of its fortifications, and this is our chance to attack it.” He begged me to go to General Grant at once and again urge him to send him the Sixth Corps, because it had been under him in the battles in the Valley of Virginia, and knew his way of fighting. I told him, as had been stated to him before, that the Sixth Corps was next to our extreme right, and that the only one which could reach him by daylight was the Fifth. I started soon after for General Grant’s headquarters at Dabney’s Mill, a distance of about eight miles. I reached there at 7 o’clock P.M., and gave the general a full description of Sheridan’s operations. He at once telegraphed the substance of my report to Meade, and preparations soon after began looking to the sending of the Fifth Corps to report to Sheridan. About 7:40 Captain M. V. Sheridan, of Sheridan’s staff, brought still later news from Dinwiddie, saying that the cavalry had had more fighting but was holding its position.

  It was finally decided that Warren should send Ayres down the Boydton plank and across by the Brooks road, and Griffin and Crawford by the Crump road, which runs from the White Oak road south to J. Boisseau’s. Mackenzie’s small division of cavalry was ordered to march to Dinwiddie and report to Sheridan. All haste was urged, in the hope that at daylight the enemy might be caught between Warren’s two divisions of infantry on one side and Ayres’s division and Sheridan’s cavalry on the other, and be badly beaten. It was expected that the infantry would reach its destination in ample time to take the offensive at break of day, but now one delay after another was met with, and Grant, Meade, and Sheridan spent a painfully anxious night in hurrying forward the movement. Ayres had to rebuild a bridge over Gravelly Run, which took till 2 A.M. Warren, with his other two divisions, did not get started from their position on the White Oak road till 5 A.M., and the hope of crushing the enemy was hourly growing less. This proved to be one of the busiest nights of the whole campaign. Generals were writing dispatches and telegraphing from dark till daylight. Staff-officers were rushing from one headquarters to another, wading through swamps, penetrating forests, and galloping over corduroy roads, engaged in carrying instructions, getting information, and making extraordinary efforts to hurry up the movement of the troops.

  The next morning, April 1st, General Grant said to me: “I wish you would spend the day with Sheridan’s command, and send me a bulletin every half-hour or so, advising me fully as to the progress of his movements. You know my views, and I want you to give them to Sheridan fully. Tell him the contemplated movement is left entirely in his hands, and he must be responsible for its execution. I have every confidence in his judgment and ability. I hope there may now be an opportunity of fighting the enemy’s infantry outside of its fortifications.”

  I set out with half a dozen mounted orderlies to act as couriers in transmitting field bulletins. Captain Peter T. Hudson, of our staff, went with me. After traveling again by way of the Brooks road, I met Sheridan, about 10 A.M., on the Five Forks road not far from J. Boisseau’s house. Ayres had his division on this road, having arrived about daylight, and Griffin had reached J. Boisseau’s between 7 and 8 A.M. I had a full conference with Sheridan. He told me the force in front of him had fallen back early in the morning, that he had pursued with his cavalry and had had several brushes with the enemy, and was driving him steadily back; that he had his patience sorely tried by the delays that had occurred in getting the infantry to him, but he was going to make every effort to strike a heavy blow with all the infantry and cavalry, as soon as he could get them into position, provided the enemy should make a stand behind his intrenchments at Five Forks, which seemed likely. General Warren, who had accompanied Crawford’s division, arrived at 11 o’clock and reported in person to Sheridan.

  A few minutes before noon Colonel (afterward General) Babcock, of General Grant’s staff, came over from headquarters and said to Sheridan: “General Grant dire
cts me to say to you, that if in your judgment the Fifth Corps would do better under one of the division commanders, you are authorized to relieve General Warren, and order him to report to General Grant, at headquarters.” General Sheridan replied, in effect, that he hoped such a step as that might not become necessary, and then went on to speak of his plan of battle. We all rode on farther to the front, and soon met General Devin, who was considerably elated by his successes of the morning, and was loudly demanding to be permitted to make a general charge on the enemy. Sheridan told him he didn’t believe he had enough ammunition, to which Devin replied: “I guess I’ve got enough to give ’em one surge more.”

  General Babcock now left us to return to headquarters. About 1 o’clock it was reported by the cavalry that the enemy was retiring to his intrenched position at Five Forks, which was just north of the White Oak road, and parallel to it, his earth-works running from a point about three-quarters of a mile east of Five Forks to a point a mile west, with an angle or crotchet about one hundred yards long thrown back at right angles to his left to protect that flank. Orders were at once given to the Fifth Corps to move up the Gravelly Run Church road to the open ground near the church, and form in order of battle, with Ayres on the left, Crawford on his right, and Griffin in rear as a reserve. The corps was to wheel to the left, and make its attack upon the “angle,” and then, moving westward, sweep down in rear of the enemy’s intrenched line. The cavalry, principally dismounted, was to deploy in front of the enemy’s line and engage his attention, and, as soon as it heard the firing of our infantry, to make a vigorous assault upon his works.

  The Fifth Corps had borne the brunt of the fighting ever since the army had moved out on the 29th, and the gallant men who composed it, and had performed a conspicuous part in nearly every battle in which the Army of the Potomac had been engaged, seemed eager once more to cross bayonets with their old antagonists. But the movement was slow, the required formation seemed to drag, and Sheridan, chafing with impatience and consumed with anxiety, became as restive as a racer when he nears the score and is struggling to make the start. He made every possible appeal for promptness, he dismounted from his horse, paced up and down, struck the clinched fist of one hand into the palm of the other, and fretted like a caged tiger. He said at one time: “This battle must be fought and won before the sun goes down. All the conditions may be changed in the morning; we have but a few hours of daylight left us. My cavalry are rapidly exhausting their ammunition, and if the attack is delayed much longer they may have none left.” And then another batch of staff-officers were sent out to gallop through the mud and hurry up the columns.

  MAP OF THE BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS.

  In his official report, General Fitzhugh Lee gives the following account of the battle of Five Forks from the Confederate point of view:

  “Our position in the vicinity of Dinwiddie Court House [March 31st] brought us to the rear of the left of the infantry confronting the right of our line of battle at Burgess’s Mills, and ascertaining during the night that that force, consisting of the Fifth Corps, had about-faced and was marching to the support of Sheridan and his discomfited cavalry, which would have brought them directly upon our left flank, at daylight on the 1st we commenced moving back to our former position at Five Forks, where Pickett placed his infantry in line of battle. W.H.F. Lee was on his right, one regiment of Munford’s command on his left, uniting with the pickets of General Roberts’s command, who filled the gap between our position and the right of our main army, then at Burgess’s Mills. Rosser was placed just in rear of the center as a reserve, Hatcher’s Run intervening between him and our line. Everything continued quiet until about 3 P.M., when reports reached me of a large body of infantry marching around and menacing our left flank. I ordered Munford to go in person, ascertain the exact condition of affairs, hold his command in readiness, and, if necessary, order it up at once. He soon sent for it, and it reached its position just in time to receive the attack. A division of two small brigades of cavalry was not able long to withstand the attack of a Federal corps of infantry, and that force soon crushed in Pickett’s left flank, swept it away, and before Rosser could cross Hatcher’s Run the position at the Forks was seized and held, and an advance toward the railroad made. It was repulsed by Rosser. Pickett was driven rapidly toward the prolongation of the right of his line of battle by the combined attack of this infantry corps and Sheridan’s cavalry, making a total of over 26,000 men, to which he was opposed with 7000 men of all arms. Our forces were driven back some miles, the retreat degenerating into a rout, being followed up principally by the cavalry, whilst the infantry corps held the position our troops were first driven from, threatening an advance upon the railroad, and paralyzing the force of reserve cavalry by necessitating its being stationary in an interposing position to check or retard such an advance.… I remained in position on Hatcher’s Run, near Five Forks, during the night, and was joined by the cavalry which was driven back the previous afternoon, and by Lieutenant-General [R. H.] Anderson with Wise’s and Gracie’s brigades, who, leaving the position at Burgess’s Mills, had marched by a circuitous route to our relief. Had he advanced up the direct road it would have brought him on the flank and rear of the infantry forming the enemy’s right, which attacked our left at Five Forks, and probably changed the result of the unequal contest. Whilst Anderson was marching, the Fifth Corps was marching back, and was enabled to participate in the attack upon our lines the next day, whilst the services of the three infantry brigades (which General Anderson reënforced us by, too late for use) and the five with Pickett, by their absence, increased the disparity between the contending forces upon the next day for the possession of the lines circumvallating Petersburg.”—EDITORS.

  At 4 o’clock the formation was completed, the order for the assault was given, and the struggle for Pickett’s intrenched line began. The Confederate infantry brigades were posted from right to left as follows: Terry, Corse, Steuart, Ransom, and Wallace. General Fitzhugh Lee, commanding the cavalry, had placed W.H.F. Lee’s two brigades on the right of the line, Munford’s division on the left, and Rosser’s in rear of Hatcher’s Run to guard the trains. I rode to the front in company with Sheridan and Warren, with the head of Ayres’s division, which was on the left. When this division became engaged, Warren took up a more central position with reference to his corps. Ayres threw out a skirmish-line and advanced across an open field, which sloped down gradually toward the dense woods, just north of the White Oak road. He soon met with a fire from the edge of this woods, a number of men fell, and the skirmish-line halted and seemed to waver. Sheridan now began to exhibit those traits that always made him such a tower of strength in the presence of an enemy. He put spurs to his horse and dashed along in front of the line of battle from left to right, shouting words of encouragement and having something cheery to say to every regiment. “Come on, men,” he cried. “Go at ’em with a will. Move on at a clean jump or you’ll not catch one of them. They’re all getting ready to run now, and if you don’t get on to them in five minutes, they’ll every one get away from you! Now go for them.” Just then a man on the skirmish-line was struck in the neck; the blood spurted as if the jugular vein had been cut. “I’m killed!” he cried, and dropped on the ground. “You’re not hurt a bit,” cried Sheridan; “pick up your gun, man, and move right on to the front.” Such was the electric effect of his words that the poor fellow snatched up his musket and rushed forward a dozen paces before he fell never to rise again. The line of battle of weather-beaten veterans was now moving right along down the slope toward the woods with a steady swing that boded no good for Pickett’s command, earth-works or no earth-works. Sheridan was mounted on his favorite black horse “Rienzi” that had carried him from Winchester to Cedar Creek, and which Buchanan Read made famous for all time by his poem of “Sheridan’s Ride.” The roads were muddy, the fields swampy, the undergrowth dense, and “Rienzi,” as he plunged and curveted, dashed the foam from his mouth and the mud fro
m his heels. Had the Winchester pike been in a similar condition, he would not have made his famous twenty miles without breaking his own neck and Sheridan’s too.

  Mackenzie had been ordered up the Crump road with directions to turn east on the White Oak road and whip everything he met on that route. He met only a small cavalry command, and having whipped it according to orders, now came galloping back to join in the general scrimmage. He reported to Sheridan in person, and was ordered to strike out toward Hatcher’s Run, then move west and get possession of the Ford road in the enemy’s rear.

  Soon Ayres’s men met with a heavy fire on their left flank and had to change direction by facing more toward the west. As the troops entered the woods and moved forward over the boggy ground and struggled through the dense undergrowth, they were staggered by a heavy fire from the angle and fell back in some confusion. Sheridan now rushed into the midst of the broken lines, and cried out: “Where is my battle-flag?” As the sergeant who carried it rode up, Sheridan seized the crimson and white standard, waved it above his head, cheered on the men, and made heroic efforts to close up the ranks. Bullets were humming like a swarm of bees. One pierced the battle-flag, another killed the sergeant who had carried it, another wounded Captain A. J. McGonnigle in the side, others struck two or three of the staff-officers’ horses. All this time Sheridan was dashing from one point of the line to another, waving his flag, shaking his fist, encouraging, threatening, praying, swearing, the very incarnation of battle. It would be a sorry soldier who could help following such a leader. Ayres and his officers were equally exposing themselves at all points in rallying the men, and soon the line was steadied, for such material could suffer but a momentary check. Ayres, with drawn saber, rushed forward once more with his veterans, who now behaved as if they had fallen back to get a “good-ready,” and with fixed bayonets and a rousing cheer dashed over the earth-works, sweeping everything before them, and killing or capturing every man in their immediate front whose legs had not saved him.