Another indicator of increasing professionalism within the Macedonian cavalry was the growing formality of the organization. When the cavalry reached what was essentially its final form under Alexander, it was composed of two broad types: heavy cavalry, known as the companion cavalry; and light cavalry, called the prodromoi or sarissophoroi. The companion cavalry were the most numerous and the most important. They were recruited from the major cities and regions of Macedonia and organized into 14 territorial squadrons plus an additional royal squadron. Each squadron consisted of approximately 200 troopers further divided into four, 50-man troops. The 14 squadrons were further organized into two, 7-squadron regiments each with its own commander: one regiment combining the squadrons of upper Macedonia and the other comprising the 7 squadrons of lower Macedonia.33
Macedonian cavalry positioned themselves in the traditional locale of cavalry—to either flank of the infantry. Alexander had a preference for his companion heavy cavalry, usually commanding it himself, on the right flank, and positioning his equally competent allied Thessalian cavalry on the left flank. Light cavalry were capable of a variety of tasks independent of the main battle, and they, therefore, could be found virtually anywhere on the battlefield. In a reconnaissance role they might be well forward, making initial contact with the enemy and keeping their commander informed. In a security role, they might be to the flanks of the defending or attacking main body of infantry and cavalry. In this capacity they concealed the movement and dispositions of the main body of soldiers.
Macedonian cavalry preferred the wedge formation. The Thessalians and the Persians likely influenced this choice by the Macedonians. The Thessalians used a diamond-shaped formation while the Persians used the similar but simpler wedge. The broad characteristics of the formations were the same. The squadron commander positioned himself at the apex of the Macedonian wedge formation. This formation was preferred for several reasons. The leader of the wedge was very visible at the apex and the remaining formation was thus able to maintain position and direction within the rapidly moving unit. It also facilitated the leader’s ability to concentrate the combat power of the formation on a single point in the enemy formation, which the leader could select during the approach to the charge. Success at the impact point allowed deep penetration into the enemy formation. Such a deep and calculated breach of the enemy line allowed the cavalry to destroy the enemy formation from the inside out.
Macedonian cavalry won their battles through close combat and were trained to attack both infantry and cavalry formations. Macedonian commanders understood that infantry had to be approached judiciously and attacked from the flank or the rear. Upon engagement of the formations, individual combat dominated. Arrian described it thus: “It was a cavalry battle with, as it were, infantry tactics: horse against horse, man against man, locked together.”34 Plutarch wrote, “For the enemy pressed upon them with loud shouts, and matching horse with horse, plied their lances, and their swords when their lances were shattered.”35 The Persians tried to adjust to this new manner of cavalry warfare. After the battle of Granikos, the Persian leader Darius attempted to reequip some of his cavalry with long lances. However, the adoption of new techniques and armaments did not make much of a difference later at the battle of Issos because the Macedonians had greater experience and superior skill.36
MACEDONIAN CAVALRY IN BATTLE
The Macedonian cavalry was not markedly different from the Greek cavalry. In particular, the Thessalians were comparable in individual and unit capability. The employment of the Macedonian cavalry was what made it superior to anything seen prior, or for a millennium afterward. Boldness, vision, and exquisite timing, derived from the inspired and personal leadership of Alexander, were the characteristics of Macedonian cavalry success. Several battles illustrate the distinctive employment of Macedonian cavalry: Philip II’s decisive victory at Chaeronea, and Alexander III’s string of victories at Granikos, Issus, and Gaugamela. These battles became the model for the employment of cavalry that other armies tried to emulate into the twentieth century.
One of the few battles that Philip II waged, and of which some detail is known, is perhaps his most important—Chaeronea in 338 BC. This battle established firm Macedonian control over the Greek city-states. Philip arrived on the field with a well-trained Macedonian army of about 30,000, including at least 2,000 cavalry.37 A Greek army of about the same size, consisting mostly of Athenian and Theban forces, opposed him. The two relatively evenly matched sides brought to the battlefield different tactical approaches. Two main differences existed between the armies. The first was the nature of their infantry. The Macedonian infantry carried the much longer sarrisa spear but did not wear as much armor as the traditional Greek hoplites. The second major difference was in the number and quality of cavalry. The Macedonians fielded an elite force of approximately 2,000 cavalry. This force was the companion cavalry, commanded by Philip’s 18-year-old son, Alexander III.
The two armies deployed facing each other in the valley of Chaeronea. Both armies anchored their flanks on the high terrain to the south, and on the river bank to the north. The southern Greeks deployed with the Athenians on the left and the Thebans on the right. The elite “Sacred Band” of the Theban army occupied the extreme right flank. Philip II positioned himself with his right flank infantry. Alexander commanded the Macedonian left, and positioned himself with the 2,000-strong companion cavalry.
The battle began with infantry phalanxes locked in combat. The infantry of both armies were equally skilled although a slight advantage in numbers favored the Macedonians. As a bloody standoff developed, Philip intentionally withdrew his right flank infantry. As the Athenians advanced against this flank, the flank of their phalanx became exposed. Alexander then led the Macedonian cavalry against this flank as Philip stopped withdrawing and began to advance. The combination of Macedonian infantry in the front and cavalry attacking the flank broke the Athenian phalanx. As the Athenians fled the field, the Macedonian cavalry and right flank turned on the exposed phalanxes of Thebes. Without a solid line, a combination of cavalry and infantry cut the Thebans apart. The Athenians suffered over 2,000 casualties in the battle, and the Theban contingent suffered much worse. Some estimates put Theban casualties as high as 6,000. The entire 300-strong elite “Sacred Band” infantry was destroyed.
The battle established Macedonian hegemony over the Greek city-states. It also demonstrated the superiority of the Macedonian combined arms battle tactics over Greek hoplite warfare. With Greece a secure Macedonian base, Philip turned his attention to expanding Macedonian dominance east, into Anatolia.
Although he sent an advance army across the Hellespont, Philip never realized his vision of conquering Persia. He was assassinated in 334 BC. It remained for his son, Alexander the Great, to carry out Philip’s ambition of avenging the Persian invasion of Greece. The first step in Alexander’s campaign to conquer Persia was to establish the Macedonian army in Asia Minor. The battle of Granikos secured the Macedonian beachhead in Anatolia.
Alexander’s crossing of the Hellespont was unopposed. However, various satraps united to form a formidable army and challenge Alexander’s presence in Anatolia. This Persian force numbered approximately 100,000, including 20,000 Greek mercenaries and 20,000 cavalry. Alexander’s army numbered about 40,000; only about 5,000 were cavalry. His cavalry divided into two main contingents: the Macedonian companion cavalry of approximately 2,500, and the Thessalian cavalry of approximately 2,000. The Macedonian infantry had approximately 20,000 men. The balance of the Macedonian force consisted of about 12,000 allied or mercenary infantry. 38
Possibly because of their inferiority in heavy infantry, the Persian satraps decided to pick a strong defensive position in hopes of destroying Alexander as he attacked.
Alexander immediately recognized the strength of the Persian position and opted for a swift attack to overcome it. Alexander’s strategy required a rapid crossing of the river under the fire of Persian archers. T
he light cavalry led the way across the river. They encountered showers of arrows and javelins, and Persian cavalry who came down to the edge of the riverbank to contest the crossing in close combat. Realizing that the light cavalry might falter, Alexander crossed with the royal squadron to stiffen their attack. As Alexander made his presence felt on the far side of the river, the bulk of the companion cavalry also crossed. With the arrival of the companions the tide of the melee quickly turned in favor of the armored and skilled Macedonian fighters. The sarissa lances of the Macedonians also gave them an advantage. The Persian cavalry broke and began to stream to the rear. This permitted the Macedonian cavalry to gain the far side of the river and fall onto the left flank, and the rear, of the Persian infantry. At the same time the Macedonian infantry began crossing. Without their cavalry and pressed from front and flank, the Persian infantry quickly retreated. The only unbroken Persian forces on the field were the 20,000 Greek mercenaries. These professionals recognized the disaster around them and attempted to surrender. Alexander, thinking in nationalistic terms, considered the mercenaries traitors to the Greek cause and ordered the attack to continue. The phalanx of the Greeks was attacked on all sides, and they were eventually overrun. The Macedonians massacred the Greeks and 2,000 who surrendered became slaves.39 The Persian army in Anatolia was broken, and Alexander was free to establish control of the Aegean port cities and to advance south along the Mediterranean coast.
Alexander consolidated his hold on Anatolia in 333 BC. Meanwhile, Darius II, the king of Persia, responded to the disaster at Granikos by raising and personally leading an army out of Mesopotamia with the objective of destroying Alexander once and for all. Darius managed to maneuver his huge army of over 300,000 to a position north of Alexander and astride his land line of communications. Alexander had the option of avoiding Darius and continuing his campaign south along the Mediterranean coast, or of turning back north to eliminate the threat in his rear. He chose the latter option. The two armies met at the town of Issos. Again, the Macedonian cavalry, personally led by Alexander, decisively defeated the Persians. A pursuit ensued in which Darius only escaped capture by abandoning his chariot. His survival was bittersweet as Alexander captured Darius’s family along with the Persian baggage train and treasury in Damascus. According to the Greek historian Arrian, 100,000 Persian infantry and 10,000 cavalry were killed in the battle.40
Victory at Issus ensured Macedonian control of Anatolia. Rather than turn east, directly into the heart of Persia, Alexander resumed his southward advance, eventually conquering Egypt. In the summer of 331 BC, with the Mediterranean firmly under control, Alexander turned east and advanced into Persia.
Alexander led his army from Egypt, north into Syria, and then east crossing the Euphrates River at Thapsacus. From there he continued along an indirect route north and east toward Babylon. He crossed the Tigris and marched toward Arbela. This more circuitous route protected the left flank of his march and allowed his army to operate in a slightly cooler climate, and in an area with better forage. Four days after crossing the Tigris, the Macedonians encountered the Persian advanced guard. From prisoners, Alexander learned that Darius was encamped near the town of Gaugamela. The Persians were positioned on ground of their choosing, in an area Darius had groomed for battle—a terrain free of any obstacles that could impede his equestrian forces.41
Darius planned to employ a significant chariot force as well as elephants, in addition to his cavalry. The Persian army at Gaugamela, despite its losses in previous campaigns, was still a highly formidable force, easily outnumbering the Macedonians. The ancient sources vary considerably but all comment on its large size. A conservative estimate is that the Persian infantry numbered 200,000 and the cavalry 45,000. In addition, the Persian force contained 200 scythed chariots and a contingent of war elephants. The Macedonian force consisted of 40,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry.42
The Macedonians deployed in their usual fashion: Thessalian cavalry on the left, infantry in the center, and Alexander and the Macedonian cavalry on the right.
Allied and mercenary cavalry augmented the Macedonian cavalry. The Macedonian infantry were in a deep, tight, two-tiered formation, with the second line of infantry prepared to face to the rear in anticipation of a successful Persian envelopment.
Although the details and sequencing of the battle are impossible to determine, the essential actions are not. The Persian strategy was fairly simple. The Persians planned to use their large cavalry advantage to envelop both flanks of the Macedonians. Simultaneously, the scythed chariots would rip holes in the center of the Macedonian infantry. Alexander’s plan was equally simple: prevent envelopment while locating an opportunity to charge with the companion cavalry against a gap in the Persian line. Then, the combination of companion cavalry and the Macedonian phalanx would destroy the enemy.
Unlike earlier encounters between the Persians and Macedonians, the Persians took the initiative. The Persian right flank cavalry, including 50 scythed chariots, pushed forward against the Thessalians on the Macedonian left flank. The Persian left flank moved to outflank the Macedonians, but the Macedonian allied cavalry matched their move forcing the Persian cavalry to move farther and farther to the flank. Eventually, the Persian left separated from the main body as it sought a flank. In the center, the Persians launched 100 scythed chariots at the Macedonian infantry front.
The Persian attacks achieved mixed results. The Thessalians on the left flank were under extreme pressure. The left wing of the army under Alexander’s ablest subordinate, Parmenio, was vastly outnumbered and outflanked. Persian cavalry bypassed the engaged Thessalians and captured the Macedonian baggage train. However, things did not go as well for the Persians in the center. The massed chariot attack failed as light infantry killed many of the chariot horses and then made short work of the crews. The Macedonians then trapped and dispatched those few chariots that made it through the light infantry screen.
On the Macedonian right flank, a pitched cavalry battle developed. Participants included contingents of Macedonian, allied, and mercenary cavalry, facing the Persian cavalry from Scythia, Bactria, and other provinces under the command of Bessus. As this pitched battle drifted ever farther to the Macedonian right, it exposed the left flank of the Persian center. As this gap developed, Alexander led the companion cavalry against it. The charge of the companions hit the gap in the Persian line and quickly blew it open. This put the companions in position to wheel left into the exposed flank of the Persian infantry center. The charge of the companions was the signal for the advance of the Macedonian infantry (minus two left flank units who remained to support Parmenio and the left wing). As the companions crashed into the flank of the Persian center and the infantry phalanx began its assault, panic began to ripple across the Persian ranks. Darius, from his position in the center on his tall chariot, probably observed the units beginning to disintegrate. The Persian center quickly crumbled. With defeat imminent, Darius fled the field, which hastened the destruction of the Persian formations.
From his position on the left flank the Persian cavalry commander Bessus saw the defeat of the Persian center. Recognizing that the battle was lost, he disengaged his cavalry and withdrew in good order. On the right flank, the Persians maintained their pressure until word of Darius’s departure reached their ranks. With the news of their leader’s retreat, the Persian attack faltered, and in that brief pause the Thessalian cavalry counterattacked, sending the last of the Persian army into retreat.
The collapse of the Persian center invited a vigorous and immediate pursuit. Alexander, however, remained cautious as he wanted to ensure the integrity of the left wing, still threatened as the Persian center collapsed. Once assured of Parmenio’s success, he turned his cavalry to the pursuit of Darius and the Persians. At dusk the cavalry rested, but only long enough to refresh their horses. At midnight the pursuit resumed. The companions captured the Persian camp and baggage train including Darius’s chariot. Once again Darius escaped wit
h his life. The pursuit ended at Arbela, 75 miles from the battlefield.43
Casualties at Gaugamela were heavier for the Macedonians than in previous battles. The Macedonians suffered because of the outstanding performance of the Persian cavalry on both flanks. Many of the Persian cavalry wore mail and other protective garments and were thus better protected than the Macedonians and their allies. Open terrain around the battlefield permitted the Persians to scatter and avoid pursuit. The Greek historian Arrian’s estimate of Macedonian losses in the battle at between 100 and 500 dead and many wounded appears dramatically low; it is more likely to be closer to 4,000. Arrian states that the Macedonians also lost over 1,000 horses, which seems probable. Nearly half the horse losses, the result of wounds or exhaustion, were within the companion cavalry. Persian casualties were very high, but estimates vary considerably between 40,000 and 300,000.44
Smashing the Persian army at Gaugamela was not the last of Alexander’s victories. Many more would follow as he conquered the remote portions of modern-day Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and India. His subsequent victories did not vary much in the tactics he employed for success. The Macedonian way of war was a watershed in the employment of cavalry. Macedonia’s military demonstrated that cavalry, working in conjunction with other arms, increased the capabilities of the total force. They also showed that cavalry could have decisive effects in close combat. Finally, the Macedonians demonstrated that cavalry, executing a vigorous pursuit, could annihilate an enemy force. Successful pursuit by cavalry became an essential component in operational warfare and campaigning.
Chapter Three
War Horse Page 7