As Saladin positioned his army, King Guy held a council of his leaders to discuss their options. Count Raymond argued that the crusader position at Sephorie was strong and the army should remain on the defensive. If they moved to Tiberius they would be entering into a battle under conditions that Saladin had carefully created. The route from Sephorie to Tiberius was approximately 15 miles and contained no fodder for the horses, and more importantly, few sources of water. In the middle of the summer, the daytime temperatures would likely be over 100 degrees. In a move to Tiberius, all the advantages would be with Saladin. On July 2, King Guy agreed with Count Raymond that the crusader army would remain on the defensive, leaving Saladin the option of attacking or calling off his offensive.
Gerard de Ridefort, the leader of the Templar knights, argued that the crusaders had to be aggressive. He persuaded King Guy to change his mind. On the morning of July 3, Guy marched his army to the north of Saladin’s position, past the village of Lubia, intending to continue south of the hill known as the Horns of Hattin, and then down a steep gorge to the town of Tiberius. Count Raymond of Tripoli led the forward battle; the king himself led the center formation; and Balian d’Ibelin commanded the rear battle. The cavalry forces marched in the center of each battle, with the infantry in moving formations around the cavalry. The formation intended to protect the valuable cavalry horses from attack by mounted archers. The crusader army was well on its way early in the morning to take advantage of the coolest part of the day. In a portent of things to come, the bulk of the cavalry horses refused to drink water either the night before or the morning of departure.
Upon hearing that the crusaders were on the move, Saladin rousted his army and prepared to intercept them. At ten in the morning of July 3, Guy’s forces had traveled five miles and passed the last water source en route to Tiberius, but the army did not stop to drink. A crusader history of the period reported: “As soon as they had left the water behind, Saladin came before them and ordered his skirmishers to harass them. From morning until midday they rode at great cost up towards the valley called Le Barof, for the Turks kept engaging them and so impeded their progress.”46
This harassing fire intensified as the crusaders continued to move, and Saladin was able to rotate more of his horse archers into position and fire into the Christian ranks. Mailed knights and sergeants were essentially immune to this harassing fire, but infantry without armor and the crusader horses, which were mostly unarmored, were not. By noon, repeated attacks had slowed the pace of the army to a crawl; many troops had used all their water, and the rear battle, consisting of the Templar and Hospitaller knights and the turcopoles, was falling behind the lead elements as the archers singled it out for more attacks.47
As Raymond’s vanguard reached the point to turn south of the Horns of Hattin he learned that Guy had ordered a halt because the rear guard, a mile and a half back, was hard pressed. Raymond convinced King Guy to change the march plan: instead of descending to the lake south of the Horns of Hattin, the army should move northwest of the Horns and halt for the night at the village of Hittin only four miles ahead—where there was water. The march could then continue to Tiberius the next day. Guy agreed to this change of plans.
Saladin, positioned to command his army from the hills south of the crusaders’ route, observed the enemy’s change of direction. Taqi al-Din’s more mobile cavalry easily moved ahead of Raymond’s force, staying between the crusaders and the springs at Hittin and prohibiting a quick move to the watering point. Meanwhile, the rear battle had halted again to allow the Templar knights to counterattack and drive off the horse archers. This attempt failed. The crusaders, particularly the infantry, were suffering from the heat and the lack of water. At this point, King Guy took council of his leaders again and deliberated over two options: consolidate his army overnight in a camp without water and strike out for water in the morning, or immediately attack Saladin’s forces in the hills near Lubia. Guy, on the advice of Count Raymond, made camp for the night.
The crusaders spent a miserable thirsty night surrounded by Saladin’s forces: “Christians were in great discomfort. Great harm befell the host since there was not a man or a horse that had anything to drink that night. The day that they left their camp was a Friday, and the following day, the Saturday, was the feast of Saint Martin Calidus, towards August. All that night the Christians were stood to arms and suffered much through thirst.”48 Caravans of camels replenished Saladin’s army with fresh arrows and water. The Muslims also spent the night collecting dry brush and piling it on the windward side of the valley, along the projected crusader line of march.
Early on the morning of July 4, the crusader army assembled for its march to the water at Hittin. Some of Guy’s men deserted, carrying reports to Saladin of the cru-saders’ low morale. Soon after the march commenced Saladin ordered the center and left of his army to attack while the right flank remained on the defensive between the crusaders and Hittin.
Squadrons of horse archers closed in on the crusader formation, firing their arrows, and then wheeling away to be replaced by a fresh attack. The frustrated crusaders counterattacked. Raymond in the vanguard charged the forces of Taqi al-Din in front of Hittin. Balian d’Ibelin, the Templars, and probably the main battle under King Guy charged the main Muslim formations under Saladin and Gokbori. The crusaders drove Taqi al-Din’s force back to the village of Hittin and the horse archers were temporarily push backed from the center and rear battles. But the crusaders lost many more horses to the archers and many knights were dismounted. Sometime during this period Saladin’s army also ignited the collected bundles of dry brush. As the smoke of the fires intensified the crusaders’ thirst, their infantry formations began to crumble.
The crusaders probably only advanced a mile before the Muslims renewed their assault. Again, the mounted archers executed devastating attacks on the perimeter of the crusader army. Countercharges by small groups of men-at-arms were less and less effective. The crusader formations began to disintegrate into formless gaggles of struggling infantry, disconnected from the remaining mounted men-at-arms. Count Raymond launched another desperate charge against Taqi al-Din’s position at Hittin. This time the Muslim cavalry dispersed and allowed Raymond’s knights to ride through the village and into the gorge descending to Lake Tiberius. The Muslim cavalry then reformed behind Raymond’s force, cutting him off from the rest of the crusader army. Raymond had to choose: fight his way back up the gorge into what was an obvious deathtrap or disengage from the battle. He chose the latter course and took his knights, probably numbering less than a thousand, to Tyre.
Meanwhile, the rest of the crusader army drifted into a gap between Saladin’s main force and that of Taqi al-Din and found itself on the slopes of the Horns of Hattin. The infantry, detached from the men-at-arms and King Guy, took refuge around the northern horn. The knights assembled both in the mountain’s saddle and around the southern horn. Saladin now brought up his infantry and, in combination with his cavalry, closed in on the crusaders from all directions. The few mounted knights continued to countercharge, briefly threatening Saladin and his personal guard. However, as more horses and men were lost the crusaders were reduced to defending themselves. It was probably during one of these last charges that some mounted men-at-arms under Balian d’Ibelin broke through the Muslim lines and escaped. The destruction of the army was recorded several months later in a letter to the master of the Hospitallers:
Therefore Saladin sent against us Techedin [Taki-Eddin] with twenty thousand chosen soldiers who rushed upon our army, and the battle raged very fiercely from the ninth hour to vespers. And, because of our sins, very many of ours were killed, the Christian people were conquered, the king was captured, and the holy cross and count Gabula and Milo of Colaterido and Onfred [Honfroy] the youth, and prince Reinald [Reginald] captured and killed. And Walter of Arsun and Hugo of Gibelen [Gibelin] and the lord of Botrono [Botron] and the lord of Marachele and a thousand others of the best, captur
ed and killed, so that not more than two hundred of the horsemen and soldiers escaped.”49
One by one the banners of the crusaders fell. And as Saladin observed Guy’s tent collapse at the center of crusader resistance, all hope was lost. The exhausted Christians surrendered.
The crusader casualties were significant, probably around 17,000 killed or captured. However, about 3,000 soldiers, mostly mounted men-at-arms, escaped. The battle resulted in the effective destruction of the only Christian army indigenous to the region. In the future, expeditionary crusader armies would arrive in the region from Europe, but after Hattin the permanent European population of the crusader states was never again able to field its own army. Following the battle, Saladin systematically captured most of the inland crusader cities and fortresses. In fact, many surrendered without a fight having lost most of their garrisons at Hattin. Jerusalem, the symbol of the European presence in the Holy Land, surrendered after a 19-day siege. The garrison, under Balian d’Ibelin, was spared.
The battle of Hattin, poor generalship aside, demonstrated the limited tactical flexibility of the European heavy cavalry when faced with an opposing cavalry that was truly mobile. European cavalry were most effective in close combat. They only had a mobility advantage over infantry. Faced with the superior speed and maneuverability of the general purpose cavalry of the Muslim armies, they were incapable of closing with the enemy on favorable terms. At the operational level, the entire Muslim army could be maneuvered into or out of battle depending on the situation. At the tactical level their greater mobility allowed them to choose not only when and where to attack, but also how. Fundamentally, Hattin illustrated the superiority of the Islamic military system—centered on general purpose cavalry and tactical mobility—over the European military system centered on heavy cavalry and close combat.
Crécy, 1346
Moving forward 159 years, the battle of Crécy demonstrated another aspect of cavalry warfare that developed over the course of the Middle Ages: the difficulty of successfully conducting a mounted charge against disciplined infantry supported by effective missile weapons.50 The battle occurred during the Hundred Years War. In 1346 King Edward III of England landed an invasion force on the Cotentin Peninsula in Normandy and on July 12 began a march toward Paris. The objective of Edward’s invasion of Normandy is not clear. Edward himself was very secretive and never clearly articulated exactly what he hoped to achieve. Edouard Perroy, an expert in the history of the Hundred Years War, asserts that Edward III’s actions throughout the first part of the campaign suggest he was not seriously pursuing the crown of France.51
The Crécy campaign began like a large-scale chevauchée. Following their landing, the English moved rapidly (but systematically) through Normandy, plundering and looting as they went. By July 26 the English had marched more than 80 miles in nine days and taken Carentan, St. Lo, and the port of Caen. The English fleet, paralleling the army’s movement, linked up with the army in Caen. On July 31 the advance resumed, marching on a line that would take it to the banks of the Seine River—mid-way between Paris and Rouen, the capital of Normandy.
As the English advanced, King Philip had moved his army from Paris to Rouen. In Rouen the two armies were 40 miles apart. The French army controlled the major crossing point of the Seine River, which at this location was 300 yards wide. However, the English reconnaissance identified the French forces at Rouen, and they quickly turned upriver toward Paris. The two armies marched on parallel courses: the French army destroyed or set guards at every Seine River crossing between Rouen and Paris; the English army burned and pillaged a 30-mile stretch of land on the south side of the river. By August 14, English raiders were south of Paris, and the smoke from burning settlements could be seen from the city. Paris was in a panic and Philip was preparing his army to defend the city. Edward had his carpenters repaired the bridge at Poissy and then crossed over to the north side of the river on August 15. Clearly, Edward’s objective was to get north of the Somme River and link up with the Flemish army moving south from Ypres.
Philip sent his army in pursuit. The immediate objective of both armies was the same: the bridges across the Somme River. The English made for Airaines while the French moved on a parallel course to Amiens. The French cavalry made good time. They arrived at Amiens on April 20, having traveled 75 miles in three days. The infantry was moving up rapidly behind them. The English arrived at Airaines on August 21. On the 22nd they found that all the bridges between Abbeville and Amiens either destroyed or strongly defended. They decided to ford the river at Blanchetaque, west of Abbeville. This ford could only be used at low tide, so on the morning of August 24 the English waited on the banks of the Somme for the tide to go out. A brief skirmish occurred as the English crossed, but the crossing was complete before a major French force could arrive at the scene.
After the crossing at Blanchetaque, English morale soared. Many horses had been worn out by the strenuous march—350 miles in six weeks—and knights saddled farm horses stolen from the ravaged French countryside. The boots of the infantry were also in tatters. Still, the successful crossing of the Somme, and the decisive routing of the French defenders, was seen as a sign of divine support for their campaign. Not all the news was good however; soon after crossing the river Edward discovered that the Flemish army he was hoping to link up with had withdrawn to Flanders. Edward concluded that he had no alternative but to fight Philip. King Edward’s focus then became finding a suitable place to do battle.
He chose a low ridge between the villages of Crécy and Wadicourt. On August 25, Edward moved his army into the Crécy Wood. The next morning, he positioned his army along the ridge. The entire force was dismounted, and horses were placed with the baggage train north of the army’s position. The main defense rested on two battles of men-at-arms. Edward, Prince of Wales, 16 years old and newly knighted, commanded the right of the line; he was supported in command by the Earls of Warwick and Oxford. The veteran Earl of Northampton commanded the left of the English line. King Edward placed his main battle in reserve, in the center of the position. Edward personally took up a place in the loft of a windmill, behind the battle of the Black Prince, from which he had an unobstructed view of both armies.
The English position was unusual because the entire force was dismounted. The English, in their battles with the Scots, had come to respect the defensive power of a disciplined line of infantry. They did not attempt to create a formal shield wall, but the effect of the 5,000 dismounted men at arms was formidable. The archers covered the flanks of the two forward battles. They assembled in triangular formations slightly forward of the main battle line, and once the enemy had closed on the men-at-arms, the archers could continue to fire inward—into the exposed flanks of the attackers. Trip holes were dug one foot square and one foot deep to protect the archers and the infantry line from cavalry attack. This was the extent of defensive preparations.
The English army spent the daytime hours of August 26 waiting for the French. Reviewing the troops, Edward rode the battle line slowly on a white palfrey and talked encouragingly to his soldiers. The soldiers were then released for the noon meal at the baggage train. There, they were advised to stand ready to return to their position once the French were sighted.
At 6:00 p.m. the army held evening prayers. Soon after, when lookouts spotted the vanguard of Philip’s army, the English were called to battle positions. The French scouts soon spotted the English army arrayed on the ridge. Philip was surprised by their presence. The French intelligence system had not been aware of the English army’s position, despite the fact that the English had been near Crécy for more than 24 hours. The French king ordered the army to halt and called a quick council of war. Opinions differed greatly. After much deliberation, the king sided with those who advised waiting till morning to give battle. The French army was strung out in a long column toward Abbeville, which it had left that morning.
King Philip’s decision to halt the army was one of the last ta
ctically informed decisions made by the French during the battle. Knights in the vanguard either ignored the halt order or never received it. They could see the English army arrayed for battle; honor dictated that they destroy the enemy. They also knew they outnumbered their foe, especially in terms of men-at-arms. Anxious for glory, the army moved forward, ignoring the king’s orders. Realizing that his commands were not being obeyed King Philip changed his orders and permitted an attack.
The French army moved directly into the attack from the march. The army moved in columns across the Mayre River with units then wheeling left to strike west into the English position. This caused the bulk of the French attack to fall on the right of the English line commanded by the 16-year-old Prince of Wales. His force consisted of about 2,000 archers, 1,000 Welsh spearmen, and 800 men-at-arms.52
Attacking from the march was a difficult task even for a well-trained and well-drilled army. It was an almost impossible task for Philip’s army that had no experience in drill, little discipline, and only a rudimentary command and control system. Confusion and frustration immediately plagued the army as the leaders tried to establish order before the attack commenced. Units crossed paths, and trailing formations literally ran into the lead formations trying to form before attacking. The horses would have marched unarmored, and it is unlikely that there was time to retrieve armor from the baggage train. It is also unlikely that there was time for many knights to change horses, thus leaving many knights to charge on mounts that were fatigued and not their best-trained war horses. The French commanders probably had about three hours of daylight to ensure victory—this was not even enough time to move the entire French army to the field.
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