War Horse
Page 31
As Napoleon contemplated the Allied position he had few good options for attack. The hedges at the top of the ridge prevented good observation of the road and the troops along the crest and behind the ridge. Thus, he did not have good information on the disposition of the allied battle line, nor was he able to see and anticipate any allied maneuvering because the Mont St. Jean ridge masked allied movement from sight. In addition, time was an important factor. Napoleon knew that Blücher’s Prussian army was somewhere to his right. He hoped that Grouchy could fix the Prussians, but he expected that eventually the Prussians would arrive to support Wellington. He had to defeat Wellington before that happened. Given this constraint, Napoleon could not maneuver Wellington out of his defensive position but had to accept battle on the terrain that Wellington chose. Further, he knew that any attack against the allied strong points would be very time-consuming and thus ruled out an attack at the flanks. This left him two options, a frontal attack against the allied center west of the Brussels road or a frontal attack against the allied center east of the Brussels road. Both attack avenues would be subject to enfilading fire from the allied strong points. Further complicating the planning was the fact that it had begun to rain the previous afternoon and had rained most of the night. The ground was soft and muddy, and this greatly effected the maneuver of men, horses, and artillery.
Napoleon’s force organized into five major components: three infantry corps, I, II, and VI Corps; the Imperial Guard; and the Cavalry Reserve. General Honoré Reille’s II Corps deployed on the left and Jean-Baptiste Drouet, Count d’Erlon’s I Corps on the right. Napoleon chose to launch a diversionary attack at Hougoumont with the II Corps to indicate an effort to take Wellington’s right flank. The intent was to draw reserves from the allied center. Once the center was weakened, I Corps would launch the main French attack east of the Brussels road between La Haye Sainte and Papelotte. Napoleon gave himself great flexibility by keeping a large reserve consisting of the Imperial Guard, Lobau’s VI Corps, and the Cavalry Reserve.
The battle began at about 10:00 a.m. when the French infantry attacked Hougoumont. This diversionary attack soon developed into a major action. The French eventually committed almost all of the II Corps—15,000 infantry—but it had little effect on the allied dispositions and thus the diversion failed in its primary objective.
Napoleon delayed the main French attack until about 11:30 a.m. because of the difficulty of positioning heavy artillery over the soft ground. It began with a bombardment of the allied positions by the French massed artillery. This bombardment was unsuccessful because few of the allied positions were visible and the soft ground absorbed many of the cannon balls. At about 1:30 p.m. the Infantry of the French center, the four divisions of d’Erlon’s I Corps, 18,000 infantry, attacked between La Haye Sainte and Papelotte. The left flank division surrounded La Haye Sainte, the right flank division captured Papelotte, and the center two divisions achieved the top of the ridge where they gained the ridge-top road and slowly began to push back the British infantry positioned there.
At this point two French cuirassier regiments (1st and 4th) of the IV Cavalry Corps’ 1st Brigade, 13th Cavalry Division, commanded by General Baron Dubois, moved forward on d’Erlon’s left flank and charged over the ridge. The timing of the French cavalry attack was perfect but did not account for the sunken road at the crest of the ridge. Just as the French cavalry hit their stride, they hit the road. The left regiment was unable to stop, and horses and riders tumbled into the road. The debacle at the road threw the entire regiment into confusion and destroyed the charge before it met the enemy. The right flank regiment was able to halt before the road and scramble across it. However, by the time they gained the far side all order was lost. It was then that they and d’Erlon’s lead infantry spotted advancing British cavalry.
At this point the allied left center was in danger of collapsing. To reestablish the center Henry William Paget, the earl of Uxbridge and commander of the allied cavalry, ordered the two British heavy brigades to charge d’Erlon’s infantry. The British cavalry attacked with Somerset’s Guards Brigade on the right in two lines. The first line consisted of, from right to left, the 1st Life Guards, the King’s Dragoon Guards, and the 2nd Life Guards. The second line was the Horse Guards. The Guards Brigade hit the French cuirassiers. The disorganized French were in no position to receive a cavalry charge. After a fierce but short melee the French cavalry broke and scattered to the rear. The British regiments carried on into the flank of d’Erlon’s Corps already engaged by the Union Brigade.
The French infantry were organized in wide columns and not prepared for a cavalry attack. The British cavalry attacked with Somerset’s Guards Brigade on the west side of the road and Ponsonby’s Union brigade on the east side of the road. The plan was for the Union Brigade to attack with the 1st (Royal) Dragoons on the right and the 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons on the left in the first line. The 2nd (Scots Greys) Dragoons would follow in the second line. However, as the charge developed the Scots Greys came on line with the other two regiments, and the Union brigade effectively charged with all three regiments in the first line and no reserve. As the British cavalry came up, several of the French battalions were able to get off volleys of musket fire but they were uncoordinated and not effective enough to deter the British cavalry. The three heavy cavalry regiments hit the center two French divisions. French Colonel Duthilt, fighting in the front ranks of the French infantry described the attack from the infantry perspective:
Just as I was pushing one of my men back into the ranks I saw him fall at my feet from a sabre slash., I turned round instantly to see English cavalry forcing their way into our midst and hacking us to pieces. Just as it is difficult, if not impossible, for the best cavalry to break into infantry who are formed into squares and who defend themselves with coolness and daring, so its is true that once the ranks have been penetrated, then resistance is useless and nothing remains for the cavalry to do but to slaughter at almost no risk to themselves. This is what happened, in vain our poor fellows stood up and stretched out their arms; they could not reach far enough to bayonet these cavalrymen mounted on powerful horses, and the few shots fired in the chaotic melee were just as fatal to our own men as to the English. And so we found ourselves defenceless against a relentless enemy who, in the intoxication of battle, sabred even our drummers and fifers without mercy.67
In minutes the French battalion columns were destroyed and infantrymen were being sabered and run down as they fled the southern slope of the Mont St. Jean. The ferocity of the British attack became legend. Six-foot-four-inch tall Scots Greys Sergeant Charles Ewart described how he captured the eagle of the French 45th Regiment.
It was in the charge I took the eagle from the enemy. He and I had a hard contest for it; he made a thrust at me groin, I parried it off and cut him down through the head. After this a lancer came at me; I threw the lance off by my right side, and cut him through the chin upwards through the teeth. Next a foot soldier fired at me, and then charged me with his bayonet, which I also had the good luck to parry, and then I cut him down through the head; thus ended the contest. As I was about to follow my regiment, the general said, “My brave fellow, take that to the rear; you have done enough till you get quit of it.” I took the eagle to the ridge and afterwards to Brussels.68
The Union brigades’ 1,100 horseman forced almost 10,000 infantry off the crest of the Mont St. Jean. British infantry followed closely behind the heavy cavalry and recaptured La Haye Sainte and Papelotte. In total the charge of the two heavy brigades, slightly more than 2,000 cavalrymen, completely routed the entire French II Corps of 18,000 men and the two cuirassier regiments. The exact number of casualties inflicted on the French was impossible to determine, but fully 3,000 prisoners were taken and the French corps temporarily ceased to exist as a fighting unit.
Had the charge of the heavy brigades ended at that point, it would have been the most successful cavalry action in the history of the Brit
ish army. However, it did not. As the French infantry scattered, the six regiments found themselves at the base of the shallow valley south of Mont St. Jean. Barely 300 yards in front of them, and totally exposed, was Napoleon’s grand artillery battery composed of some 70 guns. Without a thought to the disorganization that existed among the regiments, the larger tactical situation, or the possible danger of a countercharge, the heavy brigades continued the attack south, up the opposite slope of the valley, against the French guns.
The British cavalry, led by their officers, ignored the recall trumpets and continued the charge against Napoleon’s grand battery. They achieved the artillery position with little trouble and then proceeded to saber the gunners, cut the traces of the horses, and in general wreaked havoc among the French. Napoleon, positioned only 300 yards south of the artillery, witnessed all the action. The cavalry put between 12 and 40 guns permanently out of action.
As the British cavalry finished their action on the battery position, they became aware that the valley behind them, their route back to their own positions, was filling with French cavalry. Two regiments of lancers and two regiments of cuirassiers had finally responded to the British threat and were rapidly closing a trap behind the heavy brigades. The British were totally disorganized, squadrons of the various regiments were intermingled, and their horses were exhausted. Under these conditions, they were no match for the French. The only British regiment with some organization left was the Royal Horse Guards of the Guards brigade. The 200 troopers of the Horse Guards were the supporting line of the Guards brigade charge and were in a position to engage the French cavalry. With the help of the Horse Guards, much of Somerset’s heavy brigade was able to escape back to the British lines. The Union Brigade was not as fortunate. Because the Scots Greys became intermingled with the first line, no support existed for the Union Brigade. Thus the French cavalry caught the entire brigade disorganized and on tired horses. Knee-deep mud further inhibited the British retreat. The retreat of the Union brigade was every man for himself, and many did not make it. French lancers, on fresh horses, easily rode down the retreating British, and their 9-foot lances were the ideal weapon to attack the backs of the fleeing British. The complete destruction of the Union Brigade was only averted by the charge of General John Vandeleur’s light cavalry brigade (the 11th, 12th, and 16th Light Dragoons), which forced the French cavalry to break off their pursuit of the Union Brigade.
The two British heavy brigades suffered severe casualties during their charge. The bulk of the losses came during the retreat from the French artillery position. Three of seven regimental commanders were killed, as was Ponsonby. In the Scots Greys only 8 of 23 officers were not killed or wounded. The Union Brigade suffered 525 killed, wounded, or missing out of 1,181 engaged. The Guards Brigade suffered 533 casualties out of 1,226 engaged. Though both brigades eventually reformed and remained in reserve for the rest of the battle, having suffered 44 percent casualties, they were unable to play an important role. Lord Uxbridge, the British cavalry commander, admitted that the major fault of the attack was that he placed himself at the head of the charge and thus lost control. Subsequently he stated that he should have positioned himself with the second line so that he could control their commitment and effect the tempo of the attack. The overaggressiveness of the Scots Greys also cost the Union Brigade the support they needed to disengage after the charge. Still, despite the disorganization and the casualties suffered as a result, the charge of the British heavy brigades had accomplished a great deal. d’Erlon’s attack was the French’s best opportunity for success at Waterloo. The repulse of the French I Corps severely complicated the tactical situation for Napoleon and left him in a disadvantageous position with only a limited number of options for the further conduct of the battle.
As Count d’Erlon’s attack failed at the crest of Mont St. Jean, word came that the Blücher Prussians were approaching the French right flank. Grouchy, despite having two of Napoleon’s five infantry corps, and almost two complete cavalry corps, had failed to fix Blücher in position. With the arrival of Blücher at Waterloo, the numerical advantage shifted to the allies. This forced Napoleon to dispatch Lobau’s VI Corps from his reserve to meet the threat in the east. This left Napoleon with only the two heavy cavalry corps and the Imperial Guard in reserve.
The retreat of the British cavalry left the two armies facing each other across the small valley south of Mont St. Jean in almost the same positions from which the battle had begun. Except now the battlefield was confused by smoke, mud, thousands of dead and wounded bodies, and the flotsam of riderless horses and limping retreating soldiers. In this confused pause, Marshal Ney, Napoleon’s tactical commander at Waterloo, perceived what he thought was the retreat of the British army. In reality what he saw was wounded and stragglers moving to the rear. Given this false impression, Ney made the first of several bad decisions and decided that the time had come to commit the cavalry reserve. Around 4:00 p.m. Ney gave orders for a brigade of cuirassiers from the IV Cavalry Corps to advance.
The French cavalry reserve arrayed with the III Cavalry Corps to the rear of the left of the line and the IV Cavalry Corps to the right of the Brussels road to the rear of I Corps. The Guard cavalry positioned with regiments behind the two cavalry corps. When Ney ordered one of IV Corps’ brigades forward General Baron Jacques Delort, the 14th Cavalry Division commander, protested the order. Delort pointed out that the British infantry were in a good position and unshaken. In response Ney, whose judgment seemed to have abandoned him, ordered not only the original brigade forward but the entire corps “Forward for the sake of France!” Thus, with reluctance, the Corps Commander, General Edouard Milhaud ordered the almost 3,000 troopers of the IV Cavalry Corps to attack.
The grand spectacle of the French cavalry attacking up the slope of Mont St. Jean was inspiring. Michel Ordener, commander of the 1st Cuirassiers saw “Our four superb lines were practically fresh; they moved simultaneously to cries of Vive l’Empereur! . . . Marshal Ney was at our head.” However, the spectacle lost its grandeur upon closer inspection. Troopers fought to keep their horses aligned as they struggled over ground strewn with the debris of battle and churned into a quagmire by the previous trampling of tens of thousands of men and horses. In some places the mud came to the horses’ knees. British dragoon Sergeant George Farmer described the ground conditions after the rainfall had soaked the fields: “Every few steps you took, you sank to your knees, and your foot, when you dragged it to the surface again, came loaded with some twenty pounds of clay.”69 In such conditions the mud sucked the shoes off the horse’s feet, and any stumble resulted in a down horse and rider. Managing a trot uphill was a major accomplishment. The French lines began coming apart and units intermingled before the cavalry formations were halfway up the slope. By the time the cavalry reached the crest of the hill they had covered a mile of ground, and many of the horses were already blown. Still, they had not yet reached the enemy positions.
As the mass of French cavalry crested the ridge the allied artillery positioned there blasted them at close range. The artillery, firing a double shot of round shot and canister, tore huge wholes in the lead formations. They were impossible to miss. The artillerymen then dashed to the safety of the British squares or hid under their guns, which provided cover from both horse and saber.
Reeling from the blast of artillery, the French cavalry next confronted a checkerboard of infantry squares arrayed across the reverse slope of the ridge. The mass of cavalrymen surged toward the squares and flowed around them moving at a steady trot. There was no impact on the squares, which methodically began to take down huge swathes of riders and horses with musket volleys at point-blank range. At this point the helpless French cavalry faced short sharp charges from the numerous allied light cavalry brigades stationed in support of the infantry squares. Allied infantry literally surrounded the disorganized French cavalry who were taking musket fire from all directions. Under these conditions what was left of unit co
hesion disintegrated. The French were easy victims for the allied light cavalry, which stayed under good command and forced the French off the ridge without pursuing them.
The French cavalry fell back to the base of the hill and reformed. Under the courageous command of the French officers, the regiments reassembled and attacked again. The previous sequence of events was repeated. The carnage was even greater as many of the French horses could barely walk and the French riders were literally helpless as they absorbed the fire from the allied infantry and artillery. The bodies of French horses formed ramparts around the British squares further impeding the French attack. Once again the countercharge of the allied cavalry easily pushed the French off the ridge.
After two charges, the IV Cavalry Corps and its eight regiments of cuirassiers was shattered. At this point Marshal Ney determined to launch General Kellermann’s III Cavalry Corps into the same death trap that had destroyed Milhaud’s corps. Marshal Ney was reinforcing failure—a violation of basic tactical principles. Kellermann’s corps moved off to the attack between Hougoumont and La Haye Saint. The Imperial Guard cavalry, positioned behind the III Corps, also moved into the attack with the cuirassiers.
Kellermann’s charge was a repeat of that of Milhaud’s. The French cavalry arrived at the British positions exhausted and disordered and then were butchered by allied musket and cannon fire. Kellermann’s squadrons reformed and attacked five times. Despite Kellermann’s efforts to hold back the Carabinier Brigade as a reserve, Marshal Ney committed all of remaining mounted formations to the attack, and they were all equally unsuccessful and suffered horrendous casualties. Many of the regiments were totally broken in the cavalry attacks while others only survived as handfuls of men and horses gathered around a few officers.