General Reynolds had moved his infantry divisions to within five miles of Gettysburg the previous night. At 8:00 a.m., he rode forward to Gettysburg and was greeted with the sounds of battle. At 10:00 a.m., he reached Buford’s command post on Seminary Ridge to the rear of McPherson’s Ridge. From that vantage point, Reynolds could see cavalry troopers kneeling behind fences and laying prone, firing their carbines. Buford assured Reynolds that he could hold until Reynolds’ I Corps arrived to take over the battle. Reynolds launched messengers to hurry the I Corps, as well as the following IX Corps, and to inform Meade that the battle was joined.
At about 10:15 a.m. the battle began to reach a crisis point. Devin’s brigade began to run out of ammunition, and lead elements of Ewell’s Corps that was marching toward Gettysburg on Lee’s order from the north threatened his northern flank. Gamble’s front began to crack under the weight of two attacking infantry brigades and their supporting artillery. However, Heth’s push came too late. As Gamble’s troopers gave way, the infantry of the 1st Division of I Corps, moving at the double-quick, formed on Seminary Ridge to their rear in support. The infantry opened ranks and Gamble’s weary troopers turned the battle over to the infantry.
North of the Chambersburg Pike, Devin’s brigade continued to hold its position. As infantry formed behind them, the cavalrymen replenished their ammunition. Around 11:00 a.m. the combined efforts of the brigades of Hill’s corps and Ewell’s corps gradually pushed the cavalry back. Devin’s troopers retired in good order, moving back to successive lines by squadron and regiment. Devin delayed back for two hours before turning his portion of the fight over to the infantry of General Howard’s IX Corps around 1:00 p.m.
The arrival of the infantry did not end the battle for Buford’s troops. The commanders integrated the two cavalry brigades into the infantry fire lines. The Confederate attack gained even greater momentum and forced the Union infantry back through the town of Gettysburg on to the heights of Cemetery Hill. Reformed on the new position, and reinforced by artillery, the Union troops held their position. Once on Cemetery Hill, General Hancock, now commanding the battle, ordered Buford to feign a charge against the Confederate left (eastern) flank. Buford assigned this mission to Gamble’s brigade, and the 8th Illinois Cavalry, supported by the rest of the brigade, executed the charge to the east of Cemetery Hill. The cavalry charge caused the advancing Confederate infantry to halt and form squares. The Union troopers, mounted and dismounted, then poured withering pistol and carbine fire into the infantry squares. With the Confederates temporarily checked, Buford’s cavalry broke contact. This gave General Hancock time to reinforce his line atop the hill. With darkness coming, the senior Southern Commander on the scene, General Ewell, called off further attacks.
Far southeast of the battlefield, Stuart, after his encounter with Kilpatrick at Hanover, marched through the night of the thirtieth to arrive at York on July 1. There he learned that Ewell had left the day before, marching southwest under Lee’s orders toward Gettysburg. Instead of following Ewell, Stuart proceeded northwest to Carlisle. Arriving at Carlisle late in the day, Stuart found it occupied by Pennsylvania militia. Avoiding decisive engagement, he shelled the town and burned the cavalry school barracks located there. Early in the morning of July 2, Stuart turned his command south and began to march to Gettysburg. The encounter with Kilpatrick and the detour to Carlisle had cost him a day’s march.
Kilpatrick spent July 1 searching for Stuart north of Hanover. On July 2, he received orders to move his command to Gettysburg. As he approached Gettysburg, his troopers ran into Stuart again, about two miles east of the northern edge of the battlefield. Kilpatrick interpreted Stuart’s presence as an attempt to turn the eastern flank of the Union army. Stuart assumed Kilpatrick’s division was attempting to do the same to Lee’s army. The two antagonists charged and countercharged each other. Kilpatrick reported that the “enemy was driven from this point with great loss.” Stuart reported that Hampton’s brigade compelled “the enemy to leave the field and abandon his purpose.”36 Both sides disengaged and held their initial positions through the night. During the afternoon, Gregg’s division arrived to support Kilpatrick.
On July 3, as the two infantry armies battled for the Union positions south of Gettysburg, the Union cavalry was arrayed with both Gregg’s and Kilpatrick’s divisions guarding the right flank. Orders sent Buford’s brigade to Westminster to guard the army trains. In the afternoon, Kilpatrick, with Farnsworth’s brigade, shifted to the Union southern flank where it joined Merritt’s reserve brigade. Jenkins’ brigade, meanwhile, reinforced Stuart who continued to maintain his position on the Confederate left flank opposite Gregg.
The sounds of main battle drifted to the cavalry positions as General Pickett led three divisions in the infamous desperate charge against the center of the Union line. Timed to coincide with Pickett’s charge, Stuart also took the offensive, sending Jenkins’ brigade forward as dismounted skirmishers in an attempt to push through Gregg and into the Union rear area. Armed with rifle muskets, they could out range the Union carbines, but each of Jenkins’ troopers only had ten rounds of ammunition. Gregg responded with his own dismounted skirmishers. At that point, orders came from Kilpatrick for Custer’s brigade to join him in the south. Gregg, realizing that without Custer he would be outnumbered and his was the only command between Stuart and the Union rear, countermanded the orders.
The Union and Confederate skirmishers met in a furious exchange of gunfire, beginning the engagement called the battle of East Cavalry Field. As feared by Stuart, Jenkins’ men ran out of ammunition. Backed by accurate horse artillery fire from Union batteries, Gregg’s skirmishers forced Jenkins to withdraw. Stuart responded by ordering three regiments of Chambliss and Hampton’s brigades into a mounted charge against Gregg’s skirmishers which routed them. Gregg then ordered Custer’s brigade to countercharge. Captain Miller of the 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry described the action:
The 1st Michigan, drawn up in close column of squadrons near Pennington’s battery, was ordered by Gregg to charge. Custer . . . placed himself at its head, and off they dashed. As the two columns approached each other, the pace of each increased, when suddenly a crash . . . betokened the crisis. So sudden and violent was the collision that many of the horses were turned end over end and crushed their riders beneath them. The clashing of sabers, the firing of pistols, the demands for surrender, and cries of the combatants, filled the air.37
The Union cavalry were outnumbered perhaps two to one as the melee proceeded. Stationed on the Union right (east) flank and facing west was an uncommitted squadron of the 3rd Pennsylvania. Their orders were to hold their position and protect the flank. Against orders, they spurred into the attack against the exposed left flank of the Southern cavalry. Other uncommitted squadrons spontaneously attacked the Confederate right flank. Seeing the enemy waver, Custer shouted, “Come on you Wolverines!” as he led his Michigan brigade into the midst of the Southern horsemen. This broke the Southern attack. Hampton, himself wounded, led his men back to their starting position pursued by the fire of Union horse artillery. The aggressive action of Gregg’s division supported by Custer’s brigade stopped Stuart’s attack with 20 regiments. Though neither side retreated, the Union cavalry successful defended the army flank, kept Meade’s rear area secure, and denied Stuart an opportunity to redeem his absence from the army.
The standoff on the Union right flank ended the important cavalry actions of the Gettysburg campaign. The totality of the campaign demonstrated the importance, the lethality, mobility, and tactical flexibility of well-led cavalry armed with the new breechloading carbines. The various actions proved that the speed of mounted cavalry, combined with the firepower of dismounted cavalry, could provide a decisive advantage to a commander in battle. The success of the cavalry in its security and reconnaissance roles was the key factor allowing the Union army to get into a good position for the battle and denying information to the Confederate army. The actions demonst
rated that the mounted charge remained an important tactical capability. The Gettysburg campaign also demonstrated the danger of the cavalry raid. Raids had a physiological impact but otherwise could be a waste of valuable resources. Any serious study of the Gettysburg campaign by military professionals at the time would have revealed that cavalry, rather than relegated to second status by technology, remained a critical component of warfare. However, the role cavalry played and its tactical employment had evolved considerably. Unfortunately, few European professionals were willing to look seriously at the operational lessons of American cavalry.
EUROPEAN CAVALRY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
After a long period of international peace after the Napoleonic experience, the Crimean War, 1854–56, marked a new period of renewed European warfare. The Italian War of 1859, the wars of German unification, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and most important, Franco-Prussian War of 1870 applied the emerging technologies of the nineteenth century to warfare. In addition, Prussia demonstrated the powerful effects of a brilliant general staff system. Still, the traditional political system of Europe contained the wars of the late nineteenth century sufficiently to mask many of the implications of the new technologies on the battlefield. The wars hinted at the type of destruction and the impact on tactics inherent in the new technologies, but they were sufficiently short in duration that the significance of those hints was not widely recognized.
Of the combat arms, cavalry changed the least after the Napoleonic period. Almost none of the lessons of the American Civil War cavalry experience had an impact on European cavalry. The Franco-Prussian War, in which the Prussians quickly defeated the French army, reputed to be the best in Europe, demonstrated to some professionals that there were serious problems with employing cavalry on a battlefield where infantry and artillery were equipped with rapid firing, breechloading rifled weapons. The cavalry casualties, particularly on the French side, were appalling, and worse, the cavalry action usually achieved nothing. Breach-loading rifles and artillery systematically destroyed cavalry brigades and divisions that bravely charged infantry and artillery positions.38 Still, there was just enough cavalry success using traditional methods for the role of cavalry and its place in battle to remain largely unchanged through the end of the century.
Organization
By the middle of the nineteenth century, European cavalry still organized much as it had during the Napoleonic period. Small changes did occur, the most important of which was a steady blurring of distinctions between the cavalry types. In most European armies, each cavalry regiment within the army had a distinctive uniform style and color. Cavalry on parade still presented a dazzling array of military dress; however, the distinctions were increasingly superficial. During the Franco-Prussian War, both French and German cavalry retained their distinctive types and functions. After the war, the trend to a general purpose cavalry accelerated. By the end of the century, the unit titles and distinctive uniforms were mostly honorific as the armies standardized actual organization, training, and equipping of cavalry.
Prussian cavalry was organized within the structure of the infantry-dominated army. Each infantry division had a cavalry regiment, each corps a regiment or brigade, and each army a division or a cavalry corps. Cavalry units did not operate separate from the higher infantry organization. The Prussians did not form a cavalry reserve, or cavalry corps capable of independent operations. The Prussians divided their cavalry into line and guard cavalry. By the time of mobilization for the Franco-Prussian War, the cavalry forces of Prussia had an authorized strength of 41,400. As the Prussians went to war with France their forces included the cavalry of allied German states, adding an additional 13,800 cavalryman to the Prussian force.39
Throughout the nineteenth century, the French maintained a very robust cavalry arm. In 1855, it consisted of 51 regiments and an authorized strength of 61,200 troopers. French cavalry organization changed little between 1859 and 1870. In contrast to the Prussians, who did not maintain an independent cavalry force, the French army, in addition to assigning a cavalry division to each corps, maintained a separate cavalry reserve in the Napoleonic tradition, consisting of 3 cavalry divisions—a total of 12 regiments with 7,200 men.40
General-purpose cavalry was in place in most European armies by the end of the century, although the traditional names such as cuirassier, dragoon, and hussar continued to designate individual regiments. In some countries, larger horses and riders wearing cuirasses continued to distinguish heavy cavalry, but in other respects these units were identical to other cavalry.41 Lancers were one of the only cavalry types to retain its identity in many European armies.
Weapons and Equipment
The equipment of European cavalry did not change significantly throughout the nineteenth century. Though the Prussians fielded the breechloading rifle in the 1840s, cavalry forces were not very interested in new weapons. In the Crimean War, cavalry operated essentially as it had in the Napoleonic period. It was not until after the Franco-Prussian War that European cavalry began to change in ways similar to that of American cavalry at the end of the American Civil War.
The lance remained in service with all European cavalry throughout the nineteenth century and continued in service in many armies until the end of horse cavalry. In fact, the lance was a more common weapon among cavalry forces in the nineteenth century than it had been since the Middle Ages. The British added their first lancers after the Napoleonic period. All German cavalry, regardless of type, had lances by the end of the century, as well as swords and carbines. In France, both dragoons and lancers carried lances.
The premier cavalry weapon in Europe throughout the nineteenth century was the saber. The only challenge to the saber for dominance, until the end of the century, came from the lance. The arguments between saber and lance advocates revolved around the utility of the lance against infantry, the superiority of the saber in cavalry versus cavalry action, and the difficulty of training troops to use the lance effectively. These were the same arguments that plagued Napoleon’s cavalrymen. Lancers perfected their technique through a popular cavalry sport called “tent-pegging,” which required the mounted lancer to lift tent pegs from the ground with the point of the lance. British cavalry on colonial service also practiced their lance skill hunting wild pigs.42
The breechloading carbine came slowly to European cavalry, not because the technology was unavailable but because cavalry leaders were uninterested in and did not see much use for an improved carbine as a cavalry weapon. Prussian cavalry only received a breechloading carbine in 1860s. The British army bought 6,000 of the first Sharps carbines between 1856 and 1858, but only the five royal regiments serving in India received the weapon. The British cavalry went through at least three more issues of different carbines before the end of the century, finally settling on the magazine-loaded Lee-Metford carbine in 1896. This carbine was the first British cavalry weapon to use the new smokeless powder.43 By 1885, most European cavalry carried both a sword and an effective breechloading carbine. Despite having breechloading carbines, there was little interest in using the carbines in combat or in fighting dismounted. This only started to change at the very end of the century, after the British experience in South Africa.
Though they were readily available beginning in the 1850s, revolvers, like breechloading carbines, were a weapon that European cavalry mostly ignored. Pistol use steadily declined, and most cavalry forces abandoned the saddle holster pistols in the late Napoleonic period or soon thereafter. In the British Cavalry, only NCOs, officers, and buglers had revolvers. However, this did not happen until the 1890s. Most of the other European nations, the Germans and Russians among them, followed the British example and issued pistols only to selected individuals.44 The neglect of the tactical possibilities inherent in the pistol reflected the pervasive conservatism of European cavalry.
Cuirasses remained in service through the Franco-Prussian War. During the war, French cavalry credited their cuirasses with
substantially reducing the casualties of the cuirassier regiments, even when their charges were total failures, because the French cuirass was capable of stopping all but point-blank fire from Prussian breechloading rifles.45 However, by the 1880s, new rifles were easily able to penetrate cuirasses, and by 1885, few of the major European powers issued cuirasses except for ceremonial purposes.
Tactics
Following the pattern of equipment, European tactical employment of cavalry did not substantially change during the nineteenth century. The charge remained the central focus of European cavalry doctrine, organization, and training through the end of the century. The charge remained central to European tactics largely due to the well-publicized successes of a few major charges including the charge of both the British heavy and light brigades at Balaclava in the Crimean war, as well as the perceived success of both French and Prussian cavalry executing charges during operations around Vionville during the Franco-Prussian War.
The most famous successful charge of the Franco-Prussian War was by Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Bredow’s 12th Cavalry Brigade, of the Prussian 5th Cavalry Division on August 16, 1870, during the battle of Mars-la-Tour. The Prussians charged against an infantry and artillery position that was wreaking havoc on the Prussian infantry on the left flank of the Prussian III Corps. The brigade, consisting of one regiment each of cuirassiers, uhlans, and dragoons, used the smoke of the battlefield and rolling terrain to maneuver to within a few hundred yards of the French lines before bursting forth at a gallop. They quickly got into the French gun line, routed the infantry, and put two French batteries out of action, temporarily relieving pressure on the Prussian infantry.46 French cuirassiers countercharged and drove the Prussians back. Major Count von Schmettow, commanding the 7th Cuirassiers, described the charge:
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