The German army saddle of 1885 had most of the characteristics of a modern sport saddle; however, it was specifically designed with the needs of campaigning in mind. It came in five different sizes, selected to match the horse. The smallest size was only used in service in South Africa. The tree was wood with side boards covered with wool stuffed cloth. It had a webbed seat with a leather cover. Both pommel and cantle were wood, reinforced with metal strips. The saddle included side skirts that covered the girth strap and buckles, and slotted for the stirrup leathers that attached under the skirt to the tree. The side skirts also included forward knee rolls that positioned the rider’s leg and provide support. The saddle disassembled without any tools for cleaning, repair, and maintenance. The ease with which the saddle disassembled also facilitated replacing worn or broken parts rather than repairing them. Parts were interchangeable between saddles of the same size.60
By the end of the nineteenth century, all cavalry armies recognized that the total weight carried by the horse was a significant operational issue. In 1888, Major General Rosenberg, Inspector General of the German Cavalry wrote, “Cavalry carrying more than 15 stone 10 lb. (220 lb.) are fit for nothing. Weight ruins horses.” Both American and British cavalry leaders agreed with Rosenberg. Yet average horse loads were considerably heavier in most of the world’s cavalry forces. Since, for optimum performance, a horse should not carry more than one fifth of its weight, and that the average cavalry horse during this time weighed about 1,100 pounds, the horses should not have been carrying more than 220 pounds. Only the U.S. cavalry, with its very light McClellan saddle, and the Belgian cavalry met this requirement. All other European cavalry overloaded their horses, some by as much as 60 pounds, and thus were asking for the horses to break down on a lengthy campaign.61
Horsemanship
European horsemanship changed after the Napoleonic wars. Through the Napoleonic period, beginning in the late eighteenth century, the general trend in cavalry riding was toward a more rough-and-ready style. After the Napoleonic wars Europe, as a reaction to the liberal expressions of the French Revolution, reverted to its conservative roots—including in the riding arena. The most successful cavalry through the Napoleonic period were Frederick’s cuirassiers under Seydlitz, who combined the discipline and technique of classical high school ménage riding with a daring and aggressiveness that embraced cross-country riding at speed. Subsequent cavalry rarely achieved the combination of aggressiveness and discipline that the Prussian formations had, but that was the goal. During the Napoleonic period, the British aggressive style seemed to be superior to the French preference for control when the numbers were equal. After Waterloo, however, the trend was reversed. Cavalry forces in most of the world’s armies began to put greater and greater emphasis on classical riding form and control. Even the Russians, with their superb but undisciplined horsemen—the Cossacks—joined the classical riding trend that some historians blame for the poor performance of Russian cavalry in the Russo-Turkish War (1828–29).62
Military equitation in the mid-nineteenth century broke into two schools, both originating in France. The first was that of Francois Baucher who was a classical high school advocate. The second school adhered to the principles of Comte Antoine Cartier d’Aure, who emphasized cross-country riding, hunting, and the steeplechase. The renewed emphasis on a scientific approach to horsemanship was represented by prestige of the great cavalry schools of Europe. The most famous was the French cavalry school at Saumur. Upon the return of the monarchy, Louis XVIII reestablished the cavalry school in 1814 but moved the new school from Versailles to Saumur, the home of the cavalry regiment for which he was honorary colonel. The instructors came from two sources: officers serving in cavalry regiments and civilian experts from Versailles. Over time the school added a veterinary program. In 1852, D’Aure added a cross-country obstacle course to the facilities, establishing a training technique that eventually became a standard against which all cavalry horses and riders were measured. The key to the success of the school was the Cadre Noir (the “black cadre” on account of their uniform color), a select group of expert cavalry officers who were devoted to instruction and developing the rider and horse to their greatest potential. By the end of the nineteenth century the school offered a balanced approach to equitation that took the best of the D’Aure and Baucher and seamlessly integrated them into courses of instruction for cavalry officers, remount sergeants, and riding instructors.63
Saumur set a standard of excellent horsemanship copied in all cavalry forces throughout Europe as well as places like the U.S. Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kansas. Most European countries formed their own schools and attempted to impart both the skill of cross-country riding, with the finesse and discipline of classical high school riding. It was accepted that effective cavalry needed a horse and rider that was versed in a variety of types of riding so that the two, horse and rider, could adapt to the widest variety of conditions on the battlefield.
The nineteenth century was a period of contradictions. It saw great change but also conservative inflexibility in cavalry forces. The cavalry of Sheridan and Wilson, operating in the closing months of the American Civil War, represented a major departure from the specialized forms of cavalry that were the legacy of the Napoleonic period. Armed with revolvers, carbines, and sabers, the cavalry became equally adapt at mounted and dismounted actions and were able to switch seamlessly between shock action and firepower attack, and between offense and defense. Cavalry raids and other independent actions demonstrated the mobility advantage of cavalry, which in a war of maneuver could have decisive operational and strategic effects. Mobility and the new firepower capability were a powerful combination.
European ignorance of the lessons of the American Civil War prevented European cavalry from developing to its full potential. They remained tied to the infantry and its speed and made no serious effort to develop a firepower capability. An analysis of operations in France in 1870 would have revealed numerous instances where independent cavalry operations or dismounted cavalry actions might have had decisive effects. The cavalry of Europe ignored hints regarding the need for change resulting from the 1870 war and, later, British operations in South Africa. European cavalry did, however, continue advances in horse breeding and horsemanship. Nevertheless, the most important characteristic of European cavalry in the nineteenth century was its conservatism, which produced a narrow approach to operations without due consideration of new technologies and tactics. Because of this inflexibility, European cavalry entered the modern era with large and well-trained traditional cavalry forces that had not changed significantly since Napoleon. When the intensity of World War I revealed the shortfalls that had existed for decades, it was too late.
Chapter Nine
MOUNTED GUERRILLA WARFARE
My horse, be swift in flight, Even like a bird.
My horse, be swift in flight. Bear me now to safety,
Far from the enemy’s arrows,
With streamers and ribbons red.
—A DAKOTA WARRIOR SONG
At the same time nineteenth-century European powers were measuring their military might against each other on the continent, they were also using their military power to expand their global influence. The age of imperialism was at its height. The quest for greater influence and wealth also occurred in the United States. Where the Europeans expanded overseas in places like India, Africa, and Asia, the United States expanded into its sparsely inhabited western territories. Existing populations resisted the European and American aggressive extension of influence and political control. This resistance was ruthlessly suppressed using military power. In the first half of the century, native populations were rarely successful in putting up more than a token resistance to the modern military forces empowering expansion. However, as indigenous populations gained access to new weapons, their military capability increased enormously. Two instances where the existing populations were most successful in their resistance, though ul
timately failing, were in the American West and in British South Africa. In both cases weapons technology was not the only reason for the success of the natives. The other major reason was the horse. Both American Indians and the original Dutch settlers of South Africa, the Boers, took advantage of their horses and their superior horsemanship to achieve a mobility advantage over their adversaries. Horses were central to the military power of both societies. The mobility that the horse gave American Indians and the Boer farmers was a major component in the stubbornness of their resistance against two of the nineteenth-century’s most formidable powers. Ultimately, the resistance to British and American expansion failed because both modern armies developed tactics and strategies, also largely based on mounted forces, which overcame the ability of the less sophisticated military forces to resist.
THE PLAINS INDIAN WARS
Warfare between the European settlers of North America and American Indians began in the seventeenth century, soon after the first colonies were established, and continued intermittently almost to the twentieth century. The Europeans had the advantages of weapons, organization, and numbers, and these advantages ensured European victory. In the decades before the American Civil War, the heirs of the European settlers, the Americans, came into contact with the American Indians of the western plains. Warfare began on a small scale when the United States acquired significant western territory after the war with Mexico. The year after the Civil War, 100,000 settlers passed through the city of St. Louis immigrating west. Between 1860 and 1870, a million Americans poured into the western territories of the United States.1 Many of the Indians west of the Mississippi were determined to resist this migration. These Indians had several advantages over their brethren east of the Mississippi River. They lived in an area that was vast, largely unexplored, and except for the Indian tribes, uninhabited. The Indians were also blessed with horses, whose mobility permitted them to take advantage of the terrain and space of the American plains. The Plains Indians were highly mobile nomads who used their mobility to strike swiftly and avoid pursuit. With these characteristics working in their favor, they were able to wage effective military operations against the United States.
The U.S. army had several advantages that made victory a foregone conclusion. They had some advantages in weaponry over the Indians. This was mostly in terms of availability, ammunition and supply, and in some specific special weapons capability such as artillery. Other technologies gave the U.S. army a superiority over the Indians. Trains, telegraphs, and steamships provided operational advantages to the American army in its battles and campaigns. Most important, the army had the benefits of organization, political cohesion, and an almost unlimited depth of resources including people. These advantages helped to overcome the tyranny of distance on the plains, small budgets, and the fieldcraft and military skill of the Indians.
In simplest terms, the Great Plains of the United States extend from the Missouri River at Kansas City, west to the base of the Rocky Mountains. They also straddle the north–south length of the United States from its southern border in Texas and New Mexico, to its northern border in Montana and North Dakota. The area is generally rolling grasslands broken by small ranges of hills and canyons in places such as the Black Hills of South Dakota. Forests exist in the extreme north, and in the west along the base of the Rocky Mountains. Desert conditions exist in the extreme southwest. The last of the independent American Indian tribes flourished in this harsh and isolated land in the nineteenth century. Their presence slightly overlapped the exact geographic dimensions of the area, extending north into Canada, south into Mexico, and west into Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, and Oregon. It was in this area that the Indian tribes of the plains made their final stand against the advance of the U.S. government.
The Plains Indian Wars were a series of wars fought by the U.S. army almost continuously from 1866 to 1890 against different tribes across the width and breadth of the western plains. The major wars of the plains included Red Cloud’s War (Montana, 1866–68); the Tonto Basin War (Arizona, 1872–73); the Red River War (Oklahoma 1874–75); the Centennial Campaign, also called the Great Sioux War (Montana and Wyoming, 1876–77); the Nez Perce War (Montana, 1877); the Victorio War (New Mexico 1879–80); the pursuit of Geronimo (New Mexico, 1881–86); and the Ghost Dance War (South Dakota 1890–91). These wars were only the highlights of continuous small-scale patrolling, policing, raiding, and engagements which kept the 10 regular regiments of U.S. cavalry in a constant state of operations throughout the period. The wars also indicate the geographic scope of the Plains Indian Wars. Cavalry regiments were continuously on the move to concentrate in the areas of greatest hostilities.
The Plains Indians
In 1866 the U.S. government estimated that there were 270,000 American Indians in the West, divided into 125 distinct groups. By 1866, however, only the most powerful tribes were in a position to oppose the policies of the U.S. government. The 11 most powerful hostile tribes numbered fewer than 100,000 people. However, significant unity did not exist among the tribes, and they had little sense of corporate Indian identity.
Organization
The largest sense of collective identification that the Indian recognized was the tribe. The major tribes with whom the Americans were concerned were the Blackfoot, Crow, Sioux, Arapaho, Cheyenne, Comanche, Kiowa, Apache, Iowa, Wichita, Pawnee, Nez Perce, Bannock, and Ute. Some of the tribes shared the same language group but were otherwise not connected. The tribes subdivided into bands. The bands shared language and culture and occupied the same geographic area. For example, the Blackfoot consisted of three distinct bands or subtribes, the Piegan, Blood, and Blackfoot proper. Together they ranged over a territory of 120,000 square miles. Similarly the Sioux organized into at least seven different bands of which the most warlike were the Oglala and Hunkpapa. During most of the year, hundreds of miles might separate the bands, but in winter they tended to concentrate to within a few miles if not into a single large winter camp. Bands tended to self-identify as independent units and did not feel in any way bound by agreements or treaties made by another band of the same tribe.2
The bands were informal democracies. They selected leaders by popular consent based on proven wisdom and warrior skills. Popular consent expressed through councils limited their power. Multiple leaders could exist simultaneously, each responsible for an area of proven expertise such as camps, hunting, and the most prestigious— war. Leaders of exceptional ability and charisma could have influence beyond their band to the tribe in general.3
Initially southern Plains Indians copied the equipment of their equestrian models, the Spanish, including horse armor (made from leather rather than metal), and lances. The horse armor did not flourish among the Plains Indians, but other aspects of Spanish influence did. The lance became an important weapon among the Indians. It was most prevalent among the southern tribes, notably the Comanche. Indians did not throw the lance, but rather used it as a shock weapon wielded from horseback and couched under the arm. The lance was a very powerful symbolic weapon among the Indians because the warrior had to engage in close combat to use it. Thus, only the most notable warriors choose it, and carrying a lance was associated with great prestige. Comanche warriors used a lance six or seven feet in length with a head made from chipped stone in an open leaf shape. Later, metal heads replaced the stone. Particularly prized as lance heads were blades from cavalry swords. Captured cavalry swords were highly prized symbolic weapons among the Indians.4
Though the lance was associated with the greatest prestige, the weapon of choice among the Plains Indians was the bow. Plains Indians carried a short, generally three to four feet, bow which they fired with equal ability from horseback or on foot. U.S. Colonel Henry B. Carrington determined that the Indian’s arrow “is shot with more precision than the pistol ball, and its blade is not, like a bullet, to be deflected by ten-don, cartilage, or bone.” Design of the bow varied in its specifics from tribe to tribe across the plains, but usually the In
dian bow was a single stave weapon. Compound bows were not unknown but required a skilled craftsman and were therefore rare. The Nez Perce were known for their compound bows and used them as an important trading commodity with other tribes. Some tribes strengthened the bow with a sinew backing, while the best bows, in the steppe fashion, also used bone. Although some contemporary accounts give a range for the native bow as much as 500 yards, the weapon was probably effective at 100 yards or less. Although lacking the range of firearms, its rate of fire and accuracy ensured that it was the most popular and most effective weapon in the Indian arsenal until the advent of metallic cartridge repeating rifles. Even after good firearms were available to the Indians, they never completely replaced the bow.5
By the time of the Indian campaigns many of the Plains Indians warriors carried high-quality firearms. The archeological evidence discovered on the Little Bighorn battlefield gives a good indication of the sophisticated and modern armament of the Indians in 1876. That evidence indicated that the Indians present on the battlefield used a minimum of 29 different types of firearms. Cartridge evidence on the battlefield shows that at least 62 Indians used .44-caliber Henry repeating rifles. The second and third most prevalent Indian rifles indicated by the archeological evidence were 27 .50-caliber Sharps breechloading rifles, and seven .44-caliber Winchester 1873 repeating rifles.6 Estimates are that at the Little Bighorn battle, one in every three Indians carried a firearm. The rest used the traditional bow. This evidence indicates that in terms of individual firearms the Indians were at least as well armed as the cavalry, and under some circumstances better armed. At close ranges, the repeating rifles of the Indians would have been able to generate significantly more firepower than the single-shot carbines of the cavalry.
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