98. Id.
99. See P. WEINER, EVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDERS OF PRAGMATISM, 1 52-71 (Harvard Univ. Press 1949).
loo. Green, supra note 97, at 213.
101. [Green], Torts Under the French Law (Book Review), 8 AM. L. REV. 508, 519 (1874), reprinted in N. GREEN, supra note 97.
102. Green, supra note 97, at 213.
103. Id. at 215.
104. M. HOWE, supra note 21, at 74-76; Fisch, Justice Holmes, the Prediction Theory of Law and Pragmatism, 39 J. PHIL. 85 (1942).
105. F. WHARTON, A SUGGESTION AS TO CAUSATION 3 (Riverside Press 1874). [hereafter F. WHARTON, SUGGESTION]. John Stuart Mill's challenge to orthodox ideas of causation was first presented in J. S. MILL, SYSTEM OF LOGIC (z vols., John W. Parker 1843) and J. S. MILL, AN EXAMINATION OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY (Longmans 1865). Mill's ideas on causation came to Wharton's attention through R. HAZARD, TWO LETTERS ON CAUSATION AND FREEDOM IN WILLING (Longmans 1869), which contests Mill's ideas. See F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE S 155, at 137 n.1 (2d. ed., Kay 1878) [hereafter F. WHARTON, NEGLIGENCE]. The issue was apparently revived for Wharton by the posthumous publication of J. S. MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (Longmans 1873). The significance of Mill's epistemology for American philosophy is discussed in B. KUKLICK, THE RISE OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY: CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS, 1860-1930, at 20-21 (Yale Univ. Press 1977). Just as Wharton's treatise was about to be published, he wrote a separate pamphlet, Suggestion, which he intended as an appendix to his treatise. In addition to his treatise, his ideas on causation are elaborated in Liability of Railroad Companies for Remote Fires, i S.L. REV. (n.s.) 729 (1876) (hereafter Wharton, Remote Fires ).
106. F. WHARTON, SUGGESTION, supra note 1o5, at 5, 10.
107. Id. at 8.
1o8. Id. at 10.
109. Id. at 11.
110. Id. at lo.
111. Id. at 1o-11.
112. J. S. MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 232 (J. Robson & J. Stillinger eds., Univ. of Toronto Press 1981).
113. O. W. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 173.
114. See M. HOWE, supra note 21, at 74-76; B. KuKLICK, supra note 105, at 48-50; Fisch, supra note 104.
115. F. WHARTON, NEGLIGENCE, supra note 105, S 138, at 112.
i 16. Id. $ 75, at 63.
117. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928) ("Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.") (quoting F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 455 (11th ed., Stevens 1920)).
118. 35 N.Y. zlo (1866).
i iq. Id. at 217.
120. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 76 (Callaghan 1879) (quoting Ryan v. New York Cent. R. R., 35 N.Y. at 216).
121. The decision was rejected in England and in most American states. Id. at 7677. Only New York and Pennsylvania, in Pennsylvania R.R. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. 353 (1870), adopted the Ryan rule. Even in New York, the case was "much criticized, limited, distinguished, and to some extent, at least, overruled.. . ." i T. SHEARMAN & A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 6o n.30 (6th ed., Baker, Voorhis 1913). "[T]he weight of this case as a precedent was somewhat diminished" by subsequent Pennsylvania decisions as well. T. COOLEY, supra note 120, at 76 n.3.
122. F. WHARTON, NEGLIGENCE, supra note 105, at 110.
123. Id. S 150, at 125-
124. Id. S 15o, at 135. (quoting Hoyt v. Jeffers, 30 Mich. 181, 200 (1874) (Chris- tiancy, J.)).
125. Wharton, Remote Fires, supra note 105, at 729.
126. Id. at 730.
127. Id. at 730-31.
128. F. WHARTON, NEGLIGENCE, supra note 1o5, S 139 at 114-15.
12.9. Id. S 75, at 63.
130. Green, supra note 97, at 215.
131. See THE PROBABILISTIC REVOLUTION (2 vols, L. Kruger ed., MIT Press 1987).
132. O. W. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 187.
133. O. W. HOLMES, supra note 19, at 96, 163.
134. O. W. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 182-83.
135. See Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967); J. WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE, 1900-1918, at 40-61 (Beacon Press 1968).
136. Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1920).
137. H. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 91-92 (Oxford Univ. Press 1959).
138. See Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151 (1946); Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. REV. 36, 116, 197 (1944). The most prominent example of attacks on assumption of risk were those on the fellow-servant rule in worker injury cases. See Kales, The Fellow Servant Doctrine in the United States Supreme Court, 2 MICH. L. REV. 79 (1903); James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952).
139. "There is a decided tendency to leave every question [concerning proximate cause] to the bewildered jury, tinder some vague instruction which provides no effective guide." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 319 (5th ed., West 1984). This is a prominent area in which the Legal Realists' influence was in the direction of facilitating plaintiffs' efforts to get cases to the jury. Cf. L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 21, 31 (Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1986).
140. Gregory, Proximate Cause in Negligence-A Retreat from "Rationalization," 6 U. CHI. L. REV. 36, 41 (1938).
141. Id. at 58-59.
142. Edgerton, Legal Cause (pts. 1 & 2), 72 U. PA. L. REV. 211, 343 (1924).
143. L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (Vernon 1927). See also Festschrift for Leon Green, 56 TEx. L. REV. 381 (1978); G. E. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 75-78, 82-83, 92-96 (Oxford Univ. Press 1980).
144. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
145. Id. at 351, 162 N.E. at 103-
146. Id. at 352, 354, 162 N.E. at 103, 104.
147. Id. at 346, 162 N.E. at 101.
148. Id. at 341, 162 N.E. at 99.
149. 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
150. Brett, M. R., afterwards Lord Esher, in Heaven v. Pender, L.R. 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883). See Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 A. L. REV. 652 (1873); G. E. WHITE, supra note 143.
151. "The conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its 'relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. Relatively to her it was not negligence at all." 248 N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
152. See 2 W. WALLACE, CAUSALITY AND SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 163 (Univ. of Michigan Press 1974).
153. See T. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (Univ. of Illinois Press 1977).
154. Id. at 13, 14-15.
155. Id. at 40.
Chapter 3
i. See D. Ross, ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 53 (Cambridge Univ. Press 199o). For general works on the Gilded Age, see R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (Hill & Wang 1967); A. TRACHTENBERG, INCORPORATION OF AMERICA: CUL TURE AND SOCIETY IN THE GUILDED AGE (Hill & Wang 1982); M. DUBOFSKY, INDUSTRIALISM AND THE AMERICAN WORKER (Crowell 1975); L. GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE: THE POPULIST MOMENT IN AMERICA (Oxford Univ. Press 1976); H. F. MAY, THE END OF AMERICAN INNOCENCE: A STUDY OF THE FIRST YEARS OF OUR OWN TIME, 1912-1917 (Knopf 1959). For the influence of the Paris Commune in America, see N. PAINTER, STANDING AT ARMAGEDDON: THE UNITED STATES, 1877-1919, at 17-24 (Norton 1987). See also Grob, The Railroad Strikes of 1877, 6 MIDWEST J. 16, 21-33 (1954-1955), cited in P. FONER, THE GREAT LABOR UPRISING OF 1877, at 103 n.i (Monad Press 1977); R. BRUCE, 1877: YEAR OF VIOLENCE 225-29 (Bobbs-Merrill 1959). This idea was originally suggested to me by Graham, Justice Field and the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 YALE L.J. 851, 857 (1943) [hereafter Graham, Justice Fiel'].
2. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
3. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (state regulations limiting the hours of employment in bakeries violate the right to freedom of contract guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
4. See Graham, Justice Field, supra note 1, at 853; Graha
m, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371, 403 (1938). See also C. BEARD, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN HISTORY, 1877-1913, at 208, 210-13 (Macmillan 1914).
5. 118 U.S. at 396.
6. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
7. See Graham, Justice Field, supra note 1, at 853. There can be no doubt that recent cases like First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), which recognizes a constitutional right of corporations to spend money to influence elections, have contributed enormously to the political and econornic power of big business.
8. Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385, 402-05 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883); San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R.R., 13 F. 722, 746-48 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (companion cases).
9. Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926).
10. See Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934).
ii. Dewey, supra note 9, at 669-70.
12. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1935).
13. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
14. See Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 11 YALE L.J. 201, 215-19 (1931); Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L. REV. 17 (1924)•
15. San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R.R., 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882); Sacramento v. Central Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883); California v. Northern Ry., 18 F. 385 (C.C.D. Cal 1883); California v. Central Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385 (C.C.D. Cal 1883); California v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883); Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883).
16. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
17. See id. at loo-01.
18. See id. at 104-05.
1q. Argument for Defendant at 12, San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R.R., 116 U.S. 138 (1885) (collected in Cases and Points (available in Harvard Law School Library)) (emphasis in the original).
20. Id. at 10 (emphasis in the original).
21. San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R.R., 13 F. 722, 743-44 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
22. O. GIERKE, DIE STAATS- UND KORPORATIONSLEHRE DES ALTERTHUMS UND DES MITTELALTERS UND IHRE AUFNAHME IN DEUTSCHLAND (Weidmann 1881). (vol. 3 Of DAS DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT).
23. For a good bibliography, see 4 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 2oo-01 (West 1959) (unnumbered note).
24. O. GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE (F. Maitland trans. Cambridge Univ. Press 1900).
25. F. MAITLAND, Moral Personality and Legal Personality, in 3 COLLECTED PAPERS 304 (H. Fisher ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1911).
26. E. FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS (Univ. of Chicago Press 1897).
27. F. MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 317.
28. F. MAITLAND, Trust and Corporation, in supra note 25, at 321.
29. F. MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 317.
30, See 1 S. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS Vi (1st ed., Bancroft-Whitney 1895).
31. See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1083-90 (1980).
32. See Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404 (1916). See generally W. Y. ELLIOTT, THE PRAGMATIC REVOLT IN POLITICS (Macmillan 1928); Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational "Real Entity" Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575 (1989).
33. See R. WIEBE, supra note 2; Galambos, Technology, Political Economy, and Professionalization: Central Themes of the Organizational Synthesis, 57 Bus. Hisr. REV. 471 (1983); Galambos, The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History, 44 Bus. Hisr. REV. 279 (1970).
34. See 1 P. VINOGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 147-48 (Oxford Univ. Press 1920); White & Vann, The Invention of English Individualism, 8 Soc. HIST. 345, 352-54 (1983); Sugarman & Rubin, Towards a New History of Law and Material Society in England, 1750-1914, in LAW, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, 1750-1914, at 28-30 (G. Rubin & D. Sugarman eds., Professional Books 1984).
35. F. MAITLAND, supra note 26, at 317.
36. See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819), quoted in J. W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 9 (Univ. Press of Virginia 1970).
37. Id.
38. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 1 z 5-27 and accompanying text.
41. 201 U.S. 43 (1905). As late as 1904, the Supreme Court declared: "A corporation, while by fiction of law recognized for some purposes as a person, and for purposes of jurisdiction as a citizen, is not endowed with the inalienable rights of a natural person." Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 362 (1904). And in 1906 it stated that "the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment against deprivation without due process of law is the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons." Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1906) (citing Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906)). This way of thinking began to crumble with Hale and was finally put to rest in 191o in a series of "unconstitutional conditions" cases involving foreign corporations. See infra note 67, and C. HENDERSON, infra note 62, at 132-47.
42. See A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 161 (Harvard Univ. Press 1977).
43. See infra note zoo and accompanying text.
44. E. FREUND, supra note z6, at 1o.
45. Id. at 48.
46. See generally C. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (Harvard Univ. Press 1930).
47. The most dramatic, largely because it seems so out of place, is Chief Justice Marshall's effort, in Bank of United States v. Devereux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809), to base the diversity jurisdiction of corporations on the residence of their shareholders. By the 1840s this approach was abandoned, with the conclusive presumption that the shareholders were citizens of the state of incorporation. Louisville R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (z How.) 497 (1844). A more far-reaching act of disaggregation-which remained ambiguous and muted-was the implied distinction in the Dartmouth College Case between, on the one hand, the artificial and socially created corporation and, on the other hand, the vested rights of the shareholders. See also J. W. HURST, supra note 36, at 15-22.
48. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586 (1839).
49. State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 3o N.E. 279 (1892).
50. R. REESE, THE TRUE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 2 (T. H. Flood 1897).
51. See Colson, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in the United States Supreme Court Decisions (pt. 1), 42 W. VA. L.Q. 179, 184-89 (1936).
52. Id.
53• See infra text accompanying notes 97-108.
54. 5 S. THOMPSON, supra note 30, at 4629.
55• 1 W. COOK, TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS, BONDS, MORTGAGES, AND GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 971-73 (3d ed., Callaghan 1894).
56. 5 S. THOMPSON, supra note 30, at 4664-78.
57. Compare National Bank v. Matthews, q6 U.S. 258 (1877) and San Antonio v. Mehaffy, q6 U. S. 312 (1877) with Thomas v. West Jersey R.R., 101 U.S. 71 (1879). See also Colson, supra note 51, at 207-9, 213.
58. See Colson, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in United States Supreme Court Decisions (pt. 2), 42 W. VA. L.Q. 297, 330 (1936).
59• See Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires Be Discarded?, 33 YALE L.J. 49 (1923).
6o. 1 W. COOK, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS HAVING A CAPITAL STOCK, vii-viii (4th ed., Callaghan 1898). "In the federal courts . . . the old rule against ultra vires contracts is upheld in all its rigor and applied with all its severity. The tendency of modern jurisprudence to relax on that subject finds no favor in the federal courts." 2 id. at 1374.
61. See Colson, supra notes 51 and 58.
62. G. HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 42 (Harvard Univ. Press 1918).
63. 38. U.S. (13 Pet.) 519,
587-88 (1839).
64. Id. at 588.
65. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
66. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910); Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56 (iglo); Ludwig v. Western Union Tel. Co., 216 U.S. 146 (1910); Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910).
67. See Horwitz, Progressive Legal Historiography, 63 OR. L. REV. 679 (1984).
68. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898); Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898); Addyson Pipe Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). The clearest statement of this "literalist" interpretation was given by justice Peckham in Trans-Missouri:
When, therefore, the body of an act pronounces as illegal every contract or combination in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, etc., the plain and ordinary meaning of such language is not limited to that kind of contract alone which is in unreasonable restraint of trade, but all contracts are included in such language, and no exception or limitation can be added without placing in the act that which has been omitted by Congress.
166 U.S. at 328.
69. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
70. See J. M. BLUM, THE REPUBLICAN ROOSEVELT 116-17 (Harvard Univ. Press 1954); R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 247-50 (Vintage 1955); see also Kales, Good and Bad Trusts, 3o HARV. L. REV. 830 (1917).
71. 3 J. DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 138 (Viking Press 1949).
72. See, e.g., S. DILLAYE, MONOPOLIES, THEIR ORIGIN, GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT (R. H. Darby 1882).
73. Lloyd, The Story of a Great Monopoly, 47 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 317 (1881).
74. H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 134 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1954) (citing Lloyd, Lords of Industry, 138 N. AM. REV. 535-53 (1884)).
75. A. CHANDLER, supra note 42, at 323.
76. See Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1019 (1989); Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105 (1989); Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Federalism, and the Theory of the Firm: An Historical Perspective, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 75 (199o); May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 495 (1987); May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 188o-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257 (1989); May, The Role of the States in the First Century of the Sherman Act and the Larger Picture of Antitrust History, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 93 (199o); Millon, The First Antitrust Statute, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 141 (1990); Peritz, A CounterHistory of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263.
B004E3WO62 EBOK Page 45