146. "It is to a study of the underlying causes of juvenile delinquency and to a realization of these preventive and positive measures that the trained professional men of the United States, following the splendid lead of many of their European brethren, should give some thought and some care." Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 122 (1909). Juvenile offenders were to be dealt with "as a wise and merciful father" dealt with his own children. Id. at 107. Such an approach was only' just and proper," id., "when we neglect to destroy the evils that are leading them into careers of delinquency, when we fail not merely to uproot the wrong, but to implant in place of it the positive good.. . ." Id. at 122.
147. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).
148. Id.
149. See id. at 15 n.14.
150. See id. at 21.
151. Id. (quoting Foster, Social Work, the Law and Social Action, in 45 Soc. CASEWORK 386 (1964)).
152. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir 1954).
153. Id. at 871.
154. Id. at 874. See generally id. at 870-76 for the core of Bazelon's discussion of scientific expertise.
155. See id. at 869; see also L. WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 559 n. 26 (4th ed., Foundation Press 1986).
156. 214 F.zd at 875.
157. Id. at 872. Judge Bazelon's opinion did emphasize that the question of insanity would need to be determined by "juries [that] will continue to make moral judgments" about responsibility. It added, however, that "in making such judgments, they will be guided by wider horizons of knowledge concerning mental life." Id. at 876.
158. United States v. Brawner, 471 F. 2d 969 (D. C. Cir. 1972). For Judge Bazelon's account of the history of the insanity defense from Durham to Brawner, see D. L. BAZELON, QUESTIONING AUTHORITY 24-70 (Knopf 1988).
159. Id. at 981.
160. Id. at 977-79.
161. Id. at 982.
162. Id. at 977.
163. Id. at loco-11 (Bazelon, C. J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
164. Id. at loll.
165. Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
166. See C. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 1880-1960, at 276-77, 285-87 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1985).
167. 179 F.zd 749, 751-52 (2nd Cir. 1950).
168. 340 U.S. at 487-
169. Id. at 485.
170. Id. at 478.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 479 n.8 (citing NLRB v. Standard Oil Co., 138 F.2d 885, 887 (L. Hand, J•))•
173. Id. at 482.
174. Id. at 48o n.1 2 (quoting FINAL REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE at 92).
175. Id. at 483.
176. 5 U.S.C. S 706 (2) (E) (1946).
177. Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA, L. REV. 614, 621 (1927).
178. Id. at 618.
179. For an oversimplified account of the development of academic administrative law, see W. CHASE, supra note 82.
180. 1 M. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES 200 (Free Press 1982).
181. Id. at 200-01 (citing F. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 15155 (Yale Univ. Press 1930)).
182. Id. at 201 (citing F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 181, at 159-60).
183. M. PARRISH, supra note i8o, at 2oi.
184. See id. at 81-117; C. TOMLINS, supra note 166.
185. Jaffe, The Judicial Universe of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 6z HARV. L. REV. 357, 376 (1949).
186. Id.
187. Jaffe, The Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 401, 401, (1941).
188. Jaffe, Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1245 (1939).
189. Id. at 1236.
190. Id. at 1232.
191. Id. at 1239.
192. Id. at 1242.
193. Jaffe, supra note 187, at 440.
194. Id. at 405-
195. Id. at 401.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 440.
199. Jaffe, book review, 42 COL. L. REV. 1382, 1383 (1942) (reviewing R. POUND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: ITS GROWTH, PROCEDURE AND SIGNIFICANCE (Univ. of Pittsburgh Press 1942)).
200. Id. at 1382.
201. Id. at 1382-83.
202. Id. at 1385.
203. Id. at 1383.
204. Jaffe, Administrative Procedure Re-examined: The Benjamin Report, 56 HARV. L. REV. 704, 705 (1943).
205. Jaffe, supra note 185, at 410.
zo6. Id. at 410-11.
207. Id.
208. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1954).
209. Id. at 1 io6.
210. Id. at 1109.
211. Jaffe, supra note 185, at 373-74.
212. See Jaffe, supra note 208, at 1129-30.
213. Id. at 1113.
214. Jaffe, James Landis and the Administrative Process, 78 HARV. L. REV. 319, 32223 (1964).
215. Id. at 322.
z16. Id. at 322-23.
217. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1183, 1187 (1973).
218. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239, 271 (1955); see generally Jaffe, supra note 214; Jaffe, supra note 217.
219. W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 15-16 (Louisiana State Univ. Press 1956).
220. Id. at 8.
221. Id. at 19.
222. Id. at 22.
223. J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 70 (G. P.O. 1960).
224. Id. at 71.
225. Id. at 58.
226. See, e.g., R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (Grossman Publishers 1970) Fellmeth, The Regulatory-Industrial Complex, in WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME 244. (B. Wasserstein & M. Green eds., Beacon Press 1970); Green & Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L. J 871 (1973) Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L. REV. 1069 (1971); G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916 (Princeton Univ. Press 1965); T. Lowi, supra note 31, at 85-93; Stewart, supra note 31, at 1684-87, and sources cited therein.
227. See P. Novicx, supra note 94, at 518.
22.8. Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 509, 523-74 (1974).
229. Id. at 512.
230. Id. (citing Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F•zd 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
231. Id. at 512.
232. Sive, Forward: Roles and Rules in Environmental Decisionmaking, 62 IOWA L. REV. 637 638 (1977).
233. Id.
z 34. Id.
235. Id. at 639.
236. 439 U.S. 961 (1978).
237. Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D. C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 395.
238. Id. at 359-
239. Id. at 346.
240. Id. at 401.
241. Id. at 402.
242. Id. at 401.
243. Id. at 402.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 404 (quoting his Forward to the 1973-74 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 2 (1974)).
247. Id. at 404-05.
248. Id. at 405.
249. Id.
250. J. Landis, Address Before the Administrative Law Section, American Bar Association in St. Louis 5-6 (Aug. 7, 1961) (typescript in Harvard Law School Library).
251. Id. at 6.
252. Id.
2 5 3. Id. at 7.
2 54. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 8.
258. See e.g., E. JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM (Russell Sage Foundation 1974).
259. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964).
260. Id. at 733-
261. Id.
262. Id. at 786.
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263. Id. at 768.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 774.
266. Id. at 778.
267. Id. at 771-72.
z68. See id. at 747-49, 756-58, 762 n. 149, 763-64, 767-69, 775-77.
z69. 363 U.S. 603 (i 96o).
270. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8, 265 (1970). By 1965, Reich had explicitly applied his idea to welfare rights in Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L. J. 1245 (1965).
Chapter 9
i. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 219 (Univ. Press of Kentucky 1973).
3. Id. at 176.
4. Id. at 218.
5. Id. at 176-77.
6. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 8 (Oceana 1951).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 9.
9. Id.
10. See discussion of Llewellyn, supra ch. 6.
11. Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer jurisprudence, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 581, 603 (1940).
12. W. LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 174-75 (Little, Brown 1955).
13. Id. at 172.
14. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 6, at 10.
15. See M. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE (Greenwood 1977); T. REEVES, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JOE MCCARTHY (Stein & Day 1982); D. CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER (Simon & Schuster 1978); S. KUTLER, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION (Hill & Wang 1982); E. SCHRECKER, No IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES (Oxford Univ. Press 1986).
16. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 6, 153.
IT Id. at 154.
18. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (Little, Brown 1960).
19. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 6, at lo.
20. K LLEWELLYN, supra note 18, at 3-4.
21. Id. at 4.
22. See E. PURCELL, supra note 2, "Relativist Democratic Theory and Postwar America" at 235-266.
23. See E. HOFFER, THE TRUE BELIEVER (Harper & Row 1951); T. W. ADORNO et al., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (Harper 1950).
24. See D. BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY (Free Press 1960); D. BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (Univ. of Chicago Press 1953); H. BRICK, DANIEL BELL AND THE DECLINE OF INTELLECTUAL RADICALISM (Univ. of Wisconsin Press 1986).
25. See M. WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Free Press 1949); M. WEBER, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER (H. Gerth & C. W. Mills eds., Free Press 1949); A. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER (Stanford Univ. Press 1983); A. BRECHT, POLITICAL THEORY: THE FOUNDATIONS OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT (Princeton Univ. Press 1959)•
z6. Max Lerner uses these words in his collection, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 5 (Little, Brown 1943).
27. See LOGICAL POSITIVISM (A. J. Ayer ed., Free Press 1959); A. JANIK & S. TOULMIN, WITTGENSTEIN'S VIENNA (Simon & Schuster 1973).
28, See Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1951); H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Univ. of Cal. Press 1967); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).
29. See L. Fuller, The Problem of the Grudge Informer, published as the Appendix to THE MORALITY OF LAW (Yale Univ. Press 1964). Fuller called the piece "something that I wrote long before I undertook" the lectures on which the book was based.
30. "If there was, as John Higham maintained at the time, a veritable 'cult' of consensus in American historiography in the 1950s, and if counterprogressive themes were overwhelmingly dominant, they never, as we have seen, went completely unchallenged." P. NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 345 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1988). For example, "[w]hen the first volume of Boorstin's The Americans appeared, Bernard Bailyn termed it an 'apologia for his disillusioned conservatism.' " Id. at 334. See also Higham, The Cult of the "American ConsenSUS", 27 COMMENTARY 93 (1959); R. HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS 437-66 (Knopf 1968).
31. See supra ch. 4.
32. See supra ch. 6; Llewellyn, James Coolidge Carter, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 243 (Macmillan 1937).
33. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), where Cardozo discusses the "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental" (302 U.S. at 325) and "those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all of our civil and political institutions" (302 U.S. at 328). Justice Frankfurter expressed a similar view in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 167 (1952), regarding "those canons of decency and fairness which express notions of justice of Englishspeaking people. . . .'
34. See R. l-IOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (rev. ed., Beacon Press 1955).
35. See L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 306-9 (Harcourt, Brace 1955).
36. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 29. Fuller states:
[W]e may speak of a procedural, as distinguished from a substantive natural law. What I have called the internal morality of law is in this sense a procedural version of natural law, though to avoid misunderstanding the word "procedural" should be assigned a special and expanded sense so that it would include, for example, a substantive accord between official action and enacted law. The term "procedural" is, however, broadly appropriate as indicating that we are concerned, not with the substantive aims of legal rules, but with the ways in which a system of rules for governing human conduct must be constructed and administered if it is to be efficacious and at the same time remain what it purports to be.
Id. at 96-97.
37. See H. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (Macmillan 1948); S. KONEFSKY, CHIEF JUSTICE STONE AND THE SUPREME COURT (Macmillan 1945); A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW (Viking 1956).
38. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938);
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation . . . (njor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, . . . or national, . . . or racial minorities . . . whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
39. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), overruling Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
40. See Danzig, Justice Frankfurter's Opinions in the Flag Salute Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 675 (1984).
41. See Horwitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 599 (1979); R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (Vintage Books 1977).
42. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961).
43. This view, termed the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" by Alexander Bickel, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (Bobbs-Merrill 1962), has been criticized. See Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971); Purcell, Alexander M. Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution, 11 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 521 (1976); Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981); Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1531-33 (199o); Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 472-478.
44. See A. GOULDNER, THE COMING CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY (Basic Books 1970).
45. See T. EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (Univ. of Minnesota Press 198 3).
46. C. SCHORSKE, FIN-DE-SIECLE VIENNA xx (Knopf 1980).
47
. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRocEss (tent. ed., Harvard Univ. 1958); White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973); Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 669-690 & n.431 (1982); Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1152, 1182-87 (1985); Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950'S, 21 U. MicH. J. L. REF. 561 (1988); Parker, supra note 43; Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1753-66 (1976); Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1307 (1979).
48. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 47, at iii.
49. Id. at 1-3.
50. Id. at 3-4.
51. "Against totalitarian certitude, free society can only offer modern man devoured by alienation and fallibility, The great issue of this century is who is right. Is man a creature of doubt and ambiguity.. . . Or has he mastered the secrets of history and nature sufficiently to become ruthless, monolithic and infallible, to know whom to spare and whom to kill?" A. SCHLESINGER, THE VITAL CENTER 59 (Houghton Mifflin 1949). "[T]he Brandeises and the Parringtons were caught off guard . . . nothing in their system prepared them for totalitarianism.. . ." Id. at 163. "Some perceive dangers in [the] new directions of liberalism. It is argued that the abandonment of the old faith in the full rationality of man leaves no foothold short of authoritarianism. Yet is it not rather the belief in the perfectibility of man which encourages the belief that a small group of men are already perfect and hence may exercise total power without taint or corruption?" Id. at 169. This form of discourse led even liberals to speak of "social engineering" as if it led to the gulag or the concentration camp. See Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401, 4o8 (1959).
52, H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 47, at 3.
53. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (Harper 1942).
54. Id. at 269.
55. Id. at 273.
56. H. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 227 (1960).
57. Id. at 240.
58. J. R. PENNOCK, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: ITS MERITS AND PROSPECTS 309 (Rinehart 1950). Pennock added that "It is only natural that the working classes] should tend to minimize the value of liberty." Id. at 310.
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