On a military level, the GCC was intended to provide collective security for all members via its Peninsula Shield Force. Founded in 1984, the force was supposed to comprise 10,000 soldiers representing all six monarchies. However, even after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 the force only had 5,000 servicemen, and because it had played no active role in the conflict it was temporarily disbanded, with participating units being returned to their respective national armies.102 In recent years there have been claims that the force has grown to 40,000,103 but it is unclear how many how many soldiers are actually based at its headquarters in Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid Military City, while its command and control structure remains ambiguous. The force’s existence has also been continually undermined by security disputes and even clashes between the Gulf monarchies. Even in the twenty-first century there is much evidence that nineteenth- and twentieth-century border problems and other old grievances remain unresolved. Between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, for example, there continues to exist a bitter dispute over their frontiers. Dating back to the earliest Wahhabi attacks on Abu Dhabi’s territory, a 1950s standoff over the Buraimi Oasis, and a contested border settlement in the 1970s, the subject remains highly controversial. Several institutions in Abu Dhabi today continue to produce maps that show the emirate’s territory still including land that was ceded to Saudi Arabia years ago, and in March 2010 it was widely reported that a naval clash took place in disputed waters. According to The Daily Telegraph’s UAE-based reporter, a UAE vessel had opened fire on a Saudi vessel that had allegedly strayed into UAE territory. The Saudi vessel surrendered, but its sailors were taken to Abu Dhabi and held in custody for over a week before being deported. Although a spokesperson for the UAE’s Ministry for Defence confirmed that the incident took place he was unable to provide any details. However, a Gulf-based diplomat stated that ‘…it looks as though attempts were made to keep this quiet, which is predictable given the important relationship between the two countries… But it does remind us of the simmering rows that there are in this part of the Gulf’.104
The ongoing disputes between Oman and the UAE have also undermined any sense of GCC collective security. For many years territorial issues were at stake, but over the past decade the situation has become much tenser. In 2003 the UAE began constructing a giant wall stretching across the desert border between the two states. Completed in 2008, it has effectively sealed off the UAE, closing the previously open border between the Abu Dhabi-controlled city of Al-Ayn and the adjoining Omani-controlled city of Buraimi. Greatly resented by residents of both cities and local agricultural businesses, who now have to use checkpoints to cross the border, the wall is seen as damaging centuries-old trade and familial ties between the two communities.105 More seriously, especially at an inter-governmental level, was the widely reported cracking of a UAE spy ring in Oman. In late 2010 Omani bloggers began claiming that arrests of ‘UAE agents’ had taken place, and in early 2011 the Omani authorities confirmed these suspicions. Although the UAE authorities initially denied the existence of the spies, stating that ‘The UAE expresses its full willingness to co-operate with… Oman in any investigations that it carries out in full transparency to uncover those who try to mar relations between the two countries’,106 the problem was only resolved following Kuwait-brokered personal visits to Oman by the Abu Dhabi crown prince and the ruler of Dubai.
Connected to the Gulf monarchies’ divisions over relations with Iran, it also transpired that the UAE spy ring may have been seeking information on Oman’s possible security links with Iran. As a prominent analyst at a Dubai-based think tank described ‘…one possibility is that the UAE wants to know more about Iran-Oman relations because of Tehran and Muscat’s long ties in security and military co-operation’.107 Indeed, shortly before the Omani authorities’ revelation, it was reported in Iran’s state-backed media that their minister for the interior108 had recently visited Muscat. Upon meeting with Oman’s ruler the minister reportedly described Oman as ‘an old friend of Iran which has always been seeking to develop ties with Tehran’ and praised Oman for ‘sending the Zinat Al-Bihar vessel to Iran’s southern waters with a message of peace and friendship’ and releasing 101 Iranian prisoners that had been held in Omani jails. Meanwhile Oman’s ruler had reportedly ‘…called for expansion of bilateral ties, especially in economic areas, and said Iran can serve as a route for transition of goods from Oman to Central Asia’ before concluding that ‘Iran and Oman stand beside each other like two brothers and nothing can make a split between them’.109
Such spying and bilateral regional security deals with other regional powers—whether real or fictional—understandably attenuate any sense of trust in the GCC and its capabilities. Certainly, there is little doubt that all six of the Gulf monarchies’ governments continue to view separate, international security guarantees as their only effective safety net. Some of the Western powers have seized the opportunities presented by these weaknesses and have now begun to explore the possibility of widening their individual alliances and agreements to form sub-groups of Gulf monarchies. In other words, if two or three Gulf monarchies can be brought together under the umbrella of one Western power, then a sense of collective security can be created for those countries even if it is sponsored by a foreign power and involves bypassing the GCC and its Peninsula Shield Force. Following the founding of the French military base in Abu Dhabi in 2009, the French president’s opinion-editorial in Abu Dhabi’s state-backed English language newspaper hinted at such a possibility. Explaining that ‘…with this first French military base in the Middle East, our country also shows that it intends to be fully engaged in the security and stability of this region’ he then went on to state that ‘France has many allies in the region; our presence in Abu Dhabi will enable us to reinforce our strategic partnership with them’ and that ‘we [France] hope that solid multilateral defence co-operation will develop among our allies in the region’. He concluded that ‘For this reason, we want to fully involve Qatar in the recent French-Emirates “Gulf Shield” military exercise. In a region as troubled as yours, it is essential that the countries defending the same values work together to reinforce their common security’.110
Interference and coups d’état
The bitter quarrels and differences between the Gulf monarchies have sometimes even led to attempts to alter the course of dynastic succession in each other. When opportunities have arisen in one Gulf monarchy—perhaps following the death of a ruler or a petty internal dispute—it is now commonplace for the other Gulf monarchies to interfere, either by discreetly backing a preferred candidate or, in more extreme cases, even sponsoring a coup d’état. Moreover, with the six monarchies failing to present a united front and often being divided over their choice of candidate in these ‘succession contests’, the resulting vacuums have often allowed foreign, non-regional powers to get involved. In some ways this is nothing new, as during Britain’s period of influence in the Persian Gulf there were frequent cases of the political resident stepping in to shape the future of certain monarchies. As described, the colonial representative eased the transfer of power in Abu Dhabi in 1966 from one brother to another, while in 1970 Britain ensured that control of Oman passed from father to son. In most of these situations Britain was playing the role of facilitator rather than meddler, usually consulting members of the ruling family in question and helping the dynasty install its preferred successor at the expense of unpopular or overly cautious incumbents. The squabbles and coups of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century have, however, been quite different, as when neighbouring monarchies or foreign powers have been involved there has rarely been any effort to identify the most suitable or popular candidate, with most of the focus being on installing a ruler that will be the most amenable to their interests.
In the late 1980s, for example, the coup in the UAE’s Sharjah—where one brother111 ousted another112 on the grounds of economic mismanagement and squandering—was only reversed following
interference by neighbouring Dubai, which had provided accommodation for the ousted ruler and published newspaper stories supporting him.113 Similarly in 1995 Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia tried to re-install the ousted ruler of Qatar114 who, as discussed, was removed from power by his more popular, pro-reform, son.115 Although the counter-coup was unsuccessful, fears of a repeat attempt continued to dog Qatar for several more years. Indeed, the following year some 6000 tribesmen were disenfranchised and several ruling family members were arrested after being linked to a Saudibacked coup plot.116 And in 2009 it was reported by Stratfor that a major coup in the emirate had been attempted, involving members of the Qatari military and the ruling family. Most of the subsequent press coverage hinted that the coup had Saudi Arabia’s support.117 Similarly, in February 2011 the Jordan and UAE-based Al-Bawaba news agency reported that another coup had been attempted in Qatar, with thirty military personnel being arrested. This had supposedly coincided with a statement signed by sixty-six opposition figures including sixteen members of the ruling family who were backing the ruler’s exiled brother in France118 and which claimed that the ruler and his wife were involved in ‘cases of corruption and social injustice’.119 Gaining traction, this time the story was even covered in bulletins issued to various UN agencies. Whether true or not, the foreign-sourced report proved damaging for the ruler and has kept the spectre of future coup attempts in the minds of most Qataris and resident expatriates. Indeed, in April 2012 Iran’s Fars News Agency and Saudi Arabia’s Al-Arabiya reported that yet another attempt had taken place, with high-ranking military officers being rounded up and placed under house arrest after clashes between Royal Guard troops and regular military personnel outside one of the ruler’s palaces. Perhaps works of fiction, the reports claimed that the ruler and his wife were transported by American helicopters to a safe location.120
By far the best example of a modern-day coup and resulting foreign interference has been in the UAE’s northernmost emirate of Ra’s al-Khaimah. In 2003, after having allegedly burned an American flag at the head of an anti-Iraq war demonstration, the emirate’s long-serving crown prince121 was replaced by one of his younger brothers.122 A decree was signed by their very elderly father in support of this change, but at the time many analysts questioned the ruler’s decision-making abilities given his advanced age and poor state of health. The new crown prince had the apparent backing of Abu Dhabi, as tanks belonging to the federal UAE Armed Forces were moved from Abu Dhabi to Ra’s al-Khaimah and positioned on street corners. The ousted crown prince’s supporters demonstrated, chanting his name and holding flags, and thus indicating he still enjoyed popular support—but they were fired on by water cannon and dispersed. He was duly exiled, first crossing the border to Oman, and then living in the US and Britain.
However, with the emirate’s Dubai-like development programme beginning to flounder in 2008, the new crown prince was becoming increasingly vulnerable to criticism. There were also widespread allegations of corruption in his administration, specifically relating to kickbacks in the construction industry. Still in exile, the deposed crown prince enlisted a US public relations company and a British solicitor to conduct an international media campaign with the dual aims of persuading Abu Dhabi and then the international community that the incumbent crown prince was a liability. In particular the campaign claimed that the 2003 decree was never authenticated, and that a later 2004 decree had in fact been signed by the aging ruler, which overturned the 2003 decision. In an effort to appeal to Abu Dhabi’s stance on Iran, the campaign also focused on the new crown prince’s apparent connections to Tehran, claiming that his effective deputy—a Shia Lebanese businessman—had major commercial interests, including factories, in the Islamic Republic. In 2009 the campaign even claimed that Ra’s al-Khaimah’s port was being visited by Iranian customs officers and that the emirate was being used as a conduit for nuclear materials destined for Iran. Connections were also highlighted in the media between Ra’s al-Khaimah and al-Qaeda, with claims being made that recent terror plots in the UAE, including a 2009 attempt to blow up Dubai’s then incomplete Burj Khalifa skyscraper, had originated in Ra’s al-Khaimah.123 And at one point it seemed that the campaign team had even tried to enlist the support of Israel, with it being reported that the exiled crown prince had met Israel’s ambassador to Britain and, according to documents seen by The Guardian, that the ambassador had promised that he was ‘…working with certain people from his side’ and ‘promised that the matter will be solved in his [the former crown prince’s] favour’.124
In 2010 there were signs that the campaign may have been gaining traction, as Abu Dhabi’s ruling family seemingly allowed the former crown prince to return from exile in order to visit his father, who was being treated in a hospital in Abu Dhabi. He was reportedly also allowed to stay in his wife’s palace in Kalba—a town controlled by Sharjah. Given Abu Dhabi’s increasingly hawkish position on Iran, some observers believed that Abu Dhabi was unwilling to allow Ra’s al-Khaimah to retain links to Tehran. However, when the ruler finally died in October 2010 several hours of confusion ensued. The former crown prince had reentered Ra’s al-Khaimah and installed himself in his pre-2003 palace with approximately 150 heavily armed guards and a larger number of loyal tribesmen. He believed he had Abu Dhabi’s blessing to attend his father’s funeral and had concluded that he would be installed as ruler later that day. By early evening, however, a brief announcement was made by the UAE’s Ministry for Presidential Affairs in Abu Dhabi that his younger brother was after all going to be the new ruler of Ra’s al-Khaimah. Tanks were again deployed on the outskirts of Ra’s al-Khaimah and all of the former crown prince’s retainers—including two of his cousins, several Omani citizens, and a Canadian military advisor—were arrested and detained for questioning.125 Two months later the emirate’s new ruler was invited to a banquet in Abu Dhabi held in his honour, where the ruler of Abu Dhabi congratulated him and his new crown prince—one of his sons—on their successes. The new ruler was then described as ‘… expressing happiness over meeting the president [the ruler of Abu Dhabi] and assuring that he would work with dedication and honesty in the shade of the directives of the president and his wise leadership’.126
The immediate future is likely to be marked by more such coup attempts in the region, as a number of the Gulf monarchies now have very aged rulers and—given the ever increasing size of the ruling families—powerful factions have coalesced around rival candidates. In each of these cases it is likely that internecine contests will develop and, given the high stakes involved, the discreet involvement of foreign powers is all but inevitable. In Oman, for example, the seventy-one year-old Qaboos bin Said Al-Said has no children or other natural heirs and has always shied away from appointing a crown prince. Moreover, given the exclusion of most ruling family members from senior government positions, no real candidate has emerged as a potential successor, as nobody has been able to accumulate the necessary administrative or military experience and expertise normally expected of an heir apparent in a Gulf monarchy. At present, much seems to hang on a clause in Oman’s constitution127 that permits the non-appointment of a crown prince, thereby allowing a ‘ruling family council’ to meet after the ruler’s death to decide upon the succession process. Indeed, Qaboos has stated his intention that such a council should meet after his death, but that if the council fails to reach a consensus then it should open a sealed envelope containing his two recommended candidates, in descending order. Two copies of these recommendations are believed to have been made, and are kept in safekeeping in two different places. Their contents are the subject of much speculation, with most Omanis believing them to name at least one of the sons of a popular uncle of Qaboos who died in 1980.128 The obvious concern in Oman—and currently the subject of great speculation—is that should the family council be divided over its decision and then pursue one of Qaboos’ posthumous recommendations, then the newly installed ruler would have little personal legitimacy and thus be
vulnerable to rivals.
The situation in Abu Dhabi—and thus the UAE presidency—is also worthy of attention. In late 2010 the sixty-four year-old ruler, Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, returned to the country after a lengthy period of medical treatment in Switzerland, having failed to return in time for the Eid Al-Fitr festival—the attendance of which is customary for a Gulf ruler. Moreover, he appeared to have suffered considerable weight loss, and the state-backed media published little or no information about his condition. Having been unable to appoint one of his own sons as crown prince, his heir apparent is instead one of his younger half brothers, Muhammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. Now fifty-one, and crown prince since 2004, Muhammad enjoys considerable clout in the emirate and is in de facto control of the UAE’s military in addition to the aforementioned Mubadala Development Company and several other state-backed entities. Moreover, Muhammad has the advantage of having five full brothers and a still influential mother129 who was always considered the favourite of the late ruler’s many wives and is now officially referred to as ‘Mother of the Nation’.130 Among them, these brothers control several further key portfolios in the Abu Dhabi and federal governments, and Muhammad’s eldest son is now seemingly in control of internal security. When Khalifa dies, however, all may not be smooth for Muhammad and his full brothers, as despite their strong influence they do not yet control all of the strings in Abu Dhabi. Notably the all-important Supreme Petroleum Council, the massive Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, and several other key institutions still remain beyond their collective reach. Furthermore, although Muhammad and his brothers undoubtedly enjoy popularity within some circles in Abu Dhabi, it seems that in other emirates as many UAE nationals fear him as love him. Certainly, with the described hawkish stance on Iran, the relations with Israel, and—as discussed later in this book—a recent crackdown on opponents by the UAE’s security services—the fear factor is likely to keep building. Although critics and potential rivals within the extended ruling family have kept a low profile, they nevertheless exist, and there are some individuals who enjoy discreet support and—courtesy of their maternal ancestry and marriage links—are believed to be favourably viewed by some of the UAE’s largest and most influential tribes.
After the Sheikhs Page 25