The most recent Saudi protests and demands have already been quite varied, occurring all over the country. They have ranged from men7 being arrested for filming and then uploading onto YouTube a video about widespread poverty among Saudi nationals in Riyadh—a video which has now been watched by more than 1 million,8 to women in Jeddah, Riyadh, and the Eastern Province filming themselves driving on motorways—a flagrant act of civil disobedience given the prevailing ban on women driving. The women involved tweeted that they were carrying their belongings as they were ‘ready to go to prison without fear’ while others told the international media that ‘this is a right for women that no law or religion bans… [we] went out to get our rights, so that it would be up to us to drive or not’.9 As expected, Facebook and Twitter are also playing a key role, with leading activists claiming that ‘they can now speak to thousands across the world… without the strict censorship they live under in the off-line world’ and that ‘we’re so thirsty for freedom of expression and a forum for expression that you see [we] are far more involved [in social media] than our neighbours’. Certainly, as the aforementioned Muhammad Fahad Al-Qahtani has claimed, ‘the government has underestimated the power of social media in Saudi Arabia and now it’s too widespread to censor’.10
Meanwhile there are now frequent samood or ‘resistance salons’ being held in the villas and apartments of known activists, despite some having already been threatened with the death penalty. Writing in the Washington Post in April 2012 one of these embattled figures, Waleed Abu Alkhair, related that such events are giving him ‘the pleasing epiphany that religious hard-liners have begun to lose control of a young generation that is hungry for freedom’. He gave the recent example of a ‘brave young man who responded passionately to clerics [also] invited to participate in the salon and who had threatened him for supporting freedom of expression and belief’. According to Alkhair, the young man replied to the clerics by asking ‘Who are you? Who are you to inflict your religious guardianship upon us?’ and then stating ‘We are free, free to say what we like. You are just like us, not better. The era of religious guardianship is over’.11 Similarly, other Saudi activists have been congregating in ‘safe houses’, claiming that their country is little more than a ‘prison’, and arguing that ‘we are not far away from the uprisings that are happening in other countries’.12 Indeed, fresh protests outside ministries by unemployed graduates have been staged in Jeddah and Riyadh. At these events participants lamented that ‘…after seven years of unemployment we have no other choice’ and ‘[we] plan to stay here until we find a solution’, while—rather worryingly for the government—others stated that ‘we expect to hear promises to calm us down and disperse us but we will be back. We will be back until they find a solution’.13 And more seriously, in January 2012 following the killing of a young Shia man14 by police due to their ‘indiscriminate use of force’ a reported crowd of thousands or even tens of thousands took to the streets of Awwamiya to commemorate his death. Together with several other dead activists he is now being described as a martyr in the Eastern Province, and the opposition movement is increasingly being referred to as the ‘Intifada of Dignity’.15 A total of ten protestors are believed to have been killed since the beginning of the uprising with regular firefights now taking place,16 and in July 2012 one of the regime’s strongest critics was badly wounded by security forces.17
In Kuwait’s case, with the ruler choosing to dissolve parliament in June 2012 rather than allow calls for anti-corruption investigations to continue, and asserting that the election result was ‘illegal’, he has undoubtedly made his position even weaker. With opposition MPs claiming that his self-described ‘final and unchallengeable decision’ amounts to being a ‘coup against the constitution’,18 it is likely that the government will find it much harder to keep control over future protests. Indeed, most of the recent examples of dissent have been dealt with in a very heavy handed manner. In April 2012 a young Kuwaiti Twitter user was jailed for posting blasphemous tweets about Prophet Muhammad,19 while in July 2012 even a member of the ruling family20 was arrested following his tweets that he wanted to stand in the next parliamentary elections and ‘expose corruption among top officials’.21 Thus, while Kuwait may not yet have witnessed the violent confrontations that have occurred in Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, the outlook for its ruling family is perhaps just as bleak, with the monarchy’s traditional authority being gradually eroded by a more confident and demanding citizenry that has already proven that it can embarrass and contain the ruler and his appointed prime ministers.
The UAE’s ruling families appear to be in a stronger position, as most citizens currently seem content with the state’s ability to keep distributing wealth. But as with the Saudi and Kuwaiti spending programmes, it is questionable how long such generosity can be sustained. Indeed, a decree was circulated in Abu Dhabi government departments in March 2012 stating that a number of the promised big salary increases could not, after all, be delivered.22 Moreover, it is unlikely that the situation in the poorer northern emirates can be contained or remedied in the near future, and street protests or other manifestations of opposition will probably soon emerge, most probably in Ra’s al-Khaimah. Most importantly, the UAE monarchies have faced a serious and likely permanent loss of legitimacy over the past year, largely because of the alacrity with which they resorted to repression. Although the bulk of the population has certainly been scared by the large number of arrests, especially as they have included prominent and educated UAE nationals, the strategy seems to have backfired as total acquiescence has not been achieved and the UAE’s international reputation—which is very important given its described economic model and emphasis on soft power strategies, especially in the West—is undoubtedly going to become tarnished.
Reminiscent of 2011’s collapsing North African regimes, a number of the recent UAE arrests have been accompanied by official government press releases claiming that there is an ‘international plot’ and that the opposition has connections to ‘foreign organisations and outside agendas’.23 Meanwhile, the ruler of Ra’s al-Khaimah delivered a speech in May 2012, also reported by the official state news agency, warning ‘those who poked their noses into the UAE’s [internal] affairs to mind their own business’. He went on to explain ‘We hear today… that there are some who are trying to tamper with the stability of the UAE. I would like to say to them: the people of the UAE don’t need lessons from anyone. They are confident in themselves and in the solidarity that they share. They don’t change’. Referring to the aforementioned citizenship-stripping practice, he also explained that ‘He who does not like this should leave for another place. Any treachery is a shame for him, and for his country’, before concluding that ‘the UAE is sheltered by the heritage of Sheikh Zayed and by the achievements of the president, His Highness Sheikh Khalifa, and of the rulers and Supreme Council members, and is safeguarded by its people, who are loyal to the nation, the country and its leadership. We don’t care about the raising of trivial things and arguments that have already been defeated’.24 Most recently, even the ruler of Sharjah—as described, a key benefactor to several Western universities—joined the chorus, explaining that ‘…these people were held at airports, or at border crossings with Oman or Qatar… they were running away to establish an outside organisation’. Most worryingly, in a sort of twisted paternalism he claimed that the arrests were part of a measure to ‘help those who deviated’ and that the state’s measures were ‘to protect its sons’ and to provide ‘treatment, not punishment’.25 These ruling family backlashes—likely to become anti-Western—will most probably intensify, as a London-based, Syrian-style observatory for human rights—the Emirates Centre for Human Rights—has now been established. Detailing the various human rights abuses in the UAE and recording the status of all political prisoners, it has begun to lobby against the UAE regime in the international community.26
As the only outlier, the Qatari ruling family’s future is a little ro
sier than that of the other Gulf monarchies: the state can actually sustain high spending and wealth distribution to its national population. As one recent study put it, ‘It seems at first glance Qatar has bought itself out of the possible ill effects of modernity’.27 Furthermore, it lacks a poor hinterland, is relatively calm, and has fewer issues of sectarianism or discrimination, and it is generally perceived as having played a positive role in the Arab Spring. The ruler also seems to be more sympathetic than his regional counterparts towards his citizenry’s cultural and religious practices, and it’s possible he may follow a route towards constitutional monarchy in the next few years. Nonetheless there are a number of areas of concern, and if mismanaged these could still derail the ruler’s liberal autocratic ambitions. In particular, if a more organised opposition does emerge, the authorities might still be tempted to resort to heavy handedness, which could delegitimise the ruler and expose his limitations to his own people and the rest of the Arab world. Various websites and Facebook groups have already been set up, including a ‘Revolution in Qatar’ forum which features cartoons of the ruler dressed as an Orthodox Jew or depicted naked, with a US flag draped around his body and horns protruding from his head. It also features photographs of the ruler meeting with Israeli officials. Although these groups are not yet very active—at least compared to similar groups focusing on other Gulf monarchies—and although they still seem to focus mostly on Qatar’s foreign policy, they could be used to discuss future arrests or crackdowns against activists in the emirate itself, or could facilitate discussions about the ruling family, corruption, or other red line issues. Already, for example, the groups contain much criticism of the ruler’s wife’s dress code which is deemed ‘too open and public for the wife of a ruler’,28 along with calls for genuine democracy. Indeed, as reported by the New Statesman, the audience of a recent Doha Debates forum voted overwhelmingly in favour of democratisation over economic liberalisation which—although perhaps not yet representative of the nation—indicated that the increasingly well-educated Qatari youth are likely to push soon for a new environment where legitimate democratic discussion can take place.29
POSTSCRIPT
The original, British edition of this book went to press in summer 2012. At that time there was little, if any, mainstream discussion outside the region of the prospect of serious political unrest or regime failure in the Gulf monarchies. Academia and the policy community, at least among the monarchies’ Western allies, had for the most part ‘ring-fenced’ these states as exceptional and somehow aloof from the Arab Spring movements sweeping the broader Middle East. With extensive trade and military ties to the West, coupled with the described accumulation of ‘soft power’ influence, this position was both predictable and understandable. With a mixture of carrots and sticks the poorer Gulf monarchies had, after all, managed to contain most of the protests that had spilled onto their streets in the immediate aftermath of the revolutions in North Africa. Meanwhile, the wealthier monarchies seemingly remained in command of largely apolitical, well-heeled societies with little, if anything, in common with those dwelling in the angry tenements of Tunis, Cairo, or Tripoli.
Since then, however, much has changed. By the winter of 2012 most leading Western broadsheets were carrying articles and predictions of either monarchical collapse or at least some serious impending turbulence. Veteran foreign affairs correspondents filing reports on protests, trials, growing poverty, and cyberspace activism in the Gulf states became commonplace, with even leading US think tanks publishing on the prospects of ‘Revolution in Riyadh.’ With a growing awareness of the rising discontent among increasingly large swathes of Gulf nationals, and being better plugged into regional grassroots campaigns and emerging opposition groups, the international commentariat seemed to have finally woken up to the struggle that had already begun to take place between the people of the region and their increasingly authoritarian and reactionary elites.
This current, unprecedented international interest in Gulf politics and the possibility of a ‘Gulf Spring’ is in many ways due to the hundreds of headline-grabbing incidents regarding political activism, human rights, and corruption that have taken place in the region over the past six months. Almost without exception, these have provided further, compelling evidence in support of the central thesis of this book. Namely that traditional monarchy as a legitimate regime type in the region is soon going to reach the end of its lifespan, especially as most of the Gulf states are now caught in a pincer movement of pressures between unsustainable wealth distribution mechanisms and increasingly powerful ‘super modernising forces’ that can no longer be controlled or co-opted by political elites. The former continue to manifest themselves in widening wealth gaps and increasing real unemployment, despite ramped-up public spending programmes and urgent public sector job creation schemes. These counter-revolutionary ‘rentier outlays’ are likely to keep spiralling, with the International Monetary Fund and other bodies having already predicted that even the wealthiest of the monarchies will be in budget deficit within a few years. Meanwhile, in the poorer states, where this strategy is now increasingly inapplicable, street protests keep growing and regimes have had little option but to openly crack down on dissidents, with ever larger numbers of political prisoners being taken.
As for ‘super modernisation,’ and especially improved communications in the form of social media, in recent months a veritable battle in cyberspace has now begun. New legislation has been introduced, or is about to be introduced, in all six monarchies, with the aim of tightly policing online dissent and meting out heavy punishments to all would-be critics. As unsustainable as the spiralling public spending, the strategy also seems likely to fail, with several of these states now having the highest social media usage rates in the world, and with massive, often well-organised, online political discussions having made Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube the region’s de facto new parliament. Detailed, substantiated criticism of governments has thus become commonplace, with exposés of ruling family corruption and public insults directed at hitherto unchallengeable elites being broadcasted and digested by millions each day. As with the clamping down on street protests, this new form of repression is already damaging—probably irreparably—the described social contracts and legitimacy resources of these monarchies. Certainly, such disparagement of rulers was almost unimaginable prior to 2011, but now it is almost fashionable for young Gulf nationals to question their autocrats.
With regards to Bahrain—still the vanguard of the region’s revolt – the past few months have witnessed only further tragedy and despair. Unsurprisingly, despite fresh promises of dialogue and some minor political concessions—including promotions for supposed moderates – the ruling family and its allies in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have firmly held the line. By refusing any significant reforms and keeping hundreds of activists behind bars, the island’s elites seem more distanced than ever from the majority of the population. The extensive public relations campaign to depict the long-running uprising, both to the Arab world and Western allies, as primarily a sectarian conflict or part of an Iran-Arab struggle, has continued unabated, albeit with declining plausibility. With a resurgence in mass protests in February 2013—marking the second anniversary of 2011’s ‘Pearl Revolution’—and with further deaths and clashes between security services and demonstrators, it seems increasingly unlikely that the Bahraini monarchy can regain a baseline position of legitimacy. As such, the Al-Khalifa family will effectively become the first of the Gulf dynasties to have been publicly rejected by the majority of its subjects.
Across the causeway in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, the protests have also continued to gather pace. While modest in size for much of 2012, not least due to continuing announcements from senior clerics and government officials that protests are ‘un-Islamic’ and illegal, by the end of the year they had become much larger. Notably, following the death of a young man at the hands of security services in December 2012—thought to be the twelfth suc
h killing of the year—it was estimated that tens of thousands of protestors took to the streets, many chanting slogans opposing the ruling family. In some ways even more problematic for the Al-Saud have been the protests that have begun to break out in other, predominantly Sunni provinces of the kingdom. Much harder to frame as a sectarian clash, these have mainly been campaigns for the release of political prisoners, with large numbers of women and children in the northern Al-Qassim province taking to the streets. In some cases burning pictures of key ruling family members and resisting arrest, their movement is being widely discussed across the region, mostly on Twitter. Meanwhile, several other ‘trigger incidents’ have been taking place in Saudi Arabia which continue to underline how brittle the state is becoming despite its enormous and unprecedented public spending programme. These include the jailing of leading human rights activists, including some of those discussed in this book, outrage over the apparent unaccountability of various ministers, the disappearance of activists from other Arab monarchies in Saudi territory, and the seizing of numerous social media users. 2012 also witnessed the highest rate of executions in the kingdom so far, many of which were widely debated and criticised as they included beheadings and crucifixions for crimes such as blasphemy and ‘sorcery’.
Similarly in Kuwait, the alacrity with which the authorities—concerned over seemingly uncontrollable discussion of their government’s shortcomings—have been arresting online activists has alarmed many over the past few months. The crackdown has continued offline too, with key critics—including leading former parliamentarians and members of powerful tribes – having been imprisoned after what have been described as ‘show trials’. As with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s rulers, the Al-Sabah’s increasingly repressive tactics seem to be losing them support from significant constituencies, with continuing street protests undermining the ruler’s legitimacy and with parliamentary elections in December 2012 being largely boycotted—thus denting the Kuwaiti elite’s ability to keep employing ‘liberal autocracy’ strategies. Perhaps most worryingly for the monarchy, the previously fragmented opposition groups—ranging from youth movements, to Islamists and disaffected tribes—seem to be slowly coalescing, with a broad-based opposition coalition having been formed in March 2013. Pushing for a multi-party system with ‘democratic rotation of power,’ it is likely to become the first properly organised Gulf group to press successfully for significant political reform, with constitutional monarchy as its minimum demand.
After the Sheikhs Page 32