The System Worked_How the World Stopped Another Great Depression

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by Daniel W. Drezner


  88. Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Greece.

  89. World Economic Forum 2013.

  90. David Barboza, “Contrarian Investor Sees Economic Crash in China,” New York Times, January 7, 2010. See also Edward Wong, “China’s Growth Slows, and Its Political Model Shows Limits,” New York Times, May 10, 2012.

  91. Josh Noble and Simon Rabinovitch, “Fitch Downgrades China’s Credit Rating,” Financial Times, April 9, 2013.

  92. The United States was fourth. The data can be accessed at the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index, archived at World Development Indicators at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ.

  93. A. T. Kearney 2012.

  94. Dobbs et al. 2010; Moe, Maasry, and Tang 2010; Bain Capital 2012.

  95. Slaughter 2009.

  96. Acharya 2011, p. 859.

  97. Wang and French 2013. See also Kahler 2010; Shambaugh 2013, pp. 45–46. The capacity of the other BRIC economies to engage with established international institutions is also open to question. See Miller 2013 and Jones 2014 on this point.

  98. Schweller and Pu 2011, p. 69. See also Besson 2013; and Breslin 2013.

  99. Foot and Walter 2011.

  100. McNally 2012, p. 754.

  101. “Chinese Infighting: Secrets of a Succession War,” Financial Times, March 4, 2012; John Garnault, “Rotting from Within,” Foreign Policy, April 19, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/16/rotting_from_within#sthash.iT3wVZIJ.dpbs; and David Barboza, “Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader,” New York Times, October 25, 2012.

  102. Political instability is also a problem in a tripolar system. See Schweller 1998.

  103. Khanna 2008; Gelb 2009; National Intelligence Council 2010; Naim 2013.

  104. Patrick 2010.

  105. Drezner 2007b.

  106. Helleiner 2010.

  107. For the list of contributors, see International Monetary Fund, “IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde Welcomes Additional Pledges to Increase IMF Resources, Bringing Total Commitments to US$456 B,” IMF press release 12/231, June 19, 2012, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2012/pr12231.htm.

  108. Those who have stressed the resilience of American power include Norrlof 2010; Ikenberry 2011; Lieber 2011; and Beckley 2011/12.

  109. Ploch et al. 2011.

  110. Jones 2014, p. 85.

  111. Oatley, Winecoff, Pennock, and Danzmann 2013, p. 135, fn. 12.

  112. Irwin 2013, p. 154.

  113. See Mishkin 2010; Aït-Sahalia et al. 2012; and Irwin 2013.

  114. Roy 2013, p. 19.

  115. Truman 2013.

  116. Keith Bradhser, “China Uses Rules on Global Trade to Its Advantage,” New York Times, March 14, 2010.

  117. Chris Giles and Alan Beattie, “China Reprimanded by G20 Leaders,” Financial Times, March 30, 2010.

  118. See People’s Bank of China, “Further Reform the RMB Exchange Rate Regime and Enhance the RMB Exchange Rate Flexibility,” news release, June 19, 2010, available at http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/955/2010/20100622144059351137121/20100622144059351137121_. html.

  119. Coastas Paris and Kanga Kong, “India, Brazil to Press China on Yuan,” Wall Street Journal, February 18, 2011.

  120. Lowery 2007.

  121. Bob Davis, “U.S. Pushes Sovereign Funds to Open to Outside Scrutiny,” Wall Street Journal, February 26, 2008. Policy principles can be accessed at the International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds, “Generally Accepted Principles and Practices,” http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm, accessed December 2013.

  122. Truman 2010.

  123. Peter Thal Larsen and Martin Dickson, “Singapore Fund Pledges Greater Transparency,” Financial Times, January 27, 2008.

  124. Yousef al Otaiba, “Our Sovereign Wealth Plans,” Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2008.

  125. Nadim Kawach, “SWFs Still Face Risk of Western Curbs,” Emirates Business 24/7, August 1, 2008. The Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation issued the report.

  126. Norton Rose 2008.

  127. Gao interviewed by Leslie Stahl, “Chinese Investment: An Open Book?” 60 Minutes, April 4, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-investment-an-open-book/; Jamil Anderlini, “China Fund Shuns Guns and Gambling,” Financial Times, June 13, 2008.

  128. Krishna Guha, “Sovereign Funds Back Code,” Financial Times, September 3, 2008.

  129. Halper 2010; Bremmer 2010; Sanderson and Forsythe 2013.

  130. Lanteigne 2013.

  131. “NATO Chief Praises China’s Participation in Anti-Piracy Campaign off Somalia,” China Daily, January 19, 2009; “U.S. Praises China Anti-Piracy Role Off Somalia,” Associated Press, USA Today, February 28, 2009, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-02-28-somalia-pirates_N.htm; “U.S., Chinese Navies in Joint Anti-Piracy Drills Off Somalia,” Reuters, September 18, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/18/us-china-usa-piracy-idUSBRE88H0PY20120918.

  132. Prasad and Sorkin 2009. Chinese officials stress this fiscal stimulus as their greatest contribution to stabilizing the global economy following the collapse of Lehman Brothers.

  133. Gallagher 2014.

  134. Cline and Williamson 2012; Lund et al. 2013.

  135. Gagnon 2012, 2013. See also Keith Bradsher, “China Uses Rules on Global Trade to Its Advantage,” New York Times, March 14, 2010.

  136. “China’s Decade in the WTO,” Reuters, November 29, 2011.

  137. Gawande, Hoekman, and Cui 2011, p. 25. More generally, see Baccini and Kim 2012.

  138. Bown 2012.

  139. Kennedy 2010; Zhang and Li 2014.

  140. McNally 2012, p. 758. See also He and Sappideen 2009; Kennedy 2010; Kahler 2010.

  141. Breslin 2013.

  142. Jane Perlez, “Rebuffed by China, Pakistan May Seek I.M.F. Aid,” New York Times, October 18, 2008.

  143. Irwin 2013, chapter 20.

  144. Jones 2014.

  145. Steinfeld 2010; Foot and Walter 2011; Shambaugh 2013; Breslin 2013.

  146. Johnston 2013, pp. 32–33.

  147. Frieden 2006, chapter 8; Ahamed 2009.

  Chapter 6

  1. Prasad and Sorkin 2009; Corsetti and Müller 2011, p. 8.

  2. Yergin and Stanislaw 1997; Frieden 2006, chapter 17.

  3. Burgin 2012. Though I use “neoliberalism” and “Washington Consensus” as synonymous terms in this chapter, it should be noted that the content of the Washington Consensus has evolved over time. See Hale, Held, and Young 2013, pp. 138–44.

  4. Greenspan 2007; Fox 2009; Quiggin 2010.

  5. Fukuyama 1992.

  6. Jeffrey M. Jones, “Americans Shift to More Positive View of Foreign Trade,” Gallup Economy, February 28, 2013, http://www.gallup.com/poll/160748/americans-shift-positive-view-foreign-trade.aspx.

  7. Drezner 2006; Broz 2010; Hufbauer and Woollacott 2012.

  8. Kahler 2010, p. 187.

  9. Pearson 2001.

  10. Committee of 100, “Hope and Fear: American and Chinese Attitudes toward Each Other,” C-100 2007 Survey Report, / Committee of 100, New York, NY, December 2007, p. 27, http://survey.committee100.org/2007/EN/2007_C-100_EN_Survey.pdf.

  11. See Ferchen 2013, pp. 402–3.

  12. Jamil Anderlini, “China Rebukes West’s Lack of Regulation,” Financial Times, May 27, 2008; Edward Wong, “Booming, China Faults U.S. Policy on the Economy,” New York Times, June 17, 2008.

  13. Edmund Andrews, “Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation,” New York Times, October 23, 2008.

  14. Quoted in Babb 2013, p. 285.

  15. Alan Beattie, “Washington’s Waning Way: How Bail-Outs Poison a Free Market Recipe for the World,” Financial Times, September 28, 2008; Christopher Hayes, “Free Traitors,” New Republic, October 8, 2008; Barrett Sheridan, “Why Barriers Don’t Matter,” Newsweek, December 8, 2008.

  16. For a sampling, see Posner 2009; Lewis 2010; Rajan 2010; Quiggin 2010; Roubini and Mihm 2010; Chinn and Frieden 2010; and Johnson and Kwak 2010. For
an authoritative review, see Lo 2012.

  17. See, for example, Peter Beinart, “How the Financial Crisis Has Undermined U.S. Power,” Time, June 21, 2010.

  18. Katrin Beinhold, “As China Rises, Conflict with West Rises Too,” New York Times, January 26, 2010.

  19. The seven sectors were defense, electricity generation and distribution, petroleum and petrochemicals, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation, and waterway transport.

  20. Yu 2014, p. 168. See also Woolridge 2012.

  21. Halper 2010; Jacques 2009, pp. 227–30.

  22. For the most prominent versions of this argument, see Gat 2007 and Bremmer 2010.

  23. Halper 2010, p. 104.

  24. Jacques 2009, p. 230. See also McNally 2012, p. 745.

  25. Francis Fukuyama, “US Democracy Has Little to Teach China,” Financial Times, January 17, 2011; Thomas Friedman, “Our One-Party Democracy,” New York Times, September 8, 2009; see also Williamson 2012, Kurlantzick 2013.

  26. Rodrik 2011a; Kurlantzick 2013, chapter 7.

  27. Nathan and Scobell 2012, p. 35.

  28. Wang 2012, p. 10. See also Kurlantzick 2013, chapter 7.

  29. Committee of 100, “US-China Public Perceptions: Opinion Survey 2012,” New York Report, New York, April 19, 2012, http://survey.committee100.org/2012/EN/C100_2012Survey.pdf, accessed July 2013.

  30. In 2010, Chinese attitudes toward the U.S. were 58% to 37% favorable/unfavorable; in 2013, the numbers shifted to 40% to 53%. Pew Research, Global Attitudes Project, Global Indicators Database, “Opinion of the United Sates,” http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/survey/all/response/Unfavorable/, accessed July 2013.

  31. See Drezner 2009.

  32. OECD/UNCTAD 2012, 2013.

  33. “G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit,” Pittsburgh, PA, September 25, 2009. Accessed at University of Toronto’s G20 Information Centre, http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html, July 2013.

  34. From 2008 to 2010, these were BRIC summits. South Africa official joined the group in December 2010.

  35. “Brazil, Russia, India and China Finance Ministers Joint Communiqué,” São Paulo, November 7, 2008. Accessed at the University of Toronto’s BRICS Information Centre, http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/081107-finance.html, July 2013.

  36. All communiqués can be accessed at the University of Toronto’s BRICS Information Centre, http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/.

  37. “2nd BRIC Summit of Heads of State and Government: Joint Statement,” Brasília, brazil, April 15, 2010. Accessed at the University of Toronto’s BRICS Information Centre, July 2013, http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/100415-leaders.html.

  38. “Statement by BRICS Leaders on the establishment of the BRICS-LED Development Bank,” Fifth BRICS Summit, Ethekwini, South Africa, March 27, 2013, http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=15128, accessed July 2013.

  39. Jones 2014, p. 107.

  40. See, for example, BBC World Service, “Wide Dissatisfaction with Capitalism:Twenty Years after Fall of Berlin Wall,” November 9, 2009, available on WorldPublicOpinion.org, http://worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/btglobalizationtradera/644. php?lb=btgl&pnt=644&nid=&id=, accessed July 2013.

  41. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the statements: “What do you think about the growing trade and business ties between (survey country) and other countries—do you think it is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing for our country?”

  42. The full question was “Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the following statements: Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor.”

  43. Data accessed from Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, Global Indicators Database, July 2012, http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=16&survey=13&response=Good%20thing&mode=table.

  44. Jeffrey M. Jones, “Americans Shift to More Positive View of Foreign Trade,” Gallup Economy, February 28, 2013, http://www.gallup.com/poll/160748/americans-shift-positive-view-foreign-trade.aspx.

  45. Kahler 2013, pp. 40–41. See also Nel 2010, p. 952.

  46. Babb 2013, p. 285. See also Kahler 2013.

  47. Quiggin 2010, p. 2; Crouch 2011, p. viii.

  48. See Hall 1989, 1993; Jacobsen 1995; Rodrik 2014.

  49. Goldstein and Keohane 1993.

  50. Blyth 2002 See also Rodrik 2014.

  51. Lo 2012.

  52. I am indebted to Noah Smith for making this point clear to me.

  53. Drezner and McNamara 2013.

  54. Legro 2005.

  55. Ibid. See Kreps 1990 on simplicity.

  56. On free trade and the gold standard, see “Gold Standard,” Chicago Booth School of Business IGM Forum, January 12, 2012, http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_cw1nNUYOXSAKwrq; and “Free Trade,” Chicago Booth School of Business IGM Forum, March 13, 2012, http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_0dfr9yjnDc Lh17m. On monetary policy, see “Monetary Policy,” Chicago Booth School of Business IGM Forum, September 29, 2011, http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_9yFWHquReQZjC6w; and “QE3,” Chicago Booth School of Business IGM Forum, September 25, 2012, http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_02pBtPuOkYPP9bv. On the degree of consensus, see Gordon and Dahl 2013. On the absence of consensus on monetary policy, compare Martin Wolf, “We Still Have That Sinking Feeling,” Financial Times, July 10, 2012, and Mohamed El-Erian, “Central Bankers Can’t Save the World,” Bloomberg View, August 2, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-02/central-banks-can-t-save-the-world.html?cmpid=BVrelated. See also Joe Weisenthal, “The Biggest Tragedy in Economics,” Business Insider, September 7, 2012, http://www.businessinsider.com/the-biggest-tragedy-in-economics-2012-9.

  57. Gagnon 2012. See also Keith Bradsher, “China Uses Rules on Global Trade to Its Advantage,” New York Times, March 14, 2010

  58. Barma, Ratner, and Weber 2007.

  59. Roach 2009; Yu 2014, p. 168.

  60. See, for example, Halper 2010, p. 127; Jacques 2009, p. 427; Ferchen 2013; Wang and French 2013, p. 98.

  61. Daniel W. Drezner, “The Sounds of Chinese Boilerplate,” Foreign Policy, June 13, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/13/the_sounds_of_chinese_boilerplate#sthash.q94TIm7i.dpbs.

  62. Kahler 2010, pp. 187–88.

  63. Shambaugh 2013, pp. 45–46. See also Acharya 2011; Breslin 2013.

  64. Wang and French 2013, p. 97.

  65. Beeson 2013, p. 244.

  66. “Naked Aggression,” Economist, March 12, 2009.

  67. “China’s National Defense in 2010,” Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, March 2011, Beijing, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/31/c_13806851.htm, accessed July 2013.

  68. Quoted in Joshua Kurlantzick, “The Belligerents: Meet the Hardliners Who Now Run China’s Foreign Policy,” New Republic, January 27, 2011.

  69. Johnston 2013, p. 19.

  70. Beeson 2013, p. 239.

  71. Ramo 2004.

  72. Kennedy 2010; Naughton 2010; Ferchen 2013.

  73. Kennedy 2010; Shambaugh 2013.

  74. Kennedy 2010, p. 469.

  75. Economy 2010.

  76. Shen Hu, “China’s Gini Index at 0.61, University Report Says,” Caixin Online, December 10, 2012, http://english.caixin.com/2012-12-10/100470648.html.

  77. Halper 2010, p. 126. See also Jacques 2009, chapter 6.

  78. Brandt and Zhu 2010.

  79. Shambaugh 2013, chapter 5.

  80. Kennedy 2010, p. 476.

  81. A related issue is that Chinese officials are wary of advertising the term “Beijing Consensus” because it needlessly roils the United States: “[Chinese officials] are acutely aware of American sensitivity to any talk suggesting the emergence of a rival power and ideology—and conflict w
ith America could wreck China’s economic growth.” See “The Beijing Consensus Is to Keep Quiet,” Economist, May 6, 2010.

  82. Kennedy 2010, p. 470. See also McNally 2012, p. 756.

  83. Ferchen 2013, p. 410.

  84. Kennedy 2010, p. 468; Schweller and Pu 2011, p. 52. See also Breslin 2013.

  85. Tania Branigan, “China’s Wen Jiabao Signs Off with Growth Warning,” Guardian, March 5, 2013.

  86. Quoted in Pettis 2011.

  87. For internal critiques, see Yu Yongding, “A Different Road Forward,” China Daily, December 23, 2010; Yao Yang, “The End of the Beijing Consensus,” Foreign Affairs, February 2, 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs. com/articles/65947/the-end-of-the-beijing-consensus. For external critiques, see Roach 2009; Eurasia Group 2011; Pettis 2013.

  88. “Chinese Infighting: Secrets of a Succession War,” Financial Times, March 4, 2012.

  89. Development Research Center and World Bank 2013.

  90. See Robert Zoellick’s comments at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2012/02/27/world-bank-president-zoellick-opening—remarks; Ambrose Evans Pritchard, “China May Not Overtake America This Century After All,” Daily Telegraph, May 8, 2013. Li Keqiang in particular provided unwavering political support for the project.

  91. Development Research Center and World Bank 2013, p. 4. See also Kahler 2010; McNally 2013, fn. 136.

  92. Development Research Center and World Bank 2013, p. 25.

  93. Ibid., p. 60.

  94. Li Keqiang, speech, State Council Videophone Conference on Mobilizing the Efforts to Change Government Organizations’ Functions, May 13, 2013.

  95. David Barboza and Chris Buckley, “China Plans to Reduce the State’s Role in the Economy,” New York Times, May 24, 2013; “Chinese Govt Says Financial System Must Support Economy,” Bloomberg, June 19, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-19/china-says-financial-system-must-support-economy-as-rates-rise.html.

  96. Bettina Wassener and Chris Buckley, “China’s G.D.P. Growth Slows as Government Changes Gears,” New York Times, July 14, 2013.

  97. Simon Rabinovitch, “China Unveils Measures to Boost Economy,” Financial Times, July 24, 2013.

  98. Geoff Dyer, “Sino-US investment Deal Sought,” Financial Times, July 12, 2013.

 

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