by Gary Murphy
34 See for example Fianna Fáil parliamentary-party minutes, FF441/A, 26 Feb. 15 Apr., 26 May 1948.
35 Whitaker is quoted in McCarthy, ‘Ireland’s turnaround’, p. 52.
36 Ferriter, Judging Dev, p. 285.
37 UCDA, Andrews papers, P91/136(1), notes for 1957 lecture entitled ‘Is emigration inevitable in Ireland?’ The speech is undated.
38 For an analysis on the comparative success of protectionism in the 1950s, see Girvin, Between Two Worlds, pp. 199–200.
39 UCDA, Fianna Fáil parliamentary-party minutes, FF441/A, 15 Jan. 1957.
40 Dáil Debates, vol. 16, col. 958, 8 May 1957.
41 Whitaker is quoted in Fanning, Department of Finance, p. 507.
42 Whitaker, ‘Ireland’s development experience’, pp. 8–9.
43 UCDA, Andrews papers, P91/136(1), notes for 1957 lecture entitled ‘Is emigration inevitable in Ireland?’
44 Studies, vol. xliv, no. 173 (spring 1955), p. 1; the editor was Ronald Burke Savage, SJ.
45 Ó Drisceoil, Peadar O’Donnell, pp. 110–115.
46 C.S. Andrews, Man of No Property: An Autobiography (Dublin, 1982), pp. 298–300.
47 Author’s interview with Dr Tom Barrington.
48 Garret FitzGerald, ‘Four decades of Administration’ in Administration: Cumulative Index, Volumes 1–40 (1953–1992) (Dublin, 1994), p. ix.
49 Barrington interview.
50 UCDA, Andrews papers, P91/136(1), notes for 1957 lecture entitled ‘Is emigration inevitable in Ireland?’
51 Andrews, Man of No Property, p. 297.
52 Ruth Barrington, Health, Medicine and Politics in Ireland 1900–1970 (Dublin, 1987), p. 252.
53 Bishop William Philbin, ‘Patriotism’, Christus Rex, vol. xii, no. 2 (Apr. 1958), p. 86.
54 Whitaker interview.
55 Philbin, ‘Patriotism’, p. 87.
56 Fr Terence Cosgrove, ‘Retrospective of thirty years of Irish freedom’, Christus Rex, vol. xiii, no. 4 (Oct. 1959), pp. 267–8.
57 Notes and comments, Christus Rex, vol. xiii, no. 3 (July 1959), p. 119.
58 William Conway, ‘The church and state control’, Christus Rex, vol. vi, no. 2 (Apr. 1952), p. 119.
59 Ibid., pp. 113, 126.
60 Fanning, ‘The genesis of Economic Development’, p. 104.
61 Labhras O Nuailláin, ‘Potentialities of the Irish economy’, Christus Rex, vol. xii, no. 2 (Apr. 1958), pp. 127–8.
62 Ibid., p. 136.
63 Gary Murphy, ‘Towards a corporate state: Seán Lemass and the realignment of interest groups in the policy process, 1948–1964’, Administration, vol. 47, no. 1 (1999), pp. 86–102.
64 UCDA, Andrews papers, P91/136(1), notes for 1957 lecture entitled ‘Is emigration inevitable in Ireland?’
65 Fianna Fáil parliamentary-party minutes, FF441/A, 13 Nov. 1952.
66 Garret FitzGerald, ‘Grey, white and blue: A review of three recent economic publications’ in Basil Chubb and Patrick Lynch, Economic Development and Planning (Dublin, 1969), p. 118.
67 Garret FitzGerald, Planning in Ireland (Dublin, 1968), p. 26.
68 Lee, Ireland 1912–1985, p. 344.
69 Economic Development (Dublin, 1958), p. 218.
70 David O’Mahony, ‘Economic expansion in Ireland’, Studies, vol. xlviii, no. 190 (summer 1959), p. 134.
71 UCDA, Andrews papers, P91/136(1), notes for 1957 lecture entitled ‘Is emigration inevitable in Ireland?’
72 Garret FitzGerald, ‘Mr Whitaker and industry’, Studies, vol. xlviii, no. 190 (summer 1959), p. 149.
73 T.K. Whitaker, ‘Financial turning points’ in Whitaker, Interests, p. 91.
74 Richard Aldous and Niamh Puirséil, We Declare: Landmark Documents in Ireland’s History (London, 2008), p. 172.
75 Fanning, The Quest for Modern Ireland, p. 197.
76 Fianna Fáil parliamentary-party minutes, FF441/B, 11 Dec. 1958.
77 Fianna Fáil parliamentary-party minutes, FF441/B, 28 Jan. 1959.
78 Fianna Fáil parliamentary-party minutes, FF441/B, 4 Mar., 11 Mar., 29 Apr. 1959.
79 NAI, DT, S.15281D, effects on industry of the formation of the Free Trade Area, 2. Feb. 1957.
80 Ó Cearbhaill interview.
81 This correspondence is reproduced in full in T.K. Whitaker, Protection or Free Trade – The Final Battle (Dublin, 2006). I first came across the correspondence when researching in the files of the Department of Finance a number of years ago; hence, the notes on this section refer to these files; DF, F.121/15/59, reasons for reducing protection, 14 Dec. 1959.
82 Barnes interview.
83 DF, F.121/15/59, reasons for reducing protection, 14 Dec. 1959.
84 Ibid.
85 DF, 121/15/59, MacCarthy to Whitaker, 22 Dec. 1959.
86 Ibid.
87 DF, F.121/15/59, Whitaker to MacCarthy, 23 Dec. 1959.
88 DF, F.121/15/59, MacCarthy to Whitaker, 24 Dec. 1959.
89 Ibid.
90 Andrews quotes Kavanagh in his notes for 1957 lecture entitled ‘Is emigration inevitable in Ireland?’: UCDA, Andrews papers, P91/136(1).
91 DF, F.121/15/59, Whitaker to MacCarthy, 31 Dec. 1959.
92 DF, F.121/15/59, MacCarthy to Whitaker, 5 Jan. 1960. Whitaker’s original point about the narrow protectionist plateau is in DF, F.121/15/59, Whitaker to Cremin, 22 Dec. 1959.
93 Horgan, Seán Lemass, p. 216.
94 DF, F.121/15/59, Cremin to Whitaker, 21 Dec. 1959.
95 DF, F.121/15/59, Whitaker to Cremin, 22 Dec. 1959.
96 DF, F.121/15/59, Whitaker to MacCarthy, 7 Jan. 1960.
97 Confidential source.
98 Ibid.
99 DF, 121/15/59, MacCarthy to Whitaker, 9 Jan. 1960. EFTA was founded as the European Free Trade Association in 1960, but documentation and discussions about forming such an association usually referred to EFTA as the European Free Trade Area.
100 DF, 121/15/59, Whitaker to MacCarthy, 11 Jan. 1960.
101 Ó Cearbhaill interview. The four-secretaries committee refers to a committee on free trade consisting of Cremin (External Affairs), MacCarthy (Industry and Commerce), J.C. Nagle (Agriculture) and Whitaker (Finance).
102 NAI, DT, S2850 F/64, Lemass to Margaret Greenan, 18 July 1959.
103 Bruce Arnold, Jack Lynch: Hero in Crisis (Dublin, 2001), p. 54.
104 Dermot Keogh, Jack Lynch: A Biography (Dublin, 2008), pp. 70–1.
105 Frank Barry and Stephen Weir, ‘The politics and process of trade liberalisation in three small peripheral European economies’, paper presented to GlobalEuroNet workshop: ‘Economic convergence of small peripheral countries in the post-Second World War. Examples of Finland, Ireland and Portugal’, Department of Social Science History, University of Helsinki, Finland , p. 9. I am grateful to Frank Barry for providing me with a copy of this paper and for discussing these issues with me.
4. A National Government for Ireland?
In late 2008 and early 2009 numerous letters to The Irish Times called on the political parties to form a Government of national unity given the spiralling out of control of the national finances, the nationalisation of Anglo-Irish Bank, the collapse in the share price of the other major banks, significant increases in unemployment and a burgeoning public-sector pay bill. One correspondent to The Irish Times maintained:
[A] Government of National Unity is the only way forward if we want to manage the crisis. It makes more sense than social partnership, now proving so costly. A resolute national Government can face down those who would protect their own situation regardless of the plight of the country despite weasel words of sharing their concern for the nation’s vulnerable citizens.1
Such calls for a national Government echo similar appeals made in the 1950s, when a supposedly outlandish political proposal to merge Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael was given much credence by numerous political commentators.
National Governments in democracies usually arise during extra-ordinary crises, such as world wars and political revolutions. In Ire
land, there had been significant calls for a national Government at various times during the Emergency, but these were always repudiated, most particularly by de Valera, who The Irish Times accused of being blinkered in his approach to the idea:
Mr De Valera is Sir Oracle. When he opens his mouth, let no dog bark. He exercises complete dictatorial prowess over his Ministers, and a fortiori over the rank and file of Fianna Fáil. That is why he will have nothing to do with the idea of a National Government.2
De Valera’s views are important, as his position in Fianna Fáil was central to the question of a national Government and political competition in the 1950s. The background to the 1957 election is one of the more intriguing in twentieth-century Irish history, in that the idea of a national Government was mooted very seriously in a number of political back channels and media outlets. Given the precarious economic situation at the time, several national newspapers – including The Irish Times, Irish Independent and the Cork Examiner – expressed support for the idea of a national Government to address the mounting crisis facing a country with spiralling debt and massive emigration. Despite dismissals at the time from de Valera and, much later, from Lemass, both the British and US embassies insisted in reports to their respective Foreign Office and State Department that discussions about a national Government were serious and ongoing, and that they were inextricably linked with the succession in Fianna Fáil to de Valera.
At the heart of any speculation regarding the formation of a national Government was the political context of significant policy disputes within Fianna Fáil after it lost the 1948 election. Out of office for the first time in sixteen years, Fianna Fáil felt slightly victimised by an ungrateful electorate that did not appreciate its stewardship of the country through the Emergency. As Niamh Puirséil points out, the election had not been contested on any significant policy differences, with most of the Fianna Fáil candidates contenting themselves with ‘talking up Dev and down coalition’.3This led to a widely held belief within Fianna Fáil that its policies had played no part in its defeat, and therefore required no significant revision. Instead, the party focused on its administrative machine, believing that all it needed to do was keep its superior organisation intact and wait for the hotchpotch Government to collapse, as it inevitably would.4Unfortunately for Fianna Fáil, the Inter-Party Government proved somewhat more durable than envisaged, and managed to struggle on for over three years.
When Fianna Fáil regained office in 1951, de Valera appointed MacEntee to Finance against Lemass’ wishes; according to de Valera’s official biographers, it was a deliberately conservative choice.5MacEntee’s return to Finance put an unequivocally conservative stamp on the new administration from the outset, and signalled that Lemass’ influence was on the wane: in 1939 de Valera had apparently acceded to Lemass’ demand (on pain of resignation) that MacEntee be removed from that post.6By putting MacEntee back there, the Taoiseach was making it abundantly clear that economically this would not be a progressive administration.
In 1954 Fianna Fáil went to the country in search of a new mandate based on its conservative economic record. During this election, MacEntee had emphasised:
If the wise and far seeing economic and financial policy of the Fianna Fáil Government were continued the value of our currency would continue to increase … The financial and economic policy of the Fianna Fáil Government had given the country a balanced budget, expanded social services and increased employment. It had enabled the country to conserve its reserves so that today every pound of them was increasing in value and it had enabled all our obligations abroad to be met.7
While this was classical economic orthodoxy – and MacEntee could legitimately claim that he had pulled the country back from the brink of economic collapse – what it did not say was that Fianna Fáil’s performance in industrial policy was rather abysmal. Between 1951 and 1954, MacEntee and Finance attempted to reject on grounds of cost, all the main initiatives promoted by Lemass for developing industry. In any event, the 1954 election saw MacEntee’s policies of economic orthodoxy repudiated by the electorate. Held on 18 May, it saw Fianna Fáil lose power again. Fianna Fáil’s loss led to a flurry of correspondence across de Valera’s desk on the idea of a national Government. Five days after the election, the Clann na Poblachta leader, Seán MacBride, wrote to de Valera with suggestions for the formation of a national Government, and offered his assistance. Should the proposals ‘commend themselves to you and your party and should my services be of any assistance as an intermediary to bring about the formation of such a national Government I shall be entirely at your disposal’, he declared.8
MacBride’s view was that since the election was inconclusive, all parties should form a national Government similar to Switzerland’s, with the main planks of encouraging reunification and full employment, increasing productivity, reducing emigration, and preserving the Gaeltacht. He argued that there was a general desire in the country for a national Government, but unless this desire ‘is expressed in concrete form it is likely to remain an abstract wish’.9In this context, he took it upon himself to offer just such concrete proposals. Yet his overture also contained a clear attack on Fianna Fáil: ‘it would be difficult for such a Government to be less satisfactory than the type of one party Governments we have experienced’. The trouble with the idea of a national Government was the sheer difficulty of operability. For MacBride, the Dáil would in the normal manner elect one of its members as Taoiseach, who, after consulting with the other political leaders, would appoint ministers and parliamentary secretaries in proportion to the strength of the various parties in the Dáil:
The Ministers in charge of the main economic departments and of any department whose policy was of a sharply contested nature would be filled by members of the parties supporting the Taoiseach in the Dáil. The policy of the Government would also be the policy of the parties supporting the Taoiseach in the Dáil. The leader of the opposition, in present circumstances, would be one of the leaders of the Fianna Fáil party who was not a member of the Government. Whenever no question of major policy was involved the party whips should be withdrawn to allow a free discussion and vote.10
He conceded that ‘by reason of the small representation of my party in the Dáil, I would not seek or expect representation in such a national Government’.11A more fundamental reason for not seeking representation may lie in the fact that such a scheme would be nothing short of a political disaster, given that the opposition – so-called – would consist of members of a party with members in the Government as well.
‘I fought with you in 1916’
MacBride was not the only individual enamoured with the idea of a national Government. One partisan supporter of de Valera, Liam Kavanagh, wrote to him in the following impassioned terms:
The results of the election tonight make it fairly clear that the people have decided against Government by our party Fianna Fáil as such. I have been a consistent supporter of Fianna Fáil since its inception and have no reason to change my allegiance now in its moment of defeat, but looking on the position in a broader way I feel that it ought to be possible for the sake of the common good of our country to bring about an understanding between the two big parties … In mentioning this I am only reflecting what the ordinary people of these parties and others outside are thinking. The alternative is an unsatisfactory coalition with some of the sectional parties … It is not easy for me to write this, I fought with you in 1916, and during the War of Independence, and on the republican side in 1922/23, and suffered at the hands of those who mainly control the Fine Gael party, but I have tried particularly since the Constitution was enacted to do away with the bitterness which 1922/23 engendered … I may not have put my feeling before you in a very satisfactory manner, but I would ask you for God’s sake not to misunderstand my motives, and pray that God may guide you in your decision on the matter.12
De Valera was not too impressed with this impassioned plea:
Pardon me fo
r not replying sooner to your letter. I have been very busy. I understand your feelings, but it seems to me you have not thought the matter out sufficiently and that your heart has simply got the better of your judgement. It would take too long in writing to show you how mistaken I think you are. I know, besides, that you do not want an argumentative reply from me.13
Even more critical of de Valera, however, was the Revd M. Slattery SMA, of St Xavier’s University Hall, Doughcloyne, who suggested the following heresy: ‘what about this solution: you hand over the leadership of your party to Mr Lemass who may have less repugnance than you to a coalition’. He went on to suggest that a coalition of Fianna Fáil under Lemass and Labour under Norton would be ‘a real coalition, the union of the common humble people of Ireland.’14Another correspondent asked de Valera:
In the new situation now cited is there any chance of your forming a National Government and so once and for all eliminating those ancient political differences … Wouldn’t it be a grand and glorious achievement and a fitting conclusion to your many statesmanlike accomplishments, if you succeeded in evolving a happy reconciliation between these old enemies?15