Maj R. Graham, commanding No 213 Sqn, revealed another local difficulty. In a somewhat pained communication to a nearby army unit, he expressed his dismay at the aftermath of a Sopwith Camel crash in friendly territory near Bergues, south-east of Dunkirk. ‘French soldiers and civilians undoubtedly helped themselves to parts of the machine as one piece of no importance was returned to my mechanic as he was clearing the wreckage away.’ Graham accepted that ideally the pilot ought to have made arrangements for a guard to be mounted, but ‘he was shaken by the crash so any omission on his part was excusable’. The squadron commander continued waspishly: ‘I should be grateful if you would explain to your men that the pilot expected British soldiers to look after his machine and not allow people to pilfer with it [sic] … Should such a crash occur again, I hope your men will do their utmost to keep thieves away.’
The plan south of Flanders on 21 August was to attack between Albert and Arras to outflank a German salient further south and close on the line St Quentin-Cambrai. The immediate objective on the first day was the Arras-Albert railway, followed two days later by a more general attack north of the Somme by the Third and Fourth armies. For the initial attack, No 6 Sqn was detailed to co-operate with the Cavalry Corps, No 8 Sqn the Tank Corps, which could also call on No 73 Sqn of Camels for low-level work against anti-tank guns. Nine other squadrons, including two American, were allocated in direct support of the attack. In addition, four fighter squadrons were ordered to fly high-level offensive patrols over the battlefield; day and night bomber squadrons would be made available for targets beyond the fighting zone.
On 19 August, orders were issued to RAF squadrons reminding them that success of the Army’s plan depended on surprise and that no unusual air activity should be undertaken to alert the enemy in advance. To conceal the noise of tanks manoeuvring during the night of 20/21 August, aeroplanes were to fly along the front of the Third Army. To confuse the Germans, similar flights would take place over the lines of the Fourth and First Armies. For the attack itself, detailed orders were issued to cover battlefield targets, tank, infantry and cavalry co-operation, reconnaissance flights, the bombing of aerodromes, railways and communication centres.
Ground mist and light rain during the preceding night and until after 10am on 21 August disrupted the air effort. To some extent, the overcast conditions worked in favour of the ground troops whose activity was concealed so that by the time aeroplanes appeared, considerable progress had already been made. Zero hour was 4.55am, but many machines did not get airborne until 11am. During the afternoon, long-range bombing attacks on railways and aerodromes took place with variable results. Better conditions on 22 and 23 August brought more successful raids on transport targets, though German machines also attacked British airfields, which in turn led to retaliatory raids by day and night bombers against enemy air bases.
Even before the threat to Paris had lifted or plans for the battles of Amiens and Bapaume been perfected, a significant development occurred on 6 June 1918. The lukewarm view of French airmen towards it was expressed by Gen Maurice Duval: ‘If we are defeated on land, the bombardment of Cologne is without interest’. In London, Maj Gen Sir Hugh Trenchard had clashed with his political master, the Secretary of State for Air (Lord Rothermere), and resigned as CAS. In June 1918, Trenchard found himself back in France at the head of bomber squadrons of the new Independent Force tasked with attacking industrial targets in Germany. After reinforcements arrived, two months later he commanded two wings together totalling eighty-six bombers in five squadrons: two of the squadrons flew DH9 machines, one DH4s, one the HP O/100 or HP O/400 and a fifth the pusher FE2b. By the end of August, another three Handley Page squadrons had arrived, plus one flying DH9s. In all, the new force could therefore deploy nine squadrons for long-range day and night bombing unconnected with the armies on the Western Front. In the three months, from June to August 1918, it dropped 246 tons of bombs and took 2,297 reconnaissance photos. Over the same period, 52 men were missing and 119 wounded.
Maj John Quinnell, a ‘genial Irishman’ known to his family and service colleagues as ‘Paddy Jo’, commanded No 104 Sqn of DH9s stationed at Azelot, near Nancy, one of the original five Independent Force squadrons. While serving in The Royal Field Artillery, Quinnell had been seconded to the RFC in February 1915. As a reporter for the Irish Times pre-war, he had been photographed wearing a leather helmet in a stationary machine. At his interview, he made considerable play of the fact that, although he had not actually flown, he was familiar with an aeroplane. Flying as a pilot on the Western Front, Quinnell was wounded when a bomb which had failed to release, exploded on landing. After recovery, between December 1916 and June 1917 Quinnell commanded a squadron in Mesopotamia before returning the Britain, where he raised No 104 Sqn at Andover and took it to France as part of the new bombing force.
Shortly after his arrival, he received an apology from the Independent Force commander, Sir Hugh Trenchard, explaining that due to pressure of work he was unable to visit individual squadrons. Trenchard added: ‘Everyone should remember that the bombing of Germany is considered, and I believe it is, a means of winning this war and it is up to all of you to show this by doing your utmost to bring this about during the summer months.’
On 11 August, Quinnell led twelve DH9s to bomb Mannheim, 110 miles (176km) over the lines. Twenty miles (32km) into enemy territory, fourteen hostile machines appeared and opened fire, causing two of the British aeroplanes to lose altitude and fall behind. Quinnell reduced speed and descended to 9,000ft so that the formation could close up. Even then, one DH9 was forced down and the remaining eleven were continuously attacked. ‘A thick sheet of cloud’ obscured Mannheim, so Quinnell decided to make for Karlsruhe, 40 miles (64km) due south of Mannheim. Flying over the clouds by compass, a convenient gap exposed Karlsruhe, where the ‘principal railway station’ was bombed. It later emerged that a direct hit killed twelve officers going on leave, two other strikes on a crowded train at the platform killed all the passengers in one carriage.
German fighters pursued the bombers almost to the Allied lines, three of the enemy being destroyed, another driven down, according to the post-operational report. Trenchard signalled Quinnell: ‘A great day for you and No 104 Sqn. It will help the battle up North. It showed determination, pluck and good leadership. Well done all.’ On 22 August, a more sombre message was received from the Independent Force commander: ‘I deeply regret to hear you have lost so heavily in your raid this morning … but please remember the Squadron did its job. Bomb Mannheim and a squadron which does this materially assists in the progress of the war.’
The last airship raid on Britain occurred during the night of 5/6 August 1918. Five Zeppelins approached East Anglia and thirty-five defensive sorties were launched. Visibility was not good. Two DH4s went up from RAF Yarmouth; one piloted by Lt R.E. Keys, the other by Maj Egbert Cadbury, who deserted a nearby charity concert at which his wife was singing in response to an emergency call. Cadbury had another experienced pilot, Capt Robert Leckie, as his gunner. In an attempt to gain speed, Cadbury jettisoned his two 100lb bombs, as Leckie discovered that his Lewis gun had no sight. Emerging from thick cloud, the DH4 crew saw L.70 behind them and Cadbury turned for a head-on attack. Pomeroy explosive bullets fired by Leckie ignited the airship, which broke into two and crashed close to Wells-next-the-Sea on the north Norfolk coast. Cadbury then located and attacked L.65, but after one burst, Leckie’s gun jammed and he had to break away. Writing later to his father, Cadbury described how the next thirty minutes had been the worst of his flying career to date, as he became utterly lost in cloud. His anxiety was not helped by having been told that the DH4 ‘could not land at night’. Eventually, he managed to put down at Sedgeford, Norfolk, after narrowly missing another machine in the air, where a further shock awaited him. The two 100lb bombs were still attached, which explained the aeroplane’s sluggish performance.
There was an interesting postscript to this episode. Keys, who experi
enced engine trouble and landed at Kelstern, Lincs, also claimed the destruction of L.70 and an attack on L.65. It is quite possible that both DH4s did carry out simultaneous attacks unknown to one another in the swirling cloud and troublesome wind, but Cadbury and Leckie got the credit for the last destruction of a Zeppelin over England during the war.
As Autumn 1918 approached, in France heavy fighting still lay ahead. By the end of August 1918, though, on the ground a breakthrough had undoubtedly been made, with the Germans being pushed back steadily towards the Rhine. Air superiority had been maintained and the growing bomber strength of the Independent Force promised a separate, major contribution to Allied operational achievement in the closing phase of the war.
13
Breakthrough, September–November 1918
‘Great confusion of (enemy) troops and transport’
During the night of 1/2 September 1918, RAF bombers attacked defended villages, enemy barracks and aerodromes east of Bapaume, roughly 10 miles (16km) north of the Somme and 20 miles (32km) south-west of Cambrai. When British troops launched an assault at dawn the following morning, other RAF squadrons were poised to deal with enemy anti-tank guns, co-operate with their own armour, support the cavalry, give close support to the attacking infantry divisions and seek out German troop formations. Between 6.30 and 9am on 2 September, day bombers mounted a concentrated effort against railway targets and bridges over the Sensée river.
The previous day, although badly shot up after clashing with German fighters, Rhodes and Pithey of No 12 Sqn were commended for completing their patrol and bringing back ‘a most valuable report’. On 2 September, Rhodes accounted for a two-seat LVG, bringing his and Pithey’s total to ten aeroplanes and two balloons destroyed. Both men now received a Bar to their DFC gained in June. Rhodes explained: ‘When you went into action, you had to wait and wait and wait’ until the enemy came within lethal range. In later years, Rhodes would recall their ‘numerous forays, tempting would-be executioners to try their arm with us to their own destruction’. Although the RE8 was ‘very slow, we had a perfect understanding and once we got them in the position we wanted them, it was easy’.
So swiftly did British troops advance on 2 September that, as intense aerial activity took place over the battlefield, by noon they had broken through the formidable Drocourt-Quéant Line, running across the front six miles south from the Sensée river in the north to join the formidable Hindenburg Line at right angles near Quéant, two and a half miles into enemy territory. Low-level bombing attacks that morning were carried out predominantly by Camels. At one point patrols overlapped, as single-seat machines engaging enemy infantry, artillery batteries and transport in front of the Canadian Corps of the British First Army. Eight tons of bombs were dropped and almost 50,000 rounds of machine-gun ammunition fired. German aeroplanes were not idle, though, and the RAF’s two-seater reconnaissance squadrons in particular suffered. From the four squadrons directly involved with the First Army, fifteen aeroplanes were missing or wrecked.
Despite such losses, aerial reports helped to build up an accurate and invaluable picture of the battlefield, as crews assisting the XVII Corps of the Third Army demonstrated. With their observers briefed to drop messages by bag to denote progress, two RE8s of No 13 Sqn took off at 5am, requiring the pilots to fly low through the British artillery barrage covering the infantry advance. Their Squadron recorded that ‘the reports they dropped at Corps headquarters were concise, accurate, and clear’, and as a result, XVII Corps went forward to capture Quéant, Pronville and Inchy. The OC of No 13 Sqn recorded that, on the evening of 2 September, the corps commander rang him ‘and told me that the success of the operations depended very largely indeed on the information obtained from the air’.
There were also a number of multiple air clashes that day. At about 9.30am, a group of SE5a, Camel and Bristol Fighter machines encountered a formation of Fokker and Pfalz scouts. Six aeroplanes, three from each side, were shot down. An hour and a half later, ten SE5a machines escorting four Bristol Fighters on a low-level operation were attacked by fifteen German machines. Some opened fire, while others kept watch above. As nine American Camels and RE8s joined in, other enemy aeroplanes appeared, and soon a melee developed. Five German and four American machines went down. Two other Americans returned badly damaged, and one of the RE8s force-landed on the British side with a wounded observer.
The American pilot and future author, Lt Elliott W. Springs, described part of this combat in which ‘about 25 enemy aircraft [were] seen … Fokker pilots very good, but poor shots’. Patrolling the Arras-Cambrai road at 11.45am, Springs and three other pilots engaged four Fokker machines. He explained that ‘three more came down out of the clouds and we were forced to withdraw. Seven more enemy aircraft came up from the north-west, and after some manoeuvring I attacked another enemy aircraft south-east of the road, but we, in turn, were attacked by a large number’. As the American top flight dived, a dog-fight ensued. ‘We were badly outnumbered’, Springs wrote, ‘Saw one enemy aircraft attack an RE8 and attacked him. Assisted by a Bristol, attacked another enemy aircraft very low. We succeeded in preventing enemy aircraft from attacking RE8, and eventually drove them east’, into cloud over Cambrai.
On 2 September, the RAF had thirty-six machines lost or written off, twenty-two officers missing and fourteen wounded. During the night of 2/3 September, enemy troops fell back, and a contact patrol flying at 300ft over the battlefield early on 3 September reported that no Germans remained west of the Canal du Nord. Later aerial reports showed that bridges over the canal were being blown up. Nevertheless, by 5 September British troops had crossed the canal and advanced three miles (5km) into enemy territory.
Further south, between 12 and 16 September the Americans launched a successful offensive against the St Mihiel salient jutting into the Allied line on the Meuse river, 60 miles (96km) south of Sedan, taking 16,000 prisoners and 443 guns. Col William ‘Billy’ Mitchell, commanding the air component, decisively committed a large force of aeroplanes in reconnaissance, bombing and ground-support roles. Mitchell could call on 1,481 Allied aeroplanes; 49 American and French squadrons with a further 9 British bomber squadrons on standby. Mitchell’s plan was to deploy one third of this force in close support of ground troops, the rest against the German rear areas. When its machines were called upon, poor weather interrupted some of the Independent Force operations. However, flying through heavy rain, No 207 Sqn did attack Le Cateau station with a 1,650lb bomb, forty-eight 112lb and thirty 25lb bombs during the night of 13/14 September. Two nights afterwards Nos 207, 83 and 58 squadrons hit enemy aerodromes.
Mitchell had transferred from the infantry to the Aviation Section of the US Signal Corps after witnessing the Wrights demonstrate their machines. Dismissive of staff officers, who he said knew as much about the air ‘as a hog knows about skating’, while acting as an official aviation observer at the front before the USA entered the war, he was impressed by Trenchard’s long-range bombing philosophy and supported similar action when appointed to the staff of the American commander, Gen John J. Pershing. His role during the St Mihiel offensive led to promotion to brigadier-general and command of over 1,000 aeroplanes in other battles before the Armistice.
At the extreme north of the Allied line, at 5.30am on 28 September Belgian forces under King Albert and the British Second Army, commanded by Gen Sir Herbert Plumer, advanced on Ghent, with the RAF providing extensive air support. Eight squadrons (three Camel, two DH4, one DH9, one Handley Page and one FE2b) were allocated to the Belgian force; sixteen squadrons to the British Second Army (three of RE8, DH9 and SE5a; two Armstrong-Whitworth and Camel; one each of Sopwith Dolphin, Bristol Fighter and FE2b).
Abnormal air activity was curtailed before the attack, and complete surprise therefore achieved. By the end of the first day, British and Belgian ground forces had made substantial gains. RAF bombers successfully hit railway targets and ammunition dumps from Thourout to Roulers, reporting three trains an
d three dumps destroyed without loss. Low-flying machines attacking targets, troops, artillery and transport in the immediate battle zone faced particular peril. Visibility varied from poor at best to downright dangerous, especially when a violent rainstorm occurred in the late morning. On 28 September, twenty-seven RAF aeroplanes engaged in low-level attacks failed to return. The following day, further wet weather restricted aerial activity and slowed down the ground advance.
The experiences of 2/Lt Thomas Dodwell illustrated not only the frequency of inhospitable weather, but the strength of enemy defences in the coastal region in the weeks leading up to the Allied assault. During the late spring and summer of 1918, as a DH9 observer with No 211 (former RNAS) Sqn at Petite Snythe, near Dunkirk, Dodwell survived three crash landings, had his machine mauled by fighters and damaged by ‘Archie’ (‘deuced unpleasant time’) during bombing and photographic operations. On one raid, he was ‘stunned by piece of shrapnel, which cut my helmet’. During an operation against Bruges, the engine began to misfire 5 miles (8km) east of Ostend, so the pilot fired a green Very light to signal leaving the formation and turned ‘for home’. The DH9 then ‘dropped pills on Ostend’ only to be ‘shot up in four places by Archie’. Rapidly losing height, the bomber put down on a beach after crossing the lines. The tide was rising and as the pilot dashed off to phone their base, Dodwell persuaded nearby French soldiers to haul the machine to safety. A squadron maintenance party found blocked fuel lines, rectified the problem and laid boards on the beach for the aeroplane to take off before the tide turned once more.
Back from leave, on 13 August flying with 1st Lt Allan F. Bonnalie, an American pilot, on a photo operation Dodwell’s machine ran into serious trouble. Bonnalie explained that ‘despite the presence of hostile aircraft … in the district south of Bruges, [Dodwell had] succeeded in taking the required photographs … [then] on the way back, six Fokker biplanes made a determined attack.’ The guns of both the DH9’s escorts malfunctioned, leaving Dodwell to cope alone with the enemy fighters. Bonnalie wrote that ‘Lt Dodwell used his gun so effectively that he managed to keep all the enemy aircraft engaged and prevented their attack from destroying either of the two helpless machines,’ in which one observer had been killed and a pilot wounded. Bonnalie struggled to retain control of the DH9 as he dived to protect one of the escorts. Nevertheless, his pilot reported that Dodwell ‘continued to engage three enemy machines that were attacking him and eventually drove them off, an operation that called for great coolness and skill, as the shooting platform was most unsteady.’ As they made for base, Bonnalie experienced more trouble with the DH9:
Cavalry of the Clouds Page 27