By 1912 the Cabin Creek miners were ready for a chance to throw off their oppressors. They quit their jobs in support of the Paint Creek strikers. And the strike continued to spread. Up and down the Kanawha Valley men put down their tools – “poured out their water.” The spark on Paint Creek, thrown into an explosive situation, had produced a conflagration. The UMW was now battling for its life in West Virginia.
The demands of the striking miners were these:
Abolition of the mine guard system.
A reform in the system of docking. (A miner might be docked a thousand pounds of coal for loading a few pieces of slate.)
The employment of checkweighmen on the tipples to represent the miners and to be paid by the miners. (The law provided for these checkweighmen, but this law was ignored by the coal companies.)
Permission for the men to trade where they pleased, without discrimination for so doing. (A man might find himself fired for not trading at the company store.)
The payment of wages in cash every two weeks and not in script or credit cards. (Also part of West Virginia law, but ignored by the operators.)
Improved sanitary conditions, with the requirement that the companies remove garbage and keep the houses in condition.
Payment for mining coal on the basis of the short ton on which the coal is sold, and not on the basis of the long ton, on which it was mined. (In other words, at that time the miners loaded 2,240 pounds of coal for a ton.)
Rentals of houses based on a fair return on their cost, with allowances for upkeep and electric lights on the same basis. (Rentals were checked out of a miner’s pay before he got his money, as was his light bill. Both amounts were purely arbitrary sums.)
The nine hour day – they had been working ten.
Recognition of the UMW and the check off.
An increase in pay. (The least important of their demands. In unorganized fields pay was 25 to 35 cents a ton, in the Kanawha Union Field 49 cents. In the Central Competitive Field it was 90 cents!)
A Mighty Battle
It was to be a mighty battle for the coal operators, who from a governmental point of view, WERE West Virginia. One U.S. Senator was Clarence W. Watson of Fairmont, whom the miners accused of being “king” of the state. He was president of the Consolidated Coal Company in northern West Virginia, owning 100,000 acres of land and employing 15,000 nonunion men.
Prime minister to the “king” was the other United States Senator, William E. Chilton. Chilton was owner and manager of the Charleston Gazette and a law partner of William McCorkle. McCorkle was a Democratic leader in the State Senate and their law firm represented, by some estimates, four-fifths of corporate interests in West Virginia. The UMW could be sure of being fought by the press – with the exception of the two labor papers in the Kanawha Valley – and, more important, by every official governmental agency in the state.
11/26/52 (Seventh)
If the operators had not expected the strike it was amazing how fast they got into action with the traditional strike-breaking methods. By 1912 a remarkable sort of human being had been created by the demands of employers for methods to “handle” their rebellious workers. This was the so-called labor agent. It was his job to give advice to well-paying companies as to the best methods of breaking strikes, and furnishing scabs to take the jobs of striking workers secured his main income.
One such man was George Williams of the “Industrial Corporation” of New York. He was hired to bring in men by the Cabin Creek Coal Association, an operator group. The agreement was verbal and the association promised him $3,000 for supplying scabs for a year. When he got the word that he was hired he put the following ad in newspapers in New York, New Castle, PA., Chicago, Cleveland and other cities:
“Miners and laborers for coal mine – blacksmiths, track layers, drum runners, motor runners, motor helpers, trappers, greasers, slate men, tipple boys, mule drivers, tipple bosses, and men. Good steady job all the year around; family men of all nationalities preferred. Transportation furnished; long contract; also strong men used to pick work can make $6 per day. Strike on. Homes all furnished. All the coal you want, $1 per month. Here is your chance to make money and a good home. Apply early. Call Mr. Williams, 548 Broadway.”
Scabs Answer Call
It will be noted that Mr. Williams does state that there is a strike on, but the information is buried in the body of the ad so that even a literate person might miss its significance. And many of the scabs were barely able to read English. It seems that there was a large response from men anxious to “make money and a good home.” As the great-hearted Williams says: “In the wintertime I can get a half-million men for any kind of work – strikes or any kind – because outside work is closed and people are starving in the big towns.”
Vultures of this type were employed by M. T. Davis of the Cabin Creek Coal Association. A. W. Laing and his brother John, principal operators on Cabin Creek, must have been very proud of their cohort. It seems, however, that they were hardly less heartless. While throwing miners out of their miserable little shacks, A. W. Laing lived in a 20-room brick mansion at 1416 Kanawha Blvd. in Charleston. John Laing was not only a Cabin Creek coal operator but head of the West Virginia Department of Mines at the time this strike started.
He had been appointed on Dec. 22, 1908, despite the fact that a District 17 convention at Montgomery on August 8, 1899 introduced a resolution condemning the “brutal assault and abuse by Superintendent John Laing and his confederates that inflicted bodily injury on organizer George Scott.”
Laing Is Example
John Laing is a good example of how men change. Before the turn of the century he was a UMW vice-president, but shortly thereafter quit the Union and beat up organizer Scott, then, in 1913, hired Baldwin-Felts gunmen to terrorize his former brother-miners. When asked his opinion of miners by the investigating committee he stated that they were “illiterate, a lower element of labor,” and as to labor leaders: “They are absolutely beneath recognition in my judgment.” Laing himself had been both.
Other examples of turncoats in the miners’ movement were unearthed by this Senatorial committee of 1913. This is interesting only as an object lesson: What a man is today is not necessarily what he will be tomorrow. This, unfortunately, makes life complicated. But it is true. There was John Nugent, for instance. When the United Mine Workers of America was formed in 1890 at Columbus, Ohio, John Nugent was there. He had been a leader in the old Knights of Labor. Chris Evans, UMW historian, gives the following quote from a contemporary newspaper by an eyewitness of the formation of the UMW: “John Nugent and Alexander Johnson who led the rival organizations (the K. of L. and the National Progressive Union of Miners and Mine Laborers) in the Hocking Valley, shook hands and swore allegiance to the miners’ Union, and to show his sincerity, Mr. Johnson kissed Mr. Nugent in the mouth.”
Nugent Changes Sides
This seems to be a reverse on the old Judas story, for in 1907 Nugent went to work for the West Virginia coal operators, after having for a time been president of District 17. His post in 1907 was an odd one, and at first glance he did not seem to be employed by the coal owners, for he was appointed by the governor and had the title of State Commissioner of Immigration.
But the post carried no salary. He was paid by the coal companies to bring in labor, was even sent to England and Wales for that purpose. In other words John Nugent became a labor agent, different in degree only from George Williams, the New York scab specialist.
Another was T. L. Lewis, associated with the UMW for many years, once its national president (1908-1910), who was a commissioner for the Ohio Operators at the time of the senatorial investigation, and an apologist for their tactics. Still another was D. C. Kennedy, president of District 17 from about 1902 to 1904, who quit in the latter year to become a commissioner for the Kanawha Coal Operator’s Association. Yet another was Phil R. Penna, UMW national president from 1895 to 1896, commissioner for the Indiana Coal Operators’ Associati
on as late as 1939. These are major examples of an easily perceived trend: The coal operators always tried to purchase the most intelligent and aggressive of the miners in order to cripple the Union movement.
Sadly enough, they sometimes succeeded. If the giant beneath the hills of West Virginia had been a beautiful wanton, she could have led no more men astray.
By mid-summer of 1912, the friction between the striking coal miners and the coal operators had developed a great deal of heat. The operators of both Paint and Cabin Creeks had, since 1902, imported Baldwin-Felts “detectives” to guard the scabs brought in by men like George Williams. On Paint Creek, the Baldwin men had established a sort of nonunion headquarters at Mucklow, a camp armed to the teeth with rifles, pistols, and machine guns. Near the mouth of the creek was Holly Grove, the miners’ encampment. Men, women and children lived there in tents, having been evicted from their homes to make room for strikebreakers.
Duels between Holly Grove and Mucklow continued throughout the approximate 12 months of the strike. (The strike actually lasted some months beyond its official settlement, however, the miners struck intermittently because of dissatisfaction with the terms of the new agreement.) The miners hated the armed guards and the “loyal” employees at Mucklow, and fervently wished them in Hell. The strikers had been treated with brutality and they were facing guns. So they got their own guns. O.J. Morrison, among other Charleston merchants, took advantage of the sudden demand by displaying old Springfield rifles in his store window at the bargain price of $1.98.
Morrison stated that he sold some guns to jobber H. Galperin, then seemingly a pawnbroker, which he bought from Cal Hirsch & Sons of St. Louis, Mo. From March to August of 1912 Morrison sold 1,000 rifles and 14,500 rounds of ammunition. The Charleston merchants, like the Charleston newspapers, were for “law and order,” but they did not mind making a little money while the making was good. The miners bought hundreds of rifles, perhaps thousands. They refused to be cowed by privately hired gunmen.
People for Miners
In Charleston, grand juries convened, but the people were on the side of the miners. On June 5, 1912 there was a battle near Mucklow in which the guards killed an Italian and wounded a Negro miner. To add insult to homicide the Baldwin men had a number of miners arrested and asked the grand jury to indict. But the grand jury refused and instead indicted the Baldwin men for the murder of the Italian! The case was not pushed by the prosecuting attorney, however, as it is a fact confirmed by a statement of Governor William E. Glasscock that not a single mine guard served a day in jail for any activity during the strike!
On July 26, 1912 there was another big Mucklow-Holly Grove battle and Governor Glasscock called in the National Guard. At one time he had the entire National Guard on Paint and Cabin Creeks. Then he asked both the miners and the operators to submit the names of two men to investigate the situation, saying that he would appoint a fifth. Glasscock later testified that operators refused, saying it would “cause trouble.” The Governor then appointed his own commission – which, except for finding fault with the inexcusable mine-guard system, did a beautiful whitewash job for the operators and blamed the striking miners for everything.
11/28/52 (Eighth)
About the middle of August, Glasscock issued a call for a “peace conference,” asking people to gather in the House of Delegates chamber to work out a way to arbitrate the strike. A conference of about 500 or 600 hundred people met, but broke up when an operators’ attorney named Taylor Vinson said that his employers would be glad to cooperate provided there was no mention of recognition of the United Mine Workers of America! This meant, of course, that they would not cooperate at all.
Meanwhile the miners were still living in tents and the scabs were pouring in over the railroads, at least 1,200 to one coal company on Paint Creek. By mid-August the 5,000 striking miners on Paint and Cabin Creeks also had as company several hundred assorted railway policemen, Baldwin guards and special constables, plus 1,300 militiamen. The narrow valleys must have been overflowing with men, and two-legged animals resembling same.
Being a “transportation” man scab was no easy life. They were hated by the miners and despised by their employers; they were simply unemployed workers who had no idea where they were going when they got on the train. It is significant that the ordinary men got white cards, but there were others who were issued blue cards. These were the professional toughs, killers and gunmen. They kept the others in line, and were paid a small sum for so doing.
Scabs Under Guard
Once you got on a scab labor train to West Virginia you didn’t change your mind and get off. There were generally two guards with pistols and blackjacks at each end of the coaches, and the doors were locked. The labor agent wanted to be sure that the Cabin Creek and Paint Creek coal operators got their man. Some of these men later told pitiful tales. Others joined the Union after they arrived. One boy of 22 named Philip Cajano stated that he did so one night on Cabin Creek and the next morning was fired from his job. Later that day he was beaten by three guards while M. T. Davis, superintendent of the Cabin Creek Consolidated Coal Company, looked on approvingly. The illiterate Cajano weighed only 125 pounds and could hardly see through the heavy compound lenses of his spectacles.
It is touching just how fond the coal companies were of their “transportation.” They liked them so well that they kept them under armed guard to see that they didn’t leave. But a carpenter named George Lawson and some other scabs decided they couldn’t stand their life and tried to escape from a house on Cabin Creek. Law-son tried to crawl through a window and a guard knocked out two of his teeth. But he ran a goodly distance before they caught and beat him again. By this time the other “transportation” was running away and the guards had to leave to catch them. So Lawson took to his heels and walked about 15 miles to Montgomery where he caught a train to New York.
William Rayner a 19-year-old orphan boy from New York, had been a cook, but on his arrival far up Cabin Creek at Decota he was told that he was going to shovel coal at $2 a day. If he stayed 60 days the company in its goodness would not charge him his fare from New York. But they wouldn’t pay him until the end of the month. He stayed in a two-room house with seven other men, all of whom slept on a bare mattress with a comforter for warmth. After five days he was paid one dollar in company script.
Scabs Flee West Virginia
He had been told by the company that the Union miners would shoot him if he tried to leave, and he stood it for 16 days before quitting. It was December, but he escaped one midnight and spent the night in the woods. Then he walked to Charleston, over 30 miles distant, wearing out his shoes and stockings on the way, and reported to the office of District 17 of the UMW. Mother Jones listened to his story and gave him 50 cents and the Union fed him and gave him a place to sleep. Then he walked 23 miles to Handley and hopped freight to New York.
James Kane was a machinist but was told to mine coal when he arrived on Cabin Creek at Kayford. He refused and was kept prisoner in a house for four days by rifle-carrying guards. One day guards went to lunch and he and two other men slipped out of the house and kept to the hills until they came to Eskdale, where the Union miners saw that they were allowed to get the rest of the way out of the creek.
On August 28, 1912 Governor Glasscock appointed his commission to look into the strike. It was composed of three men: the Right Rev. P.J. Donahue of Wheeling: Captain S.L. Walker of Fayetteville, and the Hon. Fred O. Blue of Charleston. These gentlemen sallied forth into the coal fields and returned with some marvelous discoveries. They found that the nonunion miner had no reason to want a Union because he was making just as much money as his fellow miners in the organized West Virginia fields. The average annual wage frequently soared to six or seven hundred dollars!
The Commission Reports
The sole reason they didn’t earn more was because they were lazy. The distinguished commission reported: “A minute examination of the payrolls disclose… that 16 or
17 (work) days in the month constitute a high average, and that many engaged in the mines decline to labor more than 12 or 14 days. This is particularly true of the native-born miners and many colored men… “
Living conditions were idyllic: Operator Charles A. Cabell of Decota on Cabin Creek “provided for his men a swimming pool fed by mountain springs with water crystal clear: a library and reading room, a bowling alley and even a miniature theatre.” The democratic thinking of the operators was shown by the alleged fact that “Mr. Cabell joined in the games when the day’s work was done.” The certain fact that several thousand of these pampered miners were on strike was clearly a case of mass insanity.
The inevitable conclusion of the commission was as follows: “We find that the operators in this state are within their rights in declining to recognize a Union which would place them in a helpless minority when joined to those of the four competitive states; and by the operation of the freight differential of 19 cents per ton to the lakes and other points would, all other conditions being equal, render them absolutely unable to find a profitable market for the 90 per cent of the total output.”
In other words, if West Virginia coal operators were forced to recognize the UMW they would go out of business. As at this date almost every coal miner in the state does belong to the Union, and as West Virginia under such conditions has retained its place as a world leader in soft-coal production. It would seem that the commission was either a victim of error or coal operator pressure.
11/29/52 (Ninth)
The later testimony of Bishop Donahue is interesting. He commends the “personal bravery and even recklessness” of the Baldwin-Felts guards, but admits, “They were not the grade of men who should be representing the rights of property and justice.” By this last statement the Bishop implies that he sees justice to be with the coal operators, but that they should hire a different class of men to uphold it.
When Miners March Page 4