As stated, the resolution to endorse the Socialist Party was not adopted, but the Socialists did succeed in getting the other UMW members to insert a bit of Socialist phraseology into the preamble to the Union constitution. It did not amount to much. Prior to 1912 the preamble asserted that the miners were entitled to “an equitable share of the fruits of their labor.” For this phrase the Convention substituted “the full social value of our product.”
The West Virginia coal operators were still wailing about this in 1920, giving this change in the preamble, which meant not a thing in actual practice despite the theoretical implications, as the reason for refusing to negotiate with the UMW. They pointed to the alleged fact that District 17 President C.F. Keeney and Secretary -Treasurer Fred Mooney, as well as Sub-district No. 2 President William Blizzard and UMW attorney Harold Houston, were or had been Socialists, hoping in this way to vindicate their own obduracy.
Strike Economic Issue
That the West Virginia Union leaders in 1920 might once have been Socialists had no bearing on the strike then in progress. The fact was that the Socialist Party had been a casualty of World War I, for all practical purposes, and there was no organization in West Virginia. Again and again and again, the 1920-21 strike in West Virginia was an economic, trade union battle, not a political demonstration. The coal miners were treated as less than citizens of a free republic, they had no redress from any governmental body, and, like brave men, they preferred armed revolt to abject slavery. That is the story in a nutshell. With the death of the Socialist Party the miners had, as a group, no special political direction in West Virginia in 1920. The same is true today.
To revert to what was happening in Mingo County in the summer of 1920: No coal was being mined. State police were everywhere in evidence. The coal operators had, besides employing the Baldwin-Felts detectives, hired a great number of “volunteer” policemen. Many were members of the American Legion, who were given a gun and told to “preserve law and order.” As they were paid by the coal operators, their definition of law and order might have been subject to some bias. At one time there were 780 of these “volunteers” hired in the Williamson Field.
This practice happened to be illegal, as a West Virginia statute forbade the hiring of mine guards except by a county court through public funds. Harry Olmstead, coal operator spokesman in Mingo explained the hiring of a few of these men as follows: “By agreement with the circuit judge and the governor and the county court of Mingo County, we paid about $1,800 for these deputy sheriffs, with the understanding with the county court that that money would be returned when they had it available to pay back.” In other words, a law which inconvenienced the operators was ignored, with the calm agreement of the officials who were supposed to enforce same!
1/3/1953 (Thirty-second)
The operators had also seen to it that they had good “public relations” in Mingo County, although one might have thought they would have been satisfied with the coverage they were receiving from the regular West Virginia press. It seems well established that they bought the Williamson Daily News and hired a George Booten as its editor. We quote from one editorial in order to give the reader an idea as to its general tone. Events alluded to will be explained later:
“A few weeks ago we had C.F. Keeney issuing pronunciamentos and announcements with respect to what he would do to help restore order and reestablish the supremacy of the law in West Virginia, and the conditions under which he would do it.
“Then came John L. Lewis to tell both President Harding and Governor Morgan what he was willing to do to help out the State and National Governments, and the conditions under which he would do it.
“Now we have Harold W. Houston denouncing Governor Morgan and instructing the public in regard to what had failed to be done and what should be done with respect to the recent insurrection in this State and the present pervading unrest.
“This is impudence run mad.
“Each of these men aided, abetted, and encouraged the insurrectionists in their mad march from the heart of Kanawha County to the edge of Logan, and each is liable to indictment for murder and larceny, if not for treason. Instead of being given newspaper space in which to publish their insolent outpouring they should each be given jail space until the juries of Logan and Boone counties can have opportunity to send them to the penitentiary or to the gallows.”
Such was the calm journalism of the coal operators of the Williamson Field.
Army Moves to Mingo
Meanwhile a grand jury had indicted Sid Hatfield and others for the killing of the Baldwin-Felts guards at Matewan. Anse Hatfield, a cousin of Sid’s had testified against his relation and in August was shot dead by an unknown assailant on the front porch of his hotel in the same Mingo County town. Governor Cornwell evidently used this incident as a reason for calling for federal troops. He maintained that his state police were not sufficient to keep order, and that a great number of threatening letters had been received by a number of people, including the deceased Anse Hatfield.
On August 29, 1920 a battalion of infantry, consisting of about 500 men, arrived in Mingo County, where they camped on Sycamore Creek, near Williamson. They were equipped with rifles, machine guns, trucks, motorcycles and a one-pound cannon. After a conference between their commander, Col. Samuel Burkhart, Jr., and acting Adjutant Gen. Thomas B. Davis, the soldiers were scattered in groups of ten or more at mining camps along a 35-mile range of territory.
With the strikers facing federal bayonets they could do little but stare helplessly as imported strikebreakers took their jobs. However, it appears that bringing in the soldiers the first time was a bluff on the part of Governor Cornwell, in the hope that the miners would be frightened into submission. For the troops stayed only a few days, leaving on Nov. 4. Cornwell took the opportunity to warn the miners, when the soldiers decamped, that if it became necessary to call them back “They will be vested with full power to suppress lawlessness and preserve order.”
A free translation of this official language (and the miners understood the language well) might run as follows: “Unless you striking miners sit idly by and let the coal operators break your strike the militia will be called in with orders to shoot to kill.”
Miners Use Guns
Striking West Virginia coal miners, however, were and are exceedingly hard to bluff. They were miserable in their tents and not eating too well and watching other men deprive them of their livelihoods. And they had rifles concealed in the woods. It can not be denied that they used them, although a vast amount of shooting was done more in order to shatter the morale of the scabs than to shoot to kill. The coal operators replied with guard-mounted machine guns. This incessant nightly gunfire had the desired effect, apparently, on the nerves of the strikebreakers, many of whom were only too glad to say farewell to the beautiful scenery of West Virginia. And it made the recruiting of the other scabs quite difficult. In fact, there was a grave danger that the miners were going to win their strike in Mingo.
This had to be prevented. On Nov. 27, 1920, Governor Cornwell proclaimed a state of insurrection in that county, and asked President Woodrow Wilson for a declaration of martial law. Wilson refused, but for the second time he consented to send federal troops to the Tug River area. A portion of the 19th Infantry Regiment under Col. Herman Hall established headquarters in the courthouse at Williamson. Governor Edwin P. Morrow of Kentucky honored Cornwell’s request to permit troops to patrol the Bluegrass side of the Tug River.
The soldiers settled down to their occupation tasks, the strikers were again frustrated, the influx of scabs mounted, and the coal operators sat behind their machine guns and wondered how long their former employees could hold out.
Winter in the tent colonies of the strikers at Lick Creek and Blackberry City and elsewhere was a numbing, bitter enemy. The snow was a menace and the cold rain a mud-producing curse. The striking miners, with their wives and children, huddled around their little iron stoves and cursed the fa
ct of their compelled inaction. It was a weary day-to-day struggle and Christmas brought little cheer. But the miners held fast, hoping for the withdrawal of the federal troops who were breaking their strike.
The coal operators, however, were grimly content with the situation. They used every maneuver to retain the soldiers in the coal fields while they put ads for “transportation men” in all the large eastern newspapers. But as the new year of 1921 rolled around it became apparent that they could not persuade the Federal Government to use troops as strikebreakers for an indefinite period. Not unless some violent incident could be manufactured. The miners were peaceful under U.S. Army occupation.
1/6/1953 (Thirty-third)
The testimony before the Senate investigating committee of R.H. Kirkpatrick, who had been fired from a job as mine foreman for the Burnwell Coal & Coke Company, gives an idea as to the tactics the operators employed in at least one case in order to keep the soldiers around. The mine had been shut down by the strike when Kirkpatrick took the job on Dec. 15, 1920. He took a small crew and repaired timbers and put the mine back into shape and on Jan. 18, 1921 a large group of scabs were imported by train.
The scabs were escorted by two men who represented themselves to be U.S. Marshals. About ten o’clock that night the two Marshals and the superintendent hatched up a scheme in which Kirkpatrick was an accomplice. There were at that time about 400 federal troops in Mingo County, but none in the coal camp of Burnwell, where this mine was located. And it was rumored that the soldiers were about to go back to Ohio at any time. The superintendent at Burnwell wanted to keep the soldiers to guard his scabs, and get them to come to Burnwell if possible. And so, as stated, a scheme was hatched. Kirkpatrick listened and did as he was told.
He took a group of the scabs up to the mouth of the mine. Some of them were curious for the simple reason that they had never before seen a coal mine. As had been planned, a U.S. Marshal, or deputy, had gone on ahead and was waiting on the hill above. The Marshal opened fire, blazing away right merrily. Kirkpatrick with great bravery stood his ground and returned the fire with a heavy-barking .45 pistol. Not content with this exhibit of intrepidity under fire he seized a rifle and did battle with his imaginary enemy by shooting about 18 times.
Power of Suggestion
The mine superintendent and the other U.S. Marshal, meanwhile were back at the club house in Burnwell with the excited stories of the mine being shot up by strikers. A little girl, the daughter of a scab, had been so excited by the shooting that she said she had seen six men run as the fearless Kirkpatrick poured hot lead in their direction. This information, with ad lib embellishment, was telephoned to the proper military authorities.
It worked. The federal troops were in Burnwell that very night.
There had been an election in November, 1920, of both state and national officials. Warren G. Harding swept into the White House on the crest of a Republican landslide. In West Virginia, the new governor was Republican Ephraim F. Morgan of coal producing Marion County. Both he and the Republican-dominated legislature had promised the miners relief from the mine guards. How well they redeemed that promise will be seen. There had been an unusual feature in the state elections in that Labor had a gubernatorial candidate in the field. This was Sam Montgomery, who had been a friend of the coal miners for many years. He had at first entered the primaries as a Republican. Defeated there, he had run in the general election on a Labor platform.
On paper, Montgomery was defeated, but many old-timers to this day contend that he actually won. The corruption of West Virginia elections was incredible beyond belief, and Montgomery’s supporters declared angrily that Republicans and Democrats had combined to steal the election from their man.
This, needless to say, is not impossible to believe. The coal operators must have received quite a fright from Montgomery’s strong showing, for by this date they have seen to it that the entry of any third political party on the scene is almost blocked by varied legal impediments. There is no justification for this at all. It is simply a method used by the machine politicians, to keep a tight rein on the will of the people. And behind the machine politicians, of course, stand the coal operators and other financial interests.
Morgan and J.G. Bradley
So the coal miners in 1920 got themselves another coal operator servant for a governor. The strikers in Mingo could not look to the state machine for redress, for there had been no real change at the statehouse in Charleston. The coal operators were just as firmly entrenched as ever. The June 8, 1923 issue of the Unionist, a trade-union publication, makes the charge that “Ephraim F. Morgan was dragged from the obscurity of the State Public Service Commission by (J.G.) Bradley and elected chief executive for $250,000.”
J.G. Bradley was and is the millionaire owner of the Elk River Coal and Lumber Company at Widen, West Virginia, one of the most powerful and viciously anti-union coal operators in the State of West Virginia. Bradley was the head of the West Virginia Coal Operator’s Association. This gentleman is still alive, and still owns a sizable segment of Clay County, W. Va., where he runs the only large coal operation in the Mountain State which is nonunion.
Just at this time (Jan., 1953) he is having a little trouble, as most of his miners went on strike in September, 1952, and are still picketing his mines. He has hired a number of mine guards equipped with high-powered rifles, and has imported strikebreakers in the time-honored tradition.
It is a bit aside from our main narrative, but we should like to point up the obvious and tremendous political influence of Bradley. It is impossible to prove just how much money this coal operator has avoided paying in taxes because of his alleged control of the Clay County Board of Equalization and Review. This board sets tax rates, and it is charged that Bradley has always seen that his assessment was comfortably low. In 1923 this feudal king listed the sum of $1,021,111 as the taxable assets of the Elk River Coal and Lumber Company. But there were many in Clay County who confidently placed the real worth at $15,000,000.
1/7/1953 (Thirty-fourth)
The miners in Mingo continued to shiver in their tents and rude shacks and few had confidence in the demagogic promises of Morgan that he would get rid of the mine guards. What the miners could expect from Morgan was very soon demonstrated.
The federal troops finally, on Feb. 16, 1921, left Mingo County. This was evidently over the protests of the coal operators, which is easily understood. After all, it is much cheaper to get the Army to do your strike- breaking. Mine guards cost money, sometimes almost $1,000 a month.
But the federal troops did leave, and the coal operators had to solve their gunman problem in some other way. This they did, as has been before related, by getting American Legion members, small business men and professionals, as well as clerks and other white-collar men dependent upon the coal companies, to serve as policemen. Such “volunteers” were supposed to have been authorized by an extraordinary session of the Legislature in 1919. Who urged the passage of such legislation may be guessed.
Lists of men available for “volunteer” duty were submitted by the coal companies to a committee composed of a Methodist minister, a wealthy jeweler, a coal operator attorney and others for approval. Once approved the men were given guns and put under the command of Captain J.R. Brockus, who headed both the regular state police and the “volunteers.” Brockus was a retired Army man the operators presumed had the right degree of toughness, and it was charged by the miners that he had been appointed state police chief before he had resided in West Virginia long enough to become officially a resident!
No Federal Troops
One reason the bright idea of arming local company men was conceived and acted upon was a War Department ruling that the local officials had to show the federal government that everything possible had been done before they would send troops. The operators were anxious to prove they had worked hard at “law enforcement,” because the bringing back of soldiers to patrol the coal camps was an end devoutly to be wished
. Just who paid this army of private gunmen is not clear, for they were under the jurisdiction of the state and as such should have been paid by the state. It is likely, we submit, that those for whom they performed the service of strike-breaking saw that they did not go hungry. The “volunteer” dodge was without doubt a legal cover up for the hiring of privately-paid gunmen.
It was resorted to because Governor Morgan had asked for the return of Federal troops not long after he succeeded John J. Cornwell on March 4, 1921. The new President of the United States was Warren G. Harding, much more of an easygoing politician than the rather moralistic Wilson, and he refused Morgan’s request, evidently feeling that if the State of West Virginia wanted a strike broken it had to do it itself.
The miners, in the absence of federal coercion, had hunted up their concealed rifles and once again the scabs got very little sleep at night. State police and armed guards did battle with the miners, but were no match for the men who had spent a bitter winter in tents in the West Virginia hills. It seems that on May 12, 13, and 14, 1921, as nearly as it can be placed, a number of battles took place between the striking miners and guards armed with machine guns. It should not be understood that these battles consisted of attacks by strikers and defense by stalwart defenders of the law and order. Ample evidence will be given to show that this was far from the case. On at least one occasion the state police were ordered by their leaders, headed by Major Thomas B. Davis of prior union-busting fame, to “clean out” the tent colonies of strikers.
Morgan’s Martial Law
Who the attackers were in the battles culminating in the three-day war spoken of above is not known. But the battles took place for the most part at or near the strikers’ tent colonies. The miners’ colony at Blackberry City was shot to pieces, but the attackers did not fare as well as those who burned Ludlow, Colorado to the ground. It will never be known how many men were killed in Mingo District 17. President C.F. Keeney said they “carried men out of the woods for days.” Other battles took place around the mining camps of Merrimac, Springg, and McCarr. Captain Brockus claimed that four of his men were killed.
When Miners March Page 13