ON SEPTEMBER 5 ACSI Yarborough first began to seriously consider the major upcoming antiwar demonstration developed by the umbrella antiwar organization, the National Mobilization Committee, and planned to take place at the Pentagon on October 21. He immediately called a staff meeting. On September 13 Yarborough, Lt. General L. J. Lincoln—commanding general of the fourth army—and their staffs journeyed to Mexico, where they stayed for five days.
Upon his return, General Yarborough arranged (through army vice chief of staff General Ralph E. Haines, Jr.) for the stockpiling of tear gas and riot-control equipment at twelve strategic locations around the U.S.
On October 3 at 6:10 the president met with Secretary of Defense McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and National Security Advisor Walt Rostow. He reported that the congressional leadership had told him that they will “not tolerate the large demonstration which is planned for late October.” He wanted contingency plans developed to protect the White House, the Pentagon, and the Capitol.
That day there was a rebellion inside the 198th Light Infantry Brigade at Fort Hood, Texas, with many men saying that they would rather go to the stockade than leave for Vietnam the next day. A riot broke out, with shooting and firebombs being used.
Between the Fort Hood riots and October 14, numerous meetings took place between members of the president’s cabinet and staff and at many levels of ACSI staff and USAINTC personnel. In every instance the focus was on the upcoming Washington demonstration and the growing antiwar movement in the cities and—at the beginning of a new academic year—on the campuses. On October 14, to some extent in collaboration with USAINTC, Yarborough dispatched forty-five undercover agents to principal U.S. cities where demonstrators were getting ready to depart for Washington. The agents were ordered to infiltrate the antiwar group, and travel with them. They were given counterfeit draft cards and IDs. Another group of agents of the 116th MIG began preparation for march infiltration.
The very next day, October 15, 1967, saw Frank C. Holloman take over as city Fire and Police Commissioner in Memphis. Though an FBI agent for twenty-five years, for seven of those he had been attached to J. Edgar Hoover’s office in Washington and had by all accounts continued to be loyal to Hoover and trusted by the director.
On October 19 at 2:30 a.m. DEFCON 2 status was declared with respect to the preparations for the demonstration. (DEFCON designations indicate the degree of seriousness attached to a perceived threat to national security. Ascending DEFCON designations [which then went from 1 to 5] indicate a heightened threat.) On that day two C-130 aircraft carrying 89 persons took off from Pope Air Force Base, landing at Andrews Air Force Base outside of Washington.
DEFCON 3 orders were received by the 82nd Airborne at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on October 20. The unit’s commander, Lt. General Throckmorton (the on-scene commander during the Detroit riots), left the headquarters of the 111th MIG at Fort McPherson and flew directly to Fort Myers, where the army Command Center had been established. He was met by Army Chief of Staff Harold Johnson, and they began a tour of the capitol area. At 5:02 p.m. that day General Throckmorton arrived at the White House for a visit with the president.
On October 21 at 10:00 a.m. the demonstrations got under way. Army leaders began watching on closed-circuit television (cameras were mounted on helicopter gunbags and the roof of the Pentagon). Eventually, Secretary of Defense McNamara, army Chief of Staff Johnson, ACSI Yarborough, and aides went onto the roof of the Pentagon to observe. The massive demonstration clearly shook those leaders. The mere presence of such an outpouring of citizens publicly condemning the government, its policies and leaders emphasized official impotence. Yarborough was subsequently quoted in the Commercial Appeal, describing the scene as follows:
It looked like a castle where the Huns had gathered around; as far as the eye could reach, there they were, shaking their bony fists. There were American Nazis. There were communists. There were hippies … I can assure you it was a sight to make you stop to think. As we looked at this great horde below us, waving their battering rams, so to speak … the Secretary of Defense [McNamara] turned to the Chief of Staff of the Army [General Johnson] and said, “Johnny, what are we going to do about this?” Johnny said, “I’m damned if I know.”
According to an inside source, the chief of staff promptly turned to his ACSI and said, “Bill, what are you going to do about this?”
DR. KING’S PRESS CONFERENCE on October 23, which followed his testimony before the National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders, only added to the anxiety of both the military and civilian leadership. In the press conference Martin unequivocally said that he would lead prolonged massive demonstrations in Washington with the purpose of shutting down the government. He was determined that if the government would not shut down the war, then the government itself would be shut down.
At 1:04 p.m. on that October 23, in the wake of the press conference, President Johnson met in emergency session with the CIA’s Richard Helms, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Earle Wheeler, and National Security Advisor Walt Rostow and various aides. At that meeting Johnson said, “We’ve almost lost the war in the last two months in the court of public opinion. These demonstrators and others are trying to show that we need somebody else to take over the country … We’ve got to do something about public opinion.”
At 3:30 on that same day a call went from the ACSI’s office to the office of the 20th SFG in Birmingham, requesting that the roster of 20th SFG be sent to Gardner at the 902nd MIG’s offices at the Pentagon. At 6:15 p.m. an AUTOVON dispatch went off with the roster. (I learned that the process of selection of the supersecret 20th SFG Alpha 184 team began with the arrival of that roster and that the team was handpicked by Gardner.)
The next morning, at about 10:30 a.m., Yarborough arrived at CIA headquarters in Langley for a special meeting with director Helms to discuss the backing of the marchers by communists. Upon his return to his office Yarborough openly declared, “We have the means to stop these bastards, all I need is the word go.”
Two mornings later (Thursday, October 26) the ACSI was back at Langley for the weekly USIB meeting with Helms in the chair. At 4:00 p.m. on that day he met with Gardner of the 902nd MIG.
Yarborough went to Vietnam on November 8 for a firsthand observation of the conflict. He was confronted with low morale everywhere. Then on November 11, the Vietnamese, rubbing salt in his wounds, released three prisoners of war, including two blacks, following negotiations in which Dr. King had participated. The National Liberation Front (NLF) said the blacks were released because of the “courageous struggle” of blacks in the U.S.
On November 17 at 5:10 p.m., in response to a report that armed blacks were preparing to target key public facilities, Special Forces teams were deployed to conduct reconnaissance in cities that it was believed could explode that spring and summer. They were ordered to make precise maps, take aerial photos, set up communication nets, command points, sniper sites, and formulate operational plans. This was exactly the activity that MPD special services/intelligence officer Jim Smith described “Coop” as doing around this time and later. They also stockpiled weapons and antiriot gear. The Special Forces teams used were the 20th from Birmingham, the 10th at Fort Devins, Massachusetts, and the 5th at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. By early 1968 this information had been compiled on 124 cities throughout the country.
Later that day, the ACSI’s office received a report that the regular army units left in CONUS (parts of the 82nd Airborne, the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions and the 5th mechanized Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado) were understrength and underequipped.
ON THE HOME FRONT, so far as the army was concerned, the prognosis worsened. On November 30, Senator Eugene McCarthy announced that he was going to run against Lyndon Johnson in the Democratic primaries as an antiwar candidate, and on December 4 in Atlanta, Martin Luther King announced the plan to hold massive demonstrations in the capitol during the spring of 1968.
On Decemb
er 5 the CIA issued a report stating that $300 million worth of damage had been imposed on Hanoi as a result of 800 tons of bombs and missiles dropped each day on North Vietnam since March 1965. The cost to the U.S., however, had been the loss of 700 aircraft worth $900 million. The exercise had thus resulted in a net loss of $600 million. The aircraft industry was hardly lamenting the nation’s losses.
On December 10 Martin King kept up the pressure in speeches at his old Dexter Avenue Baptist church in Montgomery, Alabama (recorded and photographed by the 111th MIG) and at the Sheraton Hotel in Chicago (surveilled by the 113th MIG).
On December 12, the army, in a major reassessment of its domestic intelligence operation, went on a CONUS war footing. Updating of all recon information was ordered, as was the classification of cities and groups for subversive potential. Then on December 28, as 1967 was drawing to a close, Yarborough and Gardner met at 2:00 p.m.
On January 2 Patrick Putnam delivered a bureau memorandum to Yarborough, which stated that King “will create massive civil disobedience in the nation’s capitol and in ten to fifteen major cities through the U.S. in the spring of 1968 if certain commitments are not forthcoming from Congress in the civil rights field.”
That day, after General Westmoreland’s year-end report stating that the U.S. was winning, the National Liberation Front (NLF) attacked in regimental strength within fifty miles of Saigon. The ensuing battle in a rubber plantation resulted in twenty-six American soldiers being killed and 111 wounded.
ON JANUARY 10 PRESIDENT JOHNSON ORDERED army Chief of Staff Harold Johnson to “use every resource” to diffuse the civil disturbances planned and projected by Dr. King for the spring. Some of those in the loop have confirmed that there was no longer any doubt that at the highest levels it was understood that the gloves were off—no holds were barred in the effort to stop Dr. King’s “invasion” of the capitol.
On the next day the ACSI Yarborough attended the regular weekly USIB meeting at Langley and later that same day under the surveilling eyes, microphones, and cameras of the 115th MIG and oblivious to the storm gathering around him, Dr. King spoke at the Belmont Plaza Hotel in New York City, calling for the war to end or the government to be shut down.
On January 12 at 2:00 p.m. Yarborough met with and briefed army Chief of Staff Johnson. Then, a new crisis arose. The number of “fragging” incidents (black enlisted men shooting/killing their white officers) was climbing dramatically, and ACSI senior staff met to discuss this problem. Yarborough was particularly incensed that the army’s own newspaper, Stars and Stripes, was printing stories about black unrest at home.
On January 15 the International Association of Police Chiefs held a four-day conference on the prevention and control of civil disorders at Warrenton, Virginia. In attendance were Memphis Police Chief J. C. MacDonald and Frank C. Holloman. With the conference in its first morning Mrs. Martin Luther King led a march on the Capitol of five thousand women all clad in black to protest against the war in Vietnam.
On January 26 at 4:45 Yarborough briefed his staff on his CIAB’s new intelligence assessment of Dr. King. The assessment noted Martin King’s increasing emphasis on the theme of “genocide,” since 22% of the total American soldiers killed were black, more than double the proportion of black soldiers. A copy was sent to Westmoreland’s J-2 (intelligence chief).
Patrick Putnam and Yarborough met at 3:00 p.m. on January 29 to discuss FBI/army-coordinated action to counter the expected urban civil disturbances.
On January 31, word of the NLF’s Tet (new year) Offensive shook the army and Washington. Five of South Vietnam’s largest cities were attacked along with thirty-six of forty-four provincial capitals and 25% of its 242 district capitals. The offensive involved 70,000 NLF troops which overran U.S. and South Vietnam forces. Westmoreland’s continued positive reports and claims of imminent victory were dramatically shown to be blatantly false.
IN FEBRUARY, ACSI Yarborough and his staff began to spend an increasing amount of time on CINCSTRIKE preparation for the anticipated riots. As noted earlier, CINCSTRIKE operations were the overall CONUS armed forces coordinated response to the domestic rebellions. Based at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, all domestic forces were deployed according to the plans developed there. During this period Yarborough spent on average about three hours a day on the planning and specifically on February 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 he was locked into these sessions. Most meetings were in the Pentagon but on February 7, at 4:15 p.m., Yarborough flew to Tampa for on-site meetings on February 8.
On the evening of February 7, the 116th MIG surveilled Martin King as he spoke at the Vermont Baptist Church in Washington, D.C., strongly challenging the government. An hour before his speech he met with SNCC leader H. Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael in Brown’s room at the Pitts Motor Hotel in northeast Washington. In the conversation the difference in philosophy and strategy between Martin King, Brown and Carmichael was clearly revealed. From a transcript of that session:
BROWN: “We stop the fuckers here. Right here …”
CARMICHAEL (came in, saying): “No more Uncle Tom dammit. This let them shit on you shit … ain’t working. You know
it and so does everybody …”
King (cut in): “Is killing and burning (unintelligible) in your own people’s streets, your answer?”
Carmichael: “It’s time. We can’t wait any more.”
KING: “Nobody is as tired of waiting as me.”
CARMICHAEL: “Then let’s shut the honkies down. They bring the army, we fight the fuckers with ours. We got guns. Marching for peace—shit, you seen it. What’s it got us?”
MARTIN’S APPROACH NEVER WAVERED. He wanted to include the more violent of the dissident leaders and work with them to maximize the impact of the Washington demonstration planned for the spring, but not on their terms. This was clear from the ASA and MIG surveillance of him, yet ACSI Yarborough and his colleagues on the USIB continued to lump him together with Brown, Carmichael, and others who advocated a violent strategy. It suited all of their interests and preconceptions: Hoover’s, Yarborough’s, Helms’s, and Lyndon Johnson’s as well.
Also on that day the ACSI’s office received an internal report that in 1967 the army suffered a record 40,227 desertions and 155,536 soldiers absent without leave.
On February 9, the quagmire deepened. At 11:02 a.m. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Wheeler delivered to President Johnson Westmoreland’s request for the 82nd Airborne and the 69th Marine division (fifteen battalions, 40,000 more troops) to save the situation. Wheeler advised against the deployment and told Johnson if he sent these troops “you will have no readily deployable strategic reserves” for use in CONUS. The new Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford was also critical of the request.
Three days later, on February 12, 1968, 1,300 sanitation workers in Memphis, Tennessee, went out on strike. At its Fort McPherson, Atlanta, headquarters the 111th MIG established a “special security detachment” under the direct control of ACSI Yarborough for immediate deployment and use in emergencies.
On February 15, 111th MIG agents followed and surveilled Martin King as he spoke at St. Thomas AME Church in Birmingham and Maggie Street Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama. Then on February 19 the 111th picked up the surveillance of him as he addressed a gathering of 150 black ministers in Miami. The next day ACSI Yarborough received the latest FBI study of King, which basically called him a communist and a sex fiend.
INTELLIGENCE FILES noted information as of February 22, without naming the source, that Dr. King would be coming to Memphis to lend support to the sanitation workers’ strike.
Then, as recounted by Warren, quietly, on February 25, a 20th SFG recon. team entered the city of Memphis through the Trailways bus terminal. They conducted reconnaissance of the downtown hotel area and mapped egress routes north.
Three days later, on February 28, President Johnson was confronted with Westmoreland’s request for 200,000 more men, which he was advised by Wheeler mea
nt a call-up of 250,000 and an additional $2.5 billion to the budget and possibly even the call-up of the Korean War veterans.
Also on that day at 10:30 a.m. Gardner met with CIAB chief Colonel Van Tassell and FBI liaison Patrick Putnam to discuss the latest progress on the plans to abort the planned Washington demonstration later that spring.
On March 1, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford called the army’s Vietnam policy bankrupt. (It appears that during this time he was studiously kept outside of the loop of information and bypassed within the department.) Meanwhile in Cullman, Alabama, six members of the 20th SFG met with the Tuscumbia-based Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in highly secret and covert “Klan Special Forces” exercises in which the SFG soldiers provided two days of firearms and explosives training for the klan members present.
On March 4 at 2:30 p.m. Yarborough met with Gardner, and four days later he hosted a luncheon party beginning at 12:30 p.m. with the FBI’s William Sullivan (domestic intelligence chief), Patrick Putnam, and Merrill Kelly of his staff. On March 11, Chairman William Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee opened hearings on the war. In his opening statement Fulbright stated, “The signs of rebellion are all around us, not just in the hippie movement and in the emergence of an angry New Left, but in the sharp decline of applications to the Peace Corps, in the turning away of promising students from careers in government, in letters of protest against the war and troubled consciences about the draft.”
The next day Senator McCarthy got a shocking 42% of the vote in the New Hampshire presidential primary.
On March 14 at 8:00 a.m. a CIAB report was delivered to ACSI Yarborough stating that thirty people were arrested after a breakout of violence in the Memphis sanitation workers’ strike. No early settlement was in sight and the report suggested the deployment of additional personnel from the 111th MIG to work with the MPD and the FBI to keep the city under control.
Orders to Kill Page 47