His jaw dropped. “You mean you knew we’d win? But you couldn’t have! Everything pointed the other way!”
The nightmare was fading more rapidly than she had dared hope. She shook her head, still smiling, not triumphant but glad to speak the knowledge which had kept her alive. “You’re being unfair to our people. As unfair as the Chertkoians were. They thought that because we preferred social stability and room to breathe, we must be stagnant. They forgot you can have bigger adventures in the spirit, than in all the physical universe. We really did have a very powerful science and technology. It was oriented toward life, toward beautifying and improving instead of exploiting nature. But it wasn’t less virile for that. Was it?”
“But we had no industry to speak of. We don’t even now.”
“I wasn’t counting on our factories, I said, but on our science. When you told me about that horrible virus weapon being suppressed, you confirmed my hopes. We aren’t saints. Our government wouldn’t have been quite so quick to get rid of those plagues—would at least have tried to bluff with them—if something better weren’t in prospect. Wouldn’t it?
“I couldn’t even guess what our scientists might develop, given two generations which the enemy did not have. I did think they would probably have to use physics rather than biology. And why not? You can’t have an advanced chemical, medical, genetic, ecological technology without knowing all the physics there is to know. Can you? Quantum theory explains mutations. But it also explains atomic reactions, or whatever they used in those new machines.
“Oh, yes, Ivalo, I felt sure we’d win. All I had to do myself was work to get us prisoners—especially me, to be quite honest—get us all present at the victory.”
He looked at her with awe. Somehow that brought back the heaviness in her. After all, she thought… sixty-two years. Tervola abides. But who will know me? I am going to be so much alone.
Boots rang on metal. The young squad leader stepped forward again. “That’s that,” he said. His bleakness vanished and he edged closer to Evla, softly, almost timidly.
“I trust,” said Ivalo with a rich, growing pleasure in his voice, “that my lady will permit me to visit her from time to time.”
“I hope you will!” she murmured.
“We temporal castaways are bound to be disoriented for a while,” he said. “We must help each other. You, for example, may have some trouble adjusting to the fact that your son Hauki, the Freeholder of Tervola—”
“Hauki!” She sprang to her feet. The cabin blurred around her.
—is now a vigorous elderly man who looks back on a most successful life,” said Ivalo. “Which includes the begetting of Karlavi here.” Her grandson’s strong hands closed about her own. “Who in turn,” finished Ivalo, “is the recent father of a bouncing baby boy named Hauki. And all your people are waiting to welcome you home!”
Editor's Introduction to:
THE TECHNOLOGICAL WAR
by Stefan T. Possony and Jerry Pournelle
In 1970, Stefan Possony and I published a book called The Strategy of Technology. It was a success d’ estim, which is to say that it didn’t make much money, but it did get good reviews. The book was later adopted as a text in the US Air Force Academy and the Air War College. We can hope it had some influence among up and coming officers.
There is, or was, a Brentano’s book store in the basement of the Pentagon; over a thousand copies of Strategy of Technology were sold there. Alas, we saw no other evidence of our influence on US military policy.
This chapter, “The Technological War”, was in some ways the heart of the book. In this essay we try to analyze the nature of war, the nature of technology, and the nature of strategy. No one could do more than introduce these subjects in a brief essay. We hope we have done that.
Dr. Stefan T. Possony received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Vienna. Following his graduation he was active in the anti-Nazi movement in Austria, and his name was high on the Gestapo’s wanted list. After many adventures he came to the United States, where he worked for some twenty years in the intelligence community.
Dr. Possony is Senior Fellow Emeritus of the Hoover Institution on War Revolution and Peace, and is author of more than a score of books.
The following chapter from The Strategy of Technology needed little revision. I have inserted brief comments where they seemed appropriate.
THE TECHNOLOGICAL WAR
by Stefan T. Possony and Jerry Pournelle
The United States is at war. Whether we consider this to be the Protracted Conflict initiated in 1917 by the Bolsheviks or something new brought about by the march of technology in this country, the war cannot be escaped. The field of engagement is not everywhere bloody. Except for financial sacrifices, many citizens of the West and subjects of Communism may be unaware of the conflict until the decisive moment, if it ever comes, is upon them. For all that, the Technological War is most real, and we must understand its nature, for it is decisive. Our survival depends on our not losing this battle.
The natures of both technology and the enemy dictate this state of warfare. The U.S.S.R. is a power-oriented dictatorship, whose official doctrine is Communism: That is, a chiliastic movement which seeks to liberate—we would say enslave—the entire earth. It is not necessary for all of the individual leaders of the U.S.S.R. to be true believers in this doctrine. Since the Soviet Union is a dictatorship, the usual dynamics of dictatorship apply.
One fundamental fact of dictatorship is that losing factions within its ruling structure forever lose their positions and power. They may retain their lives, but they retain little else, and often they do not survive. Thus, such rulers, whether sincere or cynical, have a powerful incentive to conform to the official ideology or line of the top man or group. Moreover, they compete with each other for power. If a powerful faction counsels aggressive expansion—whether out of sincere belief in the ideology, because expansion creates more opportunities for advancement, or because it expects aggression to prop up a tottering regime—failure is the only way through which its influence will be reduced. Every successful aggressive action increases the influence of those who counsel aggression.
If aggressive moves encounter stern opposition, so that the ruling faction is not only not rewarded for its expansionist policies, but finds its national power decreased, changes in the official policy may take place. Such failures, consequent punishment, and resultant troubles for the dictatorship may serve to place in power a more cautious group dedicated to defense of the empire and the status quo; but it is obvious that this turn to pure imperial defense has not yet happened in the U.S.S.R.
We do not mean that the Kremlin’s government will necessarily be aggressive. Other Communist states may play a role. As we write this (1968), there is a growing danger of conflict between the U.S.S.R. and Maoist China. However, expansionism is the normal state of affairs for the Soviet Union.
(We did not predict the events that took place in China following The Great Cultural Revolution. No one else did, either. We do note that tyrannies try to remain independent of each other, and it is unlikely that Communist states can ever have “equal and friendly” relations with each other. JEP 1983)
Moreover, aggressive actions may occur because of internal pressures, especially in a period when faith in Communism as an ideological system is declining, and it is possible, although unlikely, that aggressive initiatives will be taken by non-Communist states. Despite all those complications the U.S.S.R. is the single most important and strongest opponent of the United States. Consequently, American strategists must primarily be concerned with Soviet strategy and the threat posed by the U.S.S.R.[1]
The nature of technology also dictates that there will be conflict. Technology flows on without regard for human intentions, and each technological breakthrough offers the possibility for decisive advantages to the side that first exploits it. Such advantages will be fleeting, for although the weaker side does not have weapons based on
the new technology yet, it is certain that it will have them in the near future. In such circumstances, failure to exploit the capability advantage is treason to the Communist cause.
It must be emphasized that to the committed Communist, there are no ideological reasons for not exploiting advantages over the capitalists. The only possible objections are operational. No communist can admit that a capitalist government is legitimate; thus there can be no “mercy” to a vulnerable capitalist regime.
Therefore, capability combines with ideology to produce a powerful effect on intentions, which, be they ever so pure before the advantage was obtained, cannot fail to change with the increasing capabilities: if capabilities grow, intentions become more ambitious.
Thus, it is futile and dangerous to base modern strategy on an analysis of the intentions of the enemy. The modern strategist must be concerned with the present and future capabilities of his opponent, not with hopes and dreams about his goals. The dynamics of dictatorship provide a continuing source of ambitious advisors who will counsel the rulers of the Soviet Union toward aggressive action, and only through continuous engagement in the Technological War can the United States ensure peace and survival.
Because the goals of the United States and the U.S.S.R. are asymmetric, the strategies each employ in the Technological War will be different. The United States is dedicated to a strategy of stability, of being a stabilizing rather than a disturbing power; of preserving the status quo and the balance of power rather than seeking conquest and the final solution to the problems of international conflict through occupation or extermination of all opponents.
The U.S.S.R. is expansionist; aggressive; a disturber power which officially states that the only true peace is that of world Communism. The United States has conceded the initiative in the Protracted Conflict, and is to a great extent bound to a policy of reacting to Communist advances, rather than seeking the initiative in undermining Communist power.
Because we have conceded the initiative in the phase of the Protracted Conflict which deals with control of territory and people,[2] we must not abandon the initiative in the Technological War. We are engaged in war, not a race, although it may appear to be a race to many of us. But it is a race in which we must stay ahead, because if we ever fall behind, the opponent will blow up the bridges before our runners can cross them.
Given the opportunity, the Soviets will deny us access to the tools of the Technological War exactly as they have denied access to their territory, which they call the “peace zone” in distinction to the rest of the world which is the “war zone”. If we are to be on the defensive in the Protracted Conflict, survival demands that we retain the initiative and advantage in the Technological War. We know that U.S. supremacy does not bring on global war, let alone a war of conquest; we held an absolute mastery during our nuclear monopoly. We can be certain that the Soviets would not be passive were they to gain supremacy.
The Technological War is the decisive struggle in the Protracted Conflict. Victory in the Technological War gives supremacy in all other phases of the conflict, to be exploited either by thermonuclear annihilation of the opponent, or simply demanding and obtaining his surrender. The Technological War creates the resources to be employed in all other parts of the Protracted Conflict. It governs the range of strategies that can be adapted in actual or hot war. Without the proper and superior technology our strategy of deterrence would be meaningless. Without technological advantages, we could never fight and win a small war thousands of miles from our homeland, or prevent the occupation of Europe and Japan.
Up to the present moment, technological warfare has largely been confined to pre-hot war conflict. It has been a silent and apparently peaceful war, and engagement in the Technological War is generally compatible with the strong desires of most of our people for “peace”. The winner of the Technological War can, if he chooses, preserve peace and order, act as a stabilizer of international affairs, and prevent shooting wars. The loser has no choice but to accept the conditions of the victor, or to engage in a shooting war which he has already lost.
Technological War can be carried on simultaneously with any other forms of military conflict, diplomatic maneuvers, peace offensives, trade agreements, detente, and debacle. It is the source of the advanced weapons and equipment for use in all forms of warfare. It renders cold war activities credible and effective. Technological warfare combined with psychosocial operations can lead to a position of strategic dominance.
This new form of warfare has its roots in the past, but it is a product of the current environment. World War II was the last war of industrial power and mobilization, but it was also the first war of applied science. The new war is one of the directed use of science. The manner of its use is shown by the changing nature of warfare. Wars of the past were wars of attrition of the military power which was a shield to the civilian population and the will to resist. The new technology has created weapons to be applied directly and suddenly to the national will.
Definition of Technological Warfare
Technological warfare is the direct and purposeful application of the national technological base[3] and of specific advances generated by the base to attain strategic and tactical objectives. It is employed in concert with other forms of national power. The aims of this kind of warfare, as of all forms of warfare, are to enforce the national will on enemy powers; to cause them to modify their goals, strategies, tactics, and operations; to attain a position of security or dominance which assists or supports other forms of conflict techniques; to promote and capitalize on advances in technology to reach superior military power; to prevent open warfare; and to allow the arts of peace to flourish in order to satisfy the constructive objectives of society.
The emergence of this new form of war is a direct consequence of the dynamic and rapidly advancing character of the technologies of the two superpowers and of certain of the U.S. allies. Its most startling application to date has been the Soviet and American penetration of space and the highly sophisticated articulation of specific technical achievements in other aspects of modern conflict—psychological, political, and military.
Its foremost characteristics are dynamism and flexibility, while surprise is its main strategic utility. The superpowers can expand their technologies and employ them unhindered by actions short of all-out war. The nature of the technological process reinforces the uncertainty of war and of the enemy’s course of action. The indicators of success in maintaining a position of dominance are vague and inconclusive because of dynamism, variability, and uncertainty; thus, unless this form of warfare is fully understood, it is possible to lose it while maintaining to the last the illusion of winning.
The importance of this new form of conflict lies in the challenge it poses to the continued national existence of the participants. Just as the Romans deliberately increased their national power by adding seapower to landpower, and just as the major nations of the world increased their power by adding airpower to their surface power, the U.S.S.R. is adding technological power to its existing capabilities.
(The above was written in 1968. It is now possible to see the effects of Soviet adoption of a technological strategy. They have an entire new line of intercontinental missiles with accuracies sufficient to threaten the entire US land-based missile force; and they have gone into space in a big way, so that they have far more experience in manned space operations than we do.
They have also built a full line of naval vessels, including nuclear ballistic missile submarines.
The threat of Soviet technological power is much greater now than when we wrote this book; and our time for meaningful response is much shorter. There is still time, but we have little to waste. JEP 1983)
Technological advances can produce a small number of weapons with a decisive capability, as illustrated by the atomic bomb. Since some technological changes can occur unobtrusively and yet be decisive, the real power situations are never transparent and never fully understood,
so that the power of the opponent, as well as one’s own power, remains partially unknown.
This unavoidable ignorance is the source of direct challenge to the security and existence of the participants in the Technological War. Technology itself does not automatically confer military advantages. Blind faith in technology alone can lead to disaster. Like all wars, the Technological War requires a deliberate strategy, and it must be conducted by commanders who understand fully the objectives they have been instructed to reach.
The Technological War is not synonymous with technological research. The instruments of technological research and development are required for successful participation in the Technological War, but their existence does not ensure their proper use. Research itself does not create technology but is merely one of technology’s major prerequisites; and technology by itself cannot bring victory or guarantee national survival.
Foundations of the Technological War
Fundamentals of Technological Strategy
There are four overall aspects to technological strategy. Enumerating them does not constitute a strategy but merely sets forth certain criteria with which to judge the conduct of the conflict. They are:
Superior Forces In Being
Modernization of Weapons
Modernization of the Technological Base
Operational Capability to Use New Technology
There Will Be War Volume II Page 6