The Elements of Strategy
What is Strategy?
Because there seems to be little understanding of strategy and its effect on the Technological War, we will briefly review some general principles of strategy and warfare. Our purpose is not to teach the elements of strategy, which would require another book, but rather to make the reader aware of strategy and some of its complexities.
According to the traditional concept of military strategy it should mean the art of employing military forces to achieve the ends set by political policy. This definition was formulated by Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart in 1929 and it hardly differs from that of Clausewitz. Raymond Aron in his recent book follows it almost word for word. France’s leading strategist of the 60’s commented:
“In my view this definition is too restrictive because it deals with military forces only. I would put it as follows: the art of applying force so that it makes the most effective contribution towards achieving the ends set by political policy…
“In my view the essence of strategy is the abstract interplay which, to use Foch’s phrase, springs from the clash between two opposing wills. It is the art which enables a man, no matter what the techniques employed, to master the problems set by any clash between two opposing wills. [It is the art which enables a man, no matter what the techniques employed, to master the problems set by any clash of wills] and as a result to employ the techniques available with maximum efficiency. It is therefore the art of the dialectic of force, or, more precisely, the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute.[9]
In our judgment it would be hard to better the above definition provided that we understand force to include the broader concept of power and force. Examining the definition shows us several important aspects of the Technological War and its strategy.
First, we see that strategy involves two opposing wills. This in itself sets the Technological War apart from the simple development of technology. The development of technology is a game against nature, which may be uncooperative, but which never deceives or actively conspires to prevent your success. The Technology War is a contest with an intelligent opponent who seeks to divert you from seeing his purpose, and to surprise you with his results.
Secondly, strategy involves the use of power and force. In the Technological War, the more power is extant, the less often force needs to be used in the primary or decisive mode of the conflict. In the place of battles, the Technological War general disposes his own resources so as to maximize the power he holds and at the same time compel the enemy to make maximum dispersal of his. To make the enemy counter each move you make, and dance to your tune, is the aim of a Technological War strategy. In the ideal, if the enemy were required continually to build purely defensive weapons which might protect him from your weapons but could not possibly harm you, you could be said to have won a major engagement in the Technological War. In the contest between wills, seizing and holding the initiative is of importance; as indeed it has been for a long, long time:
You hear that Phillip is in the Chersonese, and you vote an expedition there; you hear that he is in Thessaly, and you vote one there. You march the length and breadth of Greece at his invitation, and you take your marching orders from him.[10]
But if the power ratio is ambiguous, the decision as to who is the stronger will be made by force, which is the application of power in battle. Other things being equal, battles are won by superior technology. But clearly superior technology prevents battle.
The Principles of War
War is an art; it is not an exact science. Precisely because there is an intelligent opponent, there are real uncertainties about war, not merely statistical uncertainties which may be measurable. Every attempt to reduce war to an exact science has ended in a dismal failure. The advent of the computer and systems analysis, useful as both may be, has not changed this fact, although it has often been forgotten.
Part of the traditional method of learning the art of war is studying the principles of war. These principles are a set of general concepts, like holds in wrestling, and no exact group of principles is universally recognized. Some strategists combine several into one or divide one of those we show into several. The following list will serve well enough for our purpose:
The Principle of the Objective
The Principle of the Initiative
The Principle of Surprise
The Principle of the Unity of Command
The Principle of Mass (Concentration of Force)
The Principle of Economy of Forces
The Principle of Mobility
The Principle of Security
The Principle of Pursuit
It will be noted that some of these principles, if carried to their extremes, would be contradictory. They are intended to serve not as a formula for the planning of a battle, but rather as a set of guides or a checklist which the planner ignores only with peril. They are as applicable to the Technological War as to any other war. At first glance, it might seem that one principle or another might be more directly applicable to the Technological War than the others, but in fact none can be disregarded if success is to be achieved. We will have occasion to refer to them from time to time in the analysis below.
Strategy and Technology
The United States today has no technological strategy. We have, instead, a series of independent and often uncorrelated decisions on specific problems of technology. This is hardly a strategy. A technological strategy would involve the setting of national goals and objectives by political leaders; it would be integrated with other aspects of our national strategy, both military and non-military (Initiative, Objective, and Unity of Command); it would include a broad plan for conducting the Technological War that provided for surprising the enemy, pursuing our advantage (Pursuit), guarding against being surprised (Security), allocating resources effectively (Economy of Forces), setting milestones and building the technological base (Objective), and so forth. Lesser conflicts such as that in Vietnam would be governed by a broad strategic doctrine instead of being considered isolated and treated as crisis.
In our national strategy, far too much attention has been given to current affairs and to specific conflict situations at particular times and places. There has been no serious attempt to integrate the individual decisions, or relate them to a comprehensive grand strategy that is adequate to overcome the challenges. The few attempts we have made to manage technological decisions properly were disastrous; examples are the ludicrous “saving” achieved through the TFX and the equally dismal saving through over-management of the C5A program. We have confused a strategy of technology with centralized interference in the design of production of specific weapons and the imposition of a “standard management plan”.
The results are that our performance in Vietnam was quite unsatisfactory, we have failed to exploit our superior technology to grasp a commanding lead in either inner space or outer space, our merchant marine where it exists at all flies the proud flag of Panama or Liberia, and many of our young men fight overseas with weapons that make use of principles discovered by Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century.
(Alas, we see no reason to revise the above after a dozen years. Our failure to understand what the Vietnam War was about cost us all the blood and treasure we had previously invested; the Soviets have surpassed us in manned space exploitation and ICBM deployment; and we were unable to use our technology or military power in the Iranian hostage crisis. JEP 1983)
The reasons for this dismal performance are complex; it is not necessary to understand all of them and it is not germane to blame anyone. Events caught up with us, the stream of technology swept us along, and only recently did we begin to realize the nature of the Technological War. In fact, one reason we have no strategy of technology is that not everyone realizes we are at war; but perhaps the most important reason is the basic failure to understand the nature of technology itself, and particularly the problems of lead time whic
h produce a crisis-oriented design process.
Crises have kept coming endlessly, and we have had to meet them. Decision makers at the national level concentrate on fighting today’s fire, partly because they hope that the current trouble will be the last but mostly because of the long lead time involved in technology. A president called upon to spend money in any fiscal year actually is spending money to solve the problems of a resident two terms later. But even if we try to find comfort in expenditures for research and development, we must understand that these are oriented to specific projects and tasks and do not result from technological strategy.
(During the 1970’s, the expenditures in research and development were cut back; the result was that high technology exports became less valuable than agriculture in our balance of payments. There has been an erosion of our technological base. Fortunately the Soviets have their problems too, caused by their generally bad management practices; but do note that the Soviet military economy is run on an entirely different basis from their notoriously inefficient civilian economy. JEP 1983)
Our misunderstanding of the Technological War is illustrated by our failure to build an organization for conducting technological warfare. The review of the annual budget and of individual projects in basic research, in applied research, in development, and in procurement is the only process by which our technological development is controlled directly. Other influences such as the statements of requirements and the evaluation of military worth are felt only at the level of individual projects. Overall evaluation of the research and development effort and of its relations to strategy is rudimentary.
An example of how irrelevant factors influence our efforts, and perhaps one of the decisive signs of the times: the January 20, 1969 issue of Aviation Week and Space Technology, the most influential journal in the aerospace field, included a report entitled “Viet Lull Advances New Weapons”. The article makes clear that the budgetary funding level of many new weapons systems, including research and development, basic technology, and actual system procurement, is largely dependent on the continuation of a “lull” in the Vietnam War. Given a proper strategy for the Technological War and proper command of our efforts, the title should read “Advanced New Weapons End Vietnam War.”
1983
The previous decade has seen the development of many “smart” weapons; however, few have actually been put in the hands of operational troops. We still do not have a strategy of technology.
Editor's Introduction to:
MANUAL OF OPERATIONS
by Jerry Pournelle
In the bad old days of science fiction, a John W. Campbell editorial was certain to have one result: a dozen writers would turn out stories illustrating the point Mr. Campbell had made. Sometimes these were good stories; sometimes they were bloody awful since they’d been churned out quickly in the hopes of catching John W. Campbell with his checkbook open.
There is a sense in which I wrote this story in response to a Campbell editorial: John once said that our attempts to understand truly advanced alien science were likely to be no more successful than would a medieval monk’s attempts to understand television were a TV suddenly to appear in his cloister. That intrigued me enough to want to do a story on the theme.
On the other hand, it took me five years, and the result turned out very different from what I had first conceived.
MANUAL OF OPERATIONS
by Jerry Pournelle
“Harry Logan, stop messing around with that junk and Get a Job!”
“Yes, dear.” It used to be a daily ritual. Now it was three or four times a day. If he’d been musically inclined, Harry could have set it to music: Chorale and concerto for percussion and nagging wife. GET A JOB, BOOM BOOM, YES DEAR, YES DEAR, GET A JOB, BOOM BOOM, YES DEAR, YES DEAR…
“I mean it, Harry. I can’t pay the grocery bills, there’s the doctor, and Shirley’s orthodonist, and Penney’s is sending our account to a collection agency. You’ve got to Do Something Before I Go Out of My Mind!”
“Yes dear.” He didn’t raise his eyes from the microscope ($65.00 surplus from Los Angeles City College, a good buy, I need it, Ruth. I can use it to make some money.) After a while he heard her retreating footsteps.
This was a preliminary skirmish. She’d be back with the main force attack later. But for now… Outside, the rooster squawked loudly and drove a young opossum away from his harem. The dog barked and ran ashamedly to help the scrappy little cock. The dog got a piece bit out of his ear for reward. Harry gratefully left the microscope with its dirty slide and listened to the sounds of peace.
The letters from his last job enquiries were on his desk, but he’d been afraid to tell Ruth. They all said the same thing. Dear Mr. Logan, we are very pleased that you have considered our company as a possible employer. However, at this time we have no position suitable for a man of your unique talents. Please be assured that we will keep your application on file…
Harry knew why they didn’t want him. He had no college degrees. In fact, he’d never been inside a college in his life, and there were dozens, hundreds, thousands of new engineering graduates looking for work. What chance did a company-trained engineer have for a professional position? He’d tried starting over, but that was no good either: with three published papers on solid state physics and four patents to his credit he was overqualified to be a technician. No engineer wanted a lab tech who knew more than his boss.
Harry was sure that the constant fights he’d had with company administrators had nothing to do with his rejections. He’d been right every time. But somehow, after the companies learned that, they still wouldn’t hire him…
His research wasn’t going well. His papers were rejected by reputable journals as too far out and he couldn’t write down for the popular science magazines. Nothing was going well, and the cold reality gnawed at his guts. What in hell am I going to do? he thought. It was a moment of panic.
The house was paid for (Harry, you should have kept title to that patent, not sold it outright! Harry, you have no business sense at all! But Ruth, I wanted to keep the patent and you said we have to have a house…) At least they couldn’t take the house. But he couldn’t raise chickens out here in Tujunga Wash anymore. The Los Angeles City Department of Health had sent a complaint. His house was miles from any other habitation, but somehow it was inside the city limits…
He stood for a moment by the desk, then paced nervously to his work bench. The blasted circuit ought to work, why didn’t it? But growing integrated circuitry was a tricky thing and he had only the most primitive equipment to work with. He thought about that. Sometimes, Ruth took off her wedding ring to do the dishes, and he could pawn it for…
He didn’t finish the thought. There was a knock on the workroom door and Logan looked up in surprise.
“Harry Logan?” the man asked. There was an accent to the voice, probably Canadian. An ordinary man: big framed, going bald, dark hair where he had any. Stocky and tough, but well dressed. “You are Harry Logan, aren’t you?”
“Yes,” Harry admitted. It was an admission: the last guy who came to see him had been a bill collector and this guy was built like one. “May I come in?”
“You’re already in. I don’t think I know you.”
“David McClellan. Before we waste each other’s time, are you the man who published that far-out thing about the future of solid-state physics in Tele-Tech? Also the article speculating about unknown forces?”
“Yes.” The unknown forces article had got him fired from his last job. His descriptions of equipment he used in the research made it plain he was working on that problem despite orders to abandon it. Who’d have thought the Director would read a thing like that? “Yeah, I wrote them.”
“Good. I’ve got a consulting job for you.”
“What kind of work?” Harry asked. No good to sound too eager. “I’m a little busy, but—”
“You’ll be well paid. Besides, you’ll learn something new. I guarantee it.”
The man was assured, and his confidence was infectious. Logan found himself looking forward to whatever McClellan had in mind. What did ‘well paid’ mean? Anything was good pay now…
McClellan was still talking. “But you don’t have a working telephone so I couldn’t call for an appointment. Glad to find you in.”
“Eh—oh, sure.” Damn phone company. He’d always paid his bills eventually… “Where is this work?”
“Canada. I want you to come with me right away.”
Logan brought up the subject of money. It wasn’t any problem. McClellan took a thousand dollars from his wallet and handed it over. It was an expensive wallet, and it looked full.
Ruth exploded as expected. McClellan wouldn’t say where they were going. He seemed obsessed with secrecy about the whole project, and Ruth took Harry’s inability to be precise for deviousness.
“Off to Canada with some bum you just met! Can’t say where! Harry Logan, you’re Up To Something! You’re going off to drink again, and I won’t put up with it, Harry Logan, now you listen to me, you take one drink and you can’t stop, I know all about you, you’re not going off to any…”
She was speechless for the first time in years as Harry shoved a thousand dollars at her. He was tempted to stuff it into her mouth…
“Where in hell are we going?” Harry asked. It seemed a reasonable question. They’d landed in Vancouver, taken a small turboprop north to Dawson, and immediately drove away from the airport in a Rover. Now they’d left the highway and started off into rugged hill country. McClellan hadn’t said three hundred words since they left Tujunga Wash.
There Will Be War Volume II Page 8