What had happened in the house was that Major Smyth had opened the door of the back bedroom and walked in, with a torch alight on his belt. All the gunman, who turned out later to have been Dan Breen had to do was to shoot Smyth through the heart. At this there was some confusion, during which Captain White, a very nice man with an excellent war record, was killed, and Cpl. Worth wounded. A little later, from the garden, I heard a single shot, which made one think that there might still be a gunman in the house. But, far from that, it was a most unfortunate accident, which involved Professor Carolan being shot by mistake while being questioned. He was taken to hospital, but died some weeks later.
In 1924 Dan Breen published his memoirs in a book called My fight for Irish Freedom , a copy of which was sent to me by one of my former colleagues. In it Dan Breen gives a highly imaginative account, full of flagrant lies, of this affair. He gives details, and these may well be true of his escape and of the time he spent in the Mater Hospital and other places, until he was able to resume his activities. Incidentally he seems, strangely enough, not to have been proud of having murdered Colonel Smyth in the County Club, Cork, because he just records – ‘He was shot dead in the County Club in the heart of Cork City’.
After this, the situation was clearly hotting up. Sean Tracey, who had been with Dan Breen at Fernside, was shot in an affray in Talbot Street, and other gunmen were captured. During all this time, Michael Collins, the head of the IRA, was at large. There was a high price on his head, but he seemed to led a charmed life, enjoying many narrow escapes from death or capture, until he was eventually killed in an ambush during the civil war after the Treaty.
In November, information was coming in well and we were beginning to get on top of the IRA, who were becoming desperate. I happened to receive information from three different sources to the effect that something was going to happen, but there was nothing definite.
In the evening of Saturday 20 November, I received orders to collect my fellows and search the railway yards at Inchicore, where it was thought that ammunition might be stored. We went there and searched for several hours, but there was obviously nothing to be found, so we slept in railway carriages, and in the morning I telephoned the Castle and asked whether I was to be relieved. Our Adjutant, Hyems, said ‘I am sorry to say that there have been some raids by the “Shinners” and I am afraid that they have got some of our fellows’. So it was agreed that we should return to our lodgings. I was at that time sharing a flat at 28 Upper Pembroke Street, with a colleague, Murray, and on getting back there I found a very distressing scene.
In the flat next to Murray’s and mine, I saw the body of my friend ‘Chummy’ Dowling, a grand ex-guardee, wounded three times in the war, lying full length on the floor. As he was to have relieved me he was in uniform and had obviously been shot through the heart, probably by a small Sinn Féiner because there was a bullet hole in one corner of the ceiling. In the doorway of the bathroom was Price’s body. Murray had already been taken to hospital. Colonel Woodcock, commanding the 1st East Lancs, had been shot three times, but survived. Likewise Captain Keenleyside, Adjutant of the same battalion. Colonel Montgomery had been shot on the stairs, as he came up after breakfast. He died some time later. Mrs Woodcock wrote a full account of all this in Blackwood’s Magazine a few months later.
In addition, Peter Ames and Bennett, who had been in 28 Upper Pembroke Street, the evening before when I went out, were murdered in their beds in Lower Leeson Street. Two officers, temporarily at the Gresham Hotel, while going on leave, or returning, I think, were also shot dead. Two or three gunmen were shot and captured in another street.
In the afternoon we received information to the effect that the gunmen had been told to meet at Croke Park, where a football match was to be played that afternoon, in order to compare notes. I was not in on this, but saw a number of truckloads of police moving off, and was told later that, when they arrived at Croke Park, they were fired on, and of course opened fire, causing a number of casualties.
After the crowd had dispersed, the police found a considerable number of revolvers and automatic pistols on the ground.
The object of this exercise on the part of the IRA, was to eliminate Intelligence and Courts Martial officers, because the gunmen felt that the net was closing round them. So men were brought up to Dublin from other parts of the country, particularly Tipperary, in order to catch as many as possible of us unawares on a Sunday morning, when most people slept late.
As a result of all this, those of us who had survived were shut up under guard in a hotel, from where it was impracticable to do any useful work. In fact, our job had to all intents and purposes been done, and the organisation was breaking up.
So at about the New Year I applied for leave, and on the boat met General Boyd, GOC Dublin District, with whom I used to play tennis on the Castle courts. He said ‘Well, Jeune, I think we have broken the back of the movement now, don’t you?’ I replied ‘Yes, sir, and I think six months should see it out’, to which he answered ‘Yes, I think you are right. Hamar Greenwood (then Colonial Secretary, and in charge of Irish affairs) says two months, but I think that is rather optimistic’.
This, as stated, was about the New Year 1921, and by the early summer the IRA were driven into the south west corner of Ireland, and would have been quickly finished. But certain influences were to save them, as I learned later in London from a friend of mine, Jeffries, who had been in our show in Dublin. When this broke up he, with a staff officer, Cameron, were instructed to set up from London a proper secret service in Ireland, which was very successfully accomplished.
About this time De Valera came back from the USA and was captured in a raid by Lord Twining, then a young subaltern in the Worcesters, whom I met in London a few years ago, not long before his death. He told me that he did not know the identity of his prisoner, who at first would not give his correct name, but did so eventually.
Now Jeffries told me that the following took place. Army GHQ at Kilmainham wired to his London office ‘De Valera captured. Cope suggests release’. This telegram arrived about 7pm and Jeffries took it across to the Colonial Office, but Hamar Greenwood had left, so Jeffries took it to Lloyd-George, who rubbed his hands together, and said ‘Well done the military. He must on no account be released’. Taking this as settled, Jeffries left, but as soon as he had gone Lloyd-George sent orders for De Valera to be released, which was done.
Later, yielding to threats from the IRA, Lloyd-George agreed to meet a delegation headed by Michael Collins, with a view to drawing up a treaty. At this time, as may well be remembered, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, a distinguished Ulsterman, was invited by Lloyd-George to join him and one or two other politicians in meeting the Irish delegation. He replied, saying that he had no intention of ‘seeing three bloody murderers dictating to three damned cowards’. He was murdered in Eaton Square, by two ex-soldiers, acting on orders, from the IRA.
The Treaty was signed. The IRA had won. Does history repeat itself?
CHAPTER 8
Lieutenant General A.E. Percival
Details
This account is taken from two lectures given by Percival, copies of which are not held in his private papers at the Imperial War Museum. Percival joined the Essex Regiment as a temporary second lieutenant in September 1914, and was appointed a temporary Lieutenant in October 1914, and a temporary Captain in November 1914. By 1917, he was a temporary Lieutenant Colonel, commanding the 7th Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment. During the First World War, he also held battalion command of an Essex Battalion and of a battalion of the Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire Regiment. He served in Russia in 1919, as a Major with the Royal Fusiliers, and returned to the Essex Regiment for service in Ireland from 1919 to 1921. He later served with the Cheshire Regiment during 1924. From 1925 to 1929, he served with the Royal West African Frontier Force, returning to the Cheshire Regiment in 1929. He taught at the Staff College, Camberley, from 1931 to 1932. From 1936 to 1938, he served in Mal
aya, as a General Staff Officer, Grade 1, returning in 1938 to England to Staff Command at Aldershot as a Brigader-General. During World War Two, Percival served as a Brigadier with 1st Corps BEF in France from 1939 to 1940. He served also in 1940 as Assistant Chief of Imperial Staff. He was appointed as GOC Malaya in July 1941, and as the commander of British forces at Singapore surrendered the city to the Japanese Army in 1942, and was imprisoned in Manchuria for the remainder of the Second World War. He retired in 1946.
Guerrilla Warfare, Ireland 1920-1921
Introduction
MY OBJECT IN the two lectures which I am going to give you on Guerrilla warfare in Ireland during 1920 and 1921 is firstly to give those of you who did not take part in the Irish War, an idea of the conditions prevailing there and of the various problems with which we as soldiers were confronted and, secondly, to explain to you how we solved these problems, and to give you the reasons which influenced our solutions. The problems I shall deal with will be in the main tactical problems, and I shall, as far as possible, avoid all political and religious questions, though it will be necessary to touch on these briefly as they had such an important influence on the conduct of military operations.
In my first lecture I propose to give you a general outline of the conditions prevailing in the South of Ireland at the commencement of 1920, and then to trace step by step the evolution of the struggle from that date till the Spring of 1921. I shall deal with the various problems as they arose and explain to you how they were influenced by changing conditions.
In my second lecture, I shall deal with the operations during the final period (April-July 1921) and shall give you my conclusions as to the best methods to be employed in warfare of this nature. I shall also deal with the organisation of intelligence within the battalion – a very important subject – and shall conclude with what I consider were some of the outstanding lessons from a military point of view.
Personal Experiences
In the course of my lecture I shall give you a few personal experiences; this I shall do, not in any spirit of self-aggrandisement, but purely with a view to illustrating the type of warfare in which we were engaged.
Appointments held and Area dealt with
I went to Ireland in January 1920 and served with my Regiment there till the Truce. The Battalion was stationed at Kinsale with a number of outlying Detachments, and was responsible for a large tract of country in west Cork, probably one of the most disturbed areas in the whole of Ireland. I was first placed in command of the Bandon Detachment and was subsequently given a special position as Intelligence Officer and organiser of operations in the battalion area.
General Description of Country
I will now give you a short description of the conditions which prevailed in County Cork at the beginning of 1920.
The country is generally wild with large uncultivated tracts. There are a few small towns e.g. Kinsale, Bandon, Clonakilty, Bantry and Macroom and a number of villages, mostly situated in the valleys between the hills. The industry of the country is almost entirely agricultural, the land being divided up into small farms, most of which are owned by the farmers themselves, or in the process of passing into their possession under the terms of the Wyndham Land Act of 1903.
There are, therefore, a number of farmhouses scattered all over the countryside. The fields are invariably small and divided from each other by stone walls with furze growing on top, which makes the range of vision very restricted. In the Bandon and Kinsale district a fairly large proportion of the land is under cultivation, but further to the west and north-west the country becomes very wild and hilly, consisting chiefly of bogs and gorse-covered hillsides with small homesteads tucked away here and there on the sides of the hills.
Roads
The main roads between the towns are fairly good and suitable for all traffic: some of the country roads, however, are very rough and in many places the inclines are very steep; they are nearly passable for HT and light lorries, but not for 3-ton lorries. Thus the main convoy lorry routes were very restricted.
Railways
There is one main railway the Cork, Bandon, and South Coast, which runs westward from Cork to Bantry, branch lines run southward from this to Kinsale, Clonakilty and Skibbereen.
Rivers
The Bandon River rises in the hills north-east of Bantry, and after flowing due east through Bandon, turns sharply south till it reaches the sea at Kinsale; the few bridges which exist over this river very much restrict the choice of alternative routes when moving from one locality to another. The country is intersected by a number of small streams, which, though in themselves no obstacle, necessitate a large number of bridges which facilitate the blocking of the roads.
The Population
The inhabitants of this country were clearly divided into different parties, whose sympathies and interests were diametrically opposed.
The Old Landlords
Only a few of these remained, the majority of them living in large houses with only a little land attached, the rest of their property having passed to the tenant farmers under the Wyndham Land Act. As will be seen later, they were, however, an important factor in the situation.They had English sympathy but avoided active participation.
The Protestant Element
Chiefly large farmers and shop-keepers. They were practically unanimously in favour of a continuation of English control in the south, but they had no organisation of their own, and were not armed; they were, therefore, powerless against the attacks of Sinn Féin. A few, but not many, were brave enough to assist Crown Forces with information.
The Priests
The Catholic priests could be divided into two categories – the elderly men, who had formally been the leaders of the people, but had recently lost all control, and the young priests who had passed through Maynooth College and were thoroughly imbued with Republican principles; the latter were almost without exception heart and soul in the Sinn Féin movement.
The Catholic Population
Finally there was the Catholic population, the large majority of which, if not active Sinn Féins, were sympathic to the Sinn Féin movement. The extent of their activity usually varied in the inverse ratio to their financial interest in the country – they were, for instance, the farmers and large shopkeepers who disliked disturbances, and the farmers’ sons and corner boys, who had no stake in the country and preferred earning a living by plunder and murder than by doing an honest day’s work. There were a large number of this latter class owing to the failure of the British Government to enforce conscription in Southern Ireland during the war, and they nearly all had an exaggerated idea of their own importance. It was of these men that the Republican Army was mainly composed.
Sinn Féin
The Sinn Féin movement, which started in 1905 was originally moderatein character, aiming at the commercial prosperity of Ireland, and the regaining of political independence. Later it got into the hands of extremists, such as the Irish Republican Brotherhood and when the war broke out began the plot with Germany. It received a setback in 1916, when the Dublin rebellion was stamped out, but quickly set to work to collect money again, which was plentiful in the country owing to the boom in farming during the latter part of the war. After their victory at the General Election in 1918, the Sinn Féin extremists worked steadily with one end in view, viz: the formation of an Independent Republic.This they did by filling the Local Government, Councils etc. with their own members, setting up their own courts, and enforcing their will by means of the Irish Republican Army.
The point I want to make here is that the rebel campaign in Ireland was a national movement backed by a large proportion of the population and was not conducted by a few hired assassins as was often supposed.
The Irish Republican Army
The organisation of the Irish Republican Army was much more complete than was generally known; it was organised on a Territorial basis with the Brigade the highest formation, Division only been formed at a later d
ate. A Bde. Consisted of from four to seven Battalions and a Battalion of any number of COs up to ten. Generally speaking each village or townland provided a CO, this arrangement facilitating training and circulation of orders, etc. The strength of the COs varied considerably, but 50-60 could be taken as a general average.
The officers were generally selected from the most desperate men of the neighbourhood, the rank and file consisting chiefly of labourers and young recruits.
A few of the officers had uniforms, but these were only worn when they did not expect to come in contact with the Crown Forces. There were, however, secret signs in the IRA by which an officer could be distinguished; for instance, they usually wore brown leggings while the rank and file wore black ones, etc. There was, however, outwardly nothing to distinguish a member of the IRA from any ordinary member of the community. This of course assisted them enormously in their operations as they could at any moment convert themselves from an armed soldier into a peaceful civilian, whose identity it would be exceedingly difficult to establish.
The arms in possession of the IRA were of a very mixed assortment, ranging from old fashioned shot guns firing slugs, to the modern Thompson Light Automatic with a rate of fire of 700 rounds a minute. On an average a Company would have six or seven service rifles, ten or twelve revolvers, a number of shotguns and occasionally a Light Automatic Weapon. Their ammunition supply for this varied assortment of weapons was, of course, very difficult and their plans had to be laid in accordance with the amount of ammunition available.This was one the reasons why they relied almost entirely on surprise action – ambushes etc. – rather that on larger engagements. They appeared, however, to get a fairly regular supply of Government pattern SAA .303. Some of this was captured by them in successful ambushes, while some was doubtless secretly imported from England.
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