And anyone who examines everything carefully will finally come to this conclusion: you either discuss a republic which desires to create an empire, like Rome, or one which is satisfied to maintain itself intact. In the first case it is necessary to do everything that Rome did; in the second instance one can imitate Venice or Sparta for the reasons that will be explained in the following chapter.
But to return to the discussion of the kinds of men that are more harmful in a republic: those who wish to acquire or those who fear losing what they have acquired. Let me say that when Marcus Menenius was made dictator and Marcus Fulvius commander of the cavalry, both of whom were plebeians, in order that they might investigate certain conspiracies which were being plotted at Capua against Rome, they were also granted the authority by the people to search for anyone in Rome who, through ambition or by irregular means, was trying to obtain the consulship and the other offices of the city. And since the nobles felt that such authority was granted to the dictator against them, they spread the rumor throughout Rome that it was not they who sought the offices out of ambition and by irregular means but the commoners, who, not trusting in their birth and their own ability, sought those ranks through unusual channels; and in particular they accused the dictator. And this accusation was so influential that after Menenius had given a speech in assembly and had complained of the false accusations lodged against him by the nobles, he renounced the dictatorship and submitted himself and his actions to the judgment of the people; and after his case had been discussed he was absolved. And there followed a great dispute about who was more ambitious, one who wished to maintain or one who wished to acquire; for one or the other passion can easily be the cause of very great disturbances. At any rate, in most cases these disturbances are caused by those who possess, for the fear of losing generates in them the same desires that those who desire to acquire possess; for men do not feel that they truly possess what they have if they do not acquire something more from others. And furthermore, those who possess much can with greater force and speed effect changes. And what is more serious, their unchecked and ambitious behavior kindles the desire for possession in the minds of those who do not possess, either in order to get revenge on the rich by taking their property away or in order to be able themselves to acquire the riches and offices which they see used so badly by others.
CHAPTER VI. WHETHER IN ROME IT WAS POSSIBLE TO INSTITUTE A GOVERNMENT THAT COULD DO AWAY WITH THE ENMITIES BETWEEN THE PEOPLE AND THE SENATE
We have discussed above the results of the controversies between the people and the senate. Now, since these continued until the time of the Gracchi, when they caused the downfall of free government, one might wish that Rome could have achieved the grand results that she did without the existence of such enmities within her. Therefore, it seems to me a matter worthy of consideration to see if in Rome one might have been able to institute a government capable of avoiding these controversies. And if we wish to study this problem, it is necessary to have recourse to those republics which, without such enmities and disturbances, have been free for a long time and to see what type of government they had and whether or not it could have been introduced in Rome. An example among ancient governments is that of Sparta; among modem governments, that of Venice, as I have already mentioned. Sparta established a king with a small senate to govern her. Venice did not distinguish by name between the parts of its government, but all those who had a place in the administration of the government were called gentlemen. This system was given to them more by chance than by the prudence of whoever instituted their laws; for, as they had taken shelter, for the reasons given earlier, on those islands where today their city now stands, many inhabitants, after they had increased to such a number that laws became necessary for them to live together, instituted one form of government; and as they often met together in their counsels to discuss the affairs of the city, when they felt that they were numerous enough to form a political organization they closed access to participation in their government to all those who might come there to live in the future; and in time, when they found that they had enough inhabitants outside the government to give reputation to those who governed, they called the latter gentlemen and the others commoners. This system could arise and maintain itself without disturbance, for when it was born anyone then residing in Venice was part of the government, so that no one was able to complain: those who came there to live afterward, finding the government closed and completed, did not have any reason or opportunity to cause a disturbance. There was no reason, since nothing of theirs had been taken from them; there was no opportunity, since anyone who ruled kept them in check and did not employ them in any manner which might allow them to acquire authority. Besides this, those who later came to live in Venice were not so numerous as to create an imbalance between those who governed and those who were governed, for the number of gentlemen was either equal to or superior to them; so that for these reasons Venice could institute that government and remain unified.
Sparta, as I have said, was governed by one king and a restricted senate. It was able to maintain itself for a long time because there were few inhabitants in Sparta and access to power had been denied to anyone who came there to live; furthermore, since the laws of Lycurgus had been adopted to the city’s advantage (the observance of which prevented any cause for disturbances), the Spartans were able to live united for a long time. For Lycurgus, with his laws, established greater equality of property and less equality of rank in Sparta, so that there was an equality of poverty there, and the plebeians were less ambitious because the offices of the city were open to only a few citizens and were closed to the plebeians, nor did the nobles ever instill a desire in them to obtain these offices by mistreating the plebeians. This was the effect of the Spartan kings, who, placed in that princedom, in the midst of that nobility, had no alternative, in order to keep a firm hold on their office, but to defend the plebeians from any harm. The plebeians, as a result, had no fear or desire for power; and neither having power nor fearing it, the competition they might have had with the nobility and the cause of disturbances were removed, and they could live united for a long time. But two main things caused this union: first, the fact that Sparta had few inhabitants; second, the fact that since they did not take foreigners into their republic, the Spartans did not have the chance either to become corrupted or to grow so much that the city became impossible to manage for the few men who governed it.
When, therefore, all these matters are considered, one can see how the legislators of Rome had to do one of two things if they wished Rome to remain as peaceful as the two republics mentioned above: either follow the Venetians and not employ the plebeians in warfare or imitate the Spartans and not open their government to foreigners. But they did both one and the other. And this gave the plebeians strength, increasing their numbers, and provided them with infinite opportunities for riots. But had the Roman government been more peaceful, this disadvantage would have followed: it would have been weaker, for this would have cut short its means of coming to that greatness which it acquired; so that if Rome had wished to remove the reasons for her disturbances, she would have also removed the reasons for her expansion. And in all human affairs, he who studies them carefully will notice that one can never remove one inconvenience without causing another to arise. Therefore, if you try to make a people so numerous and so well armed that it can create a great empire, you are endowing it with qualities that will not allow you, afterward, easily to manage it as you wish; and if you keep it small or unarmed in order to be able to manage it, as you acquire dominions you will not hold on to them, or your state will become so weak that you will be at the mercy of anyone who attacks you. And so, in all our thinking, we must consider where the fewer inconveniences are and choose that path as the best one, because a choice which is completely clear and without uncertainty can never be found. Rome could, therefore, have done as Sparta did and create a ruler for life and a small senate; but it could not, like Sparta, l
imit the number of its citizens since it wished to create an empire; thus, a king for life and a small senate would have been of little benefit in effecting her unity.
If, therefore, anyone wishes to organize a new republic, he must first decide whether he wants it to increase in dominion and in power, as Rome did, or to be confined to narrow limits. In the first case it is necessary to organize it like Rome and to make room for disturbances and widespread dissension among the inhabitants as best one can, for without a great number of well-armed men no republic will ever be able to grow or maintain itself if it does grow. In the second case you can organize it like Sparta or Venice; but since expansion is the poison of such republics, anyone who organizes it must, in all possible ways, prohibit expansion, for such acquisitions founded upon a weak republic are completely ruinous. This happened to Sparta and to Venice: the former, after it had subjugated almost all of Greece, demonstrated its weak foundation with a minor incident: when Pelopidas incited the rebellion of Thebes, the other cities revolted and that republic was completely ruined. In like manner, after Venice had occupied a large part of Italy (most of it by financial power and shrewdness), she lost it all in one day’ when she had to prove her strength. I firmly believe, therefore, that in order to create a republic that is to endure for a long time, the way to organize it internally would be to follow Sparta or Venice: place the city on a site that is byA reference to the disastrous battle of Agnadello (1509), where the Venetians were defeated by the French. By 1517, however, the Serenissima (Most Serene Republic) had regained much of her losses, a fact Machiavelli fails to note.
nature strong, and provide it with such strength that no one might think of overcoming it suddenly; on the other hand, the city should not be so large that it appears too formidable to its neighbors; and thus it could enjoy its independence for a long time. For war is waged upon a republic for two reasons: first, in order to subjugate it; and second, out of fear that it will subjugate you. These two reasons are almost completely eliminated by the above means of organization: for if a republic is difficult to take by force, as I suppose it to be, since it will be well organized for defense, rarely or never will conditions be such that one will plan to capture it. If it remains within its boundaries (and experience shows that there is no ambition within it), it will never happen that anyone will make war on it out of fear; and this fear will be even less likely if there is a constitution or law which prohibits it from expanding. And I believe, without a doubt, that if one is able to keep affairs balanced in this fashion, the result will be a true body politic and true tranquillity in the city. But since human affairs are constantly changing and never remain fixed, it is necessary that they either rise or fall, and many things that you are not impelled to do by reason you are impelled to do by necessity; so that, having organized a republic fit for maintaining itself without expansion, if necessity leads it to expand the process will remove its foundations and cause it to go to ruin very quickly.
Thus, on the other hand, if Heaven be so benevolent that it never has to wage war, the idleness would result in making it either effeminate or divided; these two things together, or each one in itself, would be the cause of its ruin. Therefore, not being able, as I believe, to balance matters or to maintain exactly this middle way, it is necessary in the organization of a republic to consider the most honorable choice and to organize it in such a way that should necessity impel it to expand, it may do so and conserve its acquisitions. And to return to my first argument, I believe that it is necessary to follow the organization of Rome and not that of other republics, because I do not believe that one can discover a middle way between one alternative and the other; and those enmities that arose between the people and the senate should be tolerated, considering them as an inconvenience necessary to arrive at Roman greatness. For other than the reasons cited, wherein I showed the authority of the tribunes to be necessary for the preservation of liberty, I easily observe the benefit republics derive from the right to make public charges, which was among the powers granted to the tribunes, as will be discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER VII. HOW THE RIGHT TO BRING PUBLIC CHARGES IS NECESSARY FOR A REPUBLIC TO PRESERVE ITS LIBERTY
No more useful and necessary authority can be granted to those who are appointed to preserve a city’s liberty than the capacity to bring before the people or before some magistrate or council charges against citizens who sin in any manner against the freedom of the government. This institution produces two very useful results in a republic: first, for fear of being accused, the citizens do not attempt anything against the government, or, if they do, they are immediately suppressed without regard to their station; second, it provides an outlet for those hatreds which grow up in cities, in whatever manner, against some particular citizen: and when these hatreds do not find a legal means of expression, they have recourse to illegal means, which cause the eventual ruin of the entire republic. And so, nothing makes a republic so stable and strong as organizing it in such a way that the agitation of the hatreds which excite it has a means of expressing itself provided for by the laws. This can be demonstrated by many examples, and especially by that which Livy brings forth concerning Coriolanus, where he says that since the Roman nobility was angered at the plebeians because they felt that the plebeians had assumed too much authority as a result of the creation of the tribunes, who were to defend them, and since it happened that Rome then suffered a great scarcity of provisions and the senate had sent to Sicily for grain, Coriolanus, enemy of the popular faction, advised that the time had come to punish the plebeians by keeping them hungry and not distributing the grain, and by taking away from them the authority which they had usurped from the nobility. When this advice reached the ears of the people, they were so angry at him that he would have been murdered by the crowd as he left the senate if the tribunes had not called him to appear before them in his own defense. What was said above can be applied to this event—that is, that it is useful and necessary for republics to provide with their laws a means of expression for the wrath that the multitude feels against a single citizen, for when these legal means do not exist the people turn to illegal ones, and without a doubt the latter produce much worse effects than do the former.
For, when a citizen is legally oppressed, even if this be unjust to him, little or no disorder in the republic follows; for the execution of the act is done without private or foreign forces, which are the ones that destroy free government; but it is done with public forces and institutions which have their specific limits—nor do they transcend these limits to damage the republic. And as for corroborating this opinion with examples, that of Coriolanus from the ancients should suffice. Everyone should observe how much evil would have resulted for the Roman republic if he had been put to death by the crowd, for this would have created private grievances, which generate fear, and fear seeks defenses for which partisans are recruited, and from partisans are born the factions in cities, and from factions the ruin of the city. But since the matter was handled by those who had the authority to do so, all those evils which might have arisen by using private power were avoided.
We have witnessed in our own times what changes occurred in the Republic of Florence when the people were not able to vent their wrath legally against one of its citizens, as was the case when Francesco Valori was almost like the prince of that city. He was regarded by many as ambitious, a man who would transgress lawful government because of his audacity and hot temper; and since there was no means within the republic’s existing institutions of resisting him without establishing a rival party, it came about that he set out to enlist partisans, not fearing anything but illegal methods; on the other hand, since those who opposed him had no legal way to suppress him, they turned to illegal methods and eventually resorted to arms. Given the proper legal institutions, he might have been opposed and his authority destroyed, harming only himself, but because he had to be destroyed unlawfully, this resulted in harm not only to him but also to many other n
oble citizens. One could also cite, in support of the above conclusion, the incident which happened in connection with Piero Soderini, which came about entirely from the absence in that republic of any means of bringing charges against the ambition of powerful citizens. For it is not enough to accuse a powerful citizen before eight judges in a republic; there must be many judges, for the few always act in favor of the few. If these methods had existed in Florence, either the citizens would have accused him if his conduct was bad—by this means, without calling in a Spanish army, they would have vented their anger—or, if his conduct was not bad, they would not have dared to act against him for fear that they themselves might be accused; and thus, in either case the appetite for conflict, which was the cause of the quarrel, would have vanished.
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