CHAPTER XI. IT IS NOT A WISE POLICY TO FORM A FRIENDSHIP WITH A RULER WHO HAS MORE PRESTIGE THAN STRENGTH
[Alliances made with powers whose remoteness or internal conflicts make them unlikely to come to your assistance provide more prestige than protection. Examples of this erroneous policy can be found not only in Roman times but also in our own day. When, in 1479, the Florentines mistakenly relied upon the King of France since they were faced with opposition from the Pope and the King of Naples, they discovered that his aid was not forthcoming.]
CHAPTER XII. WHETHER IT IS BETTER, UNDER THREAT OF ATTACK, TO ATTACK OR TO WAIT FOR THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
[Much debate has taken place on this issue. Some maintain that the only means of destroying an enemy is to take the war to his own territory, as both Hannibal and Scipio did in the Punic wars. Others affirm that the worst damage is inflicted upon an enemy when he is drawn away from his homeland, citing the defeats of the Athenians abroad as contrasted with their constant victories on their own territory, or the defeat of King Alfonso of Naples in Romagna by the King of France, Charles VIII.
My own opinion is based upon the distinction between well-armed countries and those that are not well armed, the former illustrated by the ancient Romans or the modem Swiss and the latter by the ancient Carthaginians or by modem France and Italy. A poorly armed country must keep the enemy at a distance, for its resources are financial and are weakened by the presence of the enemy within its borders. Thus, as long as Carthage’s territory was undisturbed, its resources allowed a continuous war against Rome; in like manner, Florence was practically defenseless during the invasion of her territory by Castruccio Castracani of Lucca; but once he died and his forces were removed from Florentine territory, Florence was able to call upon her resources to attack the Duke of Milan in his own country. When countries are properly armed, as the Romans were or the Swiss are now, they become more difficult to attack the closer the enemy comes to their homeland, for their strength resides in their soldiers rather than in their wealth. Therefore, a ruler whose people are well armed and prepared should always wait for the invasion of a powerful enemy, while a ruler whose people are poorly armed and unaccustomed to warfare should always keep a war as far from his own territory as possible.]
CHAPTER XIII. ONE RISES FROM A LOW TO A HIGH STATION MORE OFTEN BY USING FRAUD INSTEAD OF FORCE
I believe it to be very true that rarely or never do men of humble station rise to high ranks without force and without fraud, although others attain such rank either as a gift or by having it left to them as an inheritance. Nor do I believe that force by itself will ever suffice, although fraud alone surely can be enough: anyone who reads the life of Philip of Macedonia, Agathocles the Sicilian, and of many others like them will see this clearly, for from the lowest, or at least a very low, station they all acquired either a kingdom or great empires. Xenophon shows in his Life of Cyrus the necessity for deception: considering that the first expedition Cyrus made against the King of Armenia was full of deception and that he acquired his kingdom with cunning and not force, no conclusion can be drawn from this action other than that a prince who wishes to accomplish great things must learn to deceive. Xenophon also says that Cyrus tricked his maternal uncle, Cyaxares, the King of the Medes, in a number of ways and he demonstrates that without such fraud Cyrus would never have been able to attain the greatness he did. I do not believe that anyone who has been placed in a humble station has ever attained great authority by employing only open and guileless force, but this has certainly been the case for those who have employed only deception, as Giovanni Galeazzo Visconti did when he seized the government and the rule of Lombardy from his uncle, Messer Bernabò.
What princes have to do at the beginning of their expansion republics must also do—at least until they have become powerful and force alone is sufficient. And since Rome employed, in every instance, either by chance or by choice, all the methods necessary to attain greatness, she did not fail to use this one as well. She could not have chosen a better deception in the beginning than the method discussed above, that is, by making allies for herself, for under this title she made them her slaves, as were the Latins and the other peoples around her. For first she used their armies to subjugate the peoples near her and to gain the reputation of a state; then, after she had subjugated them, she became so great that she was able to defeat anyone. And the Latins never realized that they were completely enslaved until they saw that the Samnites were defeated twice and were forced to come to terms. This victory increased the reputation of the Romans among distant rulers, for through it they learned the Roman name but not about their armies; it also generated envy and suspicion in those who saw and heard about the armies, among whom were the Latins. And this envy and fear were so strong that not only the Latins but also the colonies they possessed in Latium, along with the Campanians, who had shortly before been defended by the Romans, conspired against the Roman name. And the Latins waged this war in the manner in which most wars are waged, as was said above: they did not attack the Romans but defended the Sidicines against the Samnites, who were waging war against them with the permission of the Romans. And Livy shows that the Latins initiated the war because they recognized this deception when he has Annius Setinus, the Latin praetor, speak these words in their council: “For if we can still endure servitude under the pretense of an alliance of equals,” and so on.52
Thus, it is evident that the Romans in their first conquests did not fail to use fraud, which must always be employed by those who from small beginnings wish to climb to sublime heights—and when such fraud is as concealed as it was in the case of the Romans, it is all the less worthy of criticism.
CHAPTER XIV. MEN OFTEN DECEIVE THEMSELVES, THINKING THEY WILL CONQUER PRIDE WITH HUMILITY
[Humility may not only be of little use in some instances, it may even increase the insolence of an opponent. If a ruler must make a concession, it is always better to make that concession after actually encountering force rather than merely the threat of it. Yielding to a mere threat usually does not forestall war, but it certainly demeans a ruler. Preparing to meet force with force will at least cause you to be respected by both your enemy and your allies and may even increase the support of your allies.]
CHAPTER XV. WEAK STATES ARE ALWAYS HESITANT IN MAKING DECISIONS, AND DELAYED DECISIONS ARE ALWAYS HARMFUL
[At some point in a discussion of policy a definite decision must be made without ambiguity or uncertainty. When the actions of a ruler or republic have been determined, the words to justify those actions will follow naturally and without need for much discussion. In the case of weak republics, like Florence, such hesitation and indecision have been just as damaging as delayed decisions, especially when the decision involves joining an ally in war. Hesitation in such instances—such as Florence’s hesitation in joining the war of King Louis XII against Lodovico Sforza, Duke of Milan—can only be harmful. In this instance it cost Florence the goodwill of the victorious French king while it did nothing to aid the duke, who would have naturally resented the hesitation if he, and not the king, had been the victor.]
CHAPTER XVI. HOW FAR SOLDIERS OF OUR TIMES HAVE TURNED FROM ANCIENT DISCIPLINE
[Modern commanders fail to follow the example of the ancient Romans, who drew up their troops in such a way that they were grouped together in three ranks and could resist repeated frontal attacks.53 Instead, they are wont to form a long, thin line of troops which cannot resist more than one attack. Not one present-day commander has imitated ancient practices and reformed modem methods in the process. In general, they allege that the force of modem artillery prohibits them from initiating such a concentration of troops.]
CHAPTER XVII. HOW MUCH VALUE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ARTILLERY IN PRESENT-DAY ARMIES; AND IF THE OPINION GENERALLY HELD ABOUT ARTILLERY IS TRUE
[Some have argued that if artillery had existed in ancient times, the Romans would not have conquered so many countries as easily, nor would they have displayed the courag
e they did; furthermore, they have argued that artillery complicates the order of battle and decreases the value of other forms of weapons or troops. Since artillery is more damaging to a defensive position than to an attacking army, and since their wars were aggressive and not defensive, the Romans would have enjoyed even greater advantage and success with artillery. As to whether or not men can still display personal valor, exposure to artillery fire is not more dangerous than exposure to other weapons, for few present-day commanders have actually met death in this way. If modern men show less courage, it is due more to their lack of discipline than to the use of artillery. The claim that wars will now be fought completely with artillery is entirely false, for a well-trained army, one patterned after the ancients, will emphasize the infantry rather than the cavalry, and this sort of soldier can most easily avoid the dangers of artillery fire. Artillery is thus useful when employed by an army composed of soldiers who match the Romans in bravery, but without such bravery artillery is inefficient when employed against valiant soldiers.]
CHAPTER XVIII. WHY, BASED UPON THE AUTHORITY OF THE ROMANS AND THE EXAMPLE OF ANCIENT ARMIES, INFANTRY SHOULD BE MORE ESTEEMED THAN CAVALRY
[The Romans always valued foot soldiers over cavalry, for good troops on foot can always break a cavalry charge, while only with much difficulty can cavalry break the ranks of well-disciplined infantrymen. This has been the greatest error committed by Italian rulers, for they have constantly favored cavalry over infantry. The soldiers of fortune they employed found it in their interest to command mounted troops rather than foot soldiers and thus profited by spreading false rumors about the ineffectiveness of infantrymen. Nevertheless, numerous battles today demonstrate the superiority of foot soldiers over mounted troops, and even though many recognized this superiority in ancient or modern times, nothing seems to persuade our princes to change their minds or to revive the military institutions of the ancients.]
CHAPTER XIX. CONQUESTS MADE BY REPUBLICS WHICH ARE NOT WELL ORGANIZED AND WHICH DO NOT PROCEED ACCORDING TO THE SKILL OF THE ROMANS BRING ABOUT THEIR RUIN INSTEAD OF THEIR PROSPERITY
Those opinions contrary to the truth and based upon the bad examples introduced by our own corrupt times prevent men from thinking about changing the ways to which they have grown accustomed. Who could have persuaded an Italian up to thirty years ago that ten thousand infantry could attack ten thousand cavalry and as many infantry on level ground and not only fight with them but defeat them, as is clear from what happened in Novara, a case cited more than once? And while histories are full of such examples, men would not place faith in them; and if they did believe in them, they would claim that men are better armed in these times and that a squadron of heavy cavalry should be able to charge a huge boulder, not to mention a group of infantry; and so, with these false excuses they would corrupt their judgment, nor would they consider how Lucullus, with just a few foot soldiers, routed 150,000 cavalry commanded by Tigranes; or how among those horsemen there existed a type of cavalry exactly like our own men-at-arms today; nor would they consider how this fallacy has been revealed by the example of those people on the other side of the Alps.
And since it is clear from this that everything histories tell us about infantry is true, all the other ancient institutions ought therefore to be accepted as true and useful. If this were the case, republics and rulers would make fewer errors and would be better able to resist any attack made against them; they would not put their trust in retreat; those who had a civic form of government in their hands would be better able to direct it, whether it be to expand it or to maintain it. They would realize tnat the true way to make a republic great and to gain power is by: increasing the inhabitants of one’s city; making allies and not subjects; sending colonies out to look after conquered territories; profiting from the spoils of war, subjugating the enemy with raids and battles rather than with sieges; keeping the public treasury rich but the individual poor; and zealously supporting military training. And if this method of expansion does not please them, they should consider the fact that conquests by any other means result in the ruin of republics; this should check their every ambition, causing them to regulate their city well internally with laws and customs, check its expansion, and think only of self-defense and of maintaining their defenses in good condition—as do the republics of Germany, which live and have lived in freedom for some time.
Nevertheless, as I said elsewhere in discussing the difference between organizing for expansion and organizing to maintain things as they are, it is impossible for a republic to succeed in remaining tranquil and to enjoy its liberty within its own narrow confines, for if the republic does not harm others she will be harmed herself; and as a result of being harmed the desire and the necessity for expansion will arise. And when a republic does not have an enemy abroad, it will find one at home—it seems that this must happen to all the great cities. And if the republics of Germany have managed to exist in this fashion and have been able to endure for some time now, this comes from certain conditions existing in that country which do not exist elsewhere and without which a similar way of life could not be maintained.
The section of Germany of which I am speaking was, like France and Spain, subject to the Roman empire. But later, when that empire declined and its authority diminished in that province, the most powerful cities, as a result of the cowardice or the needs of the emperors, began to free themselves, ransoming themselves from the empire by reserving for it a small annual tribute; little by little, all those cities not directly dependent upon the emperor and subject to no other ruler purchased their liberty in a similar manner. It happened that at the same time these cities were buying their liberty certain communities subject to the Duke of Austria rebelled against him. Among them were Fribourg, the Swiss cities, and similar towns. These communities prospered in the beginning and gradually grew to such an extent that they not only refused to return under Austria’s yoke but became feared by all their neighbors. These are the people we call the Swiss. This province, therefore, is divided among the Swiss, those republics called free cities, princes, and the emperor. And the reason wars do not start among so many different types of governments (or, if they do start, they do not last long) is due to the influence of the emperor; though unarmed, he nevertheless enjoys such a reputation among them that he serves as their conciliator, and with his authority he acts as a mediator, immediately putting an end to any quarrels. The greatest and longest wars that have been fought there have been those which took place between the Swiss and the Duke of Austria, and although the emperor and the Duke of Austria have been one and the same person for many years, he has not been able to overcome the bravery of the Swiss, with whom no agreement is ever possible without force. Nor has the rest of Germany given him much assistance, both because these communities do not wish to attack anyone who, like themselves, wishes to live in liberty and also because some of those princes cannot (for they are poor), while others will not (for they are jealous of his power). Therefore, these communities are content with their small dominion because they have no reason, on account of imperial authority, to wish it greater; they live united within their walls because there is a nearby enemy who would seize the opportunity to attack them whenever internal conflict arose. But if conditions were different in that province, they would find it necessary to expand and thus to disrupt their tranquillity.
But because such conditions are not present elsewhere, this way of life cannot be adopted: other states must either expand by means of confederations or expand as the Romans did. And anyone who does otherwise seeks not life but death and destruction, for conquests are dangerous in a thousand ways and for a thousand reasons; for one may acquire dominion but not necessarily strength, and anyone who acquires dominion without strength must come to ruin. One who is impoverished by wars cannot acquire strength even if he is victorious, for he spends more than he takes in from his conquests: the Venetians and the Florentines did this; as a result, they have been much weaker since the for
mer held Lombardy and the latter Tuscany than when the one was content with the sea and the other with six miles of territory from their walls. All this comes from having wished to conquer without knowing how to choose the means; and these cities deserve even more blame inasmuch as they have less of an excuse-they were familiar with the means the Romans employed and could thus have followed their example, whereas the Romans, with their prudence, were able to discover the means and had no example to follow.
Furthermore, conquests sometimes do no small harm to any well-organized republic that acquires a city or a province full of dissipation; these bad habits can be picked up through one’s dealings with them, as happened first to Rome after the conquest of Capua and later to Hannibal. If Capua had been further away from Rome, so that the remedy for the dissipation of her soldiers was not nearby, or if Rome herself had been corrupt in any way, the conquest of Capua, without any doubt, would have meant the downfall of the Roman republic. Livy bears witness to this with the words: “Capua, even then not very amenable to military discipline, and an instrument of every possible pleasure, turned away the weakened spirits of the soldiers from any thought of their fatherland.”54 Such cities or provinces truly take revenge upon the conqueror without battle or bloodshed, for, filling him with their own evil customs, they make him vulnerable to anyone who attacks him. Juvenal could not have put it better when, in treating this matter in his Satires, he says that as a result of their conquests of foreign lands foreign customs entered the Roman hearts, and in place of frugality and other excellent virtues “gluttony and luxury took over, avenging the conquered world.”55 If, then, the success of conquest was beginning to harm the Romans in those times during which they proceeded with so much prudence and ingenuity, what will happen to those whose actions are so different from theirs, and who, besides the other errors they commit (which I have discussed at length above), depend on soldiers who are either mercenary or auxiliary? As a result of this, they often suffer the kinds of harm that will be noted in the following chapter.
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