by Nick Lloyd
34 Haig diary, 25 August 1917, in J. Terraine, The Road to Passchendaele. The Flanders Offensive of 1917: A Study in Inevitability (London: Leo Cooper, 1977), p. 240.
35 TNA: WO 95/520, Kiggell to Gough, 28 August 1917, and R. Prior and T. Wilson, Passchendaele. The Untold Story (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002; first publ. 1996), pp. 108–9.
36 Haig seems to have been influenced by the unpopularity of Gough’s Chief of Staff, Neill Malcolm, who was accused of concealing information from his commander. See I. F. W. Beckett, ‘Operational Command: The Plans and Conduct of the Battle’, in P. Liddle (ed.), Passchendaele in Perspective. The Third Battle of Ypres (London: Leo Cooper, 1997), p. 110.
37 Edmonds, Military Operations: 1917, II, p. 207.
38 TNA: WO 95/275, Plumer to GHQ, 12 August 1917.
39 Appendix XXV, ‘Second Army’s Notes on Training and Preparation for Offensive Operations’, in Edmonds, Military Operations: 1917, II, pp. 459–64.
40 Edmonds, Military Operations: 1917, II, pp. 236–7.
41 Appendix XXI, ‘Second Army Operation Order No. 4 of the 1st September, 1917’, in Edmonds, Military Operations: 1917, II, pp. 449–50.
42 TNA: WO 95/98, I Brigade Tank Corps, ‘Allotment of Tanks to Objectives for Operations on 20th September 1917’.
43 TNA WO 95/275, ‘General Principles on Which the Artillery Plan Will be Drawn’.
44 TNA: WO 95/275, ‘Statement Showing the Rounds per Gun, Number of Guns and the Number of Rounds Required for a 7 Day Bombardment’. Plumer would also be able to employ significant amounts of the No. 106 Instant Percussion Fuse, which had recently been developed. These fuses offered a much more satisfactory method of wire-cutting by using high-explosive shells, rather than conventional shrapnel. The 106 ‘detonated the shell immediately it impacted the ground, before it had dug itself into the earth’. This ensured that the blast went outwards, horizontally, rather than upwards, giving better results at breaking down wire entanglements. Moreover, it could do so without cratering the ground. See P. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front. The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916–1918 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 140.
9. ‘An Introduction to Hard Work’
1 TNA: WO 95/275, Plumer to GHQ, 12 August 1917.
2 C. E. W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918 (13 vols., Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1941–2), IV, p. 734, n. 149. See also A. Elkins, ‘The Australians at Passchendaele’, in P. Liddle (ed.), Passchendaele in Perspective. The Third Battle of Ypres (London: Leo Cooper, 1997), pp. 231–2.
3 E. P. F. Lynch, Somme Mud. The Experiences of an Infantryman in France, 1916–1919, ed. W. Davies (London: Bantam, 2008; first publ. 2006), p. 231.
4 IWM: Documents 3215, ‘Recollections by A. Sambrook’, p. 56.
5 C. E. W. Bean, Making the Legend. The War Writings of C. E. W. Bean, ed. D. Winter (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1992), pp. 23–4.
6 Bean, The Official History of Australia, IV, p. 734.
7 TNA: WO 95/3535, ‘Advance Report on Operations of 5th Australian Division’.
8 AWM: AWM4 1/46/11, 4th Australian Division War Diary, 11–20 September 1917.
9 AWM: 2DRL/0512, B. W. Champion diary, 13 August 1917.
10 Sir J. Edmonds, Military Operations. France & Belgium 1917 (3 vols., London: HMSO, 1948), II, pp. 243–4. These minor operations were intended to improve the line and secure a number of strongpoints along the front. Both attacks failed.
11 Bean, The Official History of Australia, IV, p. 748.
12 C. Carrington, Soldier from the Wars Returning (London: Hutchinson, 1965), p. 191.
13 W. H. L. Watson, With the Tanks 1916–1918. Memoirs of a British Tank Commander in the Great War, ed. B. Carruthers (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2014; first publ. 1920), pp. 126–7.
14 J. T. B. McCudden, Flying Fury. Five Years in the Royal Flying Corps (Folkestone: Bailey Brothers & Swinfen, 1973; first publ. 1918), p. 183.
15 Ibid., pp. 186–7.
16 K. Bodenschatz, Hunting with Richthofen. The Bodenschatz Diaries: Sixteen Months of Battle with JG Freiherr von Richthofen No. 1, trans. J. Hayzlett (London: Grubb Street, 1996), pp. 37–8.
17 E. R. Hooton, War over the Trenches. Air Power and Western Front Campaigns 1916–1918 (Hersham: Ian Allen, 2010), pp. 175–8.
18 H. A. Jones, The War in the Air. Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force (6 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922–37), IV, pp. 180–81.
19 Ibid., p. 202.
20 Haig diary, 28 August 1917, in G. Sheffield and J. Bourne (eds.), Douglas Haig. War Diaries and Letters 1914–1918 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), p. 320.
21 Edmonds, Military Operations: 1917, II, pp. 244–7.
22 AWM: AWM4 14/2/2, Chief Engineer I ANZAC Corps, War Diary, 5–18 September 1917.
23 See J. Lee, ‘Command and Control in Battle: British Divisions on the Menin Road Ridge, 20 September 1917’, in G. Sheffield and D. Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front. The British Army’s Experience 1914–1918 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2004), pp. 119–39, which details the ‘blizzard of paperwork’ that divisional commanders faced.
24 AWM: 2DRL/0512, B. W. Champion diary, 6 September 1917.
25 Bean, The Official History of Australia, IV, pp. 752–3.
26 Appendix XXII, ‘Second Army Addendum of 10th September 1917, to Operation Order No. 4 of 1st September 1917’, in Edmonds, Military Operations: 1917, II, pp. 451–2.
27 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, XIII. Die Kriegführung im Sommer und Herbst 1917. Die Ereignisse außerhalb der Westfront bis November 1918 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1942), p. 71.
28 Thaer diary, 11 September 1917, in A. von Thaer, Generalstabsdienst an der Front und in der O.H.L. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958), pp. 136–7.
29 See C. Duffy, Through German Eyes. The British and the Somme 1916 (London: Orion, 2007; first publ. 2006), pp. 41–5, for the development of German interrogation techniques.
30 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg, XIII, p. 70. See also R. McLeod and C. Fox, ‘The Battles in Flanders during the Summer and Autumn of 1917 from General von Kuhl’s Der Weltkrieg 1914–18’, British Army Review, No. 116 (August 1997), pp. 82–3.
31 Thaer diary, 4 and 6 September 1917, in Thaer, Generalstabsdienst, pp. 136, 137.
32 Rupprecht diary, 6 and 12 September 1917, in Crown Prince Rupprecht, Mein Kriegstagebuch (3 vols., Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1929), II, pp. 258, 260. This was not the case. See Bean, The Official History of Australia, IV, p. 758.
33 German unit movements in J. Sheldon, The German Army at Passchendaele (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2007), pp. 145–7. See also Histories of Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army Which Participated in the War (1914–1918) (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 372.
34 KA: (WK) 1790, Gruppe Ieperen Kriegstagebuch, 10 September 1917.
35 W. Volkart, Die Gasschlacht in Flandern im Herbst 1917 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1957), pp. 57–8.
36 DTA: 3502.1, R. Lewald diary, 24 August–10 September 1917.
37 Ibid., 13 September 1917.
38 The incident occurred on the evening of 19 August when Ludendorff’s train, shunting past the southern end of Brussels, collided with the engine of an ammunition train coming the other way. The carriage was torn apart, throwing Ludendorff and his staff to the ground, but not causing any serious injuries. Apparently, an incorrect switch had placed Ludendorff’s train in danger–and with it gave rise to the possibility that the history of the war, and Germany, would have changed dramatically, had Ludendorff being killed or seriously wounded. M. Nebelin, Ludendorff. Diktator im Ersten Weltkrieg (Munich: Siedler Verlag, 2010), p. 240.
39 Ibid., p. 225, and E. Ludendorff, Ludendorff’s Own Story. August 1914–November 1918 (2 vols., New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1919), II, p. 77.
40 N
ebelin, Ludendorff, p. 240. Pernet was probably shot down by Lieutenant Ralph Curtis and Second Lieutenant H. Munro of 48 Squadron. See J. Guttman, Bristol F2 Fighter Aces of World War I (Botley: Osprey, 2007), p. 15.
41 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg, XIII, p. 198.
42 Ludendorff, Ludendorff’s Own Story, II, pp. 99–100.
43 Ibid., p. 92, and Rupprecht diary, 20 August 1917, in Rupprecht, Mein Kriegstagebuch, II, p. 247.
44 TNA: WO 157/24, ‘GHQ Summary of Information’, 25 September 1917.
45 See J. Förster, ‘Ludendorff and Hitler in Perspective: The Battle for the German Soldier’s Mind, 1917–1944’, War in History, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2003), pp. 324–5, and A. Watson, Ring of Steel. Germany and Austria–Hungary at War, 1914–1918 (London: Allen Lane, 2014), pp. 485–6.
46 R. Binding, A Fatalist at War, trans. I. F. D. Morrow (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1929), pp. 182–3.
47 A. Watson, Enduring the Great War. Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914–1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 170. See also Divisions of the German Army, p. 363.
48 BA-MA: MSG 2/13418, J. Schärdel, ‘Flandernschlacht 1917’, p. 7.
49 Schwilden, in Sheldon, Passchendaele, pp. 147–8.
50 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg, XIII, p. 73.
51 Edmonds, Military Operations: 1917, II, p. 255, n. 1.
10. ‘A Stunning Pandemonium’
1 TNA: WO 157/118, Second Army Daily Intelligence Summary, 24 September 1917.
2 G. Powell, Plumer. The Soldiers’ General (London: Leo Cooper, 1990), p. 216. According to the commander of I ANZAC Corps, Lieutenant-General Sir William Birdwood, ‘General Plumer (whose Second Army we had now rejoined) called me up and asked what I thought of postponing the attack for twenty-four hours. I was entirely against this. My 1st and 2nd Divisions were already on the move, quietly making their way to their positions of assembly.’ Lord Birdwood, Khaki and Gown. An Autobiography (London: Ward, Lock & Co., 1941), p. 314. 5mm of rain fell on the night of 19/20 September. TNA: WO 95/15, ‘Daily Values of Rainfall’, September 1917.
3 C. E. W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918 (13 vols., Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1941–2), IV, pp. 758–9.
4 Ibid., p. 757.
5 IWM: Documents 15177, A. G. MacGregor, ‘War Diary 1917–1919’, 19/20 September 1917.
6 M. Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery. Western Front 1914–18 (London: Royal Artillery Institution, 1986), p. 205, and Sir J. Edmonds, Military Operations: France & Belgium 1917 (3 vols., London: HMSO, 1948), II, p. 238.
7 The ground seems to have prevented the tanks from making any effective contribution on 20 September. Of the nineteen machines supporting 58th Division, none were able ‘to be of any material assistance to the infantry’. Thirteen ditched and four received direct hits. In 51st Division, one machine helped to capture a German position known as Delta House, but the others were stopped by either receiving direct hits or ditching. In such soft, crater-filled ground, unditching gear proved useless. TNA: WO 95/98, I Tank Brigade, ‘Report on Tank Operations 20.9.17’.
8 TNA: WO 95/1740, ‘9th (Scottish) Division. Narrative of Events. From September 18th to September 24th 1917’, Appendix C, ‘Action of Enemy’.
9 TNA: WO 157/118, Second Army Daily Intelligence Summary, 21 September 1917.
10 AWM: 3DRL/1465, A. D. Hollyhoke, ‘Battle of Polygon Wood: (Part of “Menin Road Battle”)’, pp. 1–4.
11 TNA: WO 95/983, I ANZAC Corps, ‘Weekly Summary of Operations’, 21 September 1917.
12 TNA: WO 95/3256, War Diary, 2nd Australian Division, September 1917, Appendix C: ‘Operations of 20th September, 1917’.
13 TNA: WO 95/2566, ‘39th Division. Report on Operations of 20th September 1917’.
14 TNA: WO 95/2183, ‘Operations of 69th Infantry Brigade from 19th September to 25th Sept. 1917’.
15 S. Snelling, VCs of the First World War. Passchendaele 1917 (Stroud: The History Press, 2012; first publ. 1998), p. 150.
16 Ibid., pp. 151–2.
17 TNA: WO 95/853, ‘X Corps Narrative. Zero Hour 20th September, to 6 a.m. 21st September’.
18 H. A. Jones, The War in the Air. Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force (6 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922–37), IV, pp. 183, 185.
19 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, XIII. Die Kriegführung im Sommer und Herbst 1917. Die Ereignisse außerhalb der Westfront bis November 1918 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1942), p. 74. Zone calls had been developed in 1916 in order to engage targets of opportunity. The battlefield was divided into a series of zones (based on the lettered squares of the 1:40,000 map), which were each subdivided into four letters (each covering 3,000 yards square). This gave each zone a two-letter code, which could then be quickly and efficiently sent to ground observers. This ‘reduced the necessity for personal liaison between the flying officers and the gunners to a minimum, and so eliminated the confusion which might otherwise arise from difficulty of communication when the armies were moving’. See Jones, The War in the Air, II, pp. 175–6.
20 Edmonds, Military Operations: 1917, II, pp. 272–7.
21 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg, XIII, p. 74.
22 Kleine in J. Sheldon, The German Army at Passchendaele (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2007), pp. 161–2. II Battalion had lost over 200 men before it had even got to the front. Histories of Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army Which Participated in the War (1914–1918) (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 728.
23 KA: (WK) 1246/1, ‘Gefechtsbericht des 11 IR Ueber Einsatz des Regts. Als Stossregiment im Abschnitt der bayer. Ers. Div. vom 20.9–22.9.1917’.
24 Haig diary, 20 September 1917, in G. Sheffield and J. Bourne (eds.), Douglas Haig. War Diaries and Letters 1914–1918 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), p. 329. Original emphasis.
25 ‘Menin Road Battle’, The Times, 21 September 1917.
26 ‘The British Victory’, The Times, 22 September 1917.
27 J. Charteris, At G.H.Q. (London: Cassell & Co., 1931), pp. 254–5.
28 TNA: WO 157/118, ‘Second Army. Comments on Operations, 20th Sept., 1917’, 28 September 1917.
29 See G. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory. The First World War: Myths and Realities (London: Headline, 2001), p. 176, and The Chief. Douglas Haig and the British Army (London: Aurum Press, 2011), pp. 238–9; P. Simkins, ‘Herbert Plumer’, in I. F. W. Beckett and S. J. Corvi (eds.), Haig’s Generals (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2006), p. 156; N. Steel and P. Hart, Passchendaele. The Sacrificial Ground (London: Cassell & Co., 2001; first publ. 2000), p. 233; and A. Ekins, ‘The Australians at Passchendaele’, in P. Liddle (ed.), Passchendaele in Perspective. The Third Battle of Ypres (London: Leo Cooper, 1997), pp. 219–20.
30 R. Prior and T. Wilson, Passchendaele. The Untold Story (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002; first publ. 1996), p. 119. Prior and Wilson cite the figure of 27,001 casualties for 31 July 1917, which refers only to those losses within Fifth Army and does not include the 4,849 casualties that Second Army sustained that day. If the combined figure of 31,850 is used, the casualties per square mile rise to 1,769. See Edmonds, Military Operations: 1917, II, pp. 177–8, n. 1.
31 A. Farrar-Hockley, Goughie. The Life of General Sir Hubert Gough (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1975), p. 235.
32 Prior and Wilson, Passchendaele, p. 123. These criticisms are largely repeated in G. Casey, ‘General Sir Herbert Plumer and “Passchendaele”: A Reassessment’, Firestep, Vol. 5, No. 2 (November 2004), pp. 40–60.
33 German regimental histories neatly capture this dichotomy. For example, the history of the 239 Reserve Infantry Regiment noted, with pride, its performance on 31 July, with the enemy suffering ‘terrible losses’. See J. Schatz, Geschichte des Badischen (Rheinischen) Reserve-Infanterie-Regiments 239 (Stuttgart: Chr. Belser, 1927), p. 125. Likewise, the author of the history of 60 Reserve Infantry Regiment cro
wed about a ‘brilliantly executed counter-attack’ on 31 July, which contributed to the failure of the British to break through on the first day. See F. Zechlin, Das Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 60 im Weltkriege (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1926), p. 136. For similarly positive views (‘unsurpassable performance’ and ‘outstanding bravery’) see also A. Wiedersich, Das Reserve-Infanterie Regiment Nr. 229 (Berlin: Verlag Tradition Wilhelm Rolf, 1929), p. 93. Contrast this with several histories of those regiments that fought on 20 September and the mood is much less exuberant. For example, the history of 11 Infantry Regiment complains that it suffered ‘heavy losses’ from the ‘overwhelming shelling’, leaving company strengths as low as 25–30 men (as opposed to 100 men that morning). A. Dunzinger, Das K.B. 11 Infanterie-Regiment von der Tann (Munich: Bayerische Kriegsarchivs, 1921), p. 55. 459 Infantry Regiment also lamented the ‘heavy losses’ and ‘bloody tragedies’ of 20 September. F. von Pirscher, Das (Rheinisch-Westfälische) Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 459 (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1926), p. 73. See Sheldon, Passchendaele, pp. 148–65.
34 Rupprecht diary, 20 September 1917, in Crown Prince Rupprecht, Mein Kriegstagebuch (3 vols., Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1929), II, p. 263. For Fourth Army’s report on the battle see Pirscher, Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 459, p. 74.
35 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg, XIII, p. 75.
36 J. Grigg, Lloyd George. War Leader 1916–1918 (London: Penguin Books, 2003; first publ. 2002), p. 262.
37 D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (2 vols., London: Odhams Press, 1933–6), II, pp. 1315–16. Whether this was the case remains impossible to verify. Lloyd George admitted that he had ‘no direct evidence’ of it, but had been told by an ‘unimpeachable’ source after the war that someone from GHQ rang up Fifth Army and told them to alter the composition of the prisoner cages prior to the Prime Minister’s arrival. For Lloyd George this was ‘all in keeping with the effect made to create an impression, that although the Belgian coast was not as yet much nearer, those who stood between us and that objective did not possess the requisite quality to bar the way much longer against our tremendous onslaughts’. At a meeting of the War Cabinet on 27 September, Lloyd George had remarked on the ‘poor condition of the German prisoners whom he had seen on the 26th instant’. TNA: CAB 23/4, ‘War Cabinet, 240’, 27 September 1917.