Mr. Philby, Capt. Clayton and I went to tea with Shukri Alusi who is the most learned of the learned and a great recluse. It's an immense source of pride to me that I may go to his house whenever I like.
Oh, if we can pull this thing off; rope together the young hotheads and the Shiah obscurantists, and enthusiasts like Jafar, polished old statesmen like Sasun, and scholars like Shukri — if we can make them work together and find their own salvation for themselves, what a fine thing it would be. I see visions and dream dreams. I omitted to mention that the Council of State of the first Arab Govt. in Mesopotamia since the Abbassids meets to-morrow.
To H.B.
BAGDAD, November 7th, 1920.
This week has been comparatively uneventful. The Cabinet met for the first time on Tuesday, but it doesn't seem to have done much except discuss what would be the relations between the Ministers and their advisors, and finally to resolve to ask Sir Percy to explain. He has gone into the whole matter very carefully with the Naqib, on the basis of an excellent memorandum drawn up by Mr. Philby, and I believe he meets the Cabinet to-morrow.
After the Cabinet Meeting the Naqib sent for Fahad Bey and asked whether he would be prepared to take a message from the Cabinet to the Insurgent Tribes. Fahad came hotfoot in to me. "Khatun," he said, "you I know and Kokus I know, but of Arab Governments I have no knowledge. Never will I give any answer to the Naqib till I'm assured that Kokus would approve." I brought in Mr. Philby and together we assured him. "Oh, Khatun," said he, " Oh, Veelbi, on your heads you tell me that Kokus would approve."
And he was so much perturbed that he came in the following day and said he hadn't been able to sleep for fear of doing anything contrary to the policy of Kokus. I couldn't help feeling that with such staunch allies as Fahad there was little fear that the influence of Kokus would not avail!
But if we had been setting up native institutions in the midst of order instead of disorder the task would have been incomparably easier...
Apart from the Pro-Turks, the Naqib's Council has against it almost the whole body of Shiahs, first because it's looked upon as of British parentage, but also because it contains considerably less Shiahs than Sunnis. The Shiahs, as I've often observed, are one of the greatest problems ...and their leading people the learned divines and their families are all Persian subjects. I find that the best argument when people Come to me and complain that So-and-So has not been included in the Cabinet, "Effendim, may I ask whether he is a subject of the Mesopotamian State?" "Effendim, No; he is a subject of Persia." Then I point out that in that case he can't hold office in a Mesopotamian Government. And none of my interlocutors have found an answer.
I attempt to give you the picture so that you may realise the problem; it's true that few are pleased, but they wouldn't have been pleased with any line whatever. I honestly believe that Sir Percy has chosen the best possible path. But it won't lead to immediate peace and contentment. That's not possible.
As soon as we can we must proceed to the election of an Assembly. And I shall be very much mistaken (but then I often am) if they don't ask for the son of the Sharif as an Amir. I regard that as the only solution. ...
To H.B.
November 14th, 1920.
Things are getting on. The Cabinet have accepted practically without alteration Sir Percy's scheme for the working of Ministers and their advisors. It was admirably drafted by Mr. Philby, and I think it is a real feather in his cap. Tomorrow the Ministry of the Interior gets into its new quarters in the Sarai — the old Turkish offices. They were turned, last year, into billets for officers and their wives, and it is a real dispensation that the W.O. ordered all the wives home otherwise we should have had great difficulty in recovering them ...There was no other possible place to put the Arab Govt. and people made a great point of having the old offices to which they were accustomed. To get the Ministries installed there is the only way of demonstrating that the Arab Govt. is a real thing. The Shiahs remain hostile, their chief grievance being that there is not a Shiah with a portfolio, I think there's going to be a shuffle in the Cabinet so as to admit one of them. There is also a pretty definite pro-Turkish party, consisting mainly of ex-Turkish officials, civil and military. They don't want an Arab Govt. and declare that they won't come in to it because the Turks must certainly and inevitably return.
Sir Percy preserves a calm and equitable judgment which is the most encouraging part of the whole business. Meantime, without waiting for further developments, I'm beginning to shape my branch of the Secretariat on the principle that the main thing is to get going. This week I shall bring out my first fortnightly intelligence Report — which is to be our official (and very confidential) contribution to the news of the world ...It's great fun, I need not tell you, to be creating a new office with Sir Percy's unfailing help and approval. This last week it has made a good step forward out of Chaos.
To H.B. and F.B.
BAGDAD, November 22nd, 1920.
Man for man we may say without fear that the. British adviser is better than the Turkish and we want to give this country the best chance we can. The thing is to induce the Arabs to accept the chance. I believe we can if events beyond our control don't unseat us. If we had done 18 months ago what we are doing now the problem would have been infinitely more simple.
My garden is a mass of chrysanthemums — brown and yellow and white and pink. It's very cold — the cold has come early — and the dogs have been obliged to wear last year's coats till Marie has time to make new ones., that will be after she has made a gown for me. They are disgracefully ragged and look like beggar dogs...
To H.B.
BAGDAD, November 29th, 1920.
We are greatly hampered by the tribal rising which has delayed the work of handing over to the Arab Govt. Sir Percy, I think rightly, decided that the tribes must be made to submit to force. In no other way was it possible to make them surrender their arms or teach them that you mustn't lightly engage in revolution, even when your holy men tell you to do so ...Without the lesson and without drawing their teeth by fines of arms (impossible to obtain except by force) we should have left an impossible task to the Arab Govt. Nevertheless, it's difficult to be burning villages at one end of the country by means of a British Army, and assuring people at the other end that we really have handed over responsibility to native Ministers...Meantime, Sir Percy has held strictly to his doctrine that a general amnesty must wait on submission. The Ulama have done their best to make him accept them as intermediaries; the tribes have repeatedly asked that negotiations should be conducted through the premier Mujtahid, at whose orders they would lay down arms. Sir Percy has stoutly refused — more power to him! The claim of the Ulama to loose and bind is one of the most formidable problems of the Arab State; the refusal to recognise their political authority is unmitigatedly to the good ...And it's done with such skill, with such courtesy, the letters to the Ulama are such as Sir Percy alone knows how to write.
Finally I'm summing up our difficulties — there is the fact that Govt. can't be passed from one hand to another in the twinkle of an eye...
A momentous Cabinet meeting took place this afternoon but I've not heard yet what happened ...The number of heart to heart talks which take place in my office would surprise you! All the busybodies come in to say what they're busybodying and have to be listened to with sympathetic interest and given advice which it's little likely they'll follow. I sometimes wonder whether 'au fond' I'm not a busybody myself.
Sir Percy generally sends for me towards the end of the morning and we exchange experiences. I then lunch with him and Lady Cox and Capt. Cheesman, and though we don't as a rule talk of Mesopotamia, we tell each other stories, relate comic episodes and generally keep in touch. Therefore though an hour in the middle of the day is very difficult to spare, I feel that the constant unofficial intercourse is very valuable. Also we often have a Sunday outing. Yesterday Sir P. and I and Capt. Cheesman and Capt. Pedder (my host of last Sunday) went out shooting on the r
iver bank opposite Ctesiphon ...We had about 20 Arab beaters. There were little encampments in the heart of what we call here the forest and the people were cutting liquorice and poplar for fuel to send to Bagdad and digging up the liquorice roots.
I love walking with the beaters and hearing what they say to each other in the broadest Iraq dialect which I'm proud to understand. Their clothes are amazingly unfitted for any job they're likely to undertake, especially struggling through thorns. They treat me with constant solicitous politeness, beat down the thorns with their bare feet so as to let me pass and bustle out of the way to give me the easiest place. You're not an Oriental for nothing...
To H.B.
BAGDAD, December 4th, 1920.
I wish I kept a diary. My only record of this time is my letters to you...
Yesterday afternoon I rode out to Kadhimain to see an old Persian Princess. Banu Ozma is her title, and she is a daughter of Nasr al Din Shah...
She has come to Kadhimain on a visit and has hired a small house. There I found her in a little room opening on to the Courtyard, carpeted cushioned and curtained to keep out the cold. A charcoal brazier and a parrot in a cage completed the furniture. She was lying on a mattress on the floor, leaning against cushions and covered with a padded quilt. What you could see of her was swathed in black, down to her eyebrows and up to her chin. All that was visible were voluble hands and finely cut face with enormous eyes behind spectacles. She must at one time have been very beautiful; the Kajar women are famous for their looks. She lay there and talked the most exquisite Persian, quick and sweet and faint like the shadow of a wonderful voice. These Kajar Princesses who turn up from time to time, mostly on pilgrimages, are extraordinarily interesting — they are such great ladies — but Banu Ozma is the one we liked far the best. I never saw greater native distinction than in that little old Persian lady lying on the floor.
To H.B.
BAGDAD, December 11th, 1920.
It is exactly three weeks since the last Mail came in. Do my letters arrive with any regularity? I write as you do every week. But this week there's not much to write about for I've been rather a poor thing with a chill. I stayed at home two days and then couldn't bear it any longer so I went back to the office.
The idea is to have 30 Tribal members in the election assembly, 20 being representatives of the 20 biggest tribes and the other ten one apiece for the small tribes grouped together in each of the new ten divisions. I have supplied the data to the Electoral Law Committee and selected the 20 Tribes. I don't think the Council will quarrel with my selection.
All the big landowners on the Council will try to keep the tribes out, I expect the tribes will vote through a committee of their chief Sheikhs who will select one of themselves ...As I write a mail at last with delightful long letters. As for what you and Mother say about my letters, I can't tell you what it is to me to be able to write to you so fully and to know that you're both interested. of course it makes it infinitely easier to write in such detail that you, Father, should have been actually here and seen the people and conditions ...I should not keep a record of all this time if it wasn't that I wanted to send it to you, and very often I feel that in writing to you I'm clearing my own mind...It helps me enormously.
To H.B.
BAGDAD, December 18th, 1920.
The Council is aware and Sir Percy has constantly impressed upon them, the vital need of getting down to the formation of a native army to relieve ours. Incidentally, Jafar Pasha doesn't think that without conscription in some form they can raise an army which won't be prohibitively expensive. If they have to compete in the labour market they must reckon on paying their men at least Rs 60 a month... However, that's a question which could only be settled by an elective assembly. Meantime Jafar has a committee of experts from G.H.Q. (at his request) and they're considering what steps should be taken. Roughly speaking, they think we might have a brigade by the autumn of 1921, and an Arab Division by the Autumn of 1922, which means that by that date we can reduce our force here to 1 Division, keeping it up to 2 Divisions till then...No Govt. in this country whether ours or an Arab administration, can carry on without force behind it. The Arab Government has no force till its army is organised, therefore it can't exist unless we lend it troops ...The bedrock on which this argument rests is that no administration can exist without force behind it. I think you have seen enough of the country to know that it's correct. Mesopotamia is not a civilised state, it is largely composed of wild tribes who do not wish to shoulder the burden and expense of citizenship. In setting up an Arab state we are acting in the interests of the urban and village population which expects and rightly expects that it will ultimately leaven the mass. Till the leavening has gone a good bit further than it has at present, this citizen population must control the mass, constrain it. That is why it needs force for the maintenance of internal order.
Meantime we've been busy with other matters. The early part of the week was devoted to the electoral law about which I wrote you last week. It was presented to the Council on Monday and with 5 exceptions they were all dead against making any special arrangement for tribal representation, and in favour of letting the tribes register and vote like the rest of the population. That would have meant that the tribes would have taken no part, for as Abdul Majid Shawi rightly pointed out, whereas the population of Iraq is mainly tribal and Shiah, in the. course of four general elections held under the Turks no tribesman or Shiah has been returned. Next morning Sasun Eff. and Daud Yusafani (of Mosul) came into my office to talk the matter over. We were all agreed that it would be disastrous if the tribesman were to swamp the townsmen, but I pressed upon them the consideration that whatever may have happened in Turkish times, an Arab National Govt. could not hope to succeed unless it ultimately contrived to associate the tribesmen with its endeavours. They raised good objections against providing for representatives from selected big tribes, but we also agreed that that might be got over by providing for a fixed number of tribal representatives for each division to be selected by all the tribes of that Division, i.e., by the Sheikhs. The ordinary tribesmen won't take part. It was clear that there was a good deal of misunderstanding as to what Sir Percy's views were and why he looked on adequate representation of the tribes as essential and I reported the whole conversation to him, with the result that he sent an admirable letter to the Council saying that in the election assembly which was to decide on the future of the Iraq every section of the community must be represented and that he must be able to assure his Govt. that this was the case. Jafar Pasha propounded the possible alternative of securing representation by divisions not by specified tribes. I said I thought that would meet the case excellently. Next morning, he and Sasun returned with a revised scheme — 2 tribal representatives for each Division, but any tribesman who liked to register could vote in the ordinary way — first- rate proposal, for while it secures a minimum of ten tribal members in the assembly, it does not preclude tribesmen from taking part in elections like other registered electors — if they like.
This was finally carried in the afternoon's sitting, no doubt Sir Percy's letter helping to the desired result...
In the course of the week I had long visits from the two tribal chiefs on the Council. Both are satisfied with the turn the Electoral law has taken ...I said the matter was entirely in their hands, we didn't care whom they put up as Amir or what kind of Govt. they selected to have, provided we felt sure the choice was freely and fairly made without pressure or intimidation...
To sum my impression of the week, I feel more and more how anxious the people are here with whom we're dealing to work in with us and follow our advice. On big matters and on little matters they are always dropping in to my office to consult me as to Sir Percy's views. So and So is suggested as Mutasarrif of Hillah — will that be all right? Yes, I say firmly, that's all right. My interlocutor breathes a sigh of relief and goes off to vote for him...So with the electoral law — from Sasun downwards they all want to know how
they had best meet our views. I never lose an opportunity of saying that our view is guided only by a desire to do the best by them and the country — they know the country best, how do they think this end is to be attained? and on that basis we discuss the matter, whether it's a law or an invitation to dinner! and unless I'm very much mistaken we have got the confidence of the people we're working with...
Oh dear ! I wonder what they'll decide on, and what we'll decide on, and all! What an interminable letter this is — do you mind? ...
To H.B.
BAGDAD, December 25th, 1920.
I must tell you a silly story, to understand which you must learn a little Turkish. There's an amusing idiom in Turkish by which you say "such like" by repeating the original word, only changing its initial letter to "M"...We got recently an account of the conversation between the Sharif and an Arab of these parts — the latter told us the story. The Sharif was fuming against all and sundry: "Who" he cried "is this Kokus Mokus and this Philby Milby Sir Percy was delighted...
I've been feeling a good deal lately how much the Arabs who are our friends, want us to give them lead. They constantly come to me, not only for advice on immediate conduct but in order to ask about the future: "But what do you think, Khatun?...I feel quite clear in my own mind that there is only one workable solution, a son of the Sharif and for choice Faisal: very very much the first choice ...
Letters From Baghdad Page 60