by Norman Stone
14Gorlitskaya operatsiya p. 15. There is some confusion as the Central Powers counted their field howitzers as ‘light’, where the Russians counted them as ‘medium’ cf. Rerberg ms. p. 291.
15These figures are taken from Reichsarchiv: Der Weltkrieg vol. 8, Anlage 1, vol. 10 Anlage 1 (‘deutsche und feindliche Artillerie bei Verdun und an der Somme’), vol. 12 Beilagen 28 and 29(a).
16v. appendices on ‘snabzheniye’ in Gorlitskaya operatsiya p. 504ff; Langlois’s Rapport of April 1915 (no. 2) Ch. 3 p.40 (v. note on sources); Rerberg ms. p. 200.
17A. M. Zayonchkovski: Strategicheski ocherk voyni vol. 6 (Moscow 1922) p. 12 cf. Bonch-Bruyevitch vol. 1 p. 34; ed. Svechin: ‘Dnevnik Shtukaturova’ in Voyenno-ist. sbornik (Moscow) 1919 vol. 1 p. 132f., esp. p. 180 which records a military journey.
18M. Schwarte: Der grosse Krieg 1914 bis 1918 (10 vols.)–vol. 1, Organisation und Kriegführung (Berlin 1921) p. 243, 257. cf. Ratzenhofer: ‘Die Auswertung der inneren Linie im Dreifrontenkrieg’ (Ergänzungsheft No. 2 of the Austro-Hungarian official history, 1931) p. 15.
19Lemke p. 310, 494; O. N. Chaadaeva: Armiya nakanune revolyutsii (Moscow 1935) p. 19; Sidorov: ‘zhelezno-dorozhny transport p. 24.
20Schwarte: Organisation p. 259.
21K. v. Morgen: Meiner Truppen Heldenkämpfe (2 vols. Berlin 1920) 1 p. 50f.
22O.D. Yanushkevitch to Alexeyev 31.3.1915 and letter of 14.4. British intelligence apparently reported German intentions before the end of March.
23Rerberg ms. p. 240 and Gorlitskaya operatsiya pp. 45–7 for the apprehensions of Noskov and Diederichs in Ivanov’s command; cf. Bonch-Bruyevitch vol. 2 p. 38.
24Ye. I Martinov: ‘Gibel divizii Kornilova’ in Voyenno-ist. sbornik (Moscow) 1919, I pp. 30–50.
25Taken from Gorlitskaya operatsiya, passim.
26O.D. Yanushkevitch to Ivanov 24th April; cf. Palitsyn, ‘Dnevnik’ (cit. chapter 1) III, 158–185 esp.p.158; Bonch-Bruyevitch II pp. 92, 98. 122f.
27Bonch-Bruyevitch II pp. 110 and 139. Dragomirov’s version: ‘Po povodu odnoy zametki’ in Voyenni sbornik (Belgrade) VI (1927) pp. 152–7.
28Pflanzer-Baltin, Tagebuch Mappe 1 (of 14.10.1914).
29Meanwhile, three divisions left this front for Italy, with Boroević’s army command. On overall strategy: K. H. Janssen: Der Kanzler und der General (Göttingen 1967) and H Meier-Welcker: Seeckt (Frankfurt 1967).
30This retreat—entirely voluntary—appears in the Austro-Hungarian official history (vol. 2) as a great Austro-Hungarian success. There were, on the contrary, frequent Austro-Hungarian reverses both in this theatre and in the central theatre, west of the Vistula. v. D. Parski. ‘Operatsiya 30 korpusa na Prute’ in voyenno-ist, sbornik 1920, 3, pp. 44–63 and 1921, 4 pp. 23–45; Grishinski: ‘25 korpus’ in ib. 1919, 2 pp. 37–9 and G. Korolkov: Forsirovaniye reki (Moscow 1935). Of course, these Russian victories were ultimately unimportant, indeed withdrew strength from the main theatre, as Stavka continually grumbled.
CHAPTER SEVEN
1I. Mayevski: Ekonomika russkoy promyshlennosti v usloviyakh pervoy mirovoy voyni(Moscow 1957) p. 63; cf. N. Golovin: Voyenniye usilii Rossii (2 vols. Paris 1939), a long demonstration of this
2A. L. Sidorov : Ekonomicheskoye polozheniye Rossii v gody pervoy mirovoy voyni (Moscow1973) p. 16f. very fully documents, particularly with material drawn from the commission investigating the management of things by Sukhomlinov, Smyslovski etc. the account of A. A. Manikovski: Boyevoye snabzheniye esp. vol. 3 pp. 26, 76 etc; v. below, chapter 9.
3Sidorov: Ek. pol. pp. 5–6 and Barsukov: Russkaya artilleriya vol.1 p. 17.
4Sidorov: ‘Stroitelstvo kazennykh zavodov’ in Istoricheskiye Zapiski No. 54 (1955) p.159
5Manikovski vol. 1 pp. 25, 70. To calculate needs of rifles is more difficult than with shell. It is probably safe to conclude, for spring 1915, that 200,000 rifles per month were needed, against the 50,000 (at best) being supplied.
6Korolkov: Przasnysz-skoye srazheniye (Moscow 1928) p. 12; cf. Reichsarchiv: Der Weltkrieg vol. 8, passim, for Gallwitz s army.
7Manikovski vol. 3 p. 88; p. 66f. for deliveries; Kondzerovski p. 6f. Barsukov: Podgotovka p. 100f. on organisation.
8N. Kozlov: Ocherk snabzheniya p. 107.
9Khmelkov: Borba za Osowiec p. 61f.
10Osobiye zhurnaly sovieta ministrov (Henceforth: SM.) 1914/259 of 17th October.
11Langlois, rapport No. 2 of 10th April 1915, Fascisule 2 p. 9; cf. Hanbury-Williams’s statement of 29th December 1914 to Buchanan in FO. 371. 2446 (Russia: War: 1914). Blair (despatch No. 73 of 4th August 1915, WO. 106. 977 appendix A) reckoned that Clergue, for the Canadian Purchasing Syndicate, had had orders for five million shells as well. For RAOAZ: SM. 1915/145 (27th February) and 645 (24th August); cf.D. McCormick: Pedlar of Death (London 1966), on Zaharoff.
12Hanbury-Williams to Buchanan 1st March (and memorandum) in FO. 371. 2447; cf. 2447, Buchanan’s despatch of 5th March 1915 with Knox’s views; Blair also defended Vickers, though he disliked them (Nos. 70, 15th March 1915, WO. 106.994 and 68, of 23rd February 1915, WO. 106.992). Clerk’s minute appears on Buchanan’s despatch of 5th March, and Langlois (rapport No. 2) was also highly critical of Vickers. A good Russian view is Sidorov’s Otnosheniya Rossii s soyuznikami i inostran. postavshchikami’ in Istoricheskiye Zapiski No. 15 (1945) pp. 128–79.
13Manikovski vol. 1 p. 44–5 and vol. 3 prilozheniya 7 and 11; Sidorov: Ek. Pol. p. 20.
14Manikovski vol. 1 p. 55 and 3 p.179; Percy’s minute on Buchanan’s despatch of 6th May 1915 in FO. 371.2447; cf. Ignatiev: 50 let vol. 2 p.119f.
15The most thorough investigation of the whole financial question is Sidorov’s Finansovoye polozheniye (op. cit. chapter 1), and my own account owes virtually all to it.
16Β. Bonwetsch: Kriegsallianz und Wirtschaftsinteressen. Russland in den Wirtschaftsplänen Englands und Frankreichs 1914–1917 (Düsseldorf 1973) pp. 45–58; generally, G. Hardach: Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft im 20. Jahrhundert 1: der Erste Weltkrieg (dtv. 1973).
17D. S. Babychev: ‘Deyatelnost russkogo pravitelstvennogo komiteta v Londone’ in Istoricheskiye Zapiski No. 57 (1956) pp. 276–92, which complements Sidorov’s work on ‘otnosheniya’. There are some pertinent memoirs by Russians: I. Gaidun : Utyug (New York 1918)—the title, which means ‘iron’, refers to Flatiron House, the Committee’s headquarters; A. Zalyubovski: Boyevoye snabzheniye (Belgrade, stencil, 1932 in the Hoover Library, Stanford) which in general repeats Manikovski, but with some interesting points about the activity of War-Industries-Committee representatives; V. Fedorov : V poiskakh orudiy (Moscow 1964) which has interesting statements about missions to Japan, and the Entente powers, but also contains much that is inaccurate (e.g. that ‘Second Army had almost no artillery’).
18Langlois: rapport No. 2 fasc. 4 p. 4; Ignatiev vol. 2 p. 202 and Blair No. 65 of 23rd January 1915, WO. 106.989 cf. FO. 371.2447, Wyldbore-Smith’s comment on Hanbury-Williams’ memorandum of 27th February.
19A. Knox: With the Russian Army (2 vols. London 1921); Sidorov: Ek. pol. p. 246ff. is a thorough investigation; Babychev p. 28of.; Manikovski vol. 3 p. 183; Sukhomlinov: Dnevnik pp. 232 (7th May 1915); Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya v epokhu imperializma series 3 vol. 7/1 p. 3off. (January to March 1915, on supply); Sidorov: ‘krizis vooru-zheniya’ in Istoricheski zhurnal 1944/10–11 pp. 33–57. Overall, Russian officials found that foreigners charged much more for shell than they were used to paying. Clergue offered it at $17 each, the Bethlehem Steel Company at $22. For similar instances of foreign profiteering, Mayevski pp. 50, 67, 128.
20v. below, chapter 9.
21The most substantial work on this conference is Sidorov’s—Fin. pol. p. 240ff. and Ek. pol. p. 310ff. but cf. V. Yemets: ‘Petrogradskaya konferentsiya’ in Istoricheskiye Zspiski No. 83. FO. 371.2095 contains Buchanan’s view (Russia: War: 1917) esp. Locker-Lampson’s remarks to him of 19th March. There are a number of English comments. The delegates were appalled at Russian inability to manage committees, and at the same time felt that the great round o
f banquets etc. was designed to close their eyes both to the confusions of the conference and the signs of revolution outside it:- S. Hoare: The Fourth Seal (London 1930); A. M. Gollin: Proconsul in Politics (London 1964); C. E. Callwell: Henry Wilson (2 vols. London 1927); R. Bruce Lockhart: Diary of a Secret Agent (London 1930); D. Lloyd George: War Memoirs (1938 ed. p. 928ff.); History of the Ministry of Munition vol. 10 part 3 (1922) and vol. II part 4 (1921) discusses, very thinly, the question of British supply.
22Zalyubovski p. 25.
23My account of this problem owes most to reports of British and French observers. In print, there is not much—a few remarks in the British official History of the Great War vol. 5 (1931) by H. Newbolt, Sidorov: ‘Zhelezno-dorozhny krizis’ pp. 32f Ushakov op. cit. p. 40f. The most thorough investigation is Langlois’s in rapport No. 6, of 16th June 1916, appendix 2, ‘Voie ferrée et traînage vers l’extrème Nord’, and there are other good French reports in Carton 77 (v. note on sources)—nos. 8560, by Du Castel, 7961 by Lavergne and a further unnumbered study (‘Possibilités de transport…’) between nos. 10794 and 11106 which appears to be signed ‘Guibert’. On the British side, Blair’s despatches are the fullest: Nos. 71–74 (17th July to 7th August) WO. 106.995–998 incl. and 78 (7th September) WO. 106.1001 cover the attempts in 1915 to set up a railway to Murmansk, by an English company, Paulings, which was alleged to have got the contract because its chairman was a brother of the English commander-in-chief (the chairman’s name was Lord Ffrench, not an easy transliteration). Nos. 90 (10th January 1916) and 91 (16th January)—WO. 106.1012–3 cover Archangel and the sledge-routes, with the report of Major Hallward; cf. No. 95 of 30th March 1916 (WO. 106. 1012). My source for the reaction of the Council of Ministers is SM.—1914/161 10th September opened the discussion, absurdly, with a suggestion that Archangel might be used as a port for export of grain. The subject came up again in 1914 Nos. 259 and 269 (October), 326 (November), 424 (December) and 1915 Nos. 9 (January), 88 (February)—when the picking-around momentarily gave way to visions of a new Ob-White Sea railway system—290 (April), 558 (July), 658 (August), 672 (September), 785/828 and 839 (October), 1076 (December).
24Sidorov : ‘otnosheniya’ states that whereas 22•5 million roubles’ worth of machinery were imported in 1914–15, it rose to 95 million in 1915–16, measured in gold roubles.
25SM. 1914/No. 56 of 19th July.
26Sidorov : Ek. pol. p. 36ff.
27Sidorov: ‘Stroitelstvo kaz. voyen. zavodov’ p. 161 and Mayevski p. 69.
28ed. Frantz: Russland auf dem Weg (Polivanov section) p. 263
29Manikovski : vol. 3 p. 195 cf. Barsukov : Russkaya artilleriya vol. 1.
30Manikovski: vol. 1 p. 18, 88 and vol. 3 p. 192.
31Pogrebinski: Monopol. kapitalizm v Rossii (Moscow 1958) p. 63.
32SM. 1915/No. 294 of 21st April.
33K. N. Tarnovski: Formirovaniye gos. monopol. kapit. v Rossii (Moscow 1958) p. 40ff. and cf. below, chapter 9.
34Istoriya organizatsii upolnomochennogo GAU… S. N. Vankova (Moscow 1918) p. 3ff; cf. Langlois’s rapport No. 8 (19th March 1917) Note 4 on ‘La mission Pyot’.
35Langlois : rapport No. 3 (June 1915) passim.
36Mayevski: p. 135 cf. V. Ipatiev : Life of a Chemist (Stanford 1946)
37Generally, Hardach op. cit. and cf. K. D. Schwarz: Weltkrieg und Revolution in Nürnberg (Stuttgart 1971) p. 119.
CHAPTER EIGHT
1For an excellent bibliography of these collections, v. G.Wettig : ‘Die Rolle der russischen Armee im revolutionären Machtkampf 1917’, Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte (Berlin 1967) No. 12. The best collection is probably A. L. Sidorov (ed.) : Revolyutsionnoe dvizheniye v armii (Moscow 1967) but many of its items stem from September 1915, an exceptionally bad month. O. N. Chaadayeva : Armiya (Moscow 1935); Tsarskaya armiya (Kazan 1932); soldiers’ letters in Krasny Arkhiv 17 (1926) pp. 36–54, 4 (1923) pp. 17–24 and 64 (1934) pp. 73–84 and D. Menshchinski: Revolyutsionnoye dvizheniye 2 vols. Moscow 1924) all deserve mention.
2Questions of conscription etc. are examined in chapter 10. Russian military figures are a jungle, because the Glavny Shtab virtually broke down under the strain. Some figures were given in the collection Rossiya v mirovoy voyne (Ts. Stat. Up. Moscow 1925) but they are widely regarded as unreliable. Losses are discussed in Kersnovski vol. 4 p. 870f., N. Ya. Kakurin (ed.) Razlozheniye armii v 1917 g. (Moscow 1926), and variously in Sidorov (ed.) Pervaya mirovaya voyna (Moscow 1968); I take my sickness-figures from Voyenno-istoricheski sbornik (Moscow) I p. 175f. while prisoners are best read from the Central Powers’ side—v. Oesterreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg vol. 2 p. 729, note. By May 1916, there were about fifty men to every officer (in VIII Army, for instance, 225,000 men to 4,750 officers) and this was a great improvement on figures for 1915. Important details can be taken from the record of the Cholm conference: O. D. ‘Postanovleniye soveshchaniya v Kholme 4. iyunya 1915 g.’ and prilozheniye 6 of A. M. Zayonchkovski: Manevrenni period pp. 404ff. while P. N. Simanski: Razvitiye russkoy voyennoy sily (Moscow 1938 gives a good overall picture.
3Teodor Shanin : The Awkward Class (Oxford 1972); cf. H. Gauer: Vom Bauerntum, Bürgertum und Arbeitertum in der Armee (Heidelberg 1936) p. 48f. The German army recruited 86% of its permanent personnel from towns of less than 20,000 inhabitants, and from the countryside; cf. P. A. Zayonchkovski: Samoderzhaviye i armiya p. 122f.
4Lemke pp. 178, 518–9; Kochubey: Vooruzhennaya Rossiya p. 13; N. Yevseyev: Sventsyanski proryv (Moscow 1938) p. 29; I. Patronov: ‘Staraya i novaya distsiplina’ in Voyenni sbornik (Belgrade) II (1922) pp. 221–43; Blair’s despatch No. 75 of 15th August 1915, WO. 106–999.
5Lemke p. 222.
6Yevseyev pp. 30–2; Lemke p. 180ff.; Chaadayeva p. 22–3; Sbornik dokumentov mirovoy voyni na russkom fronte. Nastupleniye yugozapadnogo fronte v. 1916 g. by RKKA. for General Staff use: No. 16 p. 25 (of May 1916). henceforth: Sbornik (Nastupleniye).
7F. Glingenbrunner: ‘Intendanzdienst’ Ergänzungsheft 8 (1933) of the Austro-Hungarian official history, p.6.
8Chaadayeva p. 18,44f.; Lemke p. 324f., 448, 515f.
9Chaadayeva pp. 28–46; Svechin (ed.) ‘Dnevnik Shtukaturova’ in voyenno-istoricheski sbornik 1 and 2; Lemke pp. 721, 800.
10The campaign of 1915 is the least-covered part of the war from the Russian side. Neznamov (ed.) Strategicheski ocherk voyni parts 3 and 4 (1922–3) and A. M. Zayonchkovski: Manevrenni period (Moscow 1929) become essential, although they are thin. The O.D. documents become an original source of much value, together with monographs in the journals. G. Korolkov: Srazheniye pod Szawli (Moscow 1926), Nesbyvshiyesya kanny (1927) and Przasnysz-skoye srazheniye (1928) are essential; cf. Flot v mirovoy voyne (1964) I passim. for the navy’s rôle and Reichsarchiv: Der Weltkrieg vols. 7 and 8, Oesterreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg vol. 2 for the Central Powers’s side. Important additions to the record come from the ‘Dnevnik’ of F. F. Palitsyn, attached to Stavka and Alexeyev at this time, in Voyenni sbornik (Belgrade) vols. 3, 4 and 5 (1923–5), and from ‘Stavka i ministerstvo inostrannykh del’ in Krasny Arkhiv 27 (1928) pp.3–57.
11Barsukov: Russkaya artilleriya table 6 p. 216; Schwarz: Ivangorod p. 126 and Gerasimov: Probuzhdeniye p. 30 (note); cf. Laguiche—GQG. in EMA Carton 77 (unnumbered despatch, of 4th August 1915—the first that Joffre knew of Russian plans to retreat).
12Palitsyn 3, pp. 180–1 and 4, 272–3; O.D. to Alexeyev 23rd May and letter to him 12th June; Schwarz p. 118.
13K. H. Janssen: Der Kanzler und der General (1967) supplies the best German account of these difficulties.
14Blair, despatch No. 73, WO. 106–997.
15Ratzenhofer: ‘Die Auswertung’ in Ergänzungsheft No. 6 (1933) p. 16.
16Korolkov: Przasnysz-skoye srazheniye and Reichsarchiv: Der Weltkrieg vol. 8 p. 123ff.
17Tactics: Palitsyn 5, 308–10 and Lemke p. 299ff.
18O.D. to Alexeyev 6th July; Palitsyn 5, 311f. cf. Schwarz p. 140 and ‘oborona reki’ in Voyennoye delo (Moscow 1918) Nos. 16 and 17.<
br />
19Lemke p. 214; Palitsyn 4, 277; ib. 5, 314; ‘B’ (probably Borisov) ‘Padeniye kr. Novogeorgievsk’ in Voyennoye delo 1918 No. 12;
20Sveshnikov: Osowiec (Petrograd 1917).
21M. Cherniavski (ed.) Prologue to Revolution (minutes of the Russian council of Ministers 1914–15) (N.J. 1967) p. 120ff.
22Blair despatch No. 73 (4th August 1915) WO. 106–997; Lemke p. 264, Kondzerovski p. 63f, Palitsyn 5, 308ff.
23Yevseyev p. 260 shows that these armies fell to 370,000 men in all—a lack of 600,000.
24Valentinov p. 47–8.
25O.D. ‘Soveshchaniye v Siedlce 15–90 iyulya’ (minutes) and cf. to Alexeyev, 18th and 23rd July.
26Lemke pp. 223–52 uses the text of Grigoriev’s trial; cf. Cherniavski (ed.) p. 75, Khmelkov Osowiec p. 88 for technical details, Palitsyn 4, 276 and ed. Frantz: Russland auf dem Weg ‘Tagebuch des Grossfürsten Andrej Wladimirowitsch’ pp. 184–5.
27Cherniavski (ed.) pp. 134–145. The Moscow City Council passed a resolution in the Grand Duke’s favour.
28Menchukov: Boy pod Logishinym (Moscow 1938) p. 62.
29Gutor: Frontalny udar pekhotnoy diviziyey (Moscow 1936) covers the Lopuszno action which showed how much greater were German difficulties.
30Lemke p. 56ff is a brilliant description of the beginnings of the Sventsiany battle. Yevseyev’s is the most thorough account.
31Menchukov op. cit. covers this action. The Russian 31. Corps had 12,000 men with 91 guns, each with 150 rounds. It took 734 men at Logiszyn.
32Oesterreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg vol. 3 p. 1–170 and Zayonchkovski: Manevrenny period p. 345ff. cover the Galician–Volhynian side.
33Lemke p. 30ff. on conditions, cf. Kondzerovski p. 70f, Lemke pp. 170, 188, 140 (on Alexeyev) etc. and Palitsyn Dnevnik 3, 160, 180f. and (ed.) Franz, Tagebuch des Grossfürsten Andrej Wladimirowitsch pp. 117, 166–7.
CHAPTER NINE
1SM. 1915/144 of 27th February.