Unfortunately, you don’t have to be a fan of conspiracy theories to suspect that the collection of files now presented to litigants is incomplete. You don’t even need to see the files yourself to spot it: for anyone who has studied Eichmann before Jerusalem, a single piece of information is sufficient. The files contain fewer than thirty pages covering the period before Eichmann’s arrest in May 1960, and four of them relate to Willem Sassen’s travels and his passport applications. They were probably added to the Eichmann files only after the Sassen interviews had come to light. Neither Simon Wiesenthal’s information nor the arrest warrants from Austria and Germany are there. There are no notes on the information exchanged with the CIA in 1958, or on Fritz Bauer’s large-scale diversionary strategy from summer 1959, to name just a few key points. Apart from the index card with Eichmann’s cover name and contact address from 1952, nothing suggests even those events and pieces of information with which we are now very familiar from other sources. If we compare the available pages with the five documents that the BfV released several years ago, it becomes clear how glaring this gap is, even against a backdrop of general reticence. A single index card may reveal a great deal to someone who has done their homework and is able to interpret it, but the real problem cannot be overlooked: whatever the reason for the current slender size of the Eichmann file, it was certainly not always the case. We have no reason to suppose that the way the BND carried out its duties was as inadequate and unsystematic as these papers suggest. Unfortunately, this observation holds true for more files than those up to May 1960.
Where does the fear of transparency come from in the Eichmann case? If we don’t want to assume that that is a general principle when it comes to the release of intelligence service files, we should perhaps consider further. What differentiates the Eichmann case from other Nazi legacies is everything that became connected with his name. Even before his abduction in 1960 people were gripped by a fear of what he might say. And the coordinator of the National Socialists’ persecution of the Jews had touched so many areas of political and economic life that the abduction unsettled not only Nazi fugitives but also economic and industrial representatives, and people working in justice, medicine, government, and the diplomatic services. From the outset, Eichmann’s name had an impact in places that Adolf Eichmann himself had never been. This was part of the mechanism of power that governed the National Socialist system to perfection. In the network of the criminal state from which so many had profited, a lot of people must have felt they had been accomplices, even if the period after 1945 had not been a time of embarrassing questions for them. The reappearance of a name that had become a symbol disrupted their collective silence. And after Ben-Gurion announced the Eichmann trial, a tremendous unrest spread to all the corners of the world where people knew this name. In 1960 no one knew that Eichmann would take the old loyalty among comrades seriously, or that he would refuse to betray them despite his garrulous nature.155 In summer 1960, as he had in the Third Reich, Eichmann was once again making an impact in places he had never been. Anyone observing the global reactions to Eichmann’s capture, as an intelligence service was bound to do, would also have been confronted with reactions even from regions Eichmann had had nothing to do with. For years, people had suspected that he was in Syria or Egypt, so investigations also had to consider the largely unexamined network of Nazis in the Middle East. This network, as we know from individual cases, quickly built important economic relationships, some of which are still revelant today. They are, of course, also relevant to the Israel-Palestine conflict (“Middle East policy”). Individuals may have thought they saw Eichmann in the Middle East, or as Erich Schmidt-Eenboom suggested, someone there may have been cavalier enough to give himself the alias “Eichmann”156—in any case, these rumors provide a key to a piece of very current postwar history. No thorough investigation by the intelligence service at the start of the 1960s could have been carried out without hearing stories of this sort. Whether in Argentina, Germany, Austria, Spain, or the Middle East, the general unrest was a reaction less to Eichmann than to the memories of people’s own involvement in the Third Reich, which were not so easily done away with. Just as a book that looks at Eichmann before 1945 is necessarily also a book about the Nazi period, the intelligence service files cannot avoid painting a picture of the postwar period, in the attempt to find Eichmann after 1945. The publication of the Eichmann files would unveil this picture. It might well also provide some uncomfortable insights.
But it would be a mistake to hold the actions of one institution and its inadequate handling of fifty-year-old files against this institution alone. The BND wasn’t a small-scale, secret unit, pursuing dubious aims behind the backs of the new Federal Republic and its representatives. If our engagement with National Socialist crimes has taught us anything, it is that small groups are able to act only when society and its representatives instruct and allow them to. One-sided accusations of guilt, as when people style the organization as a “state within a state,” cloud our judgment as much as the assumption of broad responsibility. The intelligence service was unable to operate outside Germany’s political interests in the 1950s, and its staff cannot be blamed today if the Federal Chancellery wants to block access to historical files or delay declassification by setting up commissions with working plans that stretch over years—especially when there has been no public outcry to speak of.
There is something grotesque about the attempt to keep files secret by hinting at their explosive content: we are once more allowing a lack of resolve, and the desire to avoid necessary decisions, to become inescapably linked with the name Adolf Eichmann. Half a century after his execution, the danger is very real that his name could become a symbol once more, this time for the temptation to look the other way, when we should be looking straight at this issue. This is the only way to avoid future mistakes. And it really has nothing to do with what might be contained in the historical files, or what a federal German institution neglected to do or prevented from happening in the 1950s. In the German Bundestag’s 2011 debate on the BND Eichmann files, Jerzy Montag urged a radical rethink of how we handle these unpleasant legacies: “We have to change direction.… If we discover something through the executive supplying us with new material three or four times, rather than hearing it from investigative journalists, or by chance, then something will have changed.”157
I had already finished writing this book when, unexpectedly, a journalist allowed me to get a look at the BND files. As much as it pleases an author not to have to completely rewrite her book, as a German academic I must confess that this experience left behind a lasting unease. I would have preferred to learn more than would fit into a few pages of additional comments. Among the 2,425 pages of File 121 099 in the BND archive, there is one that provides grounds for hope. It contains a single instruction, in capital letters: “Please collect everything on Eichmann carefully—we still need it.”158
Not the Last Word
Anyone wishing to study the thinking of Adolf Eichmann in Argentina now has more material at their disposal than ever before: most of the original transcripts; several different copies of them; a number of handwritten texts and typed copies; and Eichmann’s notes and commentaries on the most important publications of the day. We also have an advantage over the people who witnessed the trial, in the form of a body of research on contemporary history, and an excellent edition of the interrogation and trial transcripts.
But the task is still huge: Eichmann has always managed to browbeat and transfix people. Willem Sassen, even after the Eichmann trial and his failure with Life, continued to tell people he was going to write about Eichmann. Even when he decided to hand over the papers and the tapes to the Eichmann family in 1979, he was eager to retain the right to quote the Argentina Papers in an essay of his own. He never revealed details about the Sassen circle, keeping the knowledge to himself even after most of the people involved, like Ludolf von Alvensleben, were dead. But his encounter with Eichman
n would not let him be. In his last interview, which shows him to be a broken alcoholic, barely able to utter a coherent sentence, his thoughts still circle around the Eichmann book that he would never write.159 In the end, he seems to have suffered a fate similar to a character he created for the novel Die Jünger und die Dirnen, just when he was starting his discussions with Eichmann.160
When he came home, he did not enjoy his dinner. He went into his study, where the walls were lined to the ceiling with books, took a bottle and a glass out of the small mobile bar, and settled back in the armchair. He took up a newspaper, then a book, and finally a specialist journal with a glowing review of his latest publication, but he could not concentrate his mind for a single moment. He drank quickly and without much enjoyment; intoxication came just as quickly, and brought no comfort. It started up again—this hammering in his temples, the unease in his heart—and again he heard the penetrating voice of Erwin Holz, in snatches from the many conversations he had conducted with him in recent days. For Erwin Holz, these were the scalpel with which he had ruthlessly gone to work on himself and his generation. The doctor had tried to defend himself against Holz’s arguments and assertions, which were at times so primitive—to dismantle them with analysis or sarcasm. And afterward, he had always been dissatisfied with his destructive effort. It had been an exciting adventure for his calm, methodical mind, letting Holz light his way into the labyrinth of the modern world’s spiritual privations, and the catacombs of the self-sacrificing idealists. It had been an exciting adventure, but it had also become a burden. For now Holz’s voice was everywhere, round about him, inside him, and it even spoke in places where Dr. Dr. Thomas Bauer believed he himself had the last word. He pulled up his outstretched legs, folded his arms across his knees, and drew in his head as if to protect himself. He closed his eyes and let the voice attack him.
Sassen really did lose his own voice. The encounter with a mass murderer and his thinking paralyzed forever his most impressive talent—his skill with language, his writing. Sassen died in 2001, without ever being published again.161
When Eichmann found himself in Jerusalem in 1960, it was his Argentine past as well as his crimes that caught up with him. He couldn’t have been surprised—unlike the people around him, including his lawyer. He had told Sassen and Fritsch several times to publish the material as soon as he was dead or had been taken prisoner. And once again Eichmann had a distinct advantage over everyone else: he knew exactly what he had left behind in Argentina. He was well prepared to give his supposedly spontaneous reaction. Denying the authenticity of the papers was as risky as it was effective. In so doing, he not only managed to protect everyone involved in the Argentine interlude, and to make the Sassen circle largely invisible; he also ensured that the worth of the invaluable Argentina Papers was questioned for decades afterward. What he hoped to gain by playing this risky hand was the ability to determine his own place in history once more, in this final battle of the ideological war. But this strategy also caught him in the snare of a National Socialist error: his place in history was never a matter of his free choice, let alone a diktat to posterity. Now the age of his ability to manipulate and distract people with his lies is over. Now it is our job to create transparency and put Eichmann where he belongs, rather than be struck dumb by his torrent of words. Nearly thirteen hundred pages of the Argentina Papers, and over twenty-five hours of tape, have survived many years and numerous games of hide-and-seek. The curse of a man who was desperate to write and to explain himself is that this urge has put others in a position to read his every word, more thoroughly than he could ever have imagined.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank a great many people at the archives for their willing assistance and interest, for fetching materials, for countless letters, telephone conversations, and e-mails, and especially for all their ideas on possible shortcuts through the depths of the archives, which I would never have found without them. Particular acknowledgment is due for their courage in opening cabinets for which the contents had no index book. You can imagine how much I owe to their curiosity, enthusiasm, and personal encouragement.
For their personal assistance and information, individual corrections, and in some cases extensive correspondence and access to private archives, my thanks to: Hildegard Becher-Toussaint (Oberstaatsanw. FFM), Sonja v. Behrens, Barbara Bieringer (Vienna University archive), Wolfgang Birkholz (Kölnische Rundschau), Reinhard Brandt (Marburg), Detlef Busse (Lower Saxony State Archive), Michel Davis (Parade, United States), Nicolette A. Dobrowolski (Syracuse University, New York), Helmut Eichmann, Dr. Franke (Pattensen), Daniel Fritsch, Christian Ganzer (Kiev), Uriel Gast (ETH Zürich), Christian Gerlach (Washington), Uki Goñi, Peter beim Graben, Jasmin Gravenhorst, Georg-Michael Hafner, Martin Haidinger (ORF Vienna), Thomas Harlan (†), Gerd Heidemann, Helmut Heinen (Kölnische Rundschau), Tobias Herrmann (BA Ludwigsburg), Raul Hilberg (†), Birgit Kienow (DLA Marbach), Norbert Kiessling (LKA BW), Andy King (Telegraph), Elisabeth Klamper (DÖW), Lotte Köhler (†), Michael Köhler (Hamburg), Peter F. Kramml (Salzburg City Archive), Annette Krieger (Kölnische Rundschau), Manuela Lange (BA Koblenz), Raymond Ley, Deborah Lipstadt, Walter Lorenschitz (ÖStA), Marcel Marcus (Ludwig Mayer Bookstore, Jerusalem), Holger Meding (Cologne), Paul Mevissen, Beate Meyer (IGDJ), Lutz Möser (BA Berlin), Harry Mulisch (†), Annegret Neupert (BA Koblenz), Christoph Partsch, Daniel Passent, Anton Pelinka (Innsbruck), Timorah Perel (Yad Vashem), Bertrand Perz (Vienna), Manfred Pult (HHStA Wiesbaden), Doron Rabinovici, Oliver Rathkolb (Vienna University), Werner Renz (Fritz Bauer Institut), Dirk Riedel (Dachau Memorial Site), Francisca Sassen, Saskia Sassen, Hans-Wilhelm Saure (Bild), Esther Schapira, Patricia Schlesinger (NDR), Stefan Schmitz (Stern), Werner Schroeder, Carlo Schütt (FZH), Kurt-Werner Seebo (Bergen City Archive), Katrin Seybold-Harlan, Christoph Stamm (AdsD), Alexander Stühmer, Roelf van Til, Sidar Toptanci (BA Ludwigsburg), Michaela Vocelka (Simon Wiesenthal Archive), Angelika Voß (Archiv FZH), Klaus Wiegrefe (Spiegel), Michael Wildt, Irmtrud Wojak, Natasja de Winter (Buenos Aires), Frank Wittendorfer (Siemens AG), and the people who only helped me on the condition that they would remain nameless.
A few inquiries remain unanswered. I would still be delighted to hear from: David Cesarani, Liane Dirks (on Polityka), Guido Knopp (on sources), Jörg Müllner (on the sound editing of the tapes), and Time, Inc.
I would also like to thank all the people who have made this English edition possible. First and foremost, my publisher, Carol Janeway, who from the start gave me the feeling she really wanted my book, and who put an excellent team in place to work on it. Joshua LaMorey was responsive and good humored in his management of the strict publication schedule. Kathleen Fridella, a brave production editor. Oliver Munday, who designed the striking book jacket. My sensitive translator, Ruth Martin, gave me an English voice, and her clever work on my text brought it to an international audience that I could not have imagined while writing it. And last but not least, my thanks go to my dear friend Willi Winkler, who was not only the editor of the original German edition, but also for the English version my wise and true guard against all losses and sorrows.
For those conducting it, research is always also a piece of your own life. I had the good fortune to meet people along my path who reminded me of this fact when the garbage threatened to poison me. I have these encounters to thank for the strength to see this project through to the end. And above all, they are the only reason I can see for traveling such a road again: Eckhard Haspel, Peter Müller, and Willi Winkler.
Abbreviations
BA Bundesarchiv (German Federal Archives, documenting modern and contemporary history)
BDC Berlin Document Center, now at BA Berlin Lichterfelde
BfV Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Consitution)
BKA Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Office for Criminal Investigations)
BND Bundesnachrichtendienst (the federal intelligence service; replaced the Gehlen Organization in 195
6)
BVerwG Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court), Leipzig
CIC U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps
DÖW Dokumentationszentrum Österreichischer Widerstand (Documentation Center of Austrian Resistance), Vienna
ETH Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, home of the Archiv für Zeitgeschichte (Archives for Contemporary History), Zurich
HHStA Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (Hesse Main State Archives), Wiesbaden
HIS Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung (Hamburg Institute for Social Research)
IMT International Military Tribunal; IMT numbers refer to published protocols from the Nuremberg Trials (Blue Series)
Interrogation refers to the police interrogation of Eichmann in Israel.
NA U.S. National Archives, College Park, Md.
ÖStA Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (Austrian State Archives), Vienna
PA AA Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (German Federal Foreign Office Political Archive), Berlin
RSHA Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Main Office for Reich Security), under National Socialism
RuSHA Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt (Main Office for Race and Resettlement), under National Socialism
Sassen transcript refers to transcripts of the 1957 Sassen discussions, numbered according to (tape):(original pagination)
Session refers to the sessions of the Eichmann trial. Quotations have been translated from the German transcript.
SÚA Státní ússtreédní archive (National Central Archive), Prague
T/xx refers to the numbering of prosecution documents in the Eichmann trial
Eichmann Before Jerusalem: The Unexamined Life of a Mass Murderer Page 54