Once the state was founded the ministry of defense opened one school (later a second) that took in fourteen-year-olds with military aspirations and trained them as officer candidates; both schools continue to operate and provide the IDF with a disproportionate number of its midgrade officers. Yet the great majority of future commanders continued to come via the rank and file. At entry level no distinction was made between prospective officers and anybody else. Soldiers who distinguished themselves during their conscript service were sent to the squad commanders course, long reputed to be the toughest in the army, and the most physically demanding on the students. Upon graduating they were made to play the NCO role for a while; volunteers underwent officer-qualification tests on the basis of superiors’ recommendations.40 Although the air force and navy maintain their own officer schools, the ground forces have only a single comprehensive course, so there is no segregation by arm. The specialized training of infantrymen, armor, and the like would follow later.
The upshot is that ground officers start their careers in common with enlisted personnel. Having commanded some of the latter as an NCO, each spends another period with fellow ground officers before going on to specialize. Contrary to that in many other armies, this system has ensured that commanders have a good understanding of their troops. It also put a greater emphasis on proven military competence and leadership as opposed to social origin or education—the latter being something of a sore point for the IDF.41 There can be no doubt that from 1949 to 1973 this system served the IDF well. It not only produced first-class platoon commanders—the highest position soldiers could hold during their period of conscript service—but also provided an excellent pool from which senior officers could be selected. Whether this remains true is debatable, however; the issue will be discussed elsewhere (see Chapter 18). For the moment we will continue analyzing the officer corps.
Israeli officers traditionally have been younger than officers in other armed forces. In part this was the result of the War of Independence, which, as revolutionary wars often will, caused a winnowing-out of elderly personnel and the rapid promotion of outstanding young officers. Thus Yadin became chief of staff at thirty-two, his successor Mordechai Makleff at thirty-two, Dayan at thirty-seven, and Laskov—a true antediluvian by the standards of those days—at thirty-nine. If only because these youngsters did not want their subordinates to be older than they, what had begun as the product of circumstance turned into a matter of principle, and thus the IDF developed an officer corps that was much younger than those in other armies.
Having entered the IDF as conscripts, Israelis often served less than two years before being promoted second lieutenant, for there was no four-year academy that offered the equivalent of a university education. Once commissioned, and assuming they signed up for the tsva keva (standing forces), promotion was fast. As in all armies there are minimal periods, known as PAZAM, to be spent in each rank. And whereas thirty years of total service is common elsewhere, the vast majority of Israeli officers who did not rise higher than major (later lieutenant colonel) could expect to retire in their late thirties or early forties.42 At that point they were expected to take up a second career—usually in politics, government, or business.43 Compared to those of other armies, the Israelis’ system has probably produced a certain originality and freshness of approach,44 though whether that is still true is questionable. At the same time, however, it has also meant a large and growing burden of separation and pension payments.
The feature that has attracted the greatest amount of attention—and which is the subject of the worst misunderstandings—is the conscription of women. Throughout history, war has been the manly activity par excellence; women participated, if at all, almost exclusively as eggers-on, auxiliaries, spectators, and victims. The advent of modern warfare did not change that situation to any great extent. Unlike men, women in modern times have rarely been subject to conscription. If called upon to volunteer—as in many countries during World War I and World War II—they were assigned almost entirely to auxiliary tasks such as rear-echelon communication, administration, nursing, liaison, driving motor vehicles, and the like. With very few exceptions, only in extremis were women allowed to enter combat, as in World War II Britain, where women operated heavy home-based antiaircraft batteries, carrying out every task but pressing the firing button; and the USSR, where three regiments of female pilots were formed to fight the Nazis.45
In pre-1948 Israel, as in many other revolutionary societies, the situation was entirely different. Much military activity took place in the countryside, where conditions were primitive and something resembling a frontier society existed. Feeling exposed, men and women naturally joined to defend their homes against attack, which meant that women became Hagana members, receiving training with what weapons there were to be had. But as Hagana became institutionalized over time, women were mostly confined to ancillary tasks such as nursing, communications, and the like. As the first mobile striking force, Sadeh’s nodedot included one woman who, not accidentally, was the sister of a senior Hagana commander; there were no women in the SNS.46 The short shrift given females in Hagana generally is illustrated by an episode in the memoirs of the first chief of staff, Yochanan Ratner. At 3:00 A.M. after a particularly exhausting day, when Ratner and a fellow activist were ready to drop into bed, they were asked to discuss the problems of female chaverot (comrades)—to which they reacted by doubling up with laughter.47
Hagana’s full-time striking force, PALMACH, took in volunteers of both sexes (at peak women formed about one-fifth of the total).48 The vast majority were young and unmarried; many, having grown up in kibbutsim, had spent their entire lives in co-ed dormitories. The resulting force was perhaps more fully integrated than any other in history. Men and women—to be precise, little more than boys and girls in their late teens—lived in adjacent tents. They ate meals together and even took showers together in roofless shacks, separated by nothing more than a corrugated iron partition. The housing shortage even required married couples to live with a third person, who was expected to respect conjugal privacy.
Unlike other armed forces, as in Britain and the United States during World War II, neither PALMACH nor Hagana developed a separate women’s corps. Before 1948 many of their operations were directed against the British. Men and women were often sent out in teams, with the latter acting as cover and carrying the illegal arms. Moreover, men occupied virtually all command positions—the higher one went, the more true this became—and women were always regarded as auxiliaries whose task was to assist the men.49 Furthermore, even before independence, during “active” operations—such as blowing up a bridge—women, though they received weapons training in common with the men, were normally used only in support.50
No sooner did the War of Independence break out than the situation changed. After one incident in the Negev when a mixed patrol was attacked, its members killed, and their bodies mutilated, Hagana headquarters ordered all women out of combat units.51 Given the shortage of personnel and the fact British presence continued, the order was not always obeyed, and a typical PALMACH company with an authorized strength of 140 or so men might yet contain two or three women.52 From December 1947 to March 1948 a number of women, with pouches for hand grenades and pistols sewn under their dresses, helped take convoys into beleaguered Jerusalem as well as Gush Etsion. Acting as communicators and first-aid personnel, they often came under fire, returned fire when the opportunity presented itself,53 and took their share of casualties; of 1,200 PALMACH dead, nineteen were women.54 A few other women participated in the ferocious fighting for Safed and in the area around Latrun, where one of them, Netiva Ben Yehuda, most likely earned her reputation as “the Blonde Devil” of Arab myth. Whether accidentally or not, one of her tasks was to cover up some of the atrocities committed by male comrades, untying the hands of dead Arab prisoners to disguise the fact they had been shot in cold blood.
The fighting days of Ben Yehuda and most of her female comrad
es ended almost immediately after the proclamation of the state when, much to her resentment, she was permanently removed from the combat forces. Such was the impression of these few months that she has vowed to write no fewer than fifteen books; only three have materialized to date. Meanwhile, even in PALMACH units women were reduced almost exclusively to seeing men off to action and welcoming them upon their return—having dully cleaned rooms and prepared meals.55
When the War of Independence ended in early 1949, 10,632 women were in the IDF ranks, many of them in responsible noncombat but subordinate positions.56 Except in PALMACH, where they had been active before 1948, women had not done well during the war, mainly because the selection process had been defective, mobilization haphazard, and training inadequate or absent.57 Nevertheless the IDF, mindful of the much larger demographic and military potential of Israel’s neighboring countries, wanted to retain their services to free male soldiers for the front. Accordingly they were subjected to conscription—against a storm of opposition from religious parties, which then as now consider it contrary to the rules of female modesty. In the end a compromise was struck, and women who declared themselves to be orthodox (as well as Circessian and Druze women) were exempted (as were women who were married, pregnant, or had children). Obvious practical considerations apart, Ben Gurion held motherhood to be “a sublime and sacred thing.” A man, he said, might serve in the army and get married afterward; but taking an eighteen-year-old newlywed from her husband’s embrace was little short of a crime.58
Women served twenty-four months, the same as men; but when male service time was increased to thirty months, that for women stayed the same. The period of reserve service for females extended only to the age of thirty-four. However, in practice discharged women were rarely called up for reserve duty, enabling them to concentrate on family, study, and career. Moreover, the prestate system in Hagana and PALMACH—whereby women were fully integrated with the forces—was not retained. Instead CHEN (Chel Nashim, the Women’s Army Corps; the acronym also happens to mean grace) was established, on the British model, in June 1948.59 To the women of PALMACH the change represented a humiliation—the more so because former British army personnel were put in charge. Consequently morale dropped, and many women vented their resentment by getting married and leaving the service.60
Once the war was over, CHEN, guided by the General Staff, went to work. PALMACH members—particularly the kibbutsniks among them—had been fairly promiscuous61 (the underwear of “conquered” female comrades were suspended from tent poles, and undesirable consequences—read: sexually transmitted disease—were taken care of quietly and efficiently by the network of Histadrut-affiliated clinics). Now, to show anxious parents that the army was not simply a vast “brothel”62 as critics alleged, a much more puritan note set in. Eventually entire volumes of regulations were produced that treated every male soldier as a potential rapist. To protect women, male military police were prohibited from touching, male military doctors from examining (unless another woman was present), and male military judges from passing judgment. It became necessary to construct a double chain of administrative command, one for each sex, with the result that the main job of about 20 percent of women was to look after other women in the army.63
These arrangements certainly did not always suffice to prevent what today would be called sexual harassment, but the IDF, during most of its history, preferred to ignore or treat the problem by transferring female soldiers; after all a state that really needs its male warriors will be inclined to overlook their indiscretions (sexual and other). Nor were these arrangements able, or indeed intended, to prevent a situation where a great many Israeli youngsters first meet their partners, and acquire sexual experience, during military service. Strictly speaking, engaging in sexual intercourse on base is prohibited. Needless to say, the rule is constantly violated; normally those caught in the act are regarded with benevolent amusement. In early 1997 the Women’s Lobby in the Knesset even demanded that the IDF provide female conscripts with free contraceptives, since buying them was too expensive.
Since it needed fewer women than men, the IDF, when conducting its entry-level examinations, applied higher psychological and educational standards to females.64 Once inside, women did their five-week basic training in segregated bases, where they learned how to stand at attention and make beds modus militaris. In addition they went on marches and fired a few rounds from almost always second-class weapons; it was not until after the 1973 war that modern small arms became sufficiently plentiful to issue them to everybody; even then women often found it hard to carry the long M-16 or heavy Galil assault rifles. Tourists who visit Israel will, if they are lucky, glimpse female recruits on hikes. Their columns look disorderly—but, it must be admitted, hardly more so than those of the men.
After basic training women were assigned almost exclusively traditional tasks. They became administrators, secretaries, communicators, welfare workers, and medical auxiliaries in noncombat units as well as instructors in charge of teaching the basics to students inside and outside the army. At any one time, most women worked in bases close enough for them to go home at night whereas only a minority lived with combat units in so-called closed bases. There, inhabiting separate quarters, they are adored by the hordes of young males who surround them; those who know how to handle the situation live like princesses. Strangely enough, female military occupation specialties (MOS) did not include lorry driving (for which other armed forces assigned women during World War II). It is not clear whether this was due to physical reasons or because in the dirt-poor society that was Israel during the early fifties, driving a lorry was too prestigious a job to entrust to a mere female.
As late as the Suez campaign it was still possible to find the very rare female piloting a transport aircraft and dropping paratroopers; by the early sixties, though, they too had disappeared without giving rise to any particular comment.65 Afterwards, there were isolated attempts to train women for other tasks, such as navy diver. These, however, led nowhere: The men’s resentment caused many to drop out of the course, and few female graduates were used in their specialty.66 Such occasional viragoes apart, up to 1973 most female soldiers could aspire to occupy clerical positions in the air force—“the best [women] for the pilots” was the slogan coined by none other than Ezer Weizman, a notorious womanizer during his youth. Other enlisted women were selected for the monotonous if important job of folding parachutes; wearing the red beret, their reward was to be kissed by heroic paratroopers. As we shall see, it was only during the great manpower comb-out of the mid-seventies that the position of IDF female soldiers began to undergo significant change, the number of MOS open to them expanding. But by then, and not accidentally, the days of the IDF’s greatness were also coming to an end.
Women have been able to attain NCO and officer status along with men, the selection procedures for both sexes being similar. Female NCOs and cadets are, however, trained at a separate base; once commissioned they are either assigned to CHEN—where their task is to train and administer other women—or to staff positions in administration, intelligence, welfare, and the like. As has been the case in most modern armed forces since at least Napoleon, the IDF manpower division develops officers by systematically rotating them through command, training, and staff positions. Except inside CHEN, however, during most of IDF’s history women were excluded from two of these fields. As a result, the authority, responsibility, and prospects for promotion of female officers have always been rather limited. Not until 1982 was the post of CHEN commander—who commands far more women than most male officers will ever command men—transformed into a brigadier general’s slot; outside CHEN, the only woman who attained that rank has been Shulamit Ligom, who in 1994 was appointed to look after public complaints.67 Barred as they are from the rank of major general, female officers have yet to obtain a seat on the General Staff. Normally, the only woman present at its meetings is the chief of staff’s secretary.
Thus,
during most of its history the IDF’s treatment of women has been backward- rather than forward-looking. In a society where anyone rejected for military service was—and, to some extent, still is—automatically suspect, its policy of conscripting proportionally fewer women than men helped marginalize large numbers of Oriental women, whose schooling standards were lower. They were not only stigmatized but also prevented from making use of IDF educational facilities.68 In an army whose overriding purpose was combat, the women whom it did take were assigned almost entirely to second-rate posts. Except in staff positions, no woman was able to reach a slot where she would command men.
All this took place in a society that, being socialist and to some extent modeled on the USSR of the 1920s,69 always granted women rather greater freedoms than did most other Western countries. Women serving in Ha-shomer, Hagana, and PALMACH might complain about not being made truly equal. Still, in Israel there was never any need for women to fight for the vote, given that they participated in all elections from 1920 on; or for state-subsidized kindergartens; or for the right to enter the universities and the professions, let alone open their own bank accounts and sign a check. Contrary to normal Western beliefs, which are shaped by pictures of busty girls in short skirts and with submachine guns at the ready, as modern feminism reached Israel during the eighties and nineties it suddenly became clear that the IDF had become an island of backwardness in respect to its treatment of women. In it male chauvinist attitudes and discrimination still persisted to a greater extent than anywhere else. And, as we shall see, the more select the arm or service the more true this became.
The Sword And The Olive Page 17