Thus much points to the possibility that Nasser’s real intent was to press Israel into halting the bomb’s development—just as Pres. John F. Kennedy, five years earlier, had blockaded Cuba to put pressure on the Soviets. Whether Israel did in fact possess the bomb at the time is unknown, though at least one source suggests that such was in fact the case and that two devices were available.81 This question has recently been put in an entirely new light when Shimon Peres wrote in his memoirs that if Israel had only adopted “a certain proposal” of his “that I cannot write about for reasons of state security” then the Arabs would have been “deterred” and the war “prevented.”82
Thus Israel appears to have fallen into a trap of its own making when, bowing to U.S. pressure, it declined to tell the world how advanced its nuclear program really was. However, there is another possibility Peres also hints at,83 namely, that Rabin, with Eshkol’s backing, had wanted war against Syria all along and was doing his best to bring it about. Thus, on May 11 Eshkol said that Israeli action “larger than that of April 7” might be necessary. Three days later Rabin chimed in, giving four different interviews to four different newspapers in which he said that more IDF operations might be necessary to change the regime in Damascus and make Syria stop supporting the PLO.84
By this interpretation Rabin, acting on the advice of his chief of intelligence, Aharon Yariv, had trusted in the fact that the Egyptian was busy in Yemen.85 When Nasser, contrary to expectations, used the opportunity to extricate himself from that country, his action “struck Israel like a thunderbolt” (Moshe Dayan’s words).86 Not only that, but when the crisis materialized the Egyptians were able to carry with them both Jordan and Iraq. Although the former had been negotiating with Israel for years,87 now suddenly it concluded an alliance and put its forces under an Egyptian general; the latter mobilized and prepared to send an expeditionary force to Jordan’s aid. Taken aback by the consequences of his own actions, Rabin, recalling the events of 1960, at first hoped that things would calm down.88 When that failed to happen he went to see Ben Gurion in the hope of finding encouragement but instead was castigated for playing with Israel’s future and provoking an unnecessary war. Thereupon the chief of staff either panicked and offered to resign (as his detractors claim)89 or suffered from exhaustion and nicotine poisoning (says he, seconded by his wife).90 At any rate on May 24 he was under sedation and was hors de combat. Then he collected himself and went on to win the war.
Note, too, that nuclear weapons were never even mentioned in the public exchange of inflammatory messages between Israel and its neighbors during the crisis that preceded the war. On the Arab side this was probably because, had they been mentioned, any major military undertaking against Israel would at once have been seen to be impossible; on the Israeli side, they would have made it unnecessary. In the event it was precisely the fact that both sides—each for its own reasons—kept the nuclear genie in its bottle, which enabled the various military moves and countermoves to take place.
When the entry of Egyptian forces into the Sinai became known, the IDF’s first response was to put some units on alert and send others into the Negev. Next, on May 19, the decision to mobilize the reserves was made. Once Nasser had committed himself by getting rid of the UN forces and blocking the Straits of Tyran, war was inevitable. As it happened, the crisis found the IDF at the peak of preparedness. Mobilization brought its strength to approximately 250,000 men, some 180,000 being reservists.91 The three-week waiting period that followed proved fortunate: Whereas in 1956 parts of 38th Ugda in particular had been far from ready, now the IDF was given time to hone its edge. Having spent years preparing for exactly this eventuality, the air force, its two hundred modern combat aircraft at the ready, was eager to put its plans into practice. Since 1956, the ground forces too had been heavily reinforced until they numbered perhaps twenty-one brigades. According to a recently published account by Gen. Yisrael Tal, ten were armored and organized in four division-sized task forces. Between them they had 746 artillery barrels plus 1,300 tanks92—far above the figures mentioned in contemporary or near-contemporary accounts of the war.93 Much later, Rabin explained that people at the time did not understand how powerful the IDF had become and “really believed” that Israel had been in danger.94
Meanwhile, not being informed as to the true state of its own defenses, the Israeli public panicked before the twelve or so Arab divisions surrounding them. The feeling in Israel during those awful days was as if the world was coming to an end and a second Holocaust just around the corner. Full mobilization caused the economy to come to a near halt and men up to middle age inclusive to disappear from the streets. Steeling themselves to losses, the Israelis prepared three times as many hospital beds (14,000) than were eventually needed; meanwhile, fearing that the regular burial services would break down, Tel Aviv parks were ritually designated as cemeteries. Prime Minister Eshkol’s May 28 radio address did not help; he used IDF-ese and began to stutter as a result.95 A “Government of National Unity” was set up, with Begin and one of his cronies as ministers without portfolio. More important, Eshkol—who had once referred to the one-eyed general as Abu Jilda, after an Arab bandleader of the 1930s—was forced by public opinion to relinquish the defense portfolio and entrust it to Dayan (a lasting blow to his self-confidence). Dayan spent the few remaining days holding speeches and touring the front. As Weizman told Eshkol at the time, the IDF was perfectly capable of winning the war without him.96 Yet when victory came he would garner much of the glory.
To sum up, the IDF was confident in its power and extremely aggressive. Led by Rabin, it had done what it could to provoke the Syrians, even though by June 1967 it was at least one year since the latter had desisted from their attempt to divert the sources of the Jordan. Why Nasser chose to support Damascus at the time and in the form that he did also remains a mystery, but it very likely had something to do with his fear that Israel was about to develop nuclear weapons. When the crisis came it took the Israelis by surprise. From Ben Gurion on down, at least some of Israel’s leaders were left in the dark concerning the IDF’s true strength. If the real and alleged number of tanks is any indication, the underestimate may have been as much as 60 percent; one source even has Rabin tell the Cabinet that, in number of troops, Israel could match Egypt and Syria combined.97 Still more important was the effect on the Israeli public and the IDF rank and file—with the welcome result that during the tense weeks that preceded the war both thought of nothing but fighting for their very lives. As it turned out, fighting for its very life is precisely what the IDF would do.
The Apogee of Blitzkrieg: Israeli landing craft unloading supplies at Sharm al-Sheikh, June 1967.
CHAPTER 11
THE APOGEE OF BLITZKRIEG
THE IDF HAD NOT been idle since 1956, building up a formidable order of battle, and neither had its Arab enemies. In 1967, as eleven years earlier, the strongest country was Egypt. Egypt’s air force was deployed in some nineteen airfields, most located west of the Suez Canal. It had 385 combat aircraft, all of them Soviet-built (in contrast to 1956, when some were British) and including MIG-17, MIG-19, and MIG-21 fighters; Su-7 attack aircraft; as well as T-16 medium and Il-28 light bombers. As in the IAF, some aircraft were more modern than others, but none were obsolete. They provided cover to Egypt’s forces in the Sinai Peninsula: approximately 100,000 men armed with 900 tanks, 200 assault guns, and 900 artillery barrels. As in 1956 there was a Palestinian division, the 20th, in the Gaza Strip. As in 1956, too, the Egyptian formations were deployed along the main roads leading into the Sinai with an eye to blocking them—forming a “shield” with a “sword” behind ready to counterattack (see Map 11.1).
From north to south, 7th Infantry Division was at Al Arish, 2nd Infantry Division in the Abu Ageila-Umm Katef area, and 6th Infantry Division at Kuntilla; besides the usual artillery regiment, each unit was reinforced by an armored battalion. On the central axis, 3rd Infantry Division stood behind 2nd Infantry Division in rese
rve. It was backed up by two armored formations, 4th Armored Division at Bir Gafgafa and “Force Shazly”—actually a heavily reinforced brigade—far south at Nakhl. During the days just before the Six Day War, the Palestinians in Gaza exchanged fire with the Israelis; of the remaining Egyptian forces only Force Shazly could have been quickly redeployed for advancing into southern Negev Desert. Even this threat does not seem to have caused Rabin any loss of sleep, for the forces he allocated for the defense of Elat were absolutely minimal. As he later wrote, “We were informed about Egypt’s defensive plans ... but we did not have their offensive ones, if any.”1
What was true of the Egyptians also seems to have applied to the Jordanians (see Map 11.2). King Hussein having been forced into the confrontation by public opinion,2 his army found itself geographically well positioned to cut Israel in half; however, with an overall strength of 55,000 men it was much too weak to accomplish anything of the sort. The air force had only twenty-one subsonic, 1950s-vintage Hawker Hunter fighters (on the eve of the war six new F-104s were spirited to Turkey)3 and no bombers of any kind. The ground forces, with 100 artillery pieces and some 300 tanks, were reasonably well armed; still they could not match the IDF, which had received more advanced versions of the same tanks (M-48 Pattons and Centurions). Nine of eleven brigades were deployed in the West Bank in “a forward defense posture to ensure that not an inch of the Holy Land was abandoned without a fight”;4 of those, again the two armored ones were stationed in the rear, that is, the Jordan Valley, with the idea of forming an operational reserve and counterattack. As already mentioned, when the crisis erupted the Jordanians allowed an Egyptian general to take charge of their army and also admitted two Egyptian commando battalions; on the night of June 4-5 they were further reinforced by an Iraqi armored brigade (the 8th), which entered the country from the east. Coming under attack by the IAF, however, it never even approached the River Jordan, let alone crossed it.
Judging by their subsequent behavior, the Syrians were even less offensive-minded than the Jordanians.5 As mentioned earlier, in 1948 two different Syrian forces had penetrated perhaps two miles into Erets Yisrael before being defeated and contained at Degania and Mishmar Ha-yarden, respectively. Since then they had often clashed with the IDF by firing at various Israeli military and civilian targets along the border. Not once did they try to cross that border, however, and indeed during the mid-sixties Damascus often claimed that the way to deal with the Zionist entity was not by means of conventional warfare but of guerrilla warfare on the lines of Algeria and Vietnam.6 By supporting terrorist activities inside Israel, Syrian intelligence did its bit to raise tensions, thus helping to trigger the process that led to war.
At that time the Syrian armed forces had 65,000 men. The air force had slightly under 100 Soviet-built combat aircraft and was judged capable of carrying out “simple” operations; the ground forces consisted of the equivalent of ten brigades (including two armored and two mechanized) with 300 tanks and 300 artillery barrels.7 Three infantry brigades occupied the slopes; three more, plus the two armored and one mechanized brigades, were stationed on the plateau itself, with Kuneitra, on the road to Damascus, as their main base. In his 1966 annual report to London, the British military attaché wrote that he “shuddered to think” what the army’s “proletarian” officers and mostly “illiterate” rank and file would do with the advanced equipment at their disposal.8
MAP 11.1 THE 1967 WAR, EGYPTIAN FRONT
Preparing for the worst case—a simultaneous clash with all these forces—the IDF had distributed its forces between its Southern, Central, and Northern Commands.9 Facing the Egyptians, Brig. Gen. Yeshayahu Gavish had under him three ugdas with, from north to south, three, two, and four brigades. Of the nine, five were armored, three consisted of more or less motorized infantry (the available vehicles ranged from World War II half-tracks to civilian trucks), and one of heliborne paratroopers; in addition Gavish had three independent brigades (including one armored) standing by as an operational reserve. Central Command, under Brig. Gen. Uzi Narkis, had five brigades. Of these, one (the “Jerusalem Brigade”) was already in Jerusalem; three were in the coastal plain and were brought up to participate in the battles around Jerusalem; one was to attack Nablus from the west. Finally, Brigadier General Elazar’s Northern Command was split in two. Deployed in the Valley of Esdraelon and facing the Jordanians was an ugda under Brig. Gen. Elad Peled with one armored, one mechanized, and one infantry brigade. Left to face the Syrians under Brig. Gen. David Lanner were two infantry and one mechanized brigades. However, the IDF did not expect serious trouble on that front. On June 4 Dayan told a frustrated Elazar to “resign himself ” to the fact that the war would be waged “against Egypt and not against others”; he even doubted whether the Syrians would enter the war at all.10
Having blocked the Straits of Tyran on May 23, Nasser and his allies seem to have been content to make warlike noises and wait. Not so Israel, which, owing to its system of mobilization, could not afford to do the same—and where people believed themselves in mortal danger. Arguing that time would enable the Egyptians to reinforce their hold on the Sinai, many of the alufim on the General Staff pressed for action (some calculated that each passing day would result in two hundred additional IDF casualties).11 Still more eager to go was the chief of the General Staff, Ezer Weizman. A former air force commander, he feared lest waiting would compromise the plan for a first strike against the Egyptian airfields on which he and his successor, Brig. Gen. Mordechai Hod, had worked for so long. Roaring and bellowing, as was his wont, he went so far as to throw his epaulets on the table in front of a vacillating Eshkol,12 this probably being the closest thing to a coup that Israel has ever experienced.
Faithful to its strategic approach, the IDF under Rabin had developed a number of plans, all of which envisaged taking the offensive at the earliest possible moment.13 Though there was never any doubt about Egypt being the main enemy, initially it was not clear whether the attack against it would be limited, aiming at the occupation of the Gaza Strip and/or Sharm al-Sheikh, or full-scale, smashing the Egyptian army and overrunning the entire Sinai Peninsula; once the latter had been adopted it was still necessary to decide whether the main effort would be made by the northern ugda breaking through to Al Arish or the central one driving through ground the Egyptians regarded as impassable to attack the rear. There was also some debate whether to use the opportunity to launch an attack against Jordan. The events at Samua in 1966 demonstrated to the General Staff how easily the IDF could overrun the West Bank,14 thus setting right the “historical error” of 1948. That idea, however, was rejected. In fact, for hours after the Jordanians opened fire on June 5, the government of Israel was still sending messages calling for mediation in an attempt to avoid a large-scale confrontation with its neighbor to the east.15
As the slide toward war continued, much depended on making sure the United States would not object, as it had in 1956. During the last week of May, there was a flurry of diplomatic activity as Foreign Minister Abba Eban attempted to hold the three Western powers (United States, Great Britain, and France) to their 1957 promise to open the Straits of Tyran if blocked by Egypt.16 He failed, but at any rate his highly publicized visits reinforced the Israeli public’s feeling that it was alone and thus strengthened its determination to fight for its life—probably the most decisive factor in the war.
On June 3 the head of Mossad, Brigadier General (ret.) Amit, returned home from talks with U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. He brought the clear impression that the United States would not mind if “Nasser’s bones were broken” and certainly would do nothing to prevent it. That evening the final decision to go to war was made.17 Two days later, at 0750 hours, the air-raid sirens sounded in towns and settlements all over Israel. Those who switched on their radios could hear the announcer say that the IAF had gone to war in order to intercept Egyptian aircraft approaching Israel—a flat lie, no such approach having taken place. Five minutes p
reviously, at 0845 hours Egyptian time, the first IAF flights had reached their targets. Excellent intelligence enabled the Israelis to pinpoint the entire order of battle of Egypt’s air force, down to the names of individual pilots. More significant, the locations of individual squadrons and their types of aircraft were also known,18 thus enabling the IAF to select and strike the most dangerous Egyptian forces first.
Of the IAF’s 200 combat aircraft only twelve stayed behind to defend the homeland, either on airborne patrol or sitting at the edge of runways. Some of the attacking planes were loaded with few bombs and lots of fuel—many were operating at extreme range—and flew in low over the Mediterranean, maintaining radio silence and presumably using electronic countermeasures (ECM) to avoid the dozens of Egyptian, Soviet, and U.S. radars that might have detected them.19 Other aircraft were sent against bases located in the Sinai itself and thus made straight for their targets. The first wave hit nine bases, knocking out many modern MIG-21 fighters and launching ground-penetrating Durendals into the runways to render them unserviceable. Some of the bombs exploded immediately, creating craters, whereas delayed fuses were set on others to obstruct attempts to clear and repair the runways. Then, for two hours and fifty minutes, one wave after another followed up until no fewer than nineteen Egyptian airfields had been attacked and 286 machines of various types turned into smoldering wrecks.20
The offensive had been carefully timed to hit its targets after the Egyptian predawn patrols landed but before senior commanders reached their desks. The enemy was taken totally by surprise, what with the majority of senior officers not yet at their desks and most planes sitting neatly on the runways, waiting to be strafed. Designed to shoot planes that flew at high altitudes, the Egyptians’ Soviet-made SAM-2 surface-to-air missiles proved little threat, as did the fire of antiaircraft guns, which tended to be uncoordinated and overall lighter than anticipated. A couple of the Israeli aircraft in the first wave were shot down by Egyptian MIGs, which managed to take off but were themselves promptly downed. It was a nearly letter-perfect operation, carried out with zest and determination. By 1100 hours Israeli time Ezer Weizman could be heard bellowing on the telephone that the war had been won21—which indeed was the case.
The Sword And The Olive Page 25