As Lebanon disintegrated Israel acted. Although cross-border activity never ceased, compared to what was going on in the north and center of Lebanon the south was an oasis of quiet and attracted many refugees. Guided by Shimon Peres as minister of defense,2 Israel sought to establish a kind of protectorate over the area. It would help the local Shiites set up their own armed force; paid for, trained, and equipped by the IDF, it would do its bit in protecting the border against attack. The policy was known as the “Good Fence,” after the heavily guarded fence separating Israel and Lebanon. From 1976 on, the gates in the fence became as important as the fence itself. Through them passed Israeli supplies and military advisers in one direction, Lebanese civilians seeking work and medical treatment in the other.
During the first period of civil war Syrian intervention was generally limited to manipulating the various sides and providing arms. In June 1976, Syria invaded Lebanon, however, ostensibly to help Palestinians against their enemies and make sure they would be in a position to continue their struggle against Israel. The story of subsequent Syrian involvement is immensely complicated; suffice it to say they allied now with one side, then with another, taking on militia after militia and invariably defeating them in short, sharp encounters. How they managed this without falling apart, as would virtually every other army caught in a similar situation since 1945, has never been properly studied. All the while they were obviously determined to extend their own influence and by 1982 ended up dominating Lebanon’s eastern and central regions.
In the face of the Syrian threat, Israel’s initial response had been to issue stern warnings against an invasion.3 When that did not work, first Rabin and then Begin sought to draw “red lines,” which the Syrians were not supposed to cross. In fact an understanding was reached by which the Syrians undertook not to activate their air force against the IAF—which had been roaming over Lebanon for years—and not to station antiaircraft missiles in the country. Above all, they were to remain north of a line stretching from the mouth of the Zaharani River on the Mediterranean to the village of Mashki in the Beqa Valley to the east,4 thereby leaving a sort of no-man’s-land where PLO, supported by Syria, fought for domination against Israel and its Shiite allies.
Against this background of continual skirmishes, March 11, 1978, was a particularly bad day. A PLO party left Damour (in northern Lebanon) by sea, landed south of Haifa, and killed an American woman tourist they met on the beach. Next they hijacked a bus that was driving south along the coastal highway; thanks to deficient coordination between the IDF and the Israeli police, they were able to get as far as the northern outskirts of Tel Aviv before they were stopped. By the time the incident was terminated, thirty-seven Israelis were dead, the majority having been killed by the terrorists but some apparently by the security forces as they stormed the bus. Previously Begin as opposition leader had repeatedly chided Rabin for not being tough enough on Lebanese-based terrorism. Now he and Weizman organized two brigades—some 7,000 troops with artillery and tanks—and, after a weeklong weather delay, sent them rolling into southern Lebanon.
How Chief of Staff Gur, who during his term as CO Northern Command had been in charge of several similar operations, could have hoped to beat the PLO by such cumbersome means remains a mystery. Possibly he had learned nothing from the lessons of Vietnam, where countless similar operations had failed; more likely he and his masters just wanted to assuage outraged Israeli public opinion. In any event local Lebanese paid the price as dozens were killed, hundreds had their homes demolished, and tens of thousands fled north to escape the shelling and aerial bombardment. Needless to say the guerrillas, having had plenty of warning, also fled, some with their arms and others without (then again, outside the Occupied Territories acquiring additional light arms never constituted a problem for the PLO). Having suffered more than thirty dead, the IDF, five days after “Operation Litani” began, was back at its starting line. The only tangible result, if it may be called that, was the creation of a small UN observation force, which took up positions north of the border.
In retrospect “Operation Litani” constituted a turning point. It not only proved that the IDF did not know how to deal with the PLO but also boosted PLO confidence. Accordingly, even as skirmishes proceeded apace Arafat and his men set out to transform the guerrillas in southern Lebanon into a semiregular force. Syria and some other Arab countries, mainly Libya, helped; by summer 1981 this had resulted in the creation of three fledgling infantry brigades named Karameh, Yarmuk, and Kastel. They were supported by some one hundred artillery barrels and a number of old T-34 tanks.5 The Palestinians acquired in addition astounding quantities of small arms, various antiaircraft guns, and antitank weapons in the form of Soviet-manufactured RPG-7 rockets. Many of the arms were stored in the extensive system of underground bunkers that honeycombed the refugee camps; when the time for invasion came, the IDF would find them wrapped in their plastic covers.
By that time Israel, hoping to counter the Syrians, had become heavily involved with the Lebanese Christians concentrated in the north. The first direct contact between the two sides took place while Rabin was prime minister; he was, however, dubious and unwilling to do more than provide weapons, ammunition, fuel, and training.6 Begin, too, was initially cautious but later persuaded himself that the Syrians were genocidal, so he determined to do more. Mossad took up contact with the most important Christian militia, the Phalange, whose leaders made use of truly scrumptious feasts in order to recruit the Israelis for their cause.7 The ultimate goal was to form an alliance and drive the Syrians out of the country. Clashes between Phalange commander Bashir Gemayel and the Syrians multiplied. Syrian army helicopters were used against the Phalange, two being downed by the IAF; in April 1981 the Syrians responded by moving antiaircraft missiles into Lebanon.8
Thus, during a period of several years the elements that would combine to create the IDF’s greatest folly were being assembled one by one. In summer 1981 the border between Israel and Lebanon flared up as the IDF answered fresh Katyusha rocket attacks by means of an unprecedented heavy artillery bombardment and a heliborne raid against PLO bases on the Zaharani River. Still Begin held back; after about two weeks of fighting a cease-fire was concluded and during the next year was to be observed fairly scrupulously by both sides. A month later Sharon’s appointment as minister of defense marked the beginning of the end run. Since 1973 the hawkish former general had often castigated the government for being soft on the Arabs; he even voted against the Camp David Accords. Now that the Lebanon border was almost completely quiet he, Eytan, and other members of the General Staff, every time some incident took place anywhere in the country, would descend on it like vultures, looking hard to see whether it was their excuse to invade. During the winter and spring of 1982, the plans were repeatedly set in motion and the tank transporters loaded and sent on their way. They were always recalled for one reason or another.
In truth, the IDF’s planning for Lebanon simply was not a rational response to PLO attacks. Perhaps because he had never been a soldier, Begin saw war in romantic terms. According to Arye Naor, who served as secretary to the Cabinet, for Begin the idea of Jews taking military action against their enemies struck a deep emotional chord; after all, the state of Israel had been established specifically to put an end to the pogroms that made them the hapless victims.9 Even among those who did not share this vision, the October War had caused a trauma that the Entebbe raid and the operation against the Iraqi reactor could only do so much to heal. Constantly harassed by guerrillas in Lebanon and the Occupied Territories, army commanders were raring to go—had they not spent years building the most enormous force ever fielded by such a small country? Above all, the air force was seeking revenge for the losses it had suffered in 1973, which had induced its former commander, Ezer Weizman, to say that “the missiles had bent the wing of the airplane.” When the next clash came, it was a question of pitting “our best against theirs” to see who would come out on top.10
In any event Israel’s excuse for launching “Operation Peace for Galilee”—the name dreamed up by Begin personally—proved paper-thin (see Map 17.1). On June 3, 1982, Israel’s ambassador to London, Shlomo Argov, was shot in the head and gravely wounded. The PLO disclaimed responsibility; there were indications that the perpetrators belonged to Abu Nidal’s group, intending to put Arafat out on a limb.11 Yet Sharon ordered the IAF to bomb Palestinian bases in the camps near Beirut, knowing full well that the response would be renewed rocket attacks on northern Israel. The attacks duly took place, and the tank transporters were set rolling toward the frontier. This time they did not stop, however, and on June 6, exactly fifteen years after the Six Day War, Israel found itself embroiled in large-scale hostilities against an Arab neighbor.
Officially the campaign’s objective was to overrun the PLO strongholds and throw the guerrillas back to a line twenty-five miles (forty kilometers) north of the border, thereby putting them beyond the range of their Katyusha rockets. As early as October 1981 a much larger operation had been hatched, however, aiming to link with the Christians in Beirut to break the PLO; it was in Lebanon that the fate of the Occupied Territories was to be decided.12 Since the Syrian forward positions in the eastern sector were located only fourteen miles or so from Israel’s border, a clash with them was inevitable.
MAP 17.1 “OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE,” 1982
Sharon may have been acting in the hope that the Syrians would abandon their positions as the IDF, bypassing them on the west, cut the Beirut-Damascus Road, which served as their main line of communications with the Lebanese capital. More likely, though, a clash with the Syrians was planned from the beginning; certainly when the time came ample forces for the purpose were available, ready, and willing. Whether Begin’s Cabinet was informed of the larger plan (as Sharon claims) or whether the former paratrooper commander was once again preparing to exceed instructions (as Begin’s son, Benyamin, says on the strength of alleged conversations he had with his father) is immaterial and almost certainly will never be known.13 Another possibility that cannot be excluded: Begin, far from being misled, was using Sharon to do much more than he could reveal in public; whatever the prime minister’s faults, a fool he was not.
To carry out the operation Sharon had concentrated an enormous force, no fewer than six and a half divisions and yet another standing in readiness on the Golan Heights in case the Syrians should make a move on that front. Of those earmarked for Lebanon proper, and proceeding from west to east, two were positioned along the coastal road. Commanded by Brigadier Generals Mordechai (later to become minister of defense under Netanyahu) and Yaron, their mission was to link up with another brigade scheduled to carry out a landing at the mouth of the Awali River some thirty miles north of the border. Having done so, the combined force was to drive straight for Beirut, reaching the outskirts after only three days.
In the center a third division under Brigadier General Kahalani—in 1973 he stopped the Syrians at the Valley of Tears—stood ready to take the central route that led through the mountains toward Nabatiye and then toward Siddon on the road to Beirut. Behind him was positioned yet another division under Brigadier General Einan, the intent being to push through the road cleared by Kahalani to advance from Nabatiye and Jezzin toward the road from Beirut to Damascus; had he reached it the Syrian forces in Beirut and the Beqa Valley would have been cut off. Finally, in the Galilee panhandle near Metulla there was concentrated the IDF’s most powerful striking force, a two-division corps commanded by Major General Ben Gal. In October 1973 he had been highly successful as CO of 7th Armored Brigade on the Golan Heights; later he had served as CO Northern Command before going on study-leave. Shaggy, dour, subject to violent outbreaks of temper, he was regarded by Eytan as the IDF’s best field commander and a candidate for chief of staff. Now his mission was to advance toward the Syrian forces deployed in the Beqa Valley.
Otherwise put, the IDF’s plan of operations provided for the deployment of four independent divisions, an amphibious brigade, and a two-division corps (with yet another division standing in reserve). In charge of the whole machine—about twice as large as that in 1973, which had stopped Egypt’s entire army!—was the CO Northern Command, Maj. Gen. Amir Drori. Since this, unlike 1973, was a war on a single front, Eytan was free to control his forces at close quarters. Behind Eytan again stood Sharon, who also had a free hand and, between briefings to the Cabinet, kept visiting the front and acting as a kind of super chief of staff.
Thus the IDF’s command organization was top-heavy, what with Drori, Drori’s deputy, intelligence chief Yehosua Saguy, former intelligence chief Aharon Yariv (who was serving as “head of Northern Command’s think tank”), Refael Eytan, Moshe Levy (Eytan’s deputy), Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yona Efrat (Eytan’s assistant), and Sharon—and during the first two days Begin himself—crowding into the operations room of Northern Command for “Marathonian discussions” that went into the small hours of the night.14 Remarkably enough it also succeeded in being insufficiently thought through at the lower level since the span of control proved too large for Drori to handle. As in 1973, generals who had nothing to do with the campai gn butted in. The most important one was Yekutiel Adam, former chief of the General Staff Division who was away on study-leave in New York. When war broke out he flew home, packed his gear, marched into Lebanon on some unspecified mission, and ended up getting killed under circumstances that remain unclear.
In part, the use of such huge forces in Lebanon—the country is mountainous and, except along the coast, has hardly any first-class highways—may have been dictated by the need to show the USSR, as Syria’s supporter, that any intervention would have to be massive and costly. In part, too, it may have resulted from a dispute between Sharon and Eytan as to where the operation’s center of gravity ought to be—west or east—and a consequent decision to be strong on both axes. Be this as it may, the result was overcrowding: Fuel convoys could not get through, the wounded could not be evacuated, and commanders who went forward to observe got caught in traffic jams and were unable to return to headquarters. Fearing casualties, the IDF did not use its helicopters for seizing key points such as bridges, defiles, and the like that might have enabled it to trap the PLO’s main forces. The latter’s retreat was facilitated by terrain that, except in the Beqa Valley, was either built up or mountainous and heavily wooded.
Along the coast Yaron’s and Mordechai’s forces drove forward ponderously. Whether because of stronger-than-expected Palestinian resistance (as the PLO claims) or because they wanted to save civilian lives by not using all the firepower of their artillery (as they claim), they got entangled in the maze of refugee camps surrounding Tyre and Siddon. Originally they were supposed to reach the Awali after one day;15 in fact it took them the better part of three. The extra time was burned up in attempts to flush out guerrillas from among the civilian population, which was done by concentrating the latter on the beach and screening them. Eventually several thousand suspects were captured and brought to so-called detainee camps. Since the PLO did not constitute a state, the IDF insisted that its men did not deserve to be treated as POWs; yet since PLO members normally wore uniforms while fighting and had not been captured on Israeli territory, the IDF could not treat them as criminals either. This is as good a sign as any that something was very, very wrong with this war.
During the night of June 6-7, Israel’s navy, covered by as many as seventeen missile boats and two submarines,16 started landing what would eventually grow into a brigade at the mouth of the Awali. The landing was carried out practically without opposition; however, in the absence of surprise 17 it achieved little. Moreover, once on the beach the brigade, not having enough vehicles to carry all its troops, was slow to move, and during the next twenty-four hours it could do no more than extend its hold some nine miles to the north. Thereupon it halted, simply waiting for the ground forces to reach it. By the time the linkup was achieved on the morning of the fourth day of the cam
paign, the Palestinian bird, albeit plucked of its largest feathers, had long since flown. The two divisions then continued driving toward Beirut, reaching the southern outskirts after six days instead of three as planned.
Progress along the central axis was also much slower than expected. First, it was necessary for a commando unit of the Golani Infantry Brigade to take the dominant Beaufort Crusader Castle, an operation that started during the late afternoon of June 6 and took most of the night before finally succeeding.18 On the morning of June 7 Begin arrived by helicopter to inspect the “awesome monster,” as he called it. He told an Israeli TV audience that the assault had been carried out without loss, which turned out to be untrue (six soldiers had been killed and a number wounded), the result of a misunderstanding between him and GHQ. Then the feckless prime minister was overheard asking whether the guerrillas possessed machine guns, thus showing the world that he was still thinking in terms of the Poland of his youth, where such sophisticated weapons had presumably been few and far between.
The fortress taken, Kahalani’s advance in this sector was held up less by enemy resistance (there was hardly any) than by the narrow, twisting road his division was navigating. Every time a few machine guns and bazookas opened up, the huge column—with several thousand vehicles to a division—halted; on other occasions delays were caused by tanks overturning and commanders being hit.19 Behind Kahalani, Einan was on his way by June 8 but lost twelve hours because Kahalani had misunderstood his orders and failed to evacuate a bridge in time—a failure that would cost him his military career. Einan himself fought only one minor engagement against a Syrian commando battalion at Ayn Zachlata. Having crawled forward for three days, he discovered that resistance was becoming more tenacious. When the cease-fire went into effect he was still well short of the Beirut-Damascus highway as ordered; strategically speaking his achievement amounted to nothing.
The Sword And The Olive Page 39