By the time the Palestinian revolt got under way, however, Begin had turned himself into a living mummy, and few if any members of the IDF’s General Staff had read his book. Like their colleagues around the developed world on both sides of the Iron Curtain, IDF commanders thought of war primarily in terms of a struggle between the armed forces of opposing states. Also like colleagues around the world, they were hardheaded strategists who carried out the instructions of political masters and paid little attention to the moral implications of a prolonged struggle against much weaker opponents. Yet experience would soon prove that the IDF was no more capable of standing up to this kind of warfare than were most other modern armies. In fact it was considerably less so, given that the intensity of “operations” against largely unarmed demonstrators was always rather low and the number of military dead during the entire six years between the outbreak of Intifada and the signing of the first Oslo Agreement limited to a few dozen.
On the first day of the uprising unfortunate Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip were complaining that they had been left without clear orders. On that day a young lieutenant named Offer, together with three men, found himself amid rioting crowds, opened fire, and killed a demonstrator. His reward for doing as best he could in this hair-raising situation was to be sent home in disgrace by the CO Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Yitschak Mordechai, who felt that the troops had erred in judgment (they had entered a house while trying to arrest a stone-throwing demonstrator) and used excessive force while trying to extricate themselves. Yet Offer’s men, feeling he had been unjustly treated, demanded his reinstatement in writing ; when this was refused several other officers in the company resigned.18 (He was fortunate to be let off lightly. The longer the uprising lasted, the more IDF personnel caught in similar situations were abandoned by superiors, subordinates, and colleagues. Rather than being relieved, they were put on trial and punished if found guilty.)
Like armed forces caught in similar situations elsewhere, the IDF was at risk of committing crimes by using “excessive” force against lightly armed or unarmed opponents. Like armed forces elsewhere, it tried to cope by developing extremely detailed rules of engagement that spelled out what the troops could and could not do. Depending on circumstances—whether, for example, they were being pelted with rocks or Molotov cocktails, by “adults” older than twelve or by children, at close range or at long range—truncheons, tear gas, rubber bullets, plastic bullets, and live ammunition were to be used. In turn, ammunition was to be fired first into the air, then at demonstrators’ legs, and straight ahead only as a last resort to kill. Demonstrators and rioters were to be handled firmly and dispersed with the appropriate amount of force; random brutality and unnecessary friction with the local population were to be avoided. Provided they were old enough and of the proper sex those who resisted were to be taught a lesson; once resistance ceased captured Palestinians were not to be mishandled. “Our Jewish moral legacy” and “respect for human honor and human life” were to be maintained at all times.19 And so on in literally thousands of tadrichim (briefings), some in writing but the vast majority oral, which, circumstances permitting, were held each time a unit went into action.
In practice, needless to say, the rules of engagement were constantly broken. Sometimes this was deliberate, the handiwork of such scoundrels who are always present in any army and enjoy that kind of thing. More often it was a question of soldiers and even recruits being sent into the territories with short notice and poor training; once there they vented frustrations on hapless Arabs. Now they opened fire at the wrong persons under the wrong circumstances and in the wrong manner; now they administered beatings, either “authorized” or “extracurricular”; now they inflicted humiliations such as forbidding captives to relieve themselves or making them hop around on one leg and sing Israeli songs while cursing their own Palestinian leadership; now they invented ingenious forms of torture, as when one party of soldiers used a bulldozer to bury captured demonstrators (they came out alive). Perhaps more often still, the chariggim (excesses) were the result of stress as the troops panicked and used “excessive force” in situations they considered life-threatening—but that their superiors, prompted by the growing presence of reporters and TV cameras, thought should have been handled with greater care.
As it happened the late eighties were the years when cable TV entered Israel. In a country where citizens traditionally were limited to two Hebrewlanguage, government-supervised channels (one is government-owned), by 1996 an estimated 800,000 households were exposed to numerous American, British, German, French, Italian, and Russian programs; news in Turkish and Arabic is even available. Owing to diplomatic considerations the IDF’s censorship authority over foreign correspondents has always been limited. During the Gulf War it was not even able to prevent pictures of neighborhoods hit by Scuds from being broadcast, thus potentially aiding the Iraqis in aiming their missiles more accurately. Now, with cellular telephones and video cameras and satellite dishes proliferating among the media and the general population (including the Occupied Territories, often the site of some of the best material), it lost much of what power remained.
Moreover, the Israeli media were galvanized by foreign competition. To be sure, 1988 saw the passing of a new and comprehensive censorship law. It obliged “any person who prints or publishes material relevant to the security of the state, whether in Israel or abroad,” “to submit it to the censor in advance... even if the information in question has already been published before.”20 Yet a year later the case of Schnizter v. The State of Israel resulted in a landmark ruling. Not only did the High Court rule that the IDF censor came under its own jurisdiction (i.e., the office did not enjoy the “executive prerogative” claimed); his authority to prevent publication was limited to cases in which there was “fair certainty” that state security would be endangered.21 Since then, although the censor’s formal powers have not been curtailed, he has become much more careful in exercising them. Conversely the media insist on their own right to publish, repeatedly threatening to take him to court if necessary.
Even in the age of satellite dishes and video cameras it is obvious that the vast majority of chariggim were never reported. Often this was because brutality had become routine; often it was not considered sufficiently newsworthy or perhaps the right witness was absent or those involved on the Israeli side swore to maintain silence. Of the thousands of published reports (Israeli publications and non-Israeli groups concerned with human rights) only very few were ever properly investigated. Only a handful of investigations led to trial and the rare conviction. Yet each trial was fully covered by the national and international media. The accused contended they just followed orders from superiors; the superiors in turn disclaimed responsibility, testifying that the accused had exceeded or misinterpreted orders. Since 1987 there has been only one case in which an officer, Maj. (res.) Gideon Levite, voluntarily chose to stand by his men and was convicted alongside them. All the rest, including Major Levite’s own commander, Lt. Col. Efrayim Fein, wriggled out as best they could, usually with success since to date, no officer higher than colonel has been convicted of maltreating Arabs.
As the IDF’s own history illustrates so well, an army fighting an opponent as strong or stronger than itself will be able to suffer setbacks, take casualties, bite its lip, and carry on. As Vietnam veterans will recall, however, when an army that is ostensibly much stronger than its opponent takes casualties and suffers setbacks something must be wrong by definition, thereby causing people inside and outside the forces to start looking for an explanation. Investigations will be launched and, inevitably, culprits will be found. Once found they are blamed for mechdalim, negligence, lack of professionalism, or fashla. The upshot is that those who use “excessive” force and “unnecessarily” kill or wound Palestinian demonstrators find themselves at risk of being treated as criminals; those who did not use enough force and lost lives, as fools.
This dilemma is one that no armed force ca
n withstand in the long run: “A sword, plunged into salt water, will rust”—Lao Tsu. In the IDF’s case it was made worse by Rabin’s policy of deliberately passing as many ground units through the Occupied Territories as possible, often on short notice and with little or no specialized training.22 No wonder they often lost their heads: Between 1987 and the end of 1994 some three hundred officers and men have been investigated, subjected to disciplinary proceedings, or put on trial.23 Of those found guilty, the vast majority were let off lightly with transfers, reprimands (which might or might not entail permanent damage to one’s career), deprivation of rank, and tiny, symbolic fines. A few were sentenced to prison, yet none seems to have actually served time, as sentences were either suspended or commuted.24 At one time or another the list of implicated officers was tantamount to a Who’s Who of senior commanders of Northern Command.25 No fewer than seven out of ten commanders of the two “Arabist” units have been put on trial.26
Seeking to defend themselves, the officers in question have hired civilian lawyers. The latter accused the IDF attorney general of acting with malicious intent and of violating their clients’ rights, threatening to take their cases to the High Court. In March 1997 the chain of accusations and counteraccusations became so bad that the former chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Moshe Levy, along with thirteen major generals on active duty, wrote the attorney general demanding that the IDF back up its officers and the trials be stopped (to no avail, as the attorney general also fears being taken to the High Court by various human rights groups and the relatives of IDF soldiers who were killed in accidents).27 As always in Israel, a small and intimate society where most people listen to the news several times a day, a repertoire of would-be comic acronyms has sprung up out of nowhere to describe the situation. It opens with KASTACH (cover your...) and ends with ODATS (the lawyer who serves as the cover).
In theory fashlot that occur in the field should not necessarily affect the spirit and readiness of rear units engaged in training. In practice it has created a situation where serious training has become almost impossible for fear of committing errors that may lead to trials. At first it was curtailed by the Intifada as units constantly were alerted and had courses interrupted to act as firehoses whenever the territories “went up in flames.” For example, the period of officer training had to be cut; the system in which each member of a tank crew is trained to perform all functions was brought to an end.28 Later training was made even more difficult when Chief of Staff Ehud Barak (himself present at and blamed for failing to participate in the evacuation of several soldiers who were killed in one major accident) put in place a new network of “safety officers.” Since then unit commanders have been obliged to submit plans in advance, and exercises are closely supervised at every step. The number of accidents has indeed dropped very sharply, as has the quality and quantity of training, according to those in the know.
Amid the constant accusations and counteraccusations the various groups that during the later period of the Lebanese War had announced their refusal to serve reasserted themselves. By the end of 1992 almost two hundred soldiers29 had done or were doing time, including a high percentage of officers. One reservist, Rami Chasson, was sentenced to four consecutive prison terms of thirty-five days each until Rabin, realizing that his victim was being turned into a hero, gave up. Constantly harassed by the media and occasionally by the courts, the IDF did not dare resort to harsher measures. Instead unit commanders were instructed to solve the problem without bothering superiors with statistics, which in practice meant that anyone could avoid serving in the Occupied Territories by inventing an excuse. Since the end of 1992 very few soldiers, almost all of them conscripts, have been sentenced for this offense. Thus Rabin’s directive swept under the carpet a problem that was literally beginning to tear the IDF apart. In an army that once prided itself on truthfulness, lying had become institutionalized.
Owing to the IDF’s relative numerical weakness, for decades on end morale acted as the real engine behind the IDF’s outstanding performances, and now it began to crack. Surprisingly, surveys taken between 1988 and 1991 still showed that an overwhelming majority of youngsters trusted the IDF’s combat proficiency (87-90 percent), claimed that they would have been prepared to enlist voluntarily even if conscription had not existed (94 percent), and were willing to serve in elite units (78 percent).30 Such attitudes did not by any means turn out to be Intifada-proof. As early as 1988 Chief of Staff Shomron is reported to have refused to meet with subordinates who had researched the problem and generated uncomplimentary findings concerning the uprising’s effects on unit morale and the men’s willingness to serve.31 Later the IDF high command, feeling the ground under its feet slipping away, banned surveys and prevented those that may have been held from being published. Officers who looked facts in the face, such as a colonel in charge of manpower/behavioral science, were forbidden to speak up and relieved from their posts.32
Since systematic evidence has been deliberately suppressed for years33—as one former chief of manpower belatedly admitted34—spot reports will have to do. During the nineties the growing numbers of people in each age group caused rear-service units to be flooded with troops. Against a background of sharply rising living standards and steadily improving medical care, the conscripts ought to have been stronger and healthier than ever; yet the percentage of those examined and found fit for combat declined from 76 percent in 1986 to 64 percent a decade later.35 Year after year, the IDF experienced great difficulty in finding sufficient “quality” manpower to fill its frontline units.36 The paradox is explained by the fact that soldiers and their parents no longer trust the IDF to take care of any medical problems that may arise during the period of service.37 As Chief of Staff Shachak told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee,38 many obtain doctored doctors’ reports concerning all kinds of imaginary and semi-imaginary diseases. What he failed to mention, or perhaps did not know, is that some doctors will gladly provide recruits with such reports without being asked.
In 1995, according to one survey that was leaked to the press, 72 percent of troops interviewed felt that serving in the Occupied Territories was “very demoralizing”; no fewer than 46 percent had witnessed “inappropriate behavior” toward Palestinian civilians.39 Visiting fresh recruits in the IDF’s central depot for newly conscripted manpower (BAKUM) in the summer of 1996, Minister of Defense Mordechai was taken aback when all but a handful told him that they did not want to serve in combat units;40 by that time 10 percent of recruits destined for combat training had to be physically manhandled to get onto the transports, whereas another 4 percent were preferring imprisonment to service.41 Furthermore, out of every hundred conscripts who enter the army, twenty are prematurely discharged either honorably or dishonorably.42 According to the chief of manpower, 40 percent of those whose age and military background qualify them for reserve service do not even appear on the lists. Another 30 percent have succeeded in evading service by various means, so that only 30 percent actually serve.43 Finally, among those who are called up, only about 50 percent bother to report.44 As of late 1996, Chief of Staff Shachak described their morale as “critical.”45
In response the IDF has placed greater reliance on conscripts rather than reservists. It has also increased the salaries of soldiers in combat units, although conscripts who risk their lives in Lebanon are still paid only about $180 per month and numerous forms of bureaucratic intimidation are used to deprive newly discharged conscripts of the grants to which they are formally entitled. Various schemes for bonuses, such as free enrollment in courses that prepare Israelis to enter the universities, have been proposed; some that are not too outrageous (one would have required the universities to pass students absent owing to military service) are actually being implemented.46 As of early 1997 there also existed a scheme for reclassifying manpower so that personnel who had previously been exempt would be called up; to ensure that the mental cases among them would present no danger to themselves and to othe
rs, it was proposed to make them serve without arms.47 Though the Intifada has abated to some extent, so far there is scant evidence of these measures having any effect. Judging by the experience of the U.S. armed forces in Vietnam,48 as long as the army remains in the Occupied Territories and continues to conduct police operations against much weaker opponents, a fundamental change is not likely to take place.
War by definition is a two-sided activity. It is also an imitative activity in which, given sufficient time, the two sides will learn from each other and tend to resemble each other. Thus he who fights the weak will himself become weak; he who by “fighting” the weak behaves like a coward will end up turning into one, suffering one humiliation after another and losing the will to fight. From the beginning of the Intifada to the present day the number of Israeli soldiers killed by Palestinians during active counterinsurgency operations does not exceed a few dozen. Even including all civilians who lost their lives by stabbings, bomb explosions, and the like, during nine years the number of victims is only about 350, or forty per year, which equals the number of those killed on Israel’s roads in three weeks. For the overwhelming majority who do not live in the Occupied Territories—more than 95 percent—the impact on day-to-day life has been negligible.
The Sword And The Olive Page 47