Developing from humble beginnings into a magnificent instrument of war, for many years after 1948 the IDF met every military challenge the Arabs presented. Either it won great victories—as in 1956 and 1967—or at least it fought its enemies to a standstill, as in 1969-1970 and (arguably) 1973. During the first week of “Operation Peace for Galilee” it still did fairly well, but not so during the rest of that ill-fated campaign. Much worse was the effect of its attempt to put down the Palestinian Intifada that began in late 1987 and in one way or another continues today. Here numerical strength and technical superiority in weapons and weapons systems conferred no considerable advantage. On the contrary: Precisely because it was incomparably stronger than its opponents, the IDF was caught in moral dilemmas with which it could not cope and which continue to haunt it day and night. Though some of the dirtiest work was shifted to Shin Bet and the Frontier Guard, as could have been foreseen and should have been foreseen and was foreseen by some, the longer the struggle, the greater the impact on fighting power.
In a country that had always prided itself on its citizens’ patriotism, beginning in the early eighties hundreds simply refused to serve and declared themselves prepared to accept the consequences. In addition tens of thousands evaded service by one means or another without the state feeling powerful enough to do something; instead of being denounced, they saw growing social approval of their actions.10 By 1996 the number of the medically and mentally fit who did not join the conscript force had grown to 7 percent of each age group.11 Yet for years on end the army averted its eyes, insisting that things were going well and even going so far as to fire officers who called attention to the facts. Cover-ups—real and alleged—trials, accusations, and counteraccusations multiplied; one popular joke even claimed that the reason why retired generals so often served on commissions of investigation was they were used to fashlot. All this was to the benefit of nobody but a growing host of lawyers, who proved (not for the first time) that the acronym LIC (low-intensity conflict) really stood for lawyer-infested conflict.
By the mid-nineties the faith of Israeli society in its military had been broken. As every move came under the closest scrutiny, serious training often became all but impossible, and commanders were afraid of taking responsibility ;12 things got to the point that each time the IDF warned about a possible war with Syria the media took it as an attempt by commanders to protect salaries and benefits against possible cuts.13 In response to the barrage of criticism the sons and daughters of the social elite no longer wanted to join the corps of professionals, leaving the field to the less well educated and to the kippot sruggot. Those already on active service huddled together and adopted a defensive attitude to the outside world. They closed their eyes to evidence that might have revealed the IDF’s declining prestige,14 took care to avoid attending civilian symposia dealing with the army and its problems, and hired public-relations experts to make their case for them. In this way the development theory of the sixties was stood on its head. A military that used to regard itself—and was regarded by others—as the vanguard of the nation in many ways has turned into a social anachronism.
Worst of all, there is every reason to believe that ten years of trying to deal with the Intifada has sapped the IDF’s strength by causing troops and commanders to adapt to the enemy. The troops now look upon mostly empty-handed Palestinian men, women, and children as if they were in fact a serious military threat.15 Among the commanders, the great majority can barely remember when they trained for and engaged in anything more dangerous than police-type operations; in the entire IDF there is now hardly an officer left who has commanded so much as a brigade in a real war. Taking the behavior of the Argentines in the Falklands as our example, one shudders to think what IDF commanders and troops would do if under full-scale attack by real-life soldiers armed not with rocks and knives but with missiles, cannons, and tanks.
Finally, the internal problems that IDF experiences have not spared Israeli society as a whole—if, indeed, the process has not worked the other way around. Along with faith in the military, faith in the state itself is being undermined.16 This is shown inter alia by the phenomenal number of injunctions served by citizens against the government in the High Court, as well as the latter’s growing tendency to act as a kind of unelected supergovernment. None of this should come as a surprise. After all, the Soviets’ war in Afghanistan was one of the main factors that led to the disintegration of the USSR. Following the Christmas bombings of December 1972 during the Vietnam War, 250,000 people tried to storm the Pentagon, and the credibility gap that arose from that war has never since closed.17 In 1958 the Algerian conflict brought France to the verge of civil war, which was averted only by de Gaulle and the establishment of the Fifth Republic. Three years later the generals commanding the army in Algeria rose in revolt. To protect the National Assembly in Paris against an eventual landing by the paras, tanks had to be stationed in front.
Rabin’s assassination was the warning light. Should Israel persist on its current course of trying to hold on to the Occupied Territories and their inhabitants, in the long run it very likely will come down to civil war, not only of Jew against Jew but of some Jews and some Arabs against some other Jews and some other Arabs; unlike France and the United States, it has neither the Mediterranean Sea nor the Pacific Ocean to provide space and save it from its fate. He who is wise should never engage the weak for any length of time. He who, whether through his fault or that of others, already is involved in such a situation should consider ways to end it as fast as possible. One thinks of Deuteronomy, chapter 3, 15-20:Lo I set before thee today life and the good, death and evil ... and thou shalt choose the good ... so that thou and thine offspring mayest live ... in the country which God the Lord has sworn unto thine fathers Abraham and Yitschak and Yakov to give unto thee.
NOTES
PART I
1 D. Ben Gurion, Yoman Ha-milchama, 1948-1949 [War Diary, 1948-1949] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1982), vol. 3, p. 1019.
CHAPTER 1
1 M. Naor, ed., Al Saf Mea Chadasha: Erets Yisrael Ba-shanim 1897-1902 [On the Threshold of a New Century: Palestine in the Years 1897-1902] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1979), p. 39.
2 Such a journey is described in A. Krinitsi, Be-Koach Ha-maase [By the Deed] (Tel Aviv: Masada, 1959), pp. 45-46.
3 B. Jaffe, Djokana shel Erets-Yisrael 1840-1914 [A Portrait of Palestine, 1840-1914] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1983), p. 200.
4 Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire (New York: Morrow Quill, 1977), p. 381.
5 A. Blumberg, Zion Before Zionism, 1838-1880 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), p. 139.
6 G. Biger, An Empire in the Holy Land: Historical Geography of the British Administration in Palestine, 1917-1919 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1994), p. 154.
7 This and subsequent figures on Jewish demography from M. Eliav, Erets Yisrael Veyishuvah Ba-mea Ha-tshaesre [The Settlement of the Land of Israel During the Nineteenth Century] (Jerusalem: Keter, 1978), p. 335.
8 The size of the Arab population is discussed in detail in M. Asaf, Ha-yechasim ben Aravim Ve-yehudim Be-erets Yisrael, 1860-1948 [The Relationships Between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, 1860-1948] (Tel Aviv: Tarbut Ve-chinuch, 1967), p. 121 ff.
9 This description of conditions in Palestine is based on S. Avitsur, Chaye Yom Yom Be-erets Yisrael Ba-mea Ha-tshaesre [Daily Life in the Land of Israel During the Nineteenth Century] (Tel Aviv: Am Hasefer, 1972), p. 129 ff.
10 For the pogroms’ role in driving the Jews to Palestine see S. Laskov, Ha-biluyim [The Biluyim] (Jerusalem: Zionist Organization, 1979), introduction; also A. Shapira, Cherev Ha-yona [The Dove’s Sword] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1992), p. 58 ff.
11 Cf. A. L. Avneri, Ha-hityashvut Ha-yehudit Ve-teanat Ha-nishul, 1878-1948 [Jewish Settlement and the Myth of Expropriation, 1878-1948] (Efal: Tavenkin Institute, 1980), p. 13 ff.
12 On the Ottoman landowning system see Ph. E. Schoenberg, “Palestine in the Ye
ar 1914” (Ph.D. thesis, New York University, 1978), pp. 23-32.
13 Ibid., pp. 94-95.
14 E.g., Y. L. Pinsker, Autoemancipatsia [Autoemancipation, 1881], M. Yoeli, ed. (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Education, 1970), is one long tirade against the bad qualities that Jews supposedly acquired in the diaspora.
15 Y. Doron, “Ha-tsiyonut Ha-klasit Ve-ha-antishemiut Ha-modernit: Hakbalot Vehashpaot, 1883-1914” [Classical Zionism and Modern Anti-Semitism: Parallels and Influences, 1883-1914], Ha-tsionut 8 (1989): 57-103.
16 See G. Israel, The Jews in Russia (New York: St. Martin’s, 1975), for a short account.
17 S. A. Cohen, “The Bible and Intra-Jewish Portraits of King David,” Jewish Political Studies Review 3 (1991): 49-66.
18 Y. Klausner, Ha-ktavim Ha-Tsioniyim shel Ha-rav Tsvi Kalisher [The Zionist Writings of Rebbe Kalisher] (Jerusalem: Kuk, 1947), p. 36; J. H. Alkelai, “Minchat Yehuda” [Juda’s Offering], in Ketavim [Writings] (Jerusalem: Kuk, 1944), vol. 1.
19 Ts. H. Kalisher, Drishat Tsion, in G. Kresel, ed., Rabbi Yehuda Alklai—Rabbi Tsvi Hirsch Kalisher, Mivchar Ktavim [Rabbi Yhuda Alkelai and Rabbi Tsvi Hirsch Kalisher, Selected Writings] (Tel Aviv: Shreberk, n.d.), p. 138.
20 The first modern mention is in M. Y. Berdichevsky, Machshavot Ve-torot [Thoughts and Doctrines] (Leipzig: private printing, 1922), pp. 34-38. See also B. Schwartz and others, “The Recovery of Masada: A Study in Collective Memory,” The Sociological Quarterly 27:2 (1986): 147-164.
21 The document is pretend in M. Berslevsky, Tnuat Ha-poalim Ha-erets Yisraelit [The Workers’ Movement of Erets Yisrael] (Tel Aviv: Ha-kibbuts Ha-meuchad, 1967), pp. 293-296.
22 Shire Yaakov Cohen [The Poems of Y. Cohen] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, n.d.), pp. 75-76.
23 The Jewish-German paper, Selbtstemancipation, No. 1, 1880, quoted by Doron, “Ha-tsiyonut Ha-klasit,” p. 68.
24 Th. Herzl, The Jewish State (London: The Zionist Organization, 1934 [1896]), p. 72.
25 Cf. R. Wistrich, “Tsiyonuto shel Herzl ben Mitos Le-utopia” [Herzl’s Zionism between Myth and Utopia], in D. Ochana and R Wistrich, eds., Mitos Ve-zikaron [Myth and Memory] (Tel Aviv: Ha-kibbuts Ha-meuchad, 1996), p. 111.
26 Th. Herzl, Ha-yoman [The Diary] (Tel Aviv: Sifriya Tsiyonit, 1978-1991), vol. 1, pp. 50-51, entry for June 9, 1985.
27 R. Patai, ed., The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl (New York: Herzl Press, 1960), vol. 1, pp. 27, 33, 43, 77.
28 Y. Slutsky, Mavo Le-Toldot Tnuat Ha-avoda Ha-yisraelit [Introduction to the History of the Israeli Labor Movement] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1973), p. 160 ff.
29 The customs that prevailed in the madfa are described in Ts. Nadav, Bi-yme Shmira Ve-hagana [In the Days of Guarding and Defending] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1954), pp. 74-76.
30 I. Ivri (pseud. for Y. Klausner), Chashash [Fear], Ha-shiloach 17 (1907);J. Aharonovitsh, Klape Pnim [Turning Inward], Ha-poel Ha-tsair, November 1, 1912.
31 The death-threatening document, dated January 1914, is printed in Y. Goldstein, Chavurat-Ha-roim [The Shepherds’ Association] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1993), p. 21.
32 Ibid., p. 127.
33 A. Pialkov and Y. Rabinovitsh, eds., Yitschak Tabenkin, Pirke Chayim [Yitschak Tabenkin, a Life] (Kibbuts Beeri: Yad Tabenkin, 1982), p. 54.
34 A typical contract is printed in S. Shva, Shevet Ha-noazim: Korot Maniya Ve-Yisrael Shochet Ve-Chavrehem Be-“Ha-shomer” [The Daring Tribe: The Story of Manya and Yisrael Shochet and Their Comrades in “Ha-shomer”] (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Ha-poalim, 1970), pp. 138-139.
35 A typical episode of this sort is described in G. Gra, Ha-shomer [Ha-shomer] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1985), p. 96.
36 It is described in Y. Ben Tsvi et al., eds., Sefer Ha-shomer [The Book of Ha-shomer] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, n.d.), p. 21.
37 The role played by women in Ha-shomer is discussed by Gra, Ha-shomer, p. 66 ff.; also Y. Goldstein, Ba-derech el Ha-yaad: “Bar Giora” Ve-“Ha-shomer” 1907-1935 [Toward the Objective: “Bar Giora” and “Hashomer,” 1907-1935] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1994), pp. 62-71.
38 Avneri, Ha-hityashvut, p. 87.
39 B. Ts. Di-Nur, ed., Sefer Toldot Ha-hagana [The History of the Hagana] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1954), vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 227.
40 Ben Tsvi, Sefer Ha-shomer, p. 38.
41 There is an English translation of Shochet’s memorandum in Y. Allon, The Making of Israel’s Army (London: Sphere Books, 1971), pp. 116-118.
42 Ben Tsvi, Sefer Ha-shomer, vol. 1, pp. 36-37.
43 Cf. N. Efrati, “Ha-yishuv Ha-yehudi Be-erets Yisrael Bi-tkufat Milchemet Ha-olam Ha-rishona” [The Jewish Settlement in Palestine During World War I] (Ph.D. thesis, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1986), p. 270 ff.
44 Cf. Goldstein, Ba-derech el Ha-yaad, p. 45 ff.
45 Ben Tsvi, Sefer Ha-shomer, vol. 1, pp. 39-40.
46 A typical session is described in Kovets Ha-shomer [Ha-shomer File] (Tel Aviv: Archion Ha-avoda, 1938), pp. 484-489.
CHAPTER 2
1 The relationships that prevailed are described in A. Druyanov, Ktavim Le-Toldot Chibat-Tsion Ve-Yishuv Erets Yisrael [Writings on the History of the Chibat-Tsion Movement and the Settlement of Palestine], S. Laskov ed. (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1982), document nos. 791, 798.
2 Ibid., pp. 28, 59.
3 D. R. Divine, Politics and Society in Ottoman Palestine: The Arab Struggle for Survival and Power (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), p. 145 ff.
4 Quoted in H. M. Kalvarisky, “Ha-Yechasim ben Ha-Yehudim Ve-ha-Aravim Lifne Ha-milchama” [Relationships Between Jews and Arabs Before the War], Sheifotenu 2 (1931): 54.
5 Y. Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929 (London: Cass, 1974), pp. 28-29.
6 The most authoritative account of this episode is S. Laskov, Trumpeldor: Sippur Chayav [Trumpeldor: Story of His Life] (Jerusalem: Keter, n.d.), p. 228 ff.; for the subsequent legend see A. Shapira, Cherev Ha-yona [The Dove’s Sword] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1992), p. 141 ff.
7 For statistics see A. L. Avneri, Ha-hityashvut Ha-yehudit Ve-teanat Ha-nishul, 1878- 1948 [Jewish Settlement and the Myth of Expropriation, 1878-1948] (Efal: Tavenkin Institute, 1980), p. 224 ff.
8 The activities of these battalions are described in Y. Elam, Ha-gdudim Ha-ivriyim [The Jewish Battalions] (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1984).
9 The sufferings of Ha-shomer women are emphasized in G. Gra, Ha-shomer [Hashomer] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1985), p. 66 ff.
10 E. Talmi, Ma U-mi Ba-shmira U-ba-Hitgonenut [Who Is Who in Guarding and Defense] (Tel Aviv: Davar, 1978).
11 U. Ben Eliezer, Derech Ha-kavenet: Hivatsruto shel Ha-militarizm Ha-yisraeli, 1936- 1956 [Through the Gunsight: The Emergence of Israeli Militarism, 1936-1956] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1995), pp. 105-106.
12 Cf. Porath, The Emergence, pp. 110-111.
13 Census of Palestine, 1931 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1932), summary.
14 Term used by Y. Ratner, the organization’s future chief of staff, and quoted in M. Pail, Min Ha-hagana Li-Tsva Hagana [From the Hagana to the IDF] (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1979), p. 19.
15 On the Hagana forces in Haifa see A. Lubrani, Darko shel Adam; Kovets Le-Zichro shel Yakov Pat [A Pamphlet in Memory of Yakov Pat] (Herzliya: private edition, 1958), p. 76; also B. Ts. Di-Nur, ed., Sefer Toldot Ha-hagana [The History of the Hagana] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1954), vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 422-423.
16 The largest “ex” took place in November 1923 and is described in ibid., pp. 227-228.
17 Ibid., p. 230.
18 Ts. Nadav, Bi-yme Shmira Ve-hagana [In the Days of Guarding and Defending] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1954), p. 307.
19 Di-nur, Sefer Toldot Ha-hagana, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 628.
20 See Porath, The Emergence, p. 265 ff.
21 G. Biger, An Empire in the Holy Land: Historical Geography of the British Administration in Palestine, 1917-1929 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1994), pp. 158-159.
22 Di-nur, Sefer Toldot Ha-hagana, vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 313, 404.
23 Ts. Eshel, Maarchot Ha-hagana
Be-Chefa [The Hagana’s Campaigns in Haifa] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1978), p. 163 ff.
24 Y. Ben Tsvi et al., eds., Sefer Ha-shomer [The Book of Ha-shomer] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, n.d.), pp. 77 and 408, has two firsthand accounts of this mission.
25 Di-nur, Sefer Toldot Ha-hagana, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 387.
CHAPTER 3
1 For the details of this plan see B. Ts. Di-Nur, ed., Sefer Toldot Ha-hagana [The History of the Hagana] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1954), vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 407 ff.
2 Z. Abramovitsh and Y. Glaft, Ha-meshek Ha-aravi Be-erets Yisrael U-be-artsot Hamizrach Ha-tichon [The Arab Economy in Palestine and the Middle East] (Tel Aviv: Ha-kibbuts Ha-meuchad, 1944), p. 39.
3 Di-nur, Sefer Toldot Ha-hagana, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 479.
4 For a vivid account of Tel Aviv as it appeared during those years see S. Peres, Battling for Peace (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995), p. 17 ff.
5 These and other figures are from M. Asaf, Ha-yechasim ben Aravim Ve-yehudim Be-erets Yisrael, 1860-1948 [The Relationships Between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, 1860-1948] (Tel Aviv: Tarbut Ve-chinuch, 1967), p. 121 ff.
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