19 Dayan, Avnei Derech, pp. 531-532.
20 According to Eytan, Sippur shel Chayal, p. 108, the guerrillas’ escape was due to the fact that the IDF had dropped leaflets to warn the civilian population.
21 Different, and much larger, figures are given by S. Ali El-Edroos, The Hassemite Arab Army, 1909-1979 (Amman: The Publishing Committee, 1980), p. 440.
22 The Jordanian-Syrian clash, as well as Hussein’s operations agaisnt the Palestinians, is analyzed in some detail by Rooshdi, The Hassemite Arab Army, pp. 449-460.
23 For the details see M. Zak, Hussein Osse Shalom [Hussein Makes Peace] (Ramat Gan: Bar Illan University Press), pp. 141-142, n. 2.
24 P. Seale, Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 166.
25 Dayan, Avnei Derech, p. 422.
26 For figures see International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1968-1969 (London: IISS, 1968), pp. 33-37.
27 See on this subject the Egyptian minister of defense, Muhammad Fawzi, as discussed in D. Schueftan, Hatasha: Ha-astretegia Ha-medinit shel Mitsrayim Ha-natserit Be-ikvot Milchemet 1967 [Attrition: Egypt’s Post-1967 Political Strategy] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1989), pp. 107-109.
28 This episode has been analyzed at length in Y. Shoshan, Ha-krav Ha-acharon shel Hamaschetet Elat [The Last Battle of the Destroyer Elat] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1984).
29 Cf. A. Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 197.
30 Dayan, Avnei Derech, p. 515; A. Sharon, Warrior (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 220-221.
31 For Egypt’s war aims see Schueftan, Hatasha, p. 201 ff.; also Y. Bar-Siman Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969-1970 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 47 ff.
32 Figures from Bar-Siman Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, p. 92 (table 4.1) and p. 97 (table 4.4).
33 M. Peled, “Ech lo Hitkonena Yisrael Le-milchama” [How Israel Did Not Prepare for War], Maarachot 289/290 (October 1983): 25-28.
34 Cf. the calculations of Bar-Siman Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, p. 91 ff., regarding the types of Egyptian fire and their relative effectiveness.
35 The operation is described in some detail in M. Eldar, Shayetet 11 [Flotilla 11] (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1996), pp. 55-59.
36 Some additional operations of the same kind are briefly described in Eytan, Sippur shel Chayal, pp. 113-114.
37 Ch. Nadel, “Hafalat Ha-kochot Ha-meyuchadim shel TSAHAL Be-milchemet Hahatasha” [Israel’s Special Forces in the War of Attrition], M.A. thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1990. Nadel was a special forces officer who later rose to major general.
38 For Nasser’s plans during this period see Schueftan, Hatasha, chap. 5.
39 Y. Rabin, Pinkas Sherut [A Service Record] (Tel Aviv: Maariv), vol. 1, pp. 261-263. For quotes from other key Israeli decisionmakers see Schueftan, Hatasha, p. 120 ff.
40 Schueftan, Hatasha, p. 250 ff., using a variety of Egyptian sources.
41 Cf. A. Price, Instruments of Darkness: The History of Electronic Warfare (London: Macdonald’s, 1967).
42 Cf. E. O’Ballance, The Electronic War in the Middle East, 1968-1970 (London: Faber and Faber, 1974), pp. 123-124.
43 Quoted in Schueftan, Hatasha, p. 265.
44 Figure from E. N. Luttwak and D. Horowitz, The Israeli Army (London: Allen Lane, 1975), p. 325.
45 Bar Lev estimate, in G. Yaakobi, Ke-chut Ha-seara [By a Hair’s Breadth] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1989), p. 157.
46 Schueftan, Hatasha, p. 365.
47 The best source is once again Schueftan, Hatasha, p. 267, which makes use of all the available Israeli, Egyptian, and U.S. sources.
48 For a blow-by-blow account of the way it was done see E. Zeira, Milchemet Yom Hakippurim, Mitos mul Metsiut [The Yom Kippur War: Myth Versus Reality] (Tel Aviv: Yediot Acharonot, 1993), p. 34 ff.
49 Ezer Weizman, On Eagles’ Wings (Tel Aviv: Steimatzky’s, 1979), p. 265.
CHAPTER 13
1 S. Rolbant, The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army (New York: Barnes, 1970), p. 244.
2 For a blow-by-blow account of terrorist activities and Israeli responses see E. O’Ballance, Arab Guerrilla Power, 1968-1972 (London: Faber and Faber, 1974).
3 Dayan lecture, August 9, 1973, quoted in N. Bar Tov, Dado: Arbaim U-smoneh Shanim Ve-esrim Yom [Dado: Forty-Eight Years and Twenty Days] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978), vol. 1, p. 274.
4 Bar Tov, Dado, vol. 1, pp. 179, 202-203. There are some additional details of the plan in E. N. Luttwak, “Defense Planning in Israel: A Brief Retroperspective,” in S. G. Neuman, ed., Defense-Planning in Less-Industrialized States (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1984), p. 140.
5 Cf. the account in B. Kedar, Sippuro shel Gdud Machats [The Story of “Machats” Battalion] (Tel Aviv: Tamuz, 1975), p. 11.
6 Abdel Ghani el Gamasy, The October War (Cairo: American University Press, 1993), p. 148.
7 Dayan to Yediot Acharonot, August 18, 1972.
8 G. Yaakobi, Ke-chut Ha-seara [By a Hair’s Breadth] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1989), p. 170.
9 For the preparations that were made on this occasion see Bar Tov, Dado, vol. 1, pp. 238-248.
10 E. Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama [Today War Will Break Out] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1987), p. 17.
11 A. Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York: Collins, 1978), p. 237.
12 Cf. M. van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1993), p. 109; also Levite, Be-einei Ha-aravim, pp. 42, 76, plus the sources quoted in both works.
13 See the sources quoted in Levite, Be-einei Ha-aravim, p. 43.
14 Cf. his own account in Saad el Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980), p. 27 ff.
15 For some figures see Bar Tov, Dado, vol. 1, pp. 282, 286.
16 M. Dayan, Avnei Derech [Memoirs] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1976), p. 570.
17 Time, July 30, 1973.
18 Quotation from a GS meeting, September 17, 1973, in Bar Tov, Dado, vol. 1, p. 287.
19 For the details see Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama, pp. 15-16.
20 Cf. Meir, My Life (Jerusalem: Steimatzky, 1975, p. 347 ff.
21 Cf. M. Negbi, Namer shel Niyar [Paper Tiger] (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Ha-poalim, 1985), pp. 87-88.
22 According to Brigadier General Shalev, head of IDF intelligence/research, and Zeira’s own office manager, a lieutenant colonel whose name was also Shalev; see Bar Tov, Dado, vol. 1, p. 305.
23 Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, pp. 206-207.
24 Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama, p. 20.
25 Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, p. 213, says that the evacuation took the Egyptians by surprise and almost betrayed their plans.
26 Cf. U. Bar Joseph, “Israel’s Intelligence Failure in 1973,” Security Studies 4:3 (Spring 1995): 584-609.
27 Quoted in A. Braun, Moshe Dayan Be-milchemt Yom Ha-kippurim [Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1993), p. 58.
28 E. Zeira, Milchemet Yom Ha-kippurim, Mitos mul Metsiut [The Yom Kippur War: Myth Versus Reality] (Tel Aviv: Yediot Acharonot, 1993), p. 215.
29 For a blow-by-blow account see Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama, p. 11 ff.
30 Cf. Gamasy, The October War, p. 180.
31 Braun, Moshe Dayan, pp. 79, 81.
32 Cf. Bar Tov, Dado, vol. 1, pp. 177-178.
33 For the lack of information affecting Gonen at this time cf. M. van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 205-206.
34 Brig. Gen. Emmanuel Shaked as quoted in Zeira, Milchemet Yom Ha-kippurim, p. 217. The verb li-dfok is normal IDF slang for “to kill” or “to fuck.”
35 In these attacks Adan lost twenty-seven killed, five tanks, and eight half-tracks. Lt. Col. Nachum and Lt. Col. Tsvi, “Lechima Be-kommando Mitsri Be-milchemet Yom Ha-kippurim” [Fighting Egyptian Commandos During the 1973 War], Maarachot 327 (November-December 1992): 23.
36 E. Shimshi, Seara Be-Oktober [St
orm in October] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1986), p. 14.
37 No record of this meeting has ever come to light. It is, however, described in A. Adan, On the Banks of the Suez (London: Arms and Armor, 1980), pp. 95-100; and Bar Tov, Dado, vol. 2, pp. 73-75.
38 Cf. van Creveld, Command in War, pp. 213-218, for a blow-by-blow account of IDF “staff work” during these hours.
39 Adan, On the Banks of the Suez, p. 119.
40 Cf. Sharon’s own account in A. Sharon, Warrior (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 301-302.
41 For that commander’s own story see A. Yaguri, Le-hiyot Itam, Kulam Sheli [To Be with Them, They Are All Mine] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1979).
42 Kedar, Sippuro shel Gdud Machats, p. 23.
43 See the firsthand account in ibid., p. 28 ff.
44 The Egyptians later claimed that it was a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft that alerted the Israelis to the location of the seam; Gamasy, The October War, p. 278.
45 Sharon, Warrior, 307-309.
46 Details in Braun, Moshe Dayan, pp. 139-140.
47 Cf. the detailed account in E. Rozen, “Lama Hufkera Chativat Barak?” [Why Was “Barak” Brigade Abandoned to Its Fate?” Maariv weekend magazine, September 24, 1993, pp. 32-33.
48 See his own account in R. Eytan, Sippur shel Chayal [A Soldier’s Story] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1991), p. 130.
49 Agranat Report (Jerusalem: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 1035.
50 Braun, Moshe Dayan, p. 94.
51 See M. Zak, Hussein Osse Shalom [Hussein Makes Peace] (Ramat Gan: Bar Illan University Press), pp. 130-134, for the details.
52 Personal communication by Lt. Col. David Chillion.
53 A. Kahalani, Oz 77 [Strength 77] (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1977), p. 104 ff., is a blow-by-blow account of the battle.
54 Ch. Herzog, The War of Atonement (London: Futura, 1975), pp. 112-113.
55 For this interpretation see van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 101-102; S. Aronson, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East (New York: State University of New York, 1992), pp. 143-149.
56 Tamir, lecture, Hebrew University, December 1974.
57 Personal communication from one of Lanner’s battalion commanders, Lt. Col. Amram Lazar. The Iraqis have described this episode in Ts. Ofer, ed., Tsva Iraq Be-milchemet Yom Hakippurim [The Iraqi Army in the Yom Kippur War] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1986), pp. 110-112; according to them it was this attack that saved Damascus.
58 Bar Tov, Dado, vol. 2, p. 147.
59 M. Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (London: Sphere Books, 1974), p. 224.
60 Gamasy, The October War, p. 266 ff.
61 Figures from Herzog, The War of Atonement, p. 206, and Gamasy, The October War, p. 277; for once, the Israeli and Egyptian accounts agree.
62 Braun, Moshe Dayan, p. 96.
63 E. Amber, “Chel Ha-avir Ha-yisraeli Bi-krav Ha-yabasha Be-milchemet Yom Hakippurim” [The IAF’s Participation in the Ground Battle in the Yom Kippur War], in U. Milstein, Ha-tslicha she-lo Hayta [The Crossing That Wasn’t] (Tel Aviv: Golan, 1992), p. 284 ff.
64 Braun, Moshe Dayan, p. 141.
65 Peled lecture, Nevatim Air Base, January 16, 1988.
66 Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, p. 248.
67 Bar Tov, Dado, vol. 2, p. 216.
68 See Shazly’s own account in The Crossing of the Suez, p. 400 ff.
69 Cf. B. Telem, “Naval Lessons of the Yom Kippur War,” in L. Williams, ed., Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1975), p. 231 ff.
CHAPTER 14
1 The most detailed account is S. Nakdimon, Svirut Nemucha (Tel Aviv: Revivim, 1982), chaps. 1-10; also Y. Ben Porat, Neila [Lock-In] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1991). In 1973 Brig. Gen. Ben Porat was the Israeli intelligence officer in charge of signals intelligence (SIGINT).
2 J. G. Stein, “The 1973 Intelligence Failure: A Reconsideration,” Jerusalem Quarterly 24 (Summer 1982): 41-54.
3 Meir, My Life (Jerusalem: Steimatzky, 1975), pp. 356-357.
4 Cf. M. van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 218-229; there is an even more detailed account in U. Milstein, Ha-tslicha she-lo Hayta [The Crossing That Wasn’t] (Tel Aviv: Golan, 1992), p. 142 ff.
5 B. Kedar, Sippuro shel Gdud Machats [The Story of “Machats” Battalion] (Tel Aviv: Tamuz, 1975), p. 11.
6 E. Shimshi, Seara Be-Oktober [Storm in October] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1986), p. 15.
7 Lieutenant Colonel Adini as quoted in Milstein, Ha-tslicha she-lo Hayta, p. 183.
8 T. N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 623-627.
9 R. Eytan, Sippur shel Chayal [A Soldier’s Story] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1991), p. 131.
10 U. Eilam, “Weapons Systems and Technologies—East and West,” in L. Williams, ed., Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1975), pp. 22-27.
11 In 1967 it was six divisions and 200 combat aircraft against thirteen and 400 respectively; in 1973, seven against sixteen (counting Moroccan Iraqi and Jordanian forces that took part in the fighting) and 400 against 700 (counting Egyptian and Syrian ones only). More detailed figures in A. Adan, “Echut Ve-kamut Be-milchemet Yom Hakippurim” [Quality Versus Quantity in the Yom Kippur War], in A. Kover and A. Ofer, eds., Echut mul Kamut [Quality Versus Quantity] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1985), p. 257, tables 1 and 2.
12 Y. Ben Porat et al., Ha-mechdal [The Oversight] (Tel Aviv: Private Edition, 1974), p. 283.
PART III
1 E.g., Y. Rabin, “Ha-hartaah Be-mivchan Milchamot Yisrael” [Deterrence in the Crucible of Israel’s Wars], Safra Ve-saifa 4 (November 1981): 28-29.
CHAPTER 15
1 E. Weizman, Ha-krav al Ha-shalom [The Battle for Peace] (Jerusalem: Idanim, 1981), p. 190.
2 Y. Ben Meir, Civil-Military Relations in Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 96.
3 R. Eytan, Sippur shel Chayal [A Soldier’s Story] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1991), p. 197.
4 Eg., Ts. Lanir, Ha-haftaa Ha-besisit: Modiin Be-mashber [Basic Surprise: Intelligence in Crisis] (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center, 1983); Ts. Ofer and A. Kover, eds., Modiin U-bitachon Leumi [Intelligence and National Security] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1987); Y. Ben Yisrael, Dialogim al Mada U-modiin [Dialogues About Science and Intelligence] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1989).
5 Y. Kondor, Kalkalat Yisrael [The Israeli Economy] (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1984), p. 204, table 25.
6 M. Bentov, Kalkalat Yisrael al Parashat Drachim [The Israeli Economy at a Crossroad] (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Poalim, 1965), p. 139.
7 Figures from D. Schueftan, Hatasha: Ha-astretegia Ha-medinit shel Mitsrayim Ha-natserit Be-ikvot Milchemet 1967 [Attrition: Egypt’s Post-1967 Political Strategy] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1989), pp. 100-101, and G. Yakobi, Otsmatah shel Echut [The Power of Quality] (Haifa: Shikmona, 1972), p. 120; M. N. Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 231, table 6.7.
8 More detailed statistics on U.S. military aid in M. Gazit, “Ha-rechesh Ha-tsvai shel Yisrael Be-arhav” [Israeli Military Procurement in the United States] (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, 1983), pp. 55, 63.
9 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1972-1973 (London: IISS, 1973), p. 31.
10 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1977-1978 (London: IISS, 1978), p. 36.
11 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1981-1982 (London: IISS, 1982), p. 52.
12 D. Kochav, “The Economics of Defense—Israel,” in L. Williams, ed., Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1975), p. 179.
13 Figures from Kondor, Kalkalat Yisrael, p. 24, table 4.
14 For a unit-by-unit, item-by-item comparison see M. Merdor, RAFAEL: Bi-netivei Ha-mechkar Ve-ha-pituach Le-bit
chon Yisrael [Defense-Related Research and Development in Israel: The Story of RAFAEL] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1981), p. 21.
15 The 1973 and 1977 figures from IISS, The Military Balance, 1973-1974, and The Military Balance, 1977-1978 (London: IISS), pp. 33 and 37 respectively. The 1982 figures from M. Heller, The Military Balance in the Middle East (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1983), p. 115. For yet another set of figures see E. N. Luttwak, “Defense Planning in Israel: A Brief Retroperspective,” in S. G. Neuman, ed., Defense-Planning in Less-Industrialized States (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1984), p. 143.
16 The 1980 figures were: Sweden $13,520, France $11,730, United States $11,360, Israel $4,500. Kondor, Kalkalat Yisrael, p. 52, table 7.
17 Cf. E. Inbar, “Israeli Strategic Thinking After 1973,” Journal of Strategic Studies 6:1 (March 1983): 37-57.
18 Z. Schiff, “Mahapecha Be-hagana Merchavit” [A Revolution in Territorial Defense], Ha-arets, January 14, 1976, p. 2; A. Tamir, Chayal Shocher Shalom [A Soldier in Search of Peace] (Jerusalem: Idanim, 1988), pp. 309-310.
19 M. Bar Kochva, Merkevot Ha-plada [Steel Chariots] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1989), p. 52.
20 Cf. Dudi Shalom, Ech Ossim Chidush Irguni: Hakamat Mifkedet Chelot Ha-sadeh (MAFCHASH) Be-TSAHAL [The Making of Organizational Innovation: Setting up MAFCHASH] (Tel Aviv: The Institute for Management, 1995), chap. 4.
21 Z. Levkovits, “Hebetim Be-logistika” [Logistic Aspects], Maarachot 332 (September-October 1992): 38.
22 Ibid., p. 36, puts the number at 2,029.
23 Figure of 2,000 M-113s from Luttwak, “Defense Planning,” p. 142.
24 Figure from M. Levin and D. Halevy, “Israel,” in R. A. Gabriel, Fighting Armies: Antagonists in the Middle East, a Combat Assessment (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 19.
25 Y. Rabin, Pinkas Sherut [A Service Record] (Tel Aviv: Maariv), vol. 2, p. 539.
26 The operations are listed in U. Milstein, Ha-tslicha she-lo Hayta [The Crossing That Wasn’t] (Tel Aviv: Golan, 1992), p. 299 ff.
The Sword And The Olive Page 54