Hitler's Brandenburgers

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Hitler's Brandenburgers Page 8

by Lawrence Paterson


  Benesch’s men assisted in the capture of the mines and smelting works at Mo i Rana though they were unable to prevent the destruction of the bridge over the Renaelva River, demolished by retreating British troops on 18 May. However, the bulk of ‘Trappescol’s’ supplies plus all the Royal Artillery 25-pounder guns, cabling and signals equipment were left behind and captured by the Germans. The Mountain Platoon continued to harry the retreating Allied forces alongside the 2nd Gebirgs Division, Benesch’s men using commandeered bicycles to advance towards Skjerstadfjorden and open fire with small arms at Allied troops while they boarded a large ferry and ten trawlers at Rognan as the evacuation from Norway began. The same pattern was repeated as the advance continued through Fauske, devastated by Luftwaffe air raids, and the last Allied troops were evacuated by sea from Bodø.

  The troops of North Platoon operated in their familiar small groups – eleven in total – one five-man party led by Unteroffizier Friedrich Deininger travelling by truck from Trondheim to Kongsmoen, destroying Norwegian telephone communications en-route. From Kongsmoen they voyaged by small motor cutter to Foldereid and then overland towards Terråk. Their convoluted path took them to Vik near Bindalsfjorden on the last day of May, where they encountered resistance. Deininger was hit a glancing blow on his steel helmet and rendered unconscious for twenty-four hours while 23-year-old Austrian Pionier Günther Ernst Bergmann was killed. The small group attempted to avoid being encircled by the enemy, but in the early hours of the morning they were captured. The prisoners, including Deininger, were taken north to the camp on Skorpa Island near Tromsø. They were held there until the capitulation of Norway secured their release.

  The Wehrmacht had begun the oft-postponed ‘Case Yellow’ on 10 May against France and the Low Countries, leading to the Allied decision to evacuate Norway. Despite localised success in Narvik, the Allied Norwegian expedition had been chaotic, with little coordination between it and Norwegian forces, for whom they mistakenly had little regard. With little choice, the Norwegian government bowed to the inevitable and capitulated on 12 June, by which time disaster had also overtaken Allied forces in mainland Europe. Deininger and his men arrived in Oslo to rejoin the remainder of the North Platoon on 19 June. Kewisch’s small force had lost two men killed and another severely wounded during the fighting in Norway. Generaloberst von Falkenhorst went as far as to issue a letter to the ‘Carolus’ men from Trondheim on 12 June, praising their ‘dedication, their courage and their good achievements’. From Oslo, the Brandenburgers travelled back to their German headquarters while other units of the battalion had already entered combat in the west.

  ‘Case Yellow’ – the Invasion of the Low Countries and France

  It is almost surprising that ‘Case Yellow’ succeeded as well as it did. There had been enough security breaches in the Wehrmacht to completely reveal German intentions, let alone the fact that German military forces visibly massed along the Dutch and Belgian borders, while the Luftwaffe mounted an increasing tempo of reconnaissance flights along the entire frontier.3 Ironically, the Dutch still failed to fully grasp the scale of the impending attack despite specific information having been passed to the Dutch military attaché in Berlin, Major Gijsbertus J. Sas. In direct language, the scope of Hitler’s plans in western Europe were provided by none other than the Abwehr’s Oberst Hans Oster. Oster felt that if ‘Case Yellow’ met with disaster for Germany then the commanders of the Wehrmacht as well as the German population would rise up against the Nazis and expel them from power. A new government could then negotiate peace with the Allies. Though there is no evidence to prove Canaris was connected to this, there is equally nothing to prove that he was not. It is known that a visit to the Polish battlefield had left him, as German diplomat Ulrich von Hassell remembered, ‘completely broken after he had seen the results of our brutal conduct of the war’.4 Furthermore, despite Canaris’ best efforts and instructions, the Geheime Feldpolizei (GFP – Secret Field Police), under Abwehr command, had been frequently compelled to work alongside the SD in the rounding up of Polish intellectuals for execution. Treason appeared the only resource available to derail Hitler’s war of conquest.

  The Dutch also benefitted from observing the modus operandi of the Wehrmacht in Scandinavia, noting the effectiveness of parachute landings and sabotage work undertaken by the so-called ‘fifth column’ as well as an apparent disdain for declared neutrality. Martial law was expanded in the provinces of The Netherlands which culminated in the 19 April declaration by the Dutch government that The Netherlands were officially in a state of siege. On 9 May Sas sent a final message from Berlin to The Hague: ‘Tomorrow at dawn. Hold tight.’5 That same evening the Brandenburgers began to move, their part in the invasion codenamed Operation ‘Morgenrot’.

  In the south, Leutnant Kürschner’s West Platoon moved forward from their base at Erkelenz to Millen on the Dutch–German border during the night of 9 May. A small battalion command post had been established under the control of Oberfeldwebel Töpelmann – formerly of the 115th Infantry Regiment, the ‘oldest regiment in Christendom’ – which would accompany the strike force over the border. There they would halt while the remainder forged onward to their targets; four constituent groups, each with a bridge over the Juliana Canal to take. Reconnaissance had shown that hastily improvised demolition charges for all four bridges were triggered by fuses located along the spans themselves, rather than in cover on the eastern bank. The Brandenburgers would use this vulnerability to their advantage, having only to reach the centre of each bridge to control the firing mechanism.

  After donning a Volltarnung disguise of complete Dutch uniforms over their Wehrmacht ones, the West Platoon men prepared to cross the frontier on foot at about 0130hrs, each carrying a black Dutch bicycle. Guided by a local sympathiser, their route took them over the narrow Geleenbeek River by flimsy footbridge and through countryside between the conurbations of Oberhoven and Nieuwstadt until they reached an orchard that had been designated the point of dispersion for the four combat groups. Setting off at intervals of five to ten minutes, the groups made good time towards their allotted targets, each man riding with main weapon slung and pockets filled with pistols and grenades.

  Kürschner led the attack on the bridge at Berg himself, riding his bicycle between two concrete sewer sections placed upright and filled with sand that provided an improvised anti-tank obstacle. Dismounting, Kürschner approached a group of Dutch soldiers gathered in the middle of the bridge who immediately began nervously backing away from their unexpected visitors. Using his command of the Dutch language, Kürschner called out, ‘Halt! Where is the commander of the guard?’ This commanding gambit gave him valuable seconds of uncertainty during which time he and his men had reached the Dutch soldiers. ‘Boys, put down your weapons’, Kürschner quietly ordered them and the guards were swiftly disarmed. A single man made a sudden dash for the demolition controls at the bridge railing and was shot in the leg by Unteroffizier Bergner with his pistol. The remainder implored the Germans not to shoot and Kürschner swiftly cut the wires leading to the ignition panel as his men began to remove the inert TNT charges. A sudden burst of Dutch machine-gun fire laced through the darkness, aimed at both the German troops and the explosives in an attempt to blow the bridge. Kürschner was hit in both thighs and the right foot and as Gefreiter Frey dragged the wounded officer to shelter, he too was hit as the final bundle of TNT was removed and thrown into the river. The first bridge was in German hands and above them Luftwaffe aircraft began passing overhead to targets inland. The two wounded Brandenburg men were later taken to hospital in Sittard for medical treatment.

  Unteroffizier Klein led the attack on the Stein bridge while Unteroffizier Klausmeier handled that at Urmond. Both were taken rapidly with minimal fighting and the explosive charges swiftly defused and removed. To the north, the strongest resistance was encountered by Unteroffizier Landvogt at the Obbicht bridge. There too, the Dutch had upended concrete sewer pipe sections and fille
d them with sand, Landvogt and his men passing between them in Dutch Gendarme uniforms before being challenged by sentries. The Dutch guard commander, a young Reserve Lieutenant, approached the group and requested identification, whereupon he received the reply: ‘Hände hoch!’ Shouting for his men to open fire, the Dutch officer, Lieutenant Hendrik Gerrit Nijland, was the first to be fatally shot, Corporal Mindert Epema also being hit while attempting to reach the fuses, though the fierce defensive fire also forced the German attackers back and into cover.

  The small Brandenburg unit was pinned down by machine-gun fire from a bunker on the east bank as they removed their Dutch disguises and returned fire, identifying the demolition fuse’s ignition point midway across the bridge. Landvogt kept Dutch troops away from it with accurate submachine-gun fire until advance troops from the 7th Infantry Division brought up a 37mm PaK and silenced the Dutch machine gun, allowing Landvogt to race onto the bridge and remove the charges.

  The West Platoon had successfully taken each objective, suffering two seriously wounded men and twelve lightly injured during the process. In return they had captured 175 Dutch prisoners, including five officers. While the men of the West Platoon returned to Erkelenz, the 7th Infantry Division raced west through Dutch territory into Belgium.

  Immediately north of West Platoon’s zone, Leutnant Grabert’s 2nd Platoon encountered significant obstacles during their missions. Like Kürschner’s men they had donned disguises that ranged from full Dutch uniforms, the Halbtarnung of greatcoats and helmets (sometimes Abwehr-created copies of greatcoats with paper-mâché helmets only good enough to be convincing in darkness) to civilian metalworkers’ clothes. Their most southerly target was the bridge at Masseik that crossed the Maas River at a point at which the river delineated The Netherlands from Belgium (in which country the river is named the ‘Meuse’). First the Juliana Canal needed to be crossed via the concrete sluice bridge near Roosteren, unable to be rigged for demolition due to its composition and important sluice function. Likewise, the bridge over the canal just over 5km to the south at Born which would be taken later by an advanced unit of 82nd Infantry Regiment despite strong Dutch resistance that inflicted casualties.

  Grabert’s men approached the Roosteren bridge disguised as Dutch Gendarmes, the defending troops totalling approximately forty men distributed between three bunkers plus a 57mm light infantry gun. The Germans passed by one squad of infantry despite using a password that was twenty-four hours old before being halted at the eastern end of the bridge by a Dutch police corporal. The commander of the watch was summoned as Corporal Van der Velde had detected distinct anomalies with the newcomers’ uniforms. As he attempted to interrogate the disguised Germans, a chaotic firefight erupted after the arriving Dutch Reserve Captain, Petrus Maria Braun, was shot and killed at point-blank range. The defenders abandoned their position with several others killed and the bridge taken while the Brandenburgers hurried on, led by Grabert himself. However, their next target would not fall so easily. Though they managed to bluff their way close enough to the Dutch guards on the eastern end of the Masseik bridge, they were stopped by the Belgians that held the western end.

  At 4.00am a young officer, Lieutenant Fernand de Vinck, who oversaw watching the large bridge over the river Meuse or Maas between Belgium and Holland and Germany a few miles away. Fernand rang my father: ‘Major: I can detect some Grey or Green uniforms on the bridge, what must I do?’ (half of the bridge was Belgian and the other half Dutch). ‘Hold on,’ answered my father, ‘I am coming.’ Imagine blowing the bridge up with Dutch soldiers on it! What a diplomatic incident!! As my father arrived and approached the bridge, the Germans fired at his car and he received two bullets; one in the shoulder and the other deeply into the groin. Of course, the young Lieutenant knew they had to be Germans and immediately blew the bridge up. Later, we heard through the Belgian military attaché in Berlin what the papers said, ‘Those ghastly Belgians waited until we had 300 soldiers on the bridge to blow it up …’ the true story tells you another side …6

  Grabert’s men had been reinforced by members of the Aufklärungs Abteilung 31 (31st Infantry Division’s Reconnaissance Battalion) and the blast killed three German engineers and an infantryman who had rushed onto the bridge to defuse the explosives.

  Three kilometres to the south, another of Grabert’s detachments approached the bridge over the Juliana Canal near the hamlet of Illikhoven, lightly defended by only thirty-five men stretched along a front of 2km in three small bunkers. The Brandenburgers were disguised as Dutch bicycle troops, but the care and attention to their disguise had been incomplete and suspicious Dutch troops spotted ‘irregularities’ with the cyclists and quickly opened fire. The Germans immediately took cover and removed their disguises to return fire but within seconds the bridge was demolished before their eyes. Wehrmacht troops of the 31st Infantry Division would later pound the defenders and their bunkers to rubble with 88mm guns and force a river crossing at 0900hrs.

  A further passage over the Juliana Canal was to be taken by a small five-man group under the command of Unteroffizier Hegel, but they were thwarted by alert defenders who also quickly penetrated their disguise. Pinned down and soon encircled, Hegel and his men surrendered. As they were led across the bridge towards the Dutch rear, Hegel pulled out a concealed stick grenade and threw it. Dutch and Germans alike dived to the ground, the Brandenburgers recovering first and escaping to recover their discarded weapons and resume the fight. This time they swiftly gained the upper hand in close combat, subduing the defenders and able to defuse the demolition charges before they were detonated. The grenade blast severely wounded Hegel, and the remaining Brandenburgers held the bridge against some half-hearted counter-attacks until relieved by approaching German armour that fortunately arrived as the Brandenburgers fired the last of their ammunition. Hegel was taken to hospital shortly afterwards. It was a rare success for 2nd Platoon.

  The Maas crossings at Roermond were of crucial importance to the planned advance of the 19th Infantry Division and two vital bridges were assigned to Grabert’s platoon. The first was a large road bridge in the outskirts of the city itself that was to be taken by eleven men under the command of Feldwebel Weber and led by a guide from the borderland, all disguised in Dutch military uniforms though carrying German weapons. The second was nearly 2km north; a railway bridge at Buggenum that was targeted by six Brandenburgers dressed as metal workers led by Unteroffizier Hilmer. Behind the German border an armoured train armed with light weapons (Eisenbahn Panzerzug No. 5) was scheduled to leave immediately the bridge was taken, followed by a troop train holding the 2nd Battalion, 59th Regiment that was waiting to cross the Buggenum bridge and breach the Peel–Raam defensive line of at Weert. The armoured trains used in ‘Case Yellow’ were National Railroad locomotives, painted field grey with white aircraft identification. They sported an open carriage each with two 60cm side boards separated by a 35cm sand-filled gap designed to act as gunfire and splinter protection. Each carriage mounted a MG34 medium machine gun on a tripod and carried armed infantry; 130 men aboard in total with between six and ten heavy machine guns and four MG34 twin mounts. In front of the train an empty wagon acted as a mine-destruction device.

  The advance to the Roermond road bridge took the disguised Germans through the town itself before a Dutch patrol stopped them only a few hundred metres from their target. Weber watched as their guide, dressed as an army lieutenant, presented forged Abwehr papers for inspection by the Dutch patrol leader. However, what the Abwehr had failed to realise was that the guard detachment that held Roermond’s bridges had been stationed in the town for nearly two years and therefore any strange troops were automatically suspect. Their opposite numbers remained unconvinced and Weber decided to seize the initiative and order the startled patrol to surrender at the top of his voice. However, their reflexes were as good as the Germans’ and they scattered in seconds, Weber and his men taking cover while discarding their disguises. Before any shots had been
fired, the bridge exploded at 0355hrs; the exact moment set for the main invasion force to begin crossing the border. Though they subsequently escaped capture, Weber’s men had failed completely.

  At the Buggenum railway bridge, Dutch police stood guard before an iron gate that was always closed and locked during the hours of darkness when there was no scheduled railway traffic. Such crossings this close to the German border had been so secured since the announcement of national siege conditions in The Netherlands. An extra iron barrier blocked the track on the eastern bank while the western bank also boasted an equivalent iron gate, covered by two 50mm artillery pieces and a heavy machine gun in thick riverside bunkers.

  At 0300hrs nearby troops notified the guards of the presence of an unidentified group of six men coming on foot down the railway line from Leeuwen. Gunfire from Roermond had already raised the Dutch alert level and once Hilmer’s disguised Brandenburgers reached the eastern checkpoint they were stopped by four guards who almost immediately requested an infantry squad to arrest the Germans. At that moment, the Brandenburgers opened fire, hitting Corporal Petrus Dirk Touw in the face and killing him instantly as well as severely wounding Police Sergeant de Vries. As the remaining lightly injured corporals dragged de Vries towards the western bank, the Germans pursued them closely in their bid to reach the demolition fuses, but to no avail as the defending troops detonated explosives that destroyed the bridge, killing three of the attackers and severely injuring the remainder.7

 

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